Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

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Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

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ABSTRACT This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.

KEY WORDS: Pakistani Terrorism, Terrorist Recruitment, Quality of Terror, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul Mujahideen (HM), Kashmir, India-Pakistan Conflict

Introduction

The Kashmir dispute has long locked India and Pakistan in what T.V. Paul described as an ‘enduring rivalry’. Since 1947, Pakistan has deployed Islamist militants in Indian-administered Kashmir in hopes of wresting the disputed territory from India. This security competition has gained even greater significance since India and Pakistan achieved nuclear-power status. Many scholars believe that the proliferation of Pakistan-backed militant groups operating in India is the most likely


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cause of a future Indo-Pakistan war, and even of a nuclear conflict.\(^3\) American policy makers have thus sought to persuade Pakistan to abandon its reliance upon Islamist proxies, while also investing in the Pakistani state and its citizenry in an effort to reduce Islamist militant groups’ ability to recruit among Pakistanis. US policy approaches towards Pakistan are undergirded by the enduring belief that Islamist militancy among Pakistanis is the result of poverty and/or a lack of educational opportunities.\(^4\) This conviction persists despite the ever-growing body of scholarly literature that calls these connections into question or even dismisses them entirely.\(^5\) Motivated by this conventional wisdom, the United States has long instrumentalized US development assistance, working to improve education and employment opportunities among Pakistanis with the explicit goal of reducing the appeal of Islamist militant groups.\(^6\)

This research aims to inform US policy approaches to Pakistan by interrogating the logic that links participation in Islamist militancy to low levels of education among Pakistanis. This effort draws on and expands previous research that questions the robustness of the assumed links between poverty and educational attainment, on the one hand, and participation in Islamist militancy on the other. In fact, previous research has found that Pakistani Islamist militants tend to be better educated on average than other Pakistanis.\(^7\) The stakes involved in this research agenda are high. If lack of educational or economic opportunity does not in fact drive Pakistanis to participate in Islamist violence,

\(^3\)Paul S. Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford UP 2007).


current US policy is not likely to reduce participation in Islamist militancy.

In effort to better understand the attributes of successful militants, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center assembled a multi-person team, which included the author, to build and analyze a database derived from 1,625 posthumously published biographies of militants killed in action while carrying out terrorist strikes for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). These two groups are the most active terrorist organizations in Indian-administered Kashmir and beyond. Thus this dataset is not only the largest such dataset available, it also focuses on the most active militant organizations.

Consistent with previous research, this effort finds that HM and LeT activists are on average much better educated than the populations from which they recruit. The finding that these militants are endowed with relatively high human capital may contradict the conventional wisdom on Pakistan’s militant landscape. However, this finding supports the arguments advanced by Bueno de Mesquita (2005) who hypothesized that militant groups, like other consumers of labor, impose human-capital quality constraints on their volunteers. Thus, even if persons of lower aptitude are more likely to volunteer, terrorist organizations need not accept them as long as the number of higher-aptitude persons who aspire to be terrorists is equal to or larger than the number of available billets. These findings suggest that the contemporary US policy preferences of addressing terrorism through human development tools is not likely to mitigate terrorism in South Asia.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, it provides a brief overview of LeT and HM, focused on understanding how the groups differ in goals, modi operandi, areas of operation, and recruitment outcomes. The second section provides an overview of the unique data employed and a frank discussion of the limitations these data pose. This section also provides a descriptive overview of the organization of the data elements in the Combating Terror Center (CTC) database. The fourth section mobilizes Bueno de Mesquita’s concept of the ‘quality of terror’ partially to account for the high degrees of education observed in the sample. This article concludes with a discussion of this analysis’

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8Don Rassler, C. Christine Fair, Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal and Nadia Shoeb, ‘The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and Death’, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series, March 2013. Please see the data appendix of this report for a discussion of the coding methodology. Note that this report only discusses the LeT data.

results and their implications for US policy efforts to retard participation in Islamist militancy in Pakistan.

Who are the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen?

Pakistan has long cultivated and deployed numerous so-called Kashmiri tanzeems (organizations) to pressure India to resolve the ongoing Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favor. The intractable Kashmir conflict stems from the problematic way in which the British withdrew from South Asia and the poorly planned and executed partition of the erstwhile Raj into its successor states, India and Pakistan. As independence neared, all but three princely states (Hyderabad, Junagarh, and Kashmir) had opted either for India or Pakistan. The Hindu-majority princely states of Hyderabad and Junagarh were both governed by a Muslim who sought to remain independent and join Pakistan respectively. Because they were well within Indian territory and populated mostly by Hindus, India forcibly annexed them.

Kashmir was a Muslim-majority territory governed by a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. As independence loomed, Singh dithered, likely in the hope that Kashmir could remain an independent principality. Pakistan believed that Kashmir’s geographical proximity to Pakistan and the fact that it was a majority-Muslim state dictated that Kashmir go to Pakistan. Militants from Pakistan’s tribal areas, with help from Pakistani army officers as well as provincial and federal civilian officials, invaded Kashmir in hopes of seizing it for Pakistan. As the tribal invaders closed in on the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar, Singh agreed to accede to India in exchange for military assistance. The conflict evolved into the first Indo-Pakistan War (1947–48). The war ended on 1 January 1949 with the establishment of a ceasefire line (CFL) sponsored by the United Nations. The CFL divided Kashmir into areas of Indian and Pakistani control. Following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the CFL was redesignated as the Line of Control (LOC). Both countries remain locked in a conflict over the disputed territory.


