The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps

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ABSTRACT The Pakistan Army elicits many concerns about terrorism, nuclear and the coherence of the state. However, very little is actually known about this institution. This article mobilizes unique data to address one important facet: the Army’s geographical recruitment base. We find that the Pakistan Army has been successful at expanding the geographical recruitment base while some groups (namely those who are native to Sindh) remain highly under-represented. We also find that the officer corps is increasingly coming from urban areas. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these important shifts subject to the limitations of our data.

KEY WORDS: Pakistan Army, Changing Demographics, Pakistan Army Recruitment

The Pakistan Army has governed Pakistan directly through military rule for more than half of Pakistan’s history since it became independent in 1947. The Army has governed indirectly for the remainder by manipulating and undermining civilian political parties and other institutions and through pro-active manipulations of domestic political developments. The Army has long justified its preeminent role in the state by arguing that it alone is the sole institution capable of protecting Pakistan against external threats posed by India and against internal threats posed by centripetal ethnic fissures and sectarian conflict. With the exception of notable and extraordinary periods in Pakistan’s history, Pakistanis accept this role and hold the Army in high esteem.¹

¹Following the 1971 war when the Pakistan Army lost Bangladesh, antipathy towards the Army was prevalent. In 2007, Pakistani regard for the Army again plummeted owing to President Pervez Musharraf’s unpopular policies, including alignment with the US-led global war on terror, the military operations against domestic militants, and...
Yet the Pakistan Army discomfits many analysts and policymakers outside of Pakistan for several inter-related reasons, some of which have little empirical basis but persist nonetheless. First, the Pakistan Army is assumed to be the custodian of the country’s nuclear weapons program with a demonstrable nuclear proliferation track record. However, the National Command Authority is actually charged with this task. The notorious activities of A.Q. Khan since the 1970s underscore Pakistan’s intent to engage in subterfuge to acquire strategic capabilities. Pakistan’s relationships with Iran, China and North Korea have been characterized by extensive nuclear and/or missile technology proliferation with presumed army sanction. Second, along with the intelligence agency it oversees – the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) – it has raised, nurtured and employed Islamist militants to secure its interests vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan since 1947 and 1960 respectively, with varying intensity. Third, the Pakistan Army plays a pivotal – but controversial and highly criticized – role in the US-led efforts to contend with the threats posed by Al-Qa’eda and the Afghan Taliban.


Command and control has been formalized through the creation of the National Command Authority (NCA) in 2000. NCA is the country’s topmost decisionmaking body on issues pertaining to Pakistani nuclear affairs, including nuclear use. Its ten-member body is headed by the country’s president and also includes the prime minister and army chief of staff. However, the army-dominated Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) is responsible for oversight of the nuclear weapons program. SPD is currently headed by a retired army lieutenant general. It acts as the secretariat of NCA and has the responsibility for the implementation of policies and measures relating to the nuclear arsenal. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment (London: IISS 2007).

Fourth, in recent years, the Pakistan state has come under direct attack from domestic militants operating under the moniker ‘Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan’ (aka ‘The Pakistani Taliban’ (TTP)). Elements of the TTP have attacked military, paramilitary, police and other governance targets; perpetrated a suicide bombing campaign against government entities and citizens alike; and seized pockets of territory in the Pashtun belt and set up parallel structures of government. These events have precipitated further concerns, with varying degrees of validity, about the stability of the state and its strategic assets. These concerns have been mitigated in some measure by the Army’s redoubled military efforts in 2009 to regain lost territory. However, the international community is not confident that the Army will succeed against the TTP much less commit to tackling the Afghan Taliban or other militant groups that have been affiliated with Pakistani intelligence in the past.

These facts motivate many apprehensions about the Pakistan Army. Some analysts and policymakers have speculated that the Army may split, imperiling the territorial integrity of the state as well as the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Variants of this uneasiness involve the Army cleaving with Islamist radicals and forming a dangerous rump that supports Islamist terrorists and may provide nuclear weapons or technology to terrorists. More plausibly, the Pakistan Army, given its long association with militant proxies, may be unwilling to act against militant groups comprehensively. This concern remains even though the Army has taken on those particular militant groups that have attacked the Pakistani state. Speculation about the impact of the Army’s sustained internal security operations upon the morale and discipline of the Army are cause for further unease.

The Army is also believed to be at the bottom of significant internal discord. Speculation is rife that the Army is Punjabi dominated and seeks to protect Punjabi ethnic equities. The presumed ethnic imbalance is posited as a source of ethnic strife in Pakistan.

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Unfortunately, there are few sources of empirical data about the Pakistan Army despite these varied concerns about the Army and its role in Pakistan’s security and that of the region. This essay, employing unique and difficult to obtain district-level officer recruitment data from 1971 to 2005, explores an important aspect of the institution: its geographical representativeness over time. These data and this analysis cannot answer the most pressing questions about this institution. While these data may be the best available, they are far from ideal. These data are district level; not officer level. Therefore we can only describe changes in the districts that produce officers over time. We cannot infer anything about the characteristics of the officers themselves. Despite these debilitating data limitations, this analysis empirically documents important changes in the recruitment base of the institution and lays out some implications that may stem from these changes.

The next section of this article lays out important methodological notes and describes data limitations and analytical caveats. The third section provides a description of the recruitment process because this essay is fundamentally about officer recruitment. Because the current composition of the Pakistan Army derives from past recruitment practices, we discuss the historical lineaments of Pakistan Army recruitment and their enduring impacts upon current army composition in the fourth section. This section also describes past and current army efforts to reshape its composition. As will be evident in this section, the Army’s composition is not driven by a predatory Punjabi drive to dominate the country. The penultimate section presents the results of our data analyses which demonstrate considerable change in the geographic representation in the Pakistan Army. This article concludes by discussing the implications of the changes we have observed, subject to the limitations of our data.

Data, Data Handling, and Analytical Caveats

Shuja Nawaz acquired these data in hard copy, in spreadsheet form from the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi as part of a historical account of the Pakistan Army. A critical – but untestable – assumption is that these data reflect the Army’s efforts to collect and present authentic data. This spreadsheet enumerates the annual number of officers recruited from specific districts between 1970 and 2005.

