

The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Impacts upon U.S. Interests in Pakistan

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Introduction

After many years of viewing the Afghanistan and Pakistan theatres as distinct if not competing for priority, the Obama administration has inextricably linked the two when it unveiled its White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹ (This policy has come to be known as the “Af-Pak” strategy.) While this phrase is a useful mnemonic to remind all that the two theatres are in fact deeply linked, the term also—albeit inadvertently—suggests erroneously that U.S. interests in the two countries are symmetric. Yet, U.S. interests in both states vary in important ways.

Contemporary thinking about the “Af-Pak” theatre fostered what Steve Cohen has called a “transitive property of security” which suggests that to stabilize Afghanistan, you must stabilize Pakistan. To stabilize Pakistan, the United States must encourage India to undertake actions in Afghanistan and in Kashmir that will attenuate Pakistan’s strategic anxiety. Ostensibly, this would allow Pakistan to focus away from its conventional Indian threat and focus its attention and resources upon its internal security challenges as Pakistan claims. Proponents of this “regional approach” contend that once Pakistan feels at ease with its larger neighbor, it can abandon its long-standing policy of relying upon militant groups to prosecute its interests in Afghanistan and in India.

In this testimony, I argue that this formulation is flawed and indeed critically inverts the primacy of U.S. interests.

Arguably Pakistan—not Afghanistan—is the epicenter of the most intense U.S. national security interests including regional conventional and nuclear stability, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. This suggests that, to a great degree, focusing resources upon Pakistan will greatly enable a pacification of Afghanistan and dampen the Indo-Pakistan security competition.

Securing US Interests in the Wake of the Flawed Afghan Elections?

At last, Afghanistan’s electoral fiasco has been resolved. As is well-known, incumbent President Karzai engaged in massive electoral fraud with as many as one million votes “stolen.” The Electoral Complaints Commission disqualified enough ballots that Karzai fell below the 50 percent threshold, precipitating a run-off election against his main competitor Abdullah Abdullah. After Karzai’s initial refusal to accept this outcome and following successful lobbying by the United States, Karzai finally acceded to a run-off election scheduled for November 7. In the past week, Abdullah withdrew citing that the structural features that permitted the fraud in the first instance remained in place. (No doubt his decision was also motivated by the fact that he would lose and, in the process of participating, legitimize a process that would have been deeply flawed.)

Thus, Karzai will remain Afghanistan's president for the next five years having retained his power through a dubious process. The election was symptomatic of the pervasive corruption and impunity that has come to characterize the Afghan government under Karzai.

Karzai's electoral malfeasance and continuance as president despite the fact that he has virtually no credibility throughout country have brought into focus serious cleavages in U.S. domestic political opinion about the next steps forward in Afghanistan. On the one hand are those proponents who argue for a robust counter-insurgency strategy to be resourced with additional troops and other human and financial resources. On the other are those who argue for an increased separation of the counterinsurgency effort from the counter-terrorism effort with the Afghans taking up the primary responsibility for the former while the United States retains its commitment to the latter.

One of the most controversial elements of this debate is the request for additional troops for the Afghan theatre. While the debate over scaling up or scaling down troops has seized the public's attention, reconfiguring the footprint or mission of US and international troops alone cannot address the problem. Commander ISAF General Stanley McChrystal, in his Commander's Initial Assessment of August 30, 2009, lays out the joint problem clearly:

The ISAF mission faces two principal threats and is subject to the influence of external actors. The first of which is the existence of organized and determined insurgent groups working to expel international forces, separate the Afghan people from GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] *institutions*, and gain control of the population. *The second threat....is the crisis of popular confidence that springs from the weakness of GIROA, the unpunished abuse of power by corrupt officials and power brokers, a widespread sense of political disenfranchisement and a longstanding lack of economic opportunity.* ISAF efforts have further compounded these problems. These factors generate recruits for the insurgent groups, elevate local conflicts and power-broker disputes to a national level, degrade the people's security and quality of life, and undermine international will.²

While analysts and policy makers focus upon the footprint and mission of US troops in Afghanistan because it is *one* of the few things that the United States can directly control, increasingly skeptics of the U.S. ability to win the COIN fight argue that Washington has very little influence over the government in Kabul and lacks the political will and capabilities to persuade Karzai to provide better governance.