Since the earliest years of the conflict, Pakistan has used Islamist militant groups to conduct a variety of low-intensity operations in India in an effort to coerce India to concede to Pakistan’s territorial claims. Pakistan’s efforts in Kashmir intensified as Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella expanded during the late 1980s. The timing of the conclusion of the anti-Soviet jihad in 1989 was fortuitous for Pakistan. With the departure of the Russians from Afghanistan, many battle-hardened militants became available. Throughout the late 1980s, Indian-administered Kashmir was wracked by an insurgency. Initially, the movement developed indigenously, in response to India’s mismanagement of the province, and several ethnically Kashmiri militant groups emerged, some of which enjoyed Pakistani support. Some of these indigenous groups, however, began agitating for independence rather than union with Pakistan, while others rejected violence and embraced political activism. To counter those groups which no longer sought union with Pakistan, Pakistan inserted a new family of Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based groups into Kashmir, encouraging them to directly compete with older, more ethnically Kashmiri groups.

The Pakistan-based groups varied in terms of in the theological interpretation of Islam they espoused (Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi, Jamaat Islami), their ethnic composition (Punjabi, Pashtun, Kashmiri, other), and their tactics (sabotage, assaulting security forces, targeting civilians). After the introduction of these Pakistan-based fighters under Pakistan’s expanding nuclear umbrella, many indigenous, pro-independence insurgents were eliminated by Pakistan-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Deobandi groups such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami. By the mid-1990s, the conflict in Kashmir had been overrun by Pakistan-based militant groups pursuing Islamabad’s agenda of wresting Kashmir from India.

The two most active groups in Indian-administered Kashmir are LeT and HM. As these data demonstrate, while LeT is dominated by Pakistan-born cadres from the Punjab, HM’s cadres are generally comprised of Kashmiris from either the Indian or Pakistani side of the LOC. These two organizations share the goal of wresting the disputed territory of Kashmir from India’s control, and both HM and LeT have been

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13Jamal, Shadow War; Ganguly, Conflict Unending; Evans, ‘The Kashmir Insurgency’.
14Ganguly, Conflict Unending; Evans ‘The Kashmir Insurgency’.
15Author meetings in Srinagar and Baramullah in Kashmir, June 2012.
operational in Kashmir since the inception of the insurgency, in 1989. However, the organizations differ in their theological moorings, the tactics they use, the kinds of operations they carry out, the theatre in which they operate, and the ethnicity of their recruits. LeT has long distinguished itself as the pre-eminent organization perpetrating Islamist terrorism in India. It has garnered considerable notoriety for its ability to launch coordinated, high-risk missions (fidayeen attacks) in which the attackers’ odds of survival are slim. LeT has demonstrated its ability to operate throughout India; one of its most recent major strikes is the 2008 Mumbai assault, which featured attacks on multiple targets. In contrast, HM largely focuses on Indian security forces stationed within the confines of the disputed territory of Indian-administered Kashmir. Drawing from over a decade of field work in South Asia and from interviews with numerous American security analysts, I have observed that while LeT receives high-level attention from the Indian and international policy communities, operatives from HM are more often than not seen as ‘rustic boys’ whose violence is of little or no consequence. The Pakistani state has long supported these groups in hopes that their militant attacks can force India to concede to Pakistan’s territorial demands.16

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) is one of the largest and oldest militant groups operating in Jammu and Kashmir. It was formed in September 1989 in Indian-administered Kashmir under the leadership of Master Ahsad Dar, who was arrested in 1993. HM has long-standing ties with the Pakistani Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). JI, which has long served as an ally of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI),17 helped provide militants for the anti-Soviet Jihad. Some analysts believe that JI founded HM on behalf of the ISI while others contend that JI did so on its own initiative but with the assistance of the ISI.18 The HM quickly became a valuable

16Byman, ‘Agents of Destruction?’.
17Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan.
18For authors who propose a more direct relationship between these groups and the ISI, see Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. However, one of the anonymous reviewers of this article disagreed with this interpretation, arguing that JI set up the militant organizations for its own institutional goals but, in doing so, it enjoyed the support of the ISI. As neither the JI nor the ISI publically discusses these issues, it is perhaps impossible to discern which account is closer to the truth.
asset for Pakistan, particularly insofar as it opposed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which advocated for complete independence rather than accession to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{19}

HM has historically called for the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control, but it takes a somewhat subtler line in its public communications. For example, the organization’s website explains that:

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen appeals \textit{[sic]} the major powers of the world and other members of international fraternity to use their good offices to convince India that use of force to curb a genuine movement of self-determination will be a self-destructive exercise. in \textit{[sic]} case India sincerely creates congenial conditions and positive environment in the state, Hizb will respond positively. What is needed is that people of Jammu and Kashmir must feel that India is serious to resolve the dispute according to their wishes and aspirations.\textsuperscript{20}

While HM was likely founded to counter JKLF, many of its early cadres were former JKLF members.\textsuperscript{21} Within a few years, differences began to emerge within HM between those members who were close to JI and those who were not. This culminated in a series of splits in the organization, with one faction led by Syed Salahuddin, who would go on to become the current Amir (leader) of HM. HM is headquartered in the town of Muzaffarabad, in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. It has an estimated end-strength of 1,500 cadres distributed among five divisions: Central (Srinagar); Northern (Kupwara-Bandipora-Baramulla); Southern (Anantnag and Pulwama districts); Chenab (Doda district and Gool in Udhampur district); and Pir Panjal (Rajouri and Poonch districts). HM typically operates against military targets in Indian-administered Kashmir, although it occasionally targets civilians.\textsuperscript{22} While Indian officials have told the authors that HM aspires to operate beyond Kashmir, thus far it has not succeeded in doing so.\textsuperscript{23} While the United States has not designated HM a ‘terrorist organization’, the European Union did so in 2005.\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{21}Jamal, \textit{Shadow War}.