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9 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within (Oxford: OUP 2008).
10 Districts are the third layer of administration in Pakistan. The most central level is the federal government, followed by provincial and finally district governments.
A fundamental *but untestable* assumption undergirding this study is that the data are genuine and reflect actual army records. The team cannot independently verify the authenticity of the data. However, general features of the data do accord with the general literature on the Pakistan Army. Specific data integrity problems are addressed where appropriate herein.

Because the Pakistan Army data occasionally contained non-standard district identification, misidentified provinces for a small number of districts and because districts have changed over time due to reorganization and population growth, the project team devised a series of rules to clean and reorganize the data to ensure maximum accuracy and comparability across time and across geographical areas.

This reorganization allowed us to merge the recruiting data with GIS (Geographic Information System) codes for the boundaries of Pakistan’s districts. (This file detailing GIS district boundaries is referred to as a ‘shape file’. This file is from Princeton University’s data library and dates to 1995.) Using this shape file, we depicted shares of recruitment outcomes cartographically.

Finally, because the Army provided numbers of officers recruited from particular districts per year and because the total number of officers recruited each year varied, we converted district figures to ‘market shares’. (We use this terminology because recruitment is a market and we want to know the overall share of district recruitment as relative to the overall number of annual recruits.) The share of any given district is defined by dividing the number of recruits for any given district by the total number of recruits for the year. (Figures 1 through 4 show the cartographic depiction of shares by district for 1974, 1984, 1994 and 2005.)

Because we have district-level, not officer-level data, we can only characterize the districts’ characteristics and not those of the officers. It cannot be facilely assumed that any given officer has the same characteristics of his (or less likely her) district because the Army engages in a selection process and because officers with a propensity for military

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11 Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*.
12 Two persons independently entered the data into Excel spreadsheets. The team’s quantitative analyst converted these two spreadsheets into Stata (a statistical program) and electronically compared the two independently entered datasets for officer recruitment data. This allowed us to identify and correct data entry errors in the spreadsheets to render them identical to each other and to the hard copy originals. The raw data contained many errors in spelling, districts were sometimes put under incorrect provinces, or (rarely) the Pakistan Army used a geographical area that we could not identify in any census or district report. The raw data file only corrects spelling.
13 For more information about data handling and data cleaning, please contact the authors.
service may differ in fundamental ways from other residents of the district. This is an ‘ecological fallacy’ problem that inheres in such a study of characteristics of geographical areas of recruitment instead of individual characteristics. While officer-level data is ideal for understanding changes in the officer corps, in reality such data are unlikely to ever be available to researchers inside or outside Pakistan. Thus these data are likely to be the best data that exist on the recruitment base of the Army. Finally, because we only have annual intake data, we can only describe changes in the yearly intake of officers, not the composition of the entire army.

Overview of Army Recruitment Practices

Since this essay examines historical district-level data on officer intake into the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul (north of Abbottabad in NW Frontier Province, NWFP\(^1\)) some description of both the PMA and the recruitment process is appropriate.

Admission to the PMA is very competitive: there are roughly 3,000 applicants nationwide for the roughly 320 cadet places in each regular long course in the PMA.\(^2\) Normally the PMA conducts two long courses each year. One cohort is inducted in the spring and another in

\(^{1}\)NWFP is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). NWFP will be retained in this article as this name was in use during the period covered by the data and our study.

the fall. The PMA normally has five courses running simultaneously with the regular, two-year course being the longest. After completing the two-year long course the officer cadets are commissioned with the rank of second lieutenant and are assigned to a particular arm of service and a regiment or battalion.

To qualify, candidates must be single and hold at least an intermediate degree (i.e., 12 years of schooling) and be between 17 and 22 years of age. Candidates with a bachelor degree (aka ‘graduates’ as they are known in Pakistan) must be between 17 and 23 years of age. Serving armed or civilian armed forces personnel are also considered provided that they are between 17 and 23 years of age. Recruits must obtain a score of at least 50 percent in their matriculation (10th grade) or a Faculty of Arts degree (FA) or Faculty of Sciences degree (FSc) (12th grade) exams. The initial testing and screening occurs at eight regional selection and recruitment centers at: Peshawar (NWFP); Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan (Punjab); Hyderabad, Karachi (Sindh); Quetta (Baluchistan), and Gilgit (Northern Areas). Eligible candidates next take an ‘intelligence’ exam. Candidates must score at least 50 percent in initial testing. (For persons from Sindh and Baluchistan, candidates must achieve a score of 45 percent as described below). Successful candidates are next subjected to physical and medical tests and a preliminary interview at the recruitment centers.

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16 The graduate course and the technical graduate courses (for signals and engineering services) run one year. The integrated courses (for doctors and specialized master’s degree holders) and the women’s courses run only six months. Officers commissioned from the integrated course are inducted directly as captains in the Pakistan Army.

17 Except serving Junior Commissioned Officers (i.e. warrant officers) of the armed forces, who may be married.

18 Pakistan Army, ‘Regular Commission in Pakistan Army’, <www.joinpakarmy.gov.pk/intr-procedure-for-comission.php>. There was also a (now defunct) Junior Cadet Course (JCC) co-located with the PMA and was designed to be a feeder school for the PMA, providing military instruction in addition to other subjects. The JCC began in 1976 and was shut down in 1988. The aim was to compensate for the lack of high quality candidates by preparing JCC entrants through intensive coaching.

19 One enters an FA (or FSc) program after the 10th grade. It is a two-year program equivalent to the 11th and 12th grades. (In the United States this would be a high school diploma). After satisfactorily completing the 12th grade, students take a standardized test in their academic subjects. Upon passing these examinations, students are awarded a Higher Secondary (School) Certificate (or HSC), also known as an FA or FSc, depending on their major. This is also known as an ‘intermediate’ degree.

Candidates who are selected from this interview process proceed to the Inter-Services/General Headquarters Selection and Review Board (ISSB) in Kohat (south of Peshawar) or its ancillary centers in Gujranwala, Malir, or Quetta. Here candidates undergo four days of observation and testing to assess their intelligence, psychological profile, leadership potential, and physical fitness. After the four-day testing program at the ISSB, successful candidates are recommended for the PMA, according to requirements issued by the Army General Headquarters and derived from regimental reports on shortfalls.