Thus if one considers what *can* be done—as opposed what would be ideal to do—victory in Afghanistan is unlikely if “winning” means establishing a competent, reasonably transparent government capable of providing even limited services and increasingly able to pay for itself.

The international community, while it has made numerous missteps, cannot succeed without real reformers at the central, provincial and district levels. General McChrystal, while maintaining that the war is “winnable” conceded the importance of governance and his new strategy calls for a more intense focus upon diminishing corruption among local officials among other course corrections. For this reason, the administration is increasingly looking at sub-national partners and finding ways to “side-step” Kabul and Karzai. However, since Karzai has enormous influence over the appointment of provincial and district-level officials, the success of this approach remains in doubt.

Proponents of scaling up U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan often argue that failure in Afghanistan will spell out a grave future for Pakistan. However, I contend that this formulation reverses cause and effect: Pakistan’s behavior and policies in many ways determine the events and outcomes in Afghanistan and the rest of South Asia.

Pakistan’s Problems: Sources or Results of Instability in Afghanistan?

In 2009, the Pakistan military seemed to embrace vigorous military action to oust Islamist militants who seek to undermine the Pakistani state and who have attacked Pakistani military, paramilitary, intelligence and governance targets. These operations are often characterized as “anti-Taliban.” This terminology confuses because it suggests that Pakistani state has turned its guns on the “Taliban,” when in fact the Afghan Taliban operate freely in the country. Pakistanis, with considerable degrees of justification, blame the U.S. presence in the region for the country’s precipitous internal security situation rather than viewing their insecurity as blow-back from their country’s own national security policies.

Without doubt, the current challenges in Pakistan stem from a number of long-standing policies that have been exacerbated by the post-9/11 events and the onset of military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

To fairly assess the significant degree to which post 9-11 events have contributed to the instability in Pakistan, one first has to forthrightly address the long-standing sources of insecurity that have very little—if anything—to do with the events of 9-11 and their sequelae. This section first lays out these long-standing sources of insecurity. Next it identifies new sources of insecurity that are new and stemming from post-9/11 developments in the region. Importantly, as the third section notes, these new dynamics are deeply influenced by other enduring sources of insecurity.

Militancy and Pakistan Before 9/11

First, while the militants that have targeted the Pakistani state since 2004 have focused the attention of the world, Pakistan’s reliance upon militants is not of recent vintage. Most contemporary media and even analytical accounts of Pakistan assume that Pakistan first engaged in using militants as a tool to prosecute its foreign policy objectives during

the anti-Soviet “jihad” when Pakistan, along with the United States, Saudi Arabia and others, helped build a massive Pakistan-based infrastructure to produce Islamist insurgents generally known as the “mujahadeen.” In most standard accounts, Pakistan subsequently redeployed these battle-hardened operatives to Kashmir in 1990 when the Soviets formally withdrew from Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan has relied upon non-state actors to prosecute its foreign policy objectives in Kashmir and India arguably since its inception in 1947 when it backed a tribal lashkar to invade Kashmir, bringing about the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48.³ Following the failed effort to seize Kashmir in 1947, Pakistan supported numerous covert cells within Indian-administered Kashmir.⁴

Second, contemporary accounts suggest that Pakistan began using Islamist proxies to shape events in Afghanistan in 1979 when the United States—along with Saudi Arabia among other states—provided Pakistan with handsome allurements. Pakistan perennially opines that when the Soviet Union left, the United States abandoned Pakistan to contend with a horrific security environment characterized by a massive proliferation of weapons, militancy, an enormous Afghan refugee problem, and a burgeoning narcotics problem among other serious threats.

While Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the Afghan jihad, Pakistan chose to participate in this policy because of the benefits that it accrued rather than altruism. Moreover—and equally important—Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan did not commence with the December 25, 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather, Pakistan began employing those dissident religious leaders who fled Afghanistan during President Daoud’s tenure. Thus from at least 1973 onward, Pakistan began a policy of instrumentalizing Islamist Pashtun militias to prosecute its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan.⁵ Throughout both periods (pre and post-Soviet invasion), Pakistan preferred militant factions that were outwardly Sunni Islamist (rather than Shia or secular) in orientation and Pashtun in ethnicity. This was a deliberate effort to ensure that Pashtun political aspirations would be channeled through religious—not ethnic—terms. This was motivated by Pakistan’s long-standing discomfiture with Kabul’s irredentist claims to Pakistan’s Pashtun areas and by the activities of Pashtun nationalists demanding a separate Pashtun state (Pashtunistan).⁶

The purported military success of using “mujahadeen-cum-guerillas” in Afghanistan to defeat a nuclear-armed super-power buoyed Pakistan’s confidence in the utility of such war in India. In addition, the “jihad” in Afghanistan produced many battle-hardened jihadis and a sprawling infrastructure to produce jihadis. Thus, with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, Pakistan redeployed many of those “mujahadeen” to the Kashmir front. Many of those Pakistan and Afghanistan-based groups directly competed with Pakistan’s previous client proxies which tended to be more ethnically Kashmiri in composition. By the early 1990s, some of these proxies (e.g. the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force) were no longer supporting unification with Pakistan and were espousing ethno-nationalist demands for independence. After the introduction of “foreign fighters,” many indigenous, pro-independence Kashmir insurgents were eliminated by Pakistan-based group such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and a raft of Deobandi groups (e.g. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, etc). By the mid-1990s, the conflict had

been over-run by several Pakistan-based militant groups (referred to by the misnomer “guest militants”) who were prosecuting Pakistan’s agenda of weakening India and wresting Kashmir from it.⁷ At present, only one set of militant groups are largely Kashmiri in ethnicity (Hizbol-Mujahideen and related factions such as al Badr). All of the other groups are dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns.⁸

While Pakistan has had a long history of using Islamist militants as proxies, the determination that Pakistan had crossed nuclear red lines in the 1980s (as evidenced by the fact that aid could be delivered only by waiving nonproliferation sanctions), likely further emboldened Pakistan to act with impunity. Thus it is likely *not* a coincidence that it began spreading the “jihad” with Pakistani militants after having been designated as a covert nuclear power in 1989 when the United States finally applied proliferation-related sanctions (e.g. the Pressler Amendment). (India essentially became an overt nuclear power following its first explosion of devices in 1974). However, following the 1998 tests, Pakistan extended further its policy of proxy war by launching a limited incursion in Indian-administered Kashmir to seize a small amount of territory in the Kargil-Dras sectors.⁹

These long-standing policies are responsible for a variety of regional threats that persist to date including Pakistan’s ongoing support for the Afghan Taliban as well as a number of other Islamist militant groups that continue to operate in India as well as Afghanistan.¹⁰ However, as will be described below, these long-standing policies exacerbate more recent developments.

9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom: Transformative Events¹¹

While these historical tendencies cannot be denied, nor can the adverse affects of regional events after 9/11. First and foremost, 9/11 and the concomitant U.S.-led military effort (Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) required Pakistan to both abandon the Afghan Taliban—even if that U-turn was imperfect and temporary—under consistent U.S. pressure. Pakistan was also pressed to provide wide-spread logistical and other support to OEF. In the end, Pakistan contributed to OEF in two major ways. First, it permitted over-flight and landing rights for U.S. military and intelligence units; allowed access to some Pakistan bases; provided intelligence and immigration information; cut off most logistical support to the Taliban; and broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Second, Pakistan using military, paramilitary and intelligence assets conducted operations along infiltration routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan in support of U.S. actions across the border.¹² Pakistan is generally credited with cooperating against al Qaeda and supporting U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, even though it adamantly demurred from operating against the Afghan Taliban, whose leadership still enjoys sanctuary in Pakistan.