\textsuperscript{23}Author field work in India, 2010.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)

LeT first emerged in 1993 as the military wing of the Punjab-based Markaz Daawat ul Irshad (MDI). Headquartered in Muridke, some 30 kilometers from Lahore, the provincial capital, MDI was founded in 1986 by two Pakistani engineering professors, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Zafar Iqbal. The ISI was a crucial partner of LeT from the start; Abdullah Azzam, a close associate of Osama bin Laden, also provided assistance to the fledgling organization. Unlike HM, which draws its theological inspiration from the Jaamat Islami, MDI, and thus LeT, follow the Ahl-e-Hadith interpretative tradition of Islam.

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, LeT/MDI shifted its focus to Indian-administered Kashmir, where in 1990 it staged its first commando-style attack. The majority of LeT operatives are Pakistanis (often Punjabis) and the organization has spawned a vast training infrastructure to support its dual mission of training militants and converting Pakistanis to the Ahl-e-Hadith interpretative tradition. For much of the 1990s (with few exceptions), LeT operations were restricted to Indian-administered Kashmir. In 1993, MDI spun off its military operations under the name of LeT.

In December 2001, Pakistan banned LeT, along with several other militant groups, after a December 2001 attack by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), a Deobandi militant group based in and supported by Pakistan, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The United States acted swiftly to avert the emerging crisis, pressuring Pakistan’s then-President Pervez Musharraf to rein in numerous Pakistani terrorist groups, such as LeT and JM. (Notably, HM was not and has never been banned by Pakistan.)

While Musharraf did successfully reduce the groups’

25Note that LeT has sought to rebrand itself as Jamaat-ud-Dawah and Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation. In this article, I use its more familiar name, Lashkar-e-Taiba.
activities in India by restricting their movement across the line of control, he did not move to eliminate them. The bans were farcical: Pakistani intelligence gave advance notice of the impending ban to LeT’s Hafiz Saeed and the leaders of other militant groups, allowing them to transfer their financial assets to new accounts and quickly re-emerge under new names. Saeed announced that his organization would be restructured and renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD). In practice, the vast majority of the assets and personnel of LeT were subsumed into JuD, and organizational nodes and operatives outside of Pakistan continued to function under the name of LeT. As further evidence of the organizational continuity between the various organizations, Hafez Saeed remains the amir, or leader, of JuD.29

LeT, now known exclusively as JuD, continues to be headquartered at its sprawling 200-acre facility in Muridke,30 although it maintains offices in most of the major cities of Pakistan. The majority of LeT members are Pakistanis, but it also employs Afghans and/or veterans of the Afghan wars. While the exact size of the organization is unknown, the US Department of State estimates that LeT has ‘has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir [that part of Kashmir administered by Pakistan], Pakistan; in the southern Jammu, Kashmir, and Doda regions; and in the Kashmir Valley’.31

Unlike HM, which operates largely within Kashmir, LeT has a wide area of operations. Most notoriously, LeT is responsible for the 2008 multi-site attack in the port city of Mumbai. Four LeT attack teams

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29 One source suggests the following command structure: ‘the LeT leadership consisted of: Hafiz Mohammed Saeed (Supreme Commander); Zia-ur-Rehman Lakhvi alias Chachaaji (Supreme Commander, Kashmir); A.B. Rahman-ur-Dakhil (Deputy Supreme Commander); Abdullah Shehzad alias Abu Anas alias Shamas (Chief Operations Commander, Valley); Abdul Hassan alias MY (Central Division Commander); Kari Saif-ul-Rahman (North Division Commander); Kari Saif-ul-Islam (Deputy Commander); Masood alias Mahmoud (Area Commander, Sopore); Hyder-e-Krar alias CI (Deputy Commander, Bandipora); Usman Bhai alias Saif-ul-Islam (Deputy Commander, Lolab); Abdul Nawaz (Deputy Commander, Sogam); Abu Rafi (Deputy Divisional Commander, Baramulla); Abdul Nawaz (Deputy Commander, Handwara); Abu Museb alias Saifulla (Deputy Commander, Budgam).’ South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘Lashkar-e-Toiba: ‘Army of the Pure’, nd, <www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm>.

30 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the Muridke Markaz (center) is comprised of a ‘Madrassa (seminary), a hospital, a market, a large residential area for “scholars” and faculty members, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The LeT also reportedly operates 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks and several seminars across Pakistan.’ See South Asia Terrorism Portal, ‘Lashkar-e-Toiba’.

31 US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, 225.
assaulted luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station and a popular café, killing at least 183 persons, including 22 foreigners. In contrast to HM’s relatively unsophisticated attacks, LeT has long specialized in fidayeen operations. These are not suicide attacks per se but rather high risk missions in which there is some chance of survival but where death is considered preferable to capture.32

Comparing Terror: LeT Versus the HM

Consistent with the perception of LeT as more sophisticated than the HM, LeT has been more active than HM and its attacks are more lethal. According to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), between 1990 and 2010 these two organizations executed 195 separate attacks.33 In Figure 1, I give the annual fatalities caused by both groups for the years 1999 through 2010. (These are the years for which GTD has data for these groups.) As shown in Figure 1, LeT caused more fatalities than the HM in each year except 2004. Furthermore, while is not apparent from the numbers alone, it is LeT – not HM – that is responsible for large-scale attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai attack described above or the 2006 strike on Mumbai’s commuter rail system. Thus in Table 1 I also provide the average number of fatalities per incident over this period. The data in Table 1 demonstrate the relative lethality of LeT compared to HM, with the former having a fatality yield that is more than twice that of HM and an injury yield that is nearly three times that of HM.

Figure 1. Yearly Fatalities by Terror Group (1999–2010).
Source: UMD GTD and authors’ calculations.

