

## Research Note

# Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries

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*This research note explores aspects of the demand for terrorism using data from the Pew Research Center. With these data from 7,849 adult respondents persons within 14 Muslim countries, this article explores who supports terrorism. It is shown that females, younger persons, and those who believe Islam is under threat are more likely to support terrorism. Very poor respondents and those who believe that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics are less likely to support terrorism than others. Because these affects vary throughout the countries studies, it is argued that interventions must be highly tailored, using detailed demographic and psychographic data.*

## Introduction and Motivation for this Research

Since the spectacular terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (henceforth 9/11), quantitative analyses of terrorism and the subset suicide terrorism have proliferated. Many of these studies have focused upon the supply of terrorist manpower and the attributes of terrorists. These findings have generally found that terrorists tend to be male, better educated, and less likely to be from economically deprived backgrounds, relative to the populations from which they are drawn. The findings of various studies have been mixed with respect to marital status and propensity to be a terrorist.<sup>1</sup>

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This research was conducted under the auspices of USIP's Research and Studies program. It is the first of several inquiries into the demand-side determinants of terrorism and the implications for terrorism mitigation efforts.

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Although these supply-side studies continue to propagate, there have been no comparable quantitative efforts to examine the explanatory powers of demographic variables upon *demand* (also known as support) for terrorism generally or suicide terrorism in particular.<sup>2</sup> As a consequence, there have been few systemic efforts to exposit determinants of the support that terrorism and terrorists garner among the population on whose behalf terrorist organizations claim to act and from which terrorist cadre and commanders are drawn. Yet, understanding the determinants of the demand for terrorism is a fundamental piece of the analytical puzzle.

This research note seeks to address in modest measure these empirical lacunae by exploring aspects of the demand for terrorism using data that have been recently made available by the Pew Institute (henceforth Pew). These data have not been extensively used for these purposes. These data are comprised of respondent-level data for 7,849 adult persons across 14 countries with predominantly Muslim populations or large Muslim minorities within Africa and Southwest, South, and Southeast Asia. These data are analyzed to draw out who supports terrorism and what their characteristics are.

Consonant with the public and scholarly concern about Islamist terrorism generally and suicide terrorism in particular, Pew fielded a survey in 14 countries with predominantly Muslim populations or with large Muslim minorities in 2002. Pew's survey instrument collected several kinds of data about the respondent and included a question that Pew hoped would query support for suicide terrorism. Unfortunately, while the question used by Pew gives primary emphasis to suicide terrorism, the phrasing of the question pertains to *all* varieties of attacks against civilian targets. Pew has used these data to explicitly address countrywide aggregate support for *suicide* terrorism in these countries despite the problematic phrasing of this key question.<sup>3</sup>

The present analysis (using summary statistics and regression analysis) finds that in many cases, females are more likely to support terrorism than males, holding all other characteristics constant. It was also found that younger persons are more likely to support terrorism than older people, but support for the tactic among older persons is still high in many countries (again, this is true when all other variables are held constant). The analysis suggested that, keeping other characteristics the same, those who are very poor are less likely to support terrorism, but those who are not extremely poor are more likely to support it. The data and concomitant analyses of the data cannot make claims about income groups. Persons who believe that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics are *more* likely to support terrorism than those who do not hold this view, all other attributes invariant. Finally, it was found that persons who believed that Islam was under threat were more likely to support terrorism than those who did not have such threat perceptions, all other variables held invariant. Most importantly, it was found that although these generalizations hold, the affect of these various variables vary throughout the 14 countries in question. These findings suggest that effective demand-side interventions to mitigate support for terrorism should be directed towards highly-defined, country-specific target audiences. This market segmentation will likely require creative analytical application of demographic and even psychographic data.<sup>4</sup>

The remainder of this research note will be organized in the following manner. The second section will describe the data and methodology employed. The third section presents key findings from the descriptive analysis of these data. The fourth section details finding from the econometric modeling of support for terrorism. The fifth and final section concludes with a discussion of the results and their particular implications for counterterrorism efforts.

## Data and Methodology

### Data

This article employs the data from The Global Attitudes Survey 2002, conducted by the Pew. Although this dataset represents a very general survey of respondents in 44 countries across the globe, it specifically includes 14 countries that are either predominantly Muslim or have large Muslim minorities (henceforth the inelegant short-hand “Muslim countries” will be used to reference these states). Most of the samples were nationally representative. However, there were several countries wherein the samples were predominantly urban. For purposes of this analysis of Muslim countries, it should be noted that this caveat applies to samples for Egypt, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Pakistan, and Senegal.<sup>5</sup>

It is important to note that because Pew fielded and completed the country surveys between July and October 2002, all data were collected well in advance of the US-led operations against Iraq, which commenced in March 2003. While vigorous discussions about military operations in Iraq were occurring in the media and within various multi-lateral forums by the end of the summer 2002, most of the fieldwork was completed before these talks gained momentum later that year. While these data certainly reflect a changed global reality following 9/11 they do not reflect public opinion about US-led military actions in Iraq.

Within these countries with large Muslim populations, Muslim respondents were asked several questions related to their religious beliefs and their place in a modernizing and increasingly connected world. They were asked the following question:

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified or never justified?