As is well known, during the course of military operations in Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda operatives and other “foreign fighters” fighting in Afghanistan along side the Taliban (e.g. Uzbeks among others) made their way to Pakistan where they

ensconced themselves in Pakistan's tribal areas. There, they benefited from Afghan Taliban redoubts such as that of Jalaluddin Haqqani, an ally of the Afghan Taliban.

Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan began a series of operations in the tribal belt as early as 2002 in the north without significant consequence. When the army along with the paramilitary force, the Frontier Corps, began operations in South Waziristan in 2004, it found strong resistance from al Qaeda and other foreign elements there. Those operations ended in defeat, ratified by the first deal with militants, the Shakai Accord.¹³

From 2004 onward, several Islamist militant groups emerged who attacked security forces, ousted local administration officials and successfully established micro-emirates of *sharia* within their areas of operation. This occurred first within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

This nascent "Pashtun insurgency" gained more momentum as Pakistan launched more offensives in FATA and as the United States struck targets in FATA using un-manned aerial vehicles. The 2006 U.S. drone strikes in Damadola, Bajaur to eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri and the October 2006 drone strike against an al Qaeda-affiliated madrassah in Chingai village in Bajaur were widely seen as the catalyst for the suicide attacks against security forces in FATA and NWFP. This madrassah in Chingai was run by the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a Sunni militant outfit founded by Sufi Mohammad. Mohammad dispatched 8,000 volunteers into Afghanistan to fight the Americans and Northern Alliance in support of the Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom. While Sufi Muhammad was jailed, his militant son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah took over the organization. Sufi Mohammad's deputy, Maulvi Liaquat, died in the Chingai attack.¹⁴

In late 2007, several of these commanders coalesced under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsood. (Mehsood was killed by a U.S. drone strike in August 2009.) Mehsood claimed many allies, all of whom sought to establish in various degrees *sharia* across the Pashtun belt. Following the death of Baitullah Mehsood, TTP leadership announced amidst some discord that Hakimullah Mehsood would succeed him. It remains to be seen how cohesive the TTP will be under his leadership.¹⁵

While the so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, the phenomenon next spread to Bajaur. The Pakistan Taliban next emerged in areas that had previously been peaceful, such as Mohmand agency, Orakzai, and Kurram. They also emerged in the settled Pashtun areas of Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwar, Dera Ismil Khan, and Swat.¹⁶

There are several reasons that account for the successes of the TTP. Militant groups associated with the TTP effectively exploit weakness of the Pakistani state and governance at the local level, mobilize specific socio-economic grievance in their areas of operation; and gain legitimacy by countering—often violently—those officials who perpetuate the corruption-riven governance structures in the FATA and elsewhere. The

TTP's spread has also come about due to the complete failure of the state to provide a modicum of security to those who resist the Taliban, coupled with the excessive use of force by the Pakistan army against the Pakistani Taliban. Local populations may choose to acquiesce to the local Taliban in part because of the benefits they confer and in part due to the high cost incurred by confronting or opposing them.