32Abou Zahab, ‘I Shall be Waiting at the Door of Paradise’.
33Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, <www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=fatalities&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=1380>.
LeT and HM also differ from one another in the kinds of attacks they perpetrate. While both engage in targeted assassinations; use improvised explosive devices, small arms, and grenades; commit acts of sabotage; and attack or threaten Kashmiri politicians, among other tactics, only LeT has been able to carry out coordinated attacks by multiple attack teams against civilian, military, police, and intelligence targets. Of the two, only LeT conducts the signature fidayeen attacks in which LeT fighters take on high-risk missions with a low chance of survival. Only LeT can operate beyond Kashmir, as shown by its attacks in New Delhi, Mumbai, Varanasi and numerous other Indian cities.\(^{34}\)

Thus LeT and HM differ from one another in terms of the terror they produce whether we compare their killing capacity, targeting, or operational scopes. It should be note forthrightly that the kind of violence that HM perpetrates may in fact be consistent with their goals. For example, HM leaders may not wish to conduct the kind of attacks that LeT can execute. While I have found no information that suggests that this is the case, one cannot rule out this possibility. However, information obtained over several years of field work in India and from numerous interviews with Indian analysts suggests that this may not be the case. Indian officials believe that HM has such aspirations but for a number of reasons has failed to achieve these goals.\(^{35}\) Needless to say, Indian officials have an explicit motivation in making these claims to ensure that international attention remains focused upon the groups that have menaced it.

Introduction to the Dataset on Slain LeT and HM Activists\(^ {36}\)

The CTC dataset is comprised of individual-level data for two distinct organizations, LeT and HM. The dataset was assembled under the


\(^{35}\)Author interviews with Indian police and intelligence officials in New Delhi, Mumbai, Gujarat, Hyderabad and Srinagar in June 2012.

\(^{36}\)The author is especially thankful to Anirban Ghosh for performing the statistical analysis in this section.
auspices of the CTC at West Point. The CTC team gathered biographical information on 918 Lashkar-e-Taiba militants and 707 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen militants. The LeT biographies were derived from four primary sources published in Urdu by LeT. One hundred and eighty-one biographical records came from a three-volume book, *Hum Ma’en Lashkar-e-Taiba Ki* (We the Mothers of Lashkar-e-Taiba); 14 records from *Mujalla Taibaat* (Virtuous Women); 696 records from *Mujalla al-Dawah* (The Invitation); and 27 from *Mahanah Zarb-e-Taiba* (Strike of the Righteous). All of the LeT militants were killed in battle between 1994 and 2007. The 707 HM militant biographies were published in the organization’s monthly Urdu publication *Jihad-e Kashmir* (Kashmir’s Jihad). The dates of publication range from 6 February 1998 to 15 March 2006. Each biography was translated and the information recorded so that it is comparable across individuals and across the two organizations. The sample size used in the analysis – over 1,600 biographies – is an order of magnitude larger than the sample size of any previous study of this kind.

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38 *Mujallah al-Dawah* (renamed *Al-Haramain*) has been Lashkar-e-Taiba’s and Jamaat ud-Dawah’s most important publication. The first issue of the magazine was published in March 1989, and it is currently edited by Maulana Amir Hamza, the founding ideologue of the JuD. Qazi Kashif Niaz is also believed to have been an editor of *al-Dawah* for a period of time. Typically, every issue carries articles on what being a Muslim should mean to every Muslim, drawing especially on the Ahl-e-Hadith school of Islamic jurisprudence. *Al-Dawah* also usually carries reports of jihad (particularly in Indian-administered Kashmir), information about fallen militants, and updates about the workings of all JuD departments. *Al-Dawah* reportedly has a circulation of 140,000. Other LeT linked magazines include: *Ghazwa Times* (renamed *Jarrar*), *Tayyabat* (a bi-monthly magazine for women, which has been renamed *Al-Saffat*), *Voice of Islam* (an English language magazine, which has been discontinued), *Nanhe Mujahid* (a monthly now released under the name *Rozatul Atfal*) and *Al-Ribat* (a monthly magazine in Arabic, which is now titled *Al-Anfal*). Umm-e Hammad is the compiler of the three volume series *Ham Ma’en Lashkar-e Taiba Ki*, and is the editor of *Tayyabat*, LeT’s magazine for women, the head of LeT’s Women Wing, and a mother of two LeT militants. For background see C.M. Naim, ‘The Mothers of the Lashkar’, *Outlook India*, 15 Dec. 2008, <www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?239238> and Humeira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists: Jama’at-e-Islami and Jamat’at-ud-Da’wa in Urban Pakistan* (Univ. of Chicago 2011), 106–7.

Caveats of the Data

These data, however, and the ensuing analysis, must be presented with several extremely important caveats. First and foremost, this dataset, like others of its kind, suffers acutely from dependent variable selection bias in that persons in the databases are selected by virtue of being a militant who died in an operation. The CTC could collect data only for those militants who successfully managed to join the ranks of their militant organization and who managed to persuade their organizations to dispatch them on the mission in which they died. A close reading of the militant biographies reveal that many of the activists consistently lobbied the group leadership to be deployed on a mission. This is especially true for LeT, where the leadership (either the Amir, Hafez Saeed, or the chief of operations and military commander, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi) plays a role in selecting persons for missions. Since being selected for a mission requires constant lobbying, the recruits who succeed may possess a stronger initiative and drive than those who are never selected. Less motivated persons would thus presumably be less likely to be selected for a mission in the first instance and less likely to achieve the vaunted status of the martyrs whose deeds are recorded in the documents that comprise this dataset. It is impossible to overcome this selection bias.40

