Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces
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these services deal differently with leadership issues. How does the recent FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, play into the debate? Space that might usefully have been allocated to these questions is instead devoted to historical case-studies, which, for their richness, do little to justify the categoricalness of the ten leadership attributes listed in the introduction.

Moyar's book might have been narrower, focusing on the development and shared characteristics of counterinsurgency commanders, both American and foreign. Such a focus would have greatly added to the literature, without necessitating the bold claims of newness that accompany the elaboration of "leader-centric" warfare. Yet Moyar does not seek to add to the literature but to displace it. He effectively challenges the emphasis in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, on "social and economic programs" as "counterinsurgency tools" (p. 283). Too often, however, the critique disappoints, as it misconstrues current doctrine. Moyar claims that FM 3-24 sees security forces being used "only to protect the population from exploitation" (p. 3), when it really envisages a full range of military and civilian tasks. He claims that "recent theorists" believe that "counterinsurgents should use as little force as possible" (p. 2), when the language in FM 3-24 and elsewhere consistently stresses employing appropriate levels of force. Moyar finally plucks one sentence from FM 3-24's appendix regarding outreach to women, and uses it to deride the manual's softness and naïve devotion to do-goodism. In the same spirit, he presents a thinly veiled and inadequately defended faith in the use of overwhelming force, approvingly citing one commander's advice that "the more violent you seem and the more scared they [the population] are, the more they cooperate" (p. 245). In absence of greater elaboration, this challenge to the extant "consensus," such as it is, is a step backward rather than forward. In fact, Moyar's "leader-centric" approach to counterinsurgency can readily justify a return to an "enemy-centric" paradigm rather than create a new one.

Moyar provides a useful illustration of the challenges of leadership and of developing leaders for counterinsurgency. Its historical analysis is valuable, though occasionally slanted; the author's phrasing when he tells us he is out "to find supporting evidence from a wide range of cases" may be unintentionally revealing (p. 3). As an exposition of new counterinsurgency theory, or as a defense of a "leader-centric" paradigm, *A Question of Command* is unconvincing, falling somewhere between historical analysis and theoretical deliberation.

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Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces. Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-19-534204-8. Tables. Figure. Notes. Index. Pp. xii, 227. $24.95.

This is a collection of case studies on counterinsurgency at sacred sites in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. These include: 1) the Israeli siege of

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the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem after it was occupied by Palestinian militants in 2002; 2) India's operations against Sikh insurgents at the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984 and 1988; 3) two Indian operations during the Kashmir insurgency, one against local insurgents at the Hazratbal Mosque in Srinagar in 1993, and the other against Pakistani insurgents who occupied the remote Charar-e Sharief Shrine in 1995; 4) Pakistan's operations against Islamists who had taken control of Islamabad's Red Mosque in 2007; 5) Saudi Arabia's operation against a millenarian group at the Mecca Grand Mosque in 1979; 6) two U.S. military operations against the followers of Moqtada al-Sadar in Najaf in 2004; and 7) the Thai operation at the Krue Se Mosque against separatist insurgents in southern Thailand in 2004.

Counterinsurgency is inherently more difficult at sacred sites than at secular ones, but this topic is largely neglected in U.S. doctrine and in academic studies. The degree of a site's sacredness determines the ramifications of operations: sites where revelations occurred are of primary sacredness; sites containing an important relic or tomb are secondary; and local places of worship are tertiary. Insurgents use sacred sites because they are usually defendable and their locations in populated areas facilitate logistics. Insurgents can use worshippers as decoys or hostages, and the rules of access favor the insurgents if they are religiously affiliated with worshipers. Rules of sanctuary can protect insurgents, who can also claim that they are defending the site or the religious faith.

Counterinsurgency forces must recognize that a religious element is present which can affect the community of believers at the national and international levels. Operations must be executed without violating a site's sanctity or causing damage, which could alienate the faith's believers and strengthen the insurgent cause. Counterinsurgency forces must use restraint or attempt to mitigate the use of force through means such as employing the media to demonstrate that it was the insurgents who have violated the site. Regardless, the response from the audience will always be in proportion to the site's sacredness, but even at tertiary sites, the response will be greater than at secular sites.

The case studies highlight what contributed to failure or success and demonstrate that an operation can be a tactical success but ultimately contribute to strengthening an insurgency due to the methods employed. Military planners must have an understanding of local customs and beliefs and try to elicit the support of the local community through restraint on the use of force and consultation with local religious leaders. Force should only be used after negotiations have failed —negotiation will usually result in a positive public perception. An initial direct approach will usually result in failure, not always at the tactical level, but at the strategic level due to negative perceptions created by the operation.

I recommend this book. The value of using local forces such as the police, who are aware of the local customs and religion, is stressed, although local forces can be sympathetic towards the insurgents, in which case the military must be used. A media blackout is never useful and allows an insurgency to create its own narrative about what occurred.

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An important point not addressed is that in some circumstances, an entire nation can be considered a sacred site, such as when Muslim insurgents are resisting a foreign, non-Muslim occupation, as in the case of Iraq today. Islamic clerics have long stated it is a religious duty for Muslims to resist non-Muslim occupations.

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The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo's First 100 Days. By Karen Greenberg. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-537188-8. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi, 260. $27.95.

When U.S. armed forces engage in warfare against international terrorists, what is the objective of indefinite incarceration of enemy combatants? Is it detention or interrogation, or both? If the primary goal is to obtain actionable intelligence in order to prevent future terrorist incidents, is psychological and/or physical torture the best method of prying information out of these prisoners? If not, what is to be gained by such methods except certain international opprobrium and condemnation? These are key questions that are implicit in, but neither raised nor addressed in Karen Greenberg's incisive and well-documented narrative *Guantanamo: The Least Worst Place.*

The book takes its title from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's announcement on December 27, 2001 that the Pentagon would move terrorist detainees from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba, which he described as "the least worst place we could have selected." In an ironic way, Greenberg documents that for the first 100 days in its new role as the world's best known detention center, Guantanamo probably was the least worst place, at least so long as Brigadier General Michael Lehnert was in charge of this new command, known as Joint Task Force (JTF) 160. Greenberg characterizes Lehnert as a tough Marine, morally committed to treating all enemy prisoners in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions that mandate basic standards of humane treatment. When the detainees initiated a hunger strike after a guard kicked a copy of the Koran, Lehnert responded by sitting bare-headed on the ground outside the wire-mesh cells and, when his apology proved unconvincing, he began to cry, "the unmistakable flow of tears cascading down his face."

Respect for prisoners' basic rights, however, quickly evaporated after Secretary Rumsfeld appointed the ambitious army reservist and former interrogator Major General Michael Dunlavey to head a second command, JTF 170, to be concerned solely with interrogation. According to Greenberg's account, Dunlavey could easily bypass the normal chain of command. When someone suggested that Dunlavey should report to SOUTHCOM, Rumsfeld blurted out, "I don't care who he is under, he works for me." Later, Dunlavey reportedly claimed his orders came from even higher authority: "I got my marching orders from the President of the United States."

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