Convergence of New and Old Islamist Militant Groups¹⁷

In April 2009, news reports asserted the arrival of the "Punjabi Taliban," referencing the various militant groups ensconced in the Punjab, the most populated province.¹⁸ While it is tempting to view this as a new theatre or even as a future locus of Talibanization in the heartland of the Punjab, these sites of militancy are inter-related. Punjab-based groups such as the Deobandi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM) are allies of the TTP, the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda. These groups have conducted suicide attacks in Pakistan on behalf of the TTP and have served as al Qaeda outsourcers in numerous attacks in Pakistan since 2001. JM leader Masood Azhar was also close to the Taliban. JM, which shares considerable membership and infrastructure with LeJ, was the first South Asian Islamist group in to use suicide attacks in the region. In that 2000 attack, Mohammad Bilal (a British Pakistan) attacked the Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar.¹⁹

Since late 2001 and 2002, many of Pakistan's militant groups – particularly those of Deobandi background – have splintered or have reoriented in terms of targets and tactics. Many of the Deobandi groups are tightly allied to the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban as well as al Qaeda and are increasingly aiming their resources at the Pakistani state even though some elements within these same groups continue to enjoy various levels of formal and informal state support.

These networked relationships underscore the deeply vexing problems with Pakistan's variegated approach towards the elements of its militant landscape. Pakistan cannot truly eliminate even those groups it views as the enemy because it still insists that other militant groups are assets. Pakistan has demonstrated considerable willingness to tolerate near-term risks associated with using militant proxies for the anticipated future battle against India, be it in India or Afghanistan. Pakistan's efforts to maintain some militant groups while pursuing others is a near impossible path to take because many of the Deobandi groups, as noted above, have overlapping membership.

Compelling Pakistan

The United States should continue to support Pakistan's efforts to counter its own enemies. Indeed, Pakistan's operations *do* advance U.S. interests in key ways because these militants provide sanctuary to and otherwise assist both al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. However, it should be noted that these are "positive externalities" rather than deliberate outcomes of Pakistan's operations. However, Pakistan does not share U.S.

interests vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban and a host of other militant groups operating in and from Pakistan. As noted above, Pakistan can safely rely upon militant proxies because its nuclear umbrella raises the cost of conventional military action against it.

Pakistan has not and likely will not abandon these policies in any policy-relevant future principally because it views these policies as the best option, given its neuralgic security concerns regarding India's intentions and capabilities. This understanding has given rise to the notion that India can undertake actions that can mitigate Pakistan's apprehensions.²⁰ However, as India sees itself as an extra-regional power and an emerging global power, India is unlikely to take steps that, from its optic, would reward Pakistan for using terrorism. Moreover, this formulation misdiagnoses the problem. The two states' inability to resolve the Kashmir impasse is symptomatic not causal of the deep distrust that exists between the two states. Moreover, Pakistan's beliefs about India transcend the Kashmir issue. These fears are likely to become more acute as India continues its defense modernization buoyed by its economic growth, deepens ties with Pakistan's neighbors, and continues to enjoy strategic ties with the United States, Israel, and Russia among other countries. In contrast, Pakistan's economic woes, its concatenation of governance crises, past nuclear proliferation, and other dangerous policies threaten to again isolate Pakistan as a continuous source of international insecurity.

A hard assessment of Pakistan's behavior suggests a compellence problem whereby the United States must recondition Pakistan's perceptions of the costs and benefits of its current policies both through the development of new political and financial allurements as well as new negative inducements. U.S. abilities to engage in a compellence campaign against Pakistan are highly restricted by its reliance upon Pakistan to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. The logistical supply lines move through Pakistan and this dependence upon Pakistan will deepen as more troops enter the Afghan theatre.

Pakistan's preference that Afghanistan remains unstable rather than strong and allied to India prompts Pakistan to pursue those very policies that foster the current security situation. Perversely, Pakistan has been handsomely rewarded to facilitate the war on terror while dramatically undermining the same.²¹ Admittedly, the insurgency in Afghanistan is sustained by numerous problems with the Afghan government as well as with the international military presence there. However, it is also undeniable that Pakistan's continued support to insurgents contributes to the deepening security crises in Afghanistan that continue to absorb U.S. and international financial and human resources.

Conclusions: What Are the Options?