The profound implications of this selection bias prohibit one from drawing sweeping conclusions from the analysis of these data. First, because data on the universe of LeT and HM militants do not exist, one cannot discern how representative these militants are of their organizations’ cadres generally. Equally important, without knowing something about the distribution of attributes of all who want to join these organizations, one cannot compare the militants in the CTC database to the universe of persons who aspired to join these organizations in the first place. It is reasonable to assume that the militants in the CTC database are not representative of all members of the organization or even those who aspired to join the organization. After all, the persons in the CTC database are those who passed the the initial selection criteria, successfully completed training, lobbied to be deployed, infiltrated into India and, finally, died in an operation. Given these multiple selection barriers, one would expect the activists in the CTC dataset to be unrepresentative of the populations from which they were initially recruited. Finally, data are not available on other important individual and group-level attributes that either are not observable or for which

data are potentially observable but not usually available. These attributes include the quality of training the individual obtains during his tenure with the organization, as well as other aptitude attributes that are not easily proxied by education and work experience (inter alia morale, determination, piety, xenophobia, tenacity in achieving an objective, and the conviction that their cause is right and even righteous).41

A further complication in assessing the representativeness of the CTC sample comes from limited knowledge of the areas from which these data suggest the groups recruit. First, as shown below, while most HM personnel come from Indian-administered Kashmir, they are trained in Pakistan and then ultimately return to India, where they fight and die. This process imposes an additional selection effect, in that these HM members must first successfully exfiltrate across the Line of Control into Pakistan-held Kashmir. To do so, they must evade Indian soldiers, paramilitary troops, intelligence services, and police forces. Once they get to Pakistan, they may have to undergo additional vetting to secure the trust of their Pakistani handlers. Finally, once trained, they must infiltrate back into India or Indian-held Kashmir. In contrast, most LeT recruits are Pakistani and thus reaching a Pakistani training camp is not an arduous task. Still, there is no way to conclusively determine how relatively difficult is for persons to join organizations based on their origins and the various kinds of support they receive. What one can say is that these various recruitment requirements likely impose strong selection pressures, producing a dataset that is not representative of the militant organizations in particular or the societies from which they are recruited in general.

Finally, the CTC team did not take all the details reported in the militant biographies at face value. The team had no reason to believe that the biographies falsify information about birthplace, education, the kind and level of training received, or basic details of the mission

41Robustly subjecting Bueno de Mesquita’s model to empirical testing would require an appropriately fielded census that includes: persons who have no interest in militant groups, those who had an interest but were not selected, those who applied and were admitted but ultimately did not deploy on a mission (e.g. lost due to attrition), as well as those who successfully deployed on a mission (including some measure of the outcome of that mission). In addition, I would need a thorough assembly of individual-level data on the person’s attributes as well as group-level data on the same. Needless to say, it would be virtually impossible to assemble such a data set. Thus Bueno de Mesquita’s model can at best be understood as a framework that can explain why on the one hand actual terrorists are often not poor or uneducated relative to the populations from which they come, while, at the same time, recessionary economies and diminished economic opportunities tend to be correlated with terrorism. Also see discussion of this in Alexander Lee, ‘Who Becomes A Terrorist?’
(e.g. where and when it took place). The CTC team did not, however, use the reported information about the numbers of persons killed by the slain militant. Such information is likely to be falsified to glorify the militant, and the CTC team had no way of independently confirming such details. As noted above, individuals are usually killed in encounters in India and it is rare that the actual names of the persons involved are reported in either the Pakistani or Indian press, much less the international press. Equally problematic, many activists use *noms de guerre*, which makes it virtually impossible to cross-check the accounts given in the militant biographies with reports in the Indian media. Thus the CTC team used only those data elements for which there is minimal motivation for falsification.

With these important caveats, the below section describes the data fields of interest in this article: provinces and districts of origin, age at time of recruitment and age at death, year of death, and level of education. Each category is addressed in turn for both groups.

**LeT Hometown Districts and Provinces**

Most LeT militants in the dataset were recruited from Pakistan’s Punjab province, with 89 per cent coming from the Punjab, 5 per cent from Sindh, and about 3 per cent from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Smaller numbers of militants originated from areas such as Azad Kashmir (about 1 per cent), while Indian Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan each produced less than 1 per cent of militants in the CTC sample. Three militants had hometowns in Afghanistan, two came from Saudi Arabia and one was born in Europe (see Figure 2).

In addition to the province, the CTC dataset also includes the district in which the militant’s hometown is located. Figure 3 illustrates district-level details of recruitment for LeT militants. Each district is color-coded by the number of militants originating from that district. As Figure 3 demonstrates, more militants originate from areas that either border India or are quite close to India (e.g. Punjab, Sindh, and the Northern Areas) rather than those areas that are farther away, such as Baluchistan.

Table 2 depicts these same district-level data in a different manner by listing the top-ten LeT militant-producing districts in the data set. Notably, these are all in the Punjab.

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Both of the fighters from Afghanistan were from Nuristan province. One of the two LeT militants from Saudi Arabia was from Mecca. The other militant’s hometown in Saudi Arabia was not disclosed. The country or hometown of the fighter from Europe was also not given.
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Hometown Districts and Provinces

Figure 4 presents data on the birthplaces of HM cadres. Unlike LeT, and consistent with the secondary literature on this organization, HM overwhelmingly draws its recruits from among Kashmiris, particularly from Indian-administered Kashmir. Nearly half the HM militants are recruited from within Indian Kashmir, while another 49 per cent are recruited from within Pakistan, mainly from Punjab (24 per cent) and Pakistani Kashmir (17 per cent). A smaller number of militants are

Figure 2. Share of LeT Militants by Province.
Source: In-house tabulation.

Figure 3. Distribution of LeT militants by District.
recruited from the other provinces, and the dataset includes four individuals who were recruited from Afghanistan and one each from Yemen and Turkey. Figure 5 maps the district-level origins of HM cadres and demonstrates that HM cadres are often recruited from Indian-administered Kashmir.