Officer candidates generally are selected for the PMA based upon on merit, although the Army occasionally has relaxed standards to increase recruitment among under-represented ethnic groups, as described below. Those candidates who are selected for continued processing following the written exam are called for a preliminary physical examination, which is conducted at recruitment centers established throughout Pakistan. Candidates are declared physically fit by a board of officers headed by a Brigadier.21

In effort to attract more officers from Sindh and Baluchistan, the Pakistan Army relaxed the academic and testing requirements for recruitment in the early 1990s. The Army leadership sought to increase the number of Baluchi and Sindhi officers despite their lesser qualifications rather than offer remediation to increase their qualifications. (This may have the unfortunate affect of increasing such officers’ attrition if they are relatively less qualified than others when they are up for promotion.) The Army has episodically decreased the testing requirements for applicants from Sindh and Baluchistan, who needed a 33 percent (that is just passing) in their exams. (These minimum levels were raised later as discussed below.) During the 1980s, in effort to induct Sindhi and Baluchi recruits more quickly into the PMA and then the Army, the Army allowed the Sindhi and Baluchi recruits to study an abbreviated course at the now defunct Junior Cadet Course after which they could go to the PMA. Sindhi and Baluchi applicants to the infantry enjoyed even further relaxed grading standards with respect to their FA/FSc exams relative to other candidates.22

Moreover, Sindhi and Baluchi candidates recommended by the Inter-Services Selections Board were selected into the PMA irrespective of their rank on the ‘merit list’. The merit list ranks applicants on the basis

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22The percentage scores of candidates in their Intermediate (12 year) examinations are placed into grade levels A, B, C, etc. B is the standard minimum grade level, except for areas that are being favored by an affirmative action policy. Candidates from the favored areas may be admitted with C grades.
of their cumulative test scores. If the PMA required 300 persons for a
given class, they would typically take the top 300 persons in rank order.
However, for Sindhis and Baluchis this was relaxed. If a Baluchi or
Sindhi recruit were to be ranked at 320, for example, they would be
given preference to someone else who is ranked higher on that list. Thus
Baluchi and Sindhi recruits were favored in two ways: first their
threshold scores for passing was lower than for others and second they
need not be placed as highly on the merit list due to a quasi-quota
system that is in effect for selection.23

Subsequently, the educational scoring standards were raised
although the authors could not obtain the exact year when this
occurred. Now, candidates resident in Baluchistan, the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the districts of Kohistan, Chitral,
and Dir, and Tehsil (sub-district) Balakot of Mansehra in NWFP,
Tharparkar and Tehsil Umerkot of Sindh, Rajanpur, Cholistan, Desert
Derawer Fort (also in Cholistan), Salamsar, Mojgarh, Dingarh of
Punjab, and the Northern Areas can be admitted for preliminary testing
with a score of 45 percent in their intermediate examinations in
contrast to 50 percent required for all others.

Ethnicity and Pakistan Army: The Weight of History

As is well known, the Army sustains criticism about its over
representation of Punjabis and, to some extent, Pashtuns. While this
ethnic distribution reflects in part the population composition of
Pakistan, it also is a legacy of colonial recruitment practices inherited
by Pakistan. These practices endure despite the Army’s varied efforts
since 1947 to move away from those traditions.

One of the important concepts that continue to influence army
recruitment is the problematic notion of ‘martial races.’24 The so-called
martial races included Punjabis (from contemporary East and West
Punjab, comprised of Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims), Pashtuns (from the
NWFP and the tribal areas) as well as the Gurkhas of Nepal. In
contrast, the British considered South Indians and Bengalis to be ‘non-
martial’ and sought to exclude them from military service. Because the
British were motivated by a desire to build an effective military to
protect their interests throughout the Empire rather than to develop an
ethnically representative institution, they encouraged recruitment of

23Information provided to S. Nawaz from Army General Headquarters.
in D. Marston and C. Sundaram (eds), A Military History of India and South Asia
(Bloomington: Indiana UP 2008), 34–52.
those martial races and discouraged the induction of non-martial races.25

Apart from their beliefs about martial races, the British sought to increase recruitment from the NWFP in particular for geo-strategic reasons. The NWFP was the outer ring separating the British colonial sphere of influence from that of Russia. Afghanistan, per agreement between the two imperial powers, was the formal buffer between the two. They negotiated the northern and eastern boundaries of the Afghan state to ensure that the empires of Russia and Britain did not share a border. For this reason, Afghanistan was forced to accept the oddly shaped Wakhan corridor which provided a narrow band of territory between the two empires. Both reasoned that the likelihood of dispute would be minimized if they shared no border.26

As a result of these demand-side considerations, the British-Indian Army predominantly drew personnel from the northern part of the empire and Nepal.27 However, the composition of the Army was also shaped by several important supply-side considerations stemming from the socio-economic standing and preferences of potential recruits. The Punjab peasantry was facing difficult economic times when the British entered the region. Army service afforded those peasants opportunities to augment family income and insulate them from the vicissitudes of agricultural dependence. Many of these recruits came from the Salt Range (Potwar, also spelled Potohar) regions of northern Punjab (e.g., districts of Jhelum, Rawalpindi, and Attock—formerly Campbellpur) as well the areas adjoining the NWFP.28 The British encouraged peasant interest in the armed forces by granting agricultural land as a reward for military service.29


27Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan.

28Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan.

29In addition, in 1885, the British-Indian government began developing an important network of canals to irrigate the Punjab, which made those lands even more productive and thus attractive as allurements into army service. The British allotted these lands in reward for service to the Raj, especially to ex-servicemen (both officers and ranks). The net impact of these policies made the Army an extremely lucrative profession for
The British resolved that by the time India and Pakistan became independent states on 15 and 14 August 1947 respectively, they would have operational control of their own independent armed forces and the colonial government formed a committee to execute this complicated task. While British and Indian stakeholders hotly debated the process of dividing the armed forces, in the end, religion and territory guided the division of personnel. While most men in service could elect to join either the Indian or Pakistani military, there were important exceptions. A Muslim from the area that went to Pakistan could not opt for India and a non-Muslim in the territory that became India could not opt for Pakistan. There was no restriction for Muslims in India to join Pakistan or for a non-Muslim in Pakistan to opt for India. While few non-Muslims opted to stay in Pakistan and comparatively more Muslims chose to stay in India, the communal violence that marked partition compelled some to seek permission to reverse their decisions.

By 15 August 1947 the future disposition of the various units had been assigned, with the exception of those troops that were either abroad at the time of partition or those that were engaged in the Punjab Boundary Force, both of which were divided later. The ratio for division was 64:36 for India and Pakistan, excluding the Gurkha troops, which were divided between India and Britain. This was roughly the communal balance of Hindus and Muslims in undivided India.