While the United States government and public reconsiders the modalities of U.S. commitment in Afghanistan due to severe shortcomings in its partnership with Karzai, U.S. commitments in Afghanistan continue to be undermined by a wider suite of Pakistani policies despite Pakistan's military commitments to eliminate the Pakistan Taliban.

Arguably, to be successful in Afghanistan, the United States needs real partners in Kabul and Islamabad. If the past is any predictor of the future, such partners are unlikely to materialize any time soon. Moreover, Panglossian assessments of what the United States *should* do to influence political will in these capitals overshadow what *can* be done in practice.

I recommend reformulating and repositioning U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan to identify Pakistan as the most critical locus of grave U.S. national security challenges. This likely requires one to consider how United States can protect its interests in the region without a decisive defeat of the Afghan Taliban in the near-term while hoping to persuade Pakistan to cease interfering in Afghanistan over the long-term. This is surely a necessary if insufficient condition for Afghanistan to stabilize. Such reorientation may involve greater focus upon counter-terrorism rather than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan while continuing to focus upon building Afghan national security forces. This would allow the United States overtime to decrease its kinetic footprint in Afghanistan and lessen its requirement for Pakistan for logistical support.

Second, securing Afghanistan and stabilizing the region will require the United States, working with international partners, to create space to compel Pakistan to cease supporting all militant groups operating on its territory over a reasonable timeframe. Surely, this will require the United States to diminish its reliance upon Pakistan to fight the war in Afghanistan. Without doing so, Washington will be unlikely muster the political will to apply negative inducements. Negative inducements alone will not succeed: Washington must also consider new positive inducements. The last six decades demonstrate the financial and military assistance is unlikely to change Pakistan's cost benefit calculus away from supporting Islamist militants. This will also require the United States to seriously invest in Pakistan's civilian institutions to improve the likelihood that rule of law has any future in Pakistan.

The presence of U.S. and international military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan focuses policy upon that theatre. However, Pakistan-based militants have precipitated a near war situation in 2001-02 and stoked fears of a conventional Indo-Pakistan conflict with possible nuclear escalation. The international community worried that the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack would precipitate a similar crisis. Few are confident that India will countenance a future attack on the scale of Mumbai. Moreover, Pakistan's militant groups pose threats not only to the region but also to the international community. Recall that Pakistan was also a key state in the perpetration of the 9/11 attacks. And Pakistan has been the source of significant nuclear technology proliferation, the fruits of which are evident in the proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea.

In conclusion, the United States should realistically reconsider its prioritization of the Afghan and Pakistan theatres in light of the limits of U.S. resources and capabilities. Certainly, successfully prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is no doubt preferable to any other outcome. However, given that this may not be possible, Washington should consider finding a realistic way of jointly optimizing the need to

secure its paramount interests in Afghanistan and in Pakistan even if this means scaling down its commitments in Afghanistan to permit greater clarity of policy and action in Pakistan.

Biography

C. Christine Fair has a PhD from the Department of South Asian Languages and Civilization in 2004 and an MA in the Harris School of Public Policy. Prior to joining the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, she has served as a senior political scientist with the RAND, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. Her research focuses upon political and military affairs in South Asia. She has authored, co-authored and co-edited several books including *Treading Softly on Sacred Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations on Sacred Space* (OUP, 2008); *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (USIP, 2008), *Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance* (USIP, 2006); among others and has written numerous peer-reviewed articles covering a range of security issues in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. She is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, serves on the editorial board of *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and served as the Managing Editor of *India Review* from January 2007 to November 1, 2009.

¹ See U.S. White House, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, March 27, 2009. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.

² Commander NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, *Commander's Initial Assessment*, August 30, 2009. Redacted version available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf.

³ For various accounts, see Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords* (New York: OUP, 2008), Shuja Nawaz, "The First Kashmir War Revisited," *India Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2008), pp. 115-54; Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

⁴ The most detailed account of this is given by Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2005* (London: Routledge, 2007). Swami used a number of classified Indian documents (which were subsequently declassified) obtained in his capacity as a journalist. See also Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁵ See Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) and Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Democracy in Afghanistan* (Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2005).