Table 3 lists the ten districts that produce the most HM militants. Four of the top five districts are in Indian Kashmir. Bagh is the only district in Pakistan in the top 5. Baramulla (11 per cent), Bagh (9 per cent) and Doda (8 per cent) are the top three recruitment districts, accounting for more than twice as many militants as the next three districts on the list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>State or Province</th>
<th>Number of Militants</th>
<th>Per cent of Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shekhupura</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasur</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sialkot</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahawalnagar</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahawalpur</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanewal</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Districts</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td></td>
<td>277</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding militants for whom no district of origin is given.

Source: Militant biographies and authors’ calculations.

Table 2. Top Ten LeT Producing Districts.

![Figure 4. Share of HM Militants by Province.](image)

Source: In-house tabulations.
Although the two militant organizations’ main recruitment centers are quite different, consistent with their shared focus upon Indian-administered Kashmir their areas of deployment are very similar. The biographies contain information both on the main fighting front and on the

### Table 3. HM-Producing Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>State or Province</th>
<th>Number of Militants</th>
<th>Share of Militants*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baramulla</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagh</td>
<td>Pakistan-Kashmir</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doda</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandipore</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawalpindi</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>Pakistan-Kashmir</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupwara</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulwama</td>
<td>Indian-Kashmir</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Districts</td>
<td></td>
<td>275</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluding militants for whom no district of origin is given.

Source: Militant biographies and authors’ calculations.

### Fighting Front and Location of Death

Although the two militant organizations’ main recruitment centers are quite different, consistent with their shared focus upon Indian-administered Kashmir their areas of deployment are very similar. The biographies contain information both on the main fighting front and on the
location of the individual’s death (depicted in Figure 6). The main fighting front for both LeT and HM is Indian Kashmir. Of 786 LeT militant biographies which provide data in this field, 778, or 98.9 per cent, list Indian Kashmir as a fighting front. Thirty-nine individuals identify Afghanistan as a fighting front, but even among these militants (who make up 5 per cent of the data), 39 list Indian Kashmir as well. Two individuals list Tajikistan and Bosnia-Chechnya as their fighting fronts. Similarly, 666 out of 672 HM militants for whom data on this point exists list Indian Kashmir as their fighting front (99.1 per cent). Forty-eight (6.7 per cent) identify Afghanistan as a fighting front, but 45 of those also list Indian Kashmir as a fighting front. Two individuals give Bosnia-Chechnya as their fighting fronts. Given that the main fighting front is Indian Kashmir, an expectedly vast majority of the militant deaths occur in Indian Kashmir as well (Figure 6).

Table 4 lists the ten districts that account for the largest number of militant deaths, all of which are in Indian-administered Kashmir. Together, these ten districts account for nearly 90 per cent of all militant deaths in both organizations. There is considerable overlap in death locations; nine of the top ten districts are the same for both. Comparing data on origins and place of death, it appears that while the two groups draw recruits from different places, their militants fight and die in similar areas and locations

Age of Recruitment and of Death

Table 5 presents data on the mean age at recruitment and age at death. These data show that, compared to HM, the LeT militants are both younger when they enter the group and younger when they are killed.
Table 4. Top Ten Districts Accounting for Militant Deaths.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 10 Districts of Death for HM</th>
<th>Number of HM Militants</th>
<th>Share of HM Militants</th>
<th>Cumulative Per cent</th>
<th>Top 10 Districts of Death for LeT</th>
<th>Number of LeT Militants (excluding missing)</th>
<th>Share of Militants (excluding missing)</th>
<th>Cumulative Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rajouri</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>Kupwara</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>Baramulla</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupwara</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>Poonch</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baramulla</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>Rajouri</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doda</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>Bandipore</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgam</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>Doda</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulwama</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anantnag</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>Srinagar</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>Udhampur</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: In-house tabulations of militant biographies.
These differences are statistically significant (at 5 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively).

Education

A key measure of human capital endowment is level of education. Table 6 presents data on secular educational attainment by militant group. These data suggest that LeT militants are more likely to have had only a primary-level education, while HM militants are more likely to have reached the intermediate level or above. The difference in the share of militants with either Matric or Middle levels of education is not statistically significant. Figure 7 presents this information graphically.

To garner insights into how these militants compare to the societies from which they are recruited, one must compare the educational levels of the militants in the CTC database to the educational levels of the societies in which these militant organizations operate. As the data in Table 6 show, approximately 1.3 per cent of LeT activists in the CTC database were illiterate. In contrast, in 1990, 57 per cent of Pakistani males were illiterate and in 2009, 30 per cent of males were illiterate. In the Punjab, the province which produces most of the LeT militants, 55 per cent of males were illiterate in 1990, with the figure falling to 31 per cent in 2009. In 1990 the mean years of schooling for males

Table 5. Mean Age of Recruitment and Age at Death: LeT and HM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>LeT</th>
<th>Test for Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean age upon entry</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age at death</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 5 per cent significance level is represented by (**) and 1 per cent significance level is represented by (***)
Source: In-house data tabulation.

Table 6. Share of Militants by Level of Secular Education: HM and LeT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>HM</th>
<th>LeT</th>
<th>Test for Difference in Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matric</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate and above</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 5 per cent significance level is represented by (**) and 1 per cent significance level is represented by (***)
Source: In-house data tabulation.
across all of Pakistan was a meager 3.4 years, rising to 5.3 years in 2009; males in the Punjab received slightly fewer years of schooling, with the mean at 3.3 years in 1990 and 5.0 in 2009. 43 Whereas 44 per cent of LeT militants had achieved their matriculation (10th grade), the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics found that merely 7 per cent of males had reached this level of schooling as of 2009. Whereas nearly 17 per cent of LeT members in the dataset had an intermediate degree or above, a meager 6 per cent of all Pakistani males currently possess such a qualification. 44 Benchmarking the LeT sample, whether to Pakistani males generally or the Punjab in particular, demonstrates that the LeT militants in the CTC sample, most of whom have at least eight years of education (Middle), are much better educated than the average Pakistani man (including those from the Punjab).