As noted above, there were no purely Muslim regiments in India and many of the units with large Muslim representation were in areas that were to become part of India. While some of these Muslims could have chosen to move to Pakistan, many chose to remain in India. In contrast, virtually no Sikh or Hindu officers within Pakistan’s territory elected to stay in the Pakistan Army. Consequently, Pakistan did not receive any regiments at full strength. Generally, as the smaller successor state, Pakistan was slated to receive substantially fewer personnel, stores, supplies and facilities. Training institutions remained with the state in

Punjabi peasants seeking to improve their socioeconomic standing. Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan.


31Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan; Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1984); Pervaz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Karachi: OUP 2002).

32Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan; Cohen, Pakistan Army; Cheema, Armed Forces of Pakistan.

33Cohen, Pakistan Army, 7.
which they were situated. India retained for example, the prized Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, among other important schools. Pakistan retained seven army training centers including the Staff College (Quetta) and the Royal Indian Service Corps (Kakul).

In short, Pakistan’s army was ‘weak, less organized and ill equipped. Despite these institutional problems, the new army soon had to perform internal security duties from the first day of Pakistan’s independence. Moreover, it soon found itself embroiled in armed confrontation with India in Kashmir.\(^{34}\)

British recruitment policies bequeathed several problems to independent Pakistan. Pakistan emerged with two wings: West Pakistan (which is today Pakistan) and predominantly Bengali East Pakistan (which is today Bangladesh). In 1947, most non-Muslim Bengali officers and jawans (enlisted men) opted for India. This meant that the East Pakistanis formed less than 1 percent of the total strength of Pakistan’s armed forces, which exacerbated mounting ethnic and political tensions that were emerging between Bengali-dominant East Pakistan and West Pakistan, with its Punjab and Pashtun ethnic domination.

While the bulk of Pakistan’s military personnel were from West Pakistan, the west did not produce recruits equally. The Punjab and NWFP continued to produce the majority of officers and cadres while Sindh and Baluchistan remained massively under-represented. The districts of Kohat, Peshawar, Campbellpur (now Attock), Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Gujrat were the main recruiting areas for the Pakistan Army. In those areas, nearly every second family had some kind of ties to the Army.\(^{35}\)

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was troubled by the extreme imbalance in army recruitment across the two wings of West and East Pakistan. He appointed a committee to investigate why East Pakistani (Bengalis) were inordinately underrepresented in the Army. The committee was also charged with finding ways of increasing the representativeness of the Army. While the report was not made public, the Army did take some steps. Notably, it raised two battalions of the new East Bengal Regiment. While some of these recruits came from the pioneer (construction) units or were Muslims who had served in the Bihar Regiment of the united Indian Army, some of the junior commissioned officers came from the Punjab Regiment. As Bengalis became available the Punjabis were replaced. These regiments were distinct in that they were exclusively Bengali. (Other regiments could not claim exclusive ethnic representation.) In 1968–69, ten more

\(^{34}\)Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, 56.
\(^{35}\)Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan; Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan; Cohen, Pakistan Army.
exclusively Bengali battalions were raised and recruitment to all branches of the Pakistan military was opened to East Pakistanis.36

In 1959, President and Field Marshal Ayub Khan reduced the physical standards for recruitment into the Army in hopes of luring East Pakistanis to join the armed forces. (The standards were not relaxed for those in West Pakistan.) While these efforts did increase the numbers of Bengalis across the Army (as well as the Air Force and Navy), Bengalis never achieved a level of representation consistent with their population distribution which was nearly 50 percent of Pakistan’s population.37

While Bengali numbers slowly increased, the Army resisted further expansion of Bengali representation at least in part because many within the army leadership cadre harbored considerable ‘distaste for the quality of Bengali officers and other ranks’.38 The maltreatment of Bengalis and their lack of representation within the military was a festering problem that undermined the ultimate coherence of a united Pakistan. Those Bengali officers and other ranks that were in service comprised the backbone of the Bengali resistance during the civil war of 1971. Despite clear warnings that its policies discriminated against Bengalis, the Pakistan Army remained ambivalent whether Bengalis should be ‘taken into full partnership or completely eliminated’.39

While the Army’s anti-Bengali preferences are well known, the reasons for the lack of Bengalis in the Army was not entirely demand driven (e.g., imposed by the recruitment policies of the armed forces). Pashtun tribesmen enthusiastically joined the Army as did others from West Pakistan. As the supply of willing recruits swamped the actual demand for recruits (officers and jawans), recruiters could choose from among the best of them. Bengalis, who were often (or least assumed to be by those in West Pakistan) physically smaller, could not compete given the prevalent and essentialized notions of martial prowess. Perhaps if Pakistan faced a shortage of recruits, the Army and other services would have been more interested in rethinking their facile assumptions about the connections between ethnicity and military competence. However, it is not clear in the minds of historians of the Pakistan Army whether Bengalis ever had the same level of interest in the military. Certainly the number of applications received from East Pakistanis was a full order of magnitude fewer than those from West Pakistan.40

36Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan; Cohen, Pakistan Army.
37Ibid.
38Cohen, Pakistan Army, 43.
39Ibid.
40Rizvi, Military and Politics in Pakistan.
Because the Army ran the country for much of Pakistan’s existence before the 1971 civil war, the exclusion of Bengalis was particularly problematic as they comprised a majority of pre-1971 Pakistan’s population. Arguably the compulsion to have a nationally representative army is direr when the Army directly or indirectly governs the state. Until 1971, the lack of appropriate representation of the Bengalis was a pre-eminent concern. However, from 1947 onwards there have been similar questions raised about the ‘martial qualities’ of the Baluchi and Sindhis. Both Baluchistan and Sindh have at time hosted ethno-nationalist insurgencies with varying degrees of severity. In both cases, Pakistan (under civilian and military leadership) pursued military responses often with excessive force.

The loss of Bangladesh, the persistent complaints about Punjabi domination, and the under-representation of Sindhis and Baluchi have occasioned concerns about further disintegration of Pakistan. Motivated by such concerns as well as a need for an army that is truly representative, the Army has tried to expand the numbers of Baluchi and Sindhis with little apparent success.