⁶ See Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* and Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Democracy in Afghanistan*.

⁷ See *inter alia* Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*; Alexander Evans, "The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 69-81; Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008). See also Sumit Ganguly, "A Mosque, A Shrine, and Two Sieges," in C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly Eds. *Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency in Sacred Spaces* (New York: Oxford, 2008), pp. 66-88.

⁸ See C. Christine Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2008) and C. Christine Fair, "Militant recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qa'ida and Other Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 27(6) (November/December 2004).

⁹ See Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Medby. *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

¹⁰ Both LeT and several Deobandi militant groups have also been operating in Afghanistan against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces. See C. Christine Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack Upon Mumbai," testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on March 11, 2009.

¹¹ This section draws from two publications, Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2009 and Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, "Pakistan's War Within," *Survival*, forthcoming November 27, 2009.

¹² For a detailed account of Pakistan's contributions, see in C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with India and Pakistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004). For a detailed account of Pakistan's varied operations against militants since 9/11, see Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹³ For details about this and the other deals, see Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹⁴ While drone strikes were at first infrequent, they have become more routine. Between August 2008 and April 1 2009, there were at least 30 drone strikes which may have killed as many as 300 people. While the political leadership complain about this, it is widely believed that the targeting of militants in FATA is done with the tacit knowledge and input from the Pakistan army, public displays of outrage notwithstanding. See "Many killed in 'US drone Attack,'" *BBC News*, April 1, 2009. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7975871.stm. Also see Tom Coghlan, Zahid Hussain, Jeremy Page, "Secrecy and denial as Pakistan lets CIA use airbase to strike militants," *The Times*, April 17, 2009. Available at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5755490.ece>.

¹⁵ Long-time observer of militancy in Pakistan, Mariam Abu-Zahab, strongly discounts the claims that the TTP is a coherent alliance. She argues that the constituent parts of this inchoate alliance are driven by local factors and constrained, in good measure, by tribal boundaries and leadership circumscribed by this boundary. Thus she discounts the most capacious claims that the TTP is a coherent organization running the length and width of the Pashtun belt. This view has been buttressed by field interviews in Pakistan in February and April, 2009. A number of commanders operate in specific agencies, such as: Mullah Nazir (South Waziristan), Hafiz Gul Bahadur (North Waziristan), Mangal Bagh (Khyber) Mullah Fazlullah (Swat), Faqir Mohammad (Bajaur), Sufi Mohammad (Lower Dir), and Hakimullah Mehsood (South Waziristan, successor to slain Baitullah Mehsood). In addition, foreign fighter networks are also active, including al Qaeda and several of its key commanders (such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid) and the recently killed Uzbek fighter Tahir Yuldashev.

¹⁶ C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan Loses Swat to Local Taliban," *Terrorism Focus*, 4(37) (2007).

¹⁷ This section draws from two publications, Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," and Fair and Jones, "Pakistan's War Within."

¹⁸ See Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. O'Connell Jr. and Eric Schmitt, "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," *New York Times*, April 13, 2009. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html>.

¹⁹ Author interviews with Pakistani journalists and terrorism analyst in February 2009. Also see Emma Brockes, "British man named as bomber who killed 10," *The Guardian*, December 28, 2000. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/dec/28/india.kashmir>.

²⁰ This argument has been elaborated by Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 87, No. 6 (November/December 2008)

²¹ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds," GAO-08-932T, June 24, 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T>; U.S. Government Accountability Office, "The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," GAO-08-622, April 2008, <http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20080417120235.pdf>; Craig Cohen, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2007); Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When \$10 Billion Is Not Enough," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 2007); Greg Miller, "Pakistan Fails to Aim Billions in U.S. Military Aid at al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, November 5, 2007, p. A1.