HM militants also appear to be well educated when compared to the population of Indian-administered Kashmir, which accounts for the largest share of recruits. In 1993, the mean number of years of male education in Indian-administered Kashmir was 8.6; in 2004 it was 8.3. (Male educational attainment for all of India in 1993 was 8.8 years,

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rising to 11 years in 2004.) But about 64 per cent of the sample of HM militants were matriculates or had achieved an intermediate or higher degree. Similarly, HM activists fare well when I examine their literacy rates against those in either Indian-administered Kashmir or India at large. Whereas only 1.5 per cent of HM activists in the database were illiterate, in 2004 about 20 per cent of males across India were illiterate, as were about 30 per cent of males in Kashmir.

In many cases information is available about the training the militants received from their respective organization. As shown in Table 7, nearly every recruit received some form of training. In addition, a third of the HM militants received only basic training, while a greater share of LeT militants receive specialized training. While both organizations classify their trainings as basic or specialized, one should not assume that the training they offer is in fact comparable. HM’s basic training course lasts on average five months, while that offered by LeT is only three weeks. Specialized training for HM is also on average twice as long as for LeT. However, by examining the variance or the spread in reported training periods for the same training, it is apparent that HM consistently has greater variance in their reported training. For example, the HM biographies reported basic training to last anywhere from two weeks to 30 months, resulting in a large variance measure. This suggests that the different types of training are not comparable between the two militant organizations.

Summary of What the Data Say

First and foremost, militants’ origins are not randomly distributed throughout Pakistan or Indian-administered Kashmir; rather, a relatively

Table 7. Share of Militants by Type of Training by Militant Organization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>HM (N = 507)</th>
<th>LeT (N = 627)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or unspecified</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: In-house calculation.

small number of districts seem to account for most militant productions. For LeT, the Pakistani province of the Punjab accounts for most militants whereas HM draws both the Punjab in Pakistan as well as Indian administered Kashmir. In general activists from both organizations join before they are 18 years of age and most die before their 24th birthday. Both organizations provide their activists with a variety of training opportunities that militants avail of at different rates. Perhaps what is most surprising is that these young persons are overwhelmingly better educated than the populations from which they come. Activists in both organizations are much less likely than their non-militant male counterparts to be illiterate. And they are much more likely to be well educated compared to the same as a majority of activists in both organizations have a matric or higher educational attainment.

Explaining the Relatively High Human Capital of LeT and HM Militants

The data presented here adds to the ever-growing body of evidence that successful militants tend not to be poorly educated relative to the populations from which their sponsoring organizations draw. (There is too little information about the militants’ employment to evaluate their employment relative to non-militants.) In fact, analysts have often found that terrorist operatives in other conflict areas are more likely to have educational levels equal to or above their respective societal mean and are on average less likely to live in poverty. These empirical findings inspire Krueger and Maleckova – among others – to question the explanatory value of economic conditions for violent mobilization, and hence the use of development assistance as a tool to address such mobilization.47 These findings about the human capital attributes of militants have tended to sit uneasily with the observation that recessionary economies and diminished economic opportunities are often correlated with terrorism.48

Bueno de Mesquita (2005) sought to inform this debate and resolve this seeming contradiction by arguing that militant groups, like other demanders of labor, impose quality constraints upon their volunteers.


when selecting activists. This means that during economic downturns, the pool of prospective operatives expands, increasing the supply of high quality recruits available to these groups. Thus, even if persons of lower aptitude are more likely to volunteer, terrorist organizations need not take them as long as the number of higher-aptitude persons who aspire to be terrorists is equal to or larger than the number of available billets.49

Bueno de Mesquita’s insights have important implications for empirical studies which seek to understand which attributes of militants explain their participation in violence. Most notably, since scholars generally do not have information about the universe of persons who aspire to join a militant organization, they cannot assume that the attributes of successful recruits (those who ultimately are deployed and die in the service of the organization) resemble those of the applicant pool as a whole. The CTC database provides anecdotal evidence in support of Bueno de Mesquita’s theory, showing that the selection process does not stop even once an aspirant manages to join the organization. Generally the terrorists selected for a mission are those who lobbied the organization’s leadership to be deployed. Thus in order for an operative to appear in a database of active terrorists, he usually has to have passed through multiple rounds of selection: first his successful recruitment into the organization, then the effective within-group mobilization that allows him to receive advanced training, and finally his individual motivation and initiative to lobby to be deployed. If databases on particular terrorists only include successful attacks, an additional selection process, for quality, is in effect.

It is entirely possible that, all else being equal, Pakistanis who are less educated may, on average, seek to join a militant organization more often than those who are better educated. After all, persons with low ability or little education and thus fewer lucrative economic opportunities may be more likely to volunteer to join a terrorist organization than those persons with greater aptitude/education and better economic opportunities, because the opportunity costs of militant participation are lower for the first group. But, provided that there are individuals

49His model also endogenizes the effects of government counter-terrorism efforts on the mobilization of potential recruits. Counter-terrorism efforts make terrorist volunteering more costly, thus diminishing the pool of attractive candidates and reducing the quality of terror the group can produce. But these efforts may at the same time exacerbate violent opposition to the government. Both counter-terror efforts as well as ensuing violence may impose negative economic externalities. (For example, in areas where troops are deployed and security regimes – among other measures – are imposed, investment is suppressed, people can less easily get to work, employers may relocate elsewhere, markets are closed and so forth.) These negative economic shocks also increase the availability of higher quality recruits. The net impact of these countervailing effects is not a priori obvious.
with better skills and/or aptitude, the organization need not accept the least qualified among its pool of potential recruits. In other words, as long as the supply of willing candidates exceeds the organization’s recruitment needs, the group can impose some measure of quality constraints. Given that even relatively large groups like LeT have fewer than 2,000 operatives, this assumption is likely valid. HM has even fewer, with its members perhaps numbering in the hundreds. A critical underlying assumption of this model is that terrorist organizations will always want to recruit the most effective and highly skilled terrorists for the mission. (In other words, militant groups, like military organizations, seek to ‘man’ a mission by finding the best person available for the mission, as reflected in occupational specialty.)