**Importance of Representation in an All-Volunteer Army?**

The Pakistan Army is an all-volunteer force according to Article 39 (‘Participation of People in Armed Forces’) of the 1973 constitution, which says that the state ‘shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the armed forces of Pakistan’. Under the Pakistan Army Act of 1952, the state can introduce compulsory recruitment in an emergency but this has never been discussed or actively pursued. Like most national armies, the Pakistan Army generally aspires to be – and indeed considers itself to be – representative of the country’s polity. Certainly, there is some debate and even evolution as to what ‘representative’ means. It is clear, as the following exposition makes clear, that this did not always mean comparable ethnic distribution even if the Army has in recent decades become more sensitive to this issue for reasons described herein. As is true of all-volunteer forces, its ability to be representative of its population is derived from

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41See Harrison, ‘Pakistan’s Ethnic Fault Lines’.
demand-side constraints (e.g., the preferences of the Army) and supply-side constraints (e.g., the willingness of people to join the Army).

For several reasons, the issue of representativeness of the Pakistan Army is important to the Pakistani state and institution of the Army. First, from the optic of citizenship and equal opportunity, it is important that all Pakistanis be allowed (or at least believe that they are allowed) to participate equally in the obligations and rewards associated with military service.\(^{44}\) The widespread belief that the Army is an exclusive club of Punjabis and Pashtuns underscores the extent to which the citizenry does not see the Army as a national institution even if the citizenry generally holds the Army in high esteem, especially compared to other national institutions.\(^{45}\)

Second, and related to the first, ethnic representativeness within the armed forces is important both in preventing ethno-national strife but also in contending with internal conflicts once they emerge. Pakistan has experienced several ethno-nationalist insurgencies, with varying sanguinity, in Baluchistan, Sindh and NWFP. The Pakistan security forces require adequate personnel who are familiar with the physical terrain and who understand the local languages, cultures, and other features of the human terrain of the affected region. Without such assets, the security forces cannot contend effectively with the rebels within its borders. As noted below, it is far from clear to what degree the Pakistan Army leadership has shared this view and when. Certainly in recent years, the Army has become more attuned to this requirement.

There are important downsides to including within the Army co-ethnics of rebels. Veterans of the armed forces may return to the troubled areas and participate in the insurrection. They could even provide training to the rebels. Units drawn from the local area may also be unable or unwilling to act against combatant co-ethnics who may include friends, relatives, or others affiliated through tribe or other forms of allegiance. Former or retired service members may even sympathize with the cause espoused by the militants and work to serve their cause clandestinely.

Third, since the Army has ruled Pakistan directly for more than half of its independent existence and indirectly for the remainder, the issue

\(^{44}\) The Pakistan Army is still largely a male institution. Women are mostly in the fields of health and education. Pakistan is distinctive among countries in the Muslim world in that it produced the first Major General. Dr Shahida Malik became the first female Major General of the Pakistan Army on 17 June 2002. She assumed the position of Inspector General of some 31 Pakistan Army hospitals.

of representation for the Pakistan Army is perhaps even more salient than it is for other all-volunteer forces subject to robust civilian control and which are not involved in governing their states. This is likely to be the case because the military has developed, over the last six decades, a system of perquisites for its officers as well as enlisted personnel which affords special access to economic opportunities, educational institutions for their children, special facilities for government services catering to the armed forces’ personnel among other benefits that are exclusively available to members of the armed forces. The belief that the Army is a Punjabi-Pashtun enterprise necessarily raises larger issues about social justice, unequal access to services, and the general problem of rendering public goods as private assets for military personnel.46

While the appropriate ethnic representation in a national army is important to the Pakistan Army, the Army sustains criticism that it fails to meet this standard.47 Critics of the Army’s composition note that Punjabis and Pashtuns remain overrepresented while ethnic minorities (Baluchis, Sindhis) and religious minorities remain underrepresented. (Note that since Punjabis comprise the largest group of Pakistanis, such prevalence would persist even if the composition of the Army perfectly mapped Pakistan’s population distribution.) Demographic realities notwithstanding, the Army’s composition has given rise to conspiracy theories about Punjab domination of the other provinces in connivance with Pashtun co-conspirators.48 Critics welcomed the 2001 announcement by the Pakistan Army’s Adjutant General to promulgate a ‘first ever national recruitment policy’ targeting interior Sindh and Baluchistan.49

The Army has been, at times, cognizant that its failure to develop a truly national army undermines its domestic standing as a genuinely national institution and fosters ethnic grievances. The Army learned this bitter lesson from its failure to include Bengalis (who were concentrated in East Pakistan) in the armed forces and other branches of government in the early years following independence. This, along with numerous other Bengali grievances, fostered resentment in East Pakistan and a systematic belief that Bengalis would always be second class citizens in a united Pakistan. Ultimately, Pakistan’s malfeasance towards its eastern wing precipitated a civil war, which culminated in

47Hussain, ‘Reforming the Armed Forces’; Harrison, ‘Pakistan’s Ethnic Fault Lines’.
48Cohen, Pakistan Army, 40–1.
49Hussain, ‘Reforming the Armed Forces’.
the emergence of an independent Bangladesh with Indian covert and later overt intervention.

In the aftermath of the secession of Bangladesh, the Pakistan Army has sought to broaden its recruitment base from one centered at the time of independence in 1947 on the Potohar Plateau of northern Punjab when three districts (Campbellpur, now Attock, Rawalpindi, and Jhelum) dominated the recruitment in the British–Indian Army and independent Pakistan. Since the 1990s, the Army has followed an explicit policy of broadening its recruitment base to draw from provinces other than the Punjab.\textsuperscript{50} According to the Pakistan Army’s ten-year recruitment plan launched in 2001, by 2011 the Army hopes to increase Pashtuns from 13.5 percent to 14.5 percent; Sindhis from 15 to 17 percent, and the Baluchis from nearly nil to 4 percent. In addition, the Army hopes to increase the numbers of persons from Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas from nearly zero to 9 percent of the force. Punjabis would make up the balance of 55.5 percent. Minority recruitment would be increased marginally.\textsuperscript{51}

It is possible that the Army may not be able to fully address these compositional issues. Unlike neighboring India which faces various officer shortages, the Pakistan Army continues to attract a large number of candidates for officer and soldier training. This means that in Pakistan, military recruitment is likely demand constrained for Punjabis and Pashtuns even if it is supply constrained for other ethnic groups. If ethnicity were not an issue for consideration, the Pakistan Army receives more applicants than it needs to fill required billets. Thus, the Army need not take lesser qualified or undesirable candidates (howsoever defined) unless doing so advances other goals such as ethnic diversity or geographical/ethnic needs to execute a mission (e.g., linguistic skills, personnel needed for specialized geographical knowledge, etc.). Without increasing the willingness of underrepresented groups to join the armed forces, there may be little that the Army can do to make itself truly representative of the country’s ethnic and sectarian composition.

Expanding the Ethnic Base of the Officer Corps: What the Data Say

In this section, we present results of our historical and geographical analysis of officer recruitment patterns. In Figure 1, we present total annual officer intake from 1971 to 2005. This figure depicts the explosion in officer recruitment that occurred during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This expansion became most obvious

\textsuperscript{50}Background note provided to author by General Headquarters, Pakistan Army, 1990.
from 1979 through the early 1980s. Whereas in 1979 there were about 100 officers inducted, by 1982, more than 1,000 officers were being accepted into the Pakistan Army per year. From 1984 onward, the numbers of officers inducted per year fluctuated considerably with a high of 1,350 in 1995 and low of 590 in 1996 and an average of about 1,022 per year between 1984 and 2005.

As is well known, during this period, Pakistan took advantage of US concerns about the presence of the Soviet Union to advance its own strategic concerns about India. The enormous infusion of funds from the United States and Saudia Arabia likely subsidized this expansion of the Pakistan Army. Stephen Cohen has observed ‘this massive expansion in officer intake coincided with a peak in Indian military rearmament and after 1986, the adoption of an aggressive strategy by India, which culminated in the Brasstacks fiasco of 1987 . . . [D]uring this period, both India and Pakistan were racing towards becoming nuclear weapons states.’

Geographic Distribution of New Officer Recruits Across Time

We next depict cartographically district market shares of officer recruitment for 1974, 1984, 1994 and 2005. We used 1974 as our first end point for the cartographic analysis of recruitment shares due to the 1971 war, which saw the emergence of East Pakistan as an independent Bangladesh. We wanted to permit adequate time to lapse to permit both recruitment and records of recruitment to re-equilibrate after the conclusion of the 1971 war. These analyses are presented in Figures 2 through 5.

Figures 2 through 5 dramatically demonstrate that the Pakistan Army has been successful in making the Army more geographically representative. As depicted in Figure 2, in 1974 the center of gravity for officer recruitment largely centered on key districts in the Punjab with a few in NWFP. By 1984 (see Figure 3), officer recruitment had expanded throughout the rest of Punjab, large parts of Sindh, NWFP, the Northern Areas and selected districts in Baluchistan. Changes between 1984 and 1994 were less dramatic but illustrate continued expansion of officer recruitment and some continuity as evidenced by comparing Figures 3 and 4. By 2005, as shown in Figure 5, officer recruitment had expanded into many more districts in Baluchistan and indeed into most of the districts in the country. Those districts without any recruits were generally in Baluchistan. It must be recalled that each of these maps capture one snapshot for

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52 Stephen Cohen in his review of this document.
53 Ibid.
each year’s batch of officers, which does vary from year to year. However, comparing the distribution of recruits between 1974 and 2005 demonstrates vividly that officers are now coming from most districts in the country.

One serious limitation of our data must be kept in mind: these are district level data not officer data. One cannot assume that a recruit from Baluchistan is in fact ethnically Baluchi. Nonetheless, a Punjabi, for example, who has lived and/or has been raised in Baluchistan is likely to have a very different worldview than one who has spent much or most of his life in the Punjab. Even though we cannot identify the ethnicity of the recruit, the expanded geographical reach of the Pakistan Army suggests that its various efforts have born fruit at least with geographical variation.

A less granular analysis of officer recruitment is depicted in Figure 6, which shows the market share of officer recruits for the four provinces (Baluchiistan, NWFP, Punjab, Sindh), the Federal Capital (Islamabad), Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas and FATA. As demonstrated in Figure 6, the market share for the Punjab had declined dramatically from a high of over 80 percent in 1971 to a low of less than 40 percent in 2001.
In 2005, Punjab accounted for slightly less than 60 percent of all new officers. As shown in Figure 6 (provincial market share over time) and Figure 7 (provincial population totals for 1972, 1981 and 1998), Punjab’s recent contribution to officer intake is similar to the Punjab’s 56 percent share of Pakistan’s population (per the 1998 census). Dramatic change can also be observed for the market share for NWFP which roughly doubled from 10 percent in 1971 to over 22 percent in 2005. According to the 1998 Census, NWFP only accounted for 13 percent of Pakistan’s overall population, suggesting considerable overrepresentation of new officers. Recruits from FATA remained somewhat stable and were roughly proportional to their population distribution in Pakistan. Baluchistan, which accounts for about 5 percent of Pakistan’s population, by 2005 accounted for about 5 percent or more of new officer recruits.

In contrast, Sindh remains underrepresented but exhibits important progress in expanding the number of officers drawn from its territory. In the early years of the recruitment time series, there were few officers from Sindh. By 2005, Sindh accounted for nearly 10 percent of annual officer intake. However Sindh is the second most populous province, accounting for some 22 percent of Pakistan’s population (per the most...
recent census in 1998). There are no census data for the Northern Areas or Azad Kashmir. However, market share from these areas have been turbulent across the time series.

The data in Figure 6 demonstrate a peculiar anomaly from 1999 to 2003 in the market share for both Punjab and Azad Kashmir. One notices a consistent decline in Punjab’s share beginning in 1999 commensurate with increases in the market share by Azad Kashmir. In 2001, Punjab’s market share reaches a nadir (37 percent) while that of Azad Kashmir spikes at the same level. From 2001 onward, Punjab’s market share increases and re-equilibrates at nearly 60 percent while that of Azad Kashmir declines to its previous low levels. Because these provincial figures are aggregation of district-level data which were multiple and independently entered, it is not likely to be a data entry error. Moreover, the trend is observable over several years. Given the timing of this transition, it is likely that it is related to the conversion of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), which was until 1999 a paramilitary unit, into a regular army formation. While this conversion of the NLI into a regular unit may
explain the shift in market share, this event may have triggered a change in the way the Army accounted for recruits. In the absence of a coherent explanation, we can only note this peculiar finding and draw attention to it.