Bueno de Mesquita’s model is consistent both with the various empirical findings about the socioeconomic backgrounds of actual terrorists and the finding that economic downturns are generally correlated with increases in terrorism. The explanatory mechanism that rationalizes these two seemingly contradictory findings is that, while economic contractions decrease the economic opportunity costs of violent mobilization for all persons, such contractions have a greater effect on the opportunity cost of violent mobilization for higher-quality than for lower-quality recruits. Thus economic contraction likely expands the number of higher-quality persons who are interested in joining a terrorist group, and terror groups have higher-quality options during downturns than they do during better economic times.

As discussed earlier in this article, the biographies that the CTC team has amassed here also attest to the frequent imposition of these quality constraints upon recruits. The biographies in the CTC database suggest that the militants frequently solicit the militant leadership to be selected for further training and even deployment. Thus not only does the organization impose human capital constraints at the time of recruitment, these selection pressures persist throughout the person’s tenure in the

50US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2010*.
organization. Individuals who fail to secure further training and/or eventual deployment and death will not appear in databases of slain militants.

Conclusions and Implications

Given that both of these groups’ elite activists are very well-educated relative to the populations from which they draw, it is tempting to discard US policy approaches that aim to expand educational opportunities as a tool to mitigate participation in Islamist militancy. Other Pakistan-specific research also casts doubt upon the ties between poverty and support for Islamist militancy.53

Indeed, the human capital attributes of these militants should not be terribly surprising to those who are familiar with both groups. Jamaat Islami, the political wing of HM, has long been a party led by intellectuals and its strongest – and most active – branch has been its student organization, Islami-Jamiat-Tuliba (IJT). Moreover, Jamaat Islami has long sought to combine rigorous religious and non-religious education both in the madrassahs (seminaries) it runs as well as in the various private schools it oversees.54 Activists from the IJT have long participated in violent mobilization.55 LeT’s founders were professors at the Engineering University in Lahore, and the organization has long propounded a clear philosophy of ‘developing a jihadi culture by combining Islamic teaching, preaching with modern education’. The organization aims to produce ‘a reformed individual who is well versed in Islamic moral principles and the techniques of science and technology, to produce an alternate model of governance and development’.56

These findings suggest that US efforts to instrumentalize developmental aid to lessen individual propensity to join Islamist militant groups are not likely to have the desired effect. Indeed, as long as the militant organization requires fewer persons than it can deploy, it will always be able to select the most qualified person available at the time. It is possible that broad-scale initiatives to increase educational opportunities could even increase the availability of higher aptitude militants. There may be reasons for the US government to invest in Pakistan’s human capital, but retarding the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit personnel is not

55Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan.
56Shafqat, ‘From Official Islam to Islamism’, 142.
one of them. In fact, public instrumentalization of development aid in Pakistan with the explicit goal of combating terrorism may well foster greater distrust among Pakistanis who suspect that the United States provides aid to Pakistan only to advance its own strategic interests in mind. In recent years, many Pakistanis have come to reject US aid because of the strings that they perceive are attached.57

These data point to key districts that seem to be responsible for producing disproportionately more militant recruits than others. Rather than formulating nation-wide policies, the US government should consider the attributes of these districts in particular. If Pakistan were genuinely interested in curbing the Islamist militants it produces (itself a dubious proposition), it could presumably take a more active law enforcement and intelligence approach to identifying district-specific dynamics. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that Pakistan seeks to prevent the production of these militants; on the contrary the state seems to be actively involved in promoting recruitment for the same.

However, not all of these militants are from Pakistan even if they seek training in Pakistan. In fact, many of the HM militants come from Indian-administered Kashmir. This undermines India’s claim that its ‘Kashmir problem’ is all external and attributable to Pakistan. The Indian government may be better motivated to identify and address district-specific challenges for those districts that lie within its administrative remit. Essentially, if India is unable to prevent their citizens from participating in Islamist militancy, it has two options: prevent people from traveling to Pakistan for training or stop them after they have re-entered India to conduct attacks. This suggests better law enforcement, border security, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, with which the Indian state continues to struggle.

Taken together, these findings suggest that participation in Islamist militancy should not be framed within the policy problem of education but rather remain within the rubric of law enforcement, intelligence and counter-terrorism.

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57C. Christine Fair, ‘In a World of Our Own’, The Herald (Feb. 2013), 70-80.
support, there would also be no dataset. The biographies employed by the CTC team are derived from the author’s personal collection as well as from the much more extensive collection provided by Arif Jamal, another CTC team member. Anirban Ghosh not only performed statistical analysis for the CTC project he also provided statistical support for this analysis. In addition to the CTC, the author is grateful to the British International Studies Association for allowing her to present this article at its 2012 conference (held in Edinburgh, Scotland) and the many participants who contributed valuable comments. The author also thanks the US Naval War College for sponsoring that presentation. The author also thanks the Georgetown School of Foreign Service for subsidizing the analysis herein by funding both the work of Mr Ghosh as well as that of Ms Sarah Watson. Ms Watson provided meticulous editorial assistance. Mr Sun Lee, an undergraduate at Georgetown University, created the district-wise maps used herein. Despite the contributions of many, I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.

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