A final way of viewing the provincial distribution is to examine trends across time in per capita officer recruits (the number of recruits from a province divided by the population of the province). Because Pakistan census data is only available for 1972, 1981 and 1998, we estimated population growth in Microsoft Excel’s TRENDS function. To do so, we used 1972 and 1998 as the endpoints, assuming linear expansion in population.\footnote{Provincial population data is available at the website of the Pakistan Population Census Organization, ‘Population by Province/Region Since 1951’. We estimated annual provincial population using the TRENDS command in Microsoft Excel.} Per capita recruits were calculated by dividing the number of recruits in a given year by the estimated population (in millions). These data are presented in Figure 8. As the

Figure 5. Officer Market Share 2005.
\textit{Source:} In-house data manipulation.
The data depicted in Figure 8 demonstrate, Islamabad (the federal capital) has the highest per-capita recruitment since the early 1980s. At distant second places are Punjab and NWFP which have similar per capita recruits. FATA, Sindh and Baluchistan all have very low per capita recruits.

Urbanization

Pakistan has experienced steady urbanization. There are two paths to urbanization in Pakistan. One is the growth of cities in Pakistan and the

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55 At the time of independence, Karachi was the capital. Ayub Khan undertook the decision to establish a new capital beneath the Margalla Hills. The first office building was occupied in 1966.
other is the build-up of population density in the rural areas (e.g., the formation of ‘ruralopolises’). According to the 1951 Census, 82 percent of the 34 million Pakistanis were living in rural areas compared to only 18 percent who resided in urban areas.\footnote{An urban area is defined by the Pakistani Federal Statistics Bureau as an area that has a large number of residents as well as a municipal or local government and the provision of local services. Population densities of 400 persons per square kilometer (1,000 persons per square mile) are typically considered urbanized even if the provision of public services has been organized on a communal basis. See Mohammad A. Qadeer, \textit{Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation} (London: Routledge 2005), 14–15, 51.} According to the most recent census of 1998, nearly one in three persons is living in an urban area. If one includes the urbanized rural areas (high population density without municipal services), some 56 percent of Pakistanis live in urbanized areas.\footnote{Ibid., 49–51.}

Urbanization, whether by forming megapolises or ruralopolises, has similar impact by introducing television, radio, modern communications, expanded access to and reliance upon modern forms of medication, transportation, and migration. This has opened up the rural areas and has brought about important changes in Pakistan’s social structures and the opportunities available to Pakistan’s citizens.

In the context of this study, the question arises how ‘urbanized’ the Pakistan Army is relative to the country writ large. The overall urbanization of the country is easily obtained from the Pakistan national census, which has been conducted thrice since the 1971 war and the loss of Bangladesh (1972, 1981 and 1998). (It should be noted that the Pakistan census excludes the Northern Areas and fields a shorter census in the FATA and data are not disaggregated by agency.)

Determining how urbanized the Pakistan Army officer corps is a more difficult task with our data. Ideally we would like to calculate the percentage of officers living in a rural area before they joined the Army. Our data do not permit this for two reasons. First, we do not have data on the complete officer corps, rather annual intakes of new officers. Second, we do not have officer-level data. Since our data are at the district level, we can only approximate the urbanicity of new officers (rather than the entire officer corps) using information about the urbanicity of districts and the market share of officers from each district. To approximate the urbanicity of officer intake, we generated an urbanization index for the Pakistan Army officer intake for 1981 and 1998, corresponding to the 1981 and 1998 censuses respectively. We did this by taking a weighted average (using the market share of
recruitment as the weight) of the percent urbanization of each district.\footnote{We would have liked to have done so for the 1972 census as well. However, the hard copy census data for 1972 do not provide urban and rural breakdown for each district. Overall, in 1972, about 25 percent of the population resided in urban areas. See Pakistan Census Organization, ‘Population by Province/Region Since 1951’, <www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_by_province/pop_by_province.html>. Moreover, the early years of the Army data are also unreliable perhaps owing to post-war turbulence in data collection.}

Figure 9 depicts the urbanization index of army officer intakes for 1981 and 1998 compared to the urbanization of Pakistan per the censuses in both years. The results are striking: in both 1981 and 1998 the Army cohorts are substantially more urban than the country writ large. It should be noted that the composition of army cohorts varies somewhat by year and thus the urbanization index likely would vary by year if we had census data on urbanization for all years in our series. Nonetheless these two data points suggest that army cohorts may be more urban than the country overall.

There may be several reasons for this higher urbanicity. Literacy is much higher in urbanized areas of Pakistan than rural areas.\footnote{There are wide gaps in literacy between adults, between males and female, among provinces, and between those in rural and urban areas. For example, according to the most recent Pakistan Social And Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) from 2006–07, total literacy of persons 10 years or older was 72 percent in the urban areas}
Thus the pool of qualified recruits is larger in urban areas than rural areas. Given that recruits must pay their own way to army recruitment centers, persons in urban areas have greater and less expensive access to transportation (train, bus, car, etc.) than those in rural areas and the journeys undertaken by them are likely to be less onerous than those undertaken by persons who live in remote areas, far from public transportation. Finally, the Army has a greater presence near large cities with Corps Headquarters and cantonments in burgeoning cities like Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, Karachi, Quetta, Bahawalpur, among others. These locations make the Army more accessible to city dwellers and, because the population in those cities likely benefit from the military-related businesses, the residents in turn may be more positively inclined towards the military.

Additionally, retired military personnel may also concentrate in key urban areas, creating coherent influencer communities that are positively disposed towards the military. Analyses of US military recruitment find that the attitudes of influencers (friends, family, neighbors, teachers, etc.) towards military service have important impacts upon a person’s decision to join the armed forces. When key influencers are positively inclined towards the military, a person’s propensity to join the armed forces is greater. Conversely, when influencers are adversely disposed towards military service, a person is

cmpared to 47 percent in rural areas. For more disparities, see Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2007.
less inclined to join the military. This is often referred to as an ‘influencer effect’. 60

Conclusions and Implications

In summary, analyses of these data show that new officers entering the Pakistan Army to a significant degree resemble the geographic (as opposed to ethnic) population distribution of Pakistan writ large with a few notable exceptions. By 2005, Sindh remains underrepresented despite improvement while Punjab and NWFP are over-represented to varying degrees, depending upon the year in question. However, Punjab is increasingly less dominant in annual officer intake. By 2005, most of the country’s districts have produced recruits in a marked change since the first year in our data series. Curiously, using officer intake for 1981 and 1998, the urbanization of these cohorts appears to be higher than the urbanization of Pakistan overall using census estimates.

It must be kept in mind that our data do not and cannot provide insights into the overall composition of the entire Army because we only have data for yearly officer intake. We have no cohort information (e.g. how many attended the PMA long course or other courses together or even how the officers broke out into the five courses) and we do not have officer-level data on their career paths. As such, we have no information

about the relative rates of retaining persons from these various and often relatively new districts for officer production. While the Army may be increasing recruits from these areas annually, the Army may also be losing them to attrition. Such differential attrition – if it exists – could be due to individuals’ perceived or real discrimination in the Army; institutional barriers (e.g., bias in promotion); individuals’ discomfort with being posted far away from home; individuals’ poor preparedness intellectually or physically for the Army; or discomfort with any other aspect of the army lifestyle. Finally, we have data about geographical origins not ethnic identity. While in many cases these will be isomorphic, one cannot make this assumption. Thus the above analyses pertain to geographic – not ethnic – characteristics of the officer intake. Despite these empirical caveats, these analyses do suggest that the Army has made important strides in achieving its objective of becoming at least a more geographically – if not ethnically – representative force.

The implications of this changing recruitment base over time may be very important, if uncertain, at this juncture. As the Army – a key provider of social advancement and other perquisites in Pakistan – becomes more accessible, the Army could be a foundation of greater national cohesion rather than a source of ethnic tension. However, as the Army expands its recruitment base, it must also expand military infrastructure into new areas. This is particularly true for provinces that are not well served by roads and other transport infrastructure, such as Baluchistan. (Note that the vast majority of military assets are concentrated in Punjab.)

Such expansion of army infrastructure is likely necessary for several reasons. In poorly connected areas, potential recruits may be unwilling to undertake potentially costly long trips to be considered for recruitment. Individuals in such areas may also have limited access to education and may be unprepared for military service. This may make them even less willing to undertake arduous journeys if they expect that they will not be qualified. This concern remains even for those from Baluchistan and Sindh if they are unaware of military policies to relax standards for them. In areas with poor military presence, individuals may have less interest in military service compared to those areas with significant military presence due the above-noted ‘influencer effect’.61

Pakistanis outside Punjab and NWFP have not always welcomed the introduction of cantonments and other military infrastructure. Baluchi ethno-nationalist insurgents cite the expansion of military presence in Baluchistan as concrete evidence of ‘Punjabi colonization’. This resentment persists even while some welcome the introduction of

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61Orvis et al., Military Recruiting Outlook.
cantonments because they are accompanied by expanded access to utilities (e.g., gas connections, electrification, potable water, better roads, etc.); access to better schools; employment opportunities due to base activities and activities supporting such bases among other facilities and services. Conversely, some residents resent the fact that it takes the introduction of a military facility to bring such amenities to a community. The expansion of the military into Baluchistan exhibits the entire range of such sentiments.62

The impact of expanded geographical recruitment base upon the Army’s ability to conduct internal security operations is less clear. On the one hand, training persons from ethnic groups with longstanding grievances with the center may provide important military training to co-ethnics who rise against the state. On the other hand, their successful integration into the Army creates opportunities for their near and extended families which in turn may diminish ethnic grievances and further integrate these ethnic groups into the Pakistani national project.

Expanded recruitment also distributes the cost of military action to new segments of Pakistani society. As these family members become more familiar with military operations, they may increasingly support operations if they believe the operations to be just or addressing Pakistani national interests. However, as the costs of military action increases and as civilian and military casualties mount, support for such operations may diminish putting increased pressure both on the Army and the civilian administration (assuming a civilian dispensation).63 This cluster of concerns is particularly timely given that the percentage of recruits from NWFP has increased in recent years and it is in this area where the Pakistan Army has been most engaged against Pakistan’s domestic militants. Despite expanding public opinion polls, extant polling does not employ sample sizes that permit scientifically valid comparisons across provinces much less within provinces. At this juncture, it is impossible to tell how expanded

recruitment from NWFP, increased operational tempo in the same area and public support or lack thereof for these operations interplay.\textsuperscript{64} Perhaps the most important questions about the Pakistan Army surround the posited Islamization of the Pakistan Army, anti-Americanism, and politicization. As is well known, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq sought to Islamize the Pakistan Army during his tenure as army chief in the 1980s. However, scholars of the Pakistan Army have remained dubious that there were deep impacts upon the institution.\textsuperscript{65} Similarly, the 1989 US cutoff of military education to the Pakistan military under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has led to widespread fears that the Pakistan Army harbors strong anti-US sentiment. (This is likely to be the case although the reasons may in fact pre-date the 1989 cessation of military assistance and training.)

And as is well known, the Army has long been subject to politicization. This politicization has been manifested in the politicized selection of the Army chief and other army leadership; the Army’s role in manipulating and undermining political institutions and the judiciary, often using the state’s intelligences agencies; the Army’s historical and pervasive involvement in governing the country including introducing massive changes to the country’s constitution. These questions about the social, political and indeed religious commitments of the Pakistan Army officer corps are no doubt at the core of international concerns about this institution.

Unfortunately, this current effort cannot address these questions squarely with these data alone for reasons noted throughout this essay. However, ongoing and future research may provide modest – but important – insights into the Army. Working with a team of quantitative analysts, we are assembling a panel of district-level household economic survey data from 1991 to 2005 (1991 is the earliest year for such data). These additional data will allow us to further characterize the districts from which officers are recruited in terms of social liberalism, educational attainment, urbanicity, among other household and district-level socio-economic and demographic variables that may explain variation in the district recruitment outcome.

However, even the results of this ongoing research are circumscribed by an ecological fallacy problem. That is, the best we can do is characterize more fully the districts from which officers come. We cannot assume that that any particular officer has a similar set of characteristics as the district in part because officer recruitment is not
random; rather it is the product of both supply-side and demand-side considerations.

While our results narrowly advance our understanding of the Pakistan Army, the changes that we have documented in officer recruitment are very important in terms of the social impact of the Army’s role in the nation; the operational and political constraints upon the Army; and even the Army’s capabilities to deal with critical internal security challenges that are likely to deepen rather than recede in the policy-relevant future. As such these highly caveated findings should be of interest to policymakers and analysts alike and may help them refocus inquiries about this important institution, even if this present and future analyses cannot answer these queries comprehensively.

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