Responses to this question comprise the outcome variable in this analyses. Responses ranged from one through four (1 = “Often Justified,” 2 = “Sometimes Justified,” 3 = “Rarely Justified,” and 4 = “Never Justified.”) Note that this question was not asked in Egypt.<sup>6</sup> *For purposes of the descriptive statistics, this variable was recoded such that higher values indicate higher levels of support for the tactic.* Thus, upon recoding, this variable took the values: 4 = “Often Justified,” 3 = “Sometimes Justified,” 2 = “Rarely Justified,” and 1 = “Never Justified.” For purposes of the regression analysis only, this measure was recoded as dichotomous variable (0 = Never Justified and 1 = Ever Justified) and analyzed it using both descriptive statistics as well as logistic regression.

The authors are cognizant that this question is inherently framed within the context of Islam. Ideally, they would prefer a question devoid of religious verbiage; however, because the assumption of this religious connection to suicide bombing and other forms of violence is so ubiquitous in the countries included, the allusion to it in this question is likely to be irrelevant. (Obviously, if looking at countries such as Sri Lanka or India where non-Islamist groups have employed the tactic, this phraseology of the question would be utterly inappropriate.)

As noted earlier, the question also conflates suicide terrorism (a subset of terrorism) with all other forms of attacks against civilian targets (the superset of terrorism). Pew

has used to this question to make claims about the support for *suicide terrorism*, despite the fact that the question does not address this issue in isolation from other forms of terrorism. It is possible that people may feel very differently about suicide terrorism than they do about terrorism in general. It is also possible that given the primary emphasis on suicide terrorism, respondents may cue off this emphasis depending on how the question was administered during the fielding of the survey. It is preferable that this question be disaggregated into specific queries about support for terrorism generally and suicide terrorism in particular. It is recommended that these issues (reference to Islam and the conflation of suicide terrorism with terrorism generally) be considered in future surveys.

### ***Empirical Methods***

This analysis utilizes both descriptive statistical measures to provide broad overviews of how support for terrorism varies within the respondent samples of the 14 Muslim countries by specific groups, such as age groups, gender, and marital status. (Because of the already-noted problem with the distribution of urban respondents, the authors were unable to provide cross tabulations of urban and non-urban respondents.) All summary statistics were derived using appropriate weights provided by Pew. Building on these summary statistics, the article next utilizes logistical regression to explain with greater complexity the variation in support for terrorism across the respondents in the sample.

The authors estimate regression models evaluating support for terrorism, using the dichotomous variable (0 = Never Justified, 1 = Ever Justified) as the dependent variable. A discussion is now of the independent variables employed in the models and the theoretical and empirical bases for their inclusion.

*Demographic variables.* Important demographic variables such as “sex” (female = 1), “age” (continuous 18–94) and “marital status” (married = 1, all other = 0) were included in the models because their characterization will be important to any public diplomacy campaign or targeted intervention. These variables are also important because the conventional wisdom is that young, unmarried males are the most likely candidates for participating in or supporting a terrorist campaign.<sup>7</sup> This is true despite the growing literature on female terrorists.<sup>8</sup>

*Proxies for socioeconomic status.* Economic comparisons based on monetary units is difficult given the wide variety of currencies and their exchange rates and the complex and highly debated modeling techniques to control for purchasing power parity.<sup>9</sup> Instead, two proxy questions were used to instrument the effects of socioeconomic variables on support for terrorism. These questions asked, “Have there been times in the past year when you did not have enough money to buy food your family needed?” and “Have there been times in the past year when you did not have enough money to buy clothes your family needed?” Both questions had “yes” and “no” (recoded to 1 and 0, respectively) as available responses.

These proxies for economic resources are important to an understanding of the linkages between poverty and support for terrorism. According to deprivation theory, it would be expected that there would be one of two relationships between these economic variables. Individuals with neither food nor money to buy clothes would support violent behaviors as a result of frustration manifested in aggression or support for aggression. But relative deprivation theory also suggests that there may be a threshold point at which the relationships between poverty and support for terrorism change.<sup>10</sup>

On a similar conceptual note, use of these variables permit an exploration of aspects

of Maslow's hierarchy of needs.<sup>11</sup> According to this theory, when basic needs are unmet, their satiation is the primary focus of motivation. Extremely economically deprived persons do not have the "luxury" of expending efforts toward issues unrelated to day-to-day survival. Once basic needs are met, the needs of the next level can be addressed. These issues will be explored through the use of these socioeconomic proxies in the present model.

The impact of ownership of a cell phone and a computer to instrument for variation in support for terrorism were also explored. These variables are difficult to interpret because they can reflect at least two different aspects about those who possess them. On the one hand, owners of these technologies are likely to have higher SES than those who do not have these items. In this sense these variables may behave like socioeconomic proxies and would comport with the noted earlier predictions.

On the other hand, these variables also suggest a degree of connectivity and ability to access information in ways that non-owners would not have. Ownership of these items may also correlate to other means of accessing information or even suggest different ways of understanding information than non-owners. Clearly, this is not identical to socioeconomic status.

If seen as measures of connectivity and accessibility to information, there is no explicit prediction as to how ownership of a cell phone and a computer would explain variation in support for terrorism. If these variables are seen as indexing greater access to information, their affect could be in either direction. If the information they receive is accurate and contributes to their threat perception, then greater access to information would produce an increase in the propensity to support terrorism. Access to information may dispel myths and misinformation, but the ownership of these technologies is likely to be less important than the content of the information they convey. But this too may suggest opportunities for public diplomacy interventions.

*Religiopolitical Sentiments.* We also included an explanatory variable that characterized respondents' religio-political sentiments. Specifically, respondents were asked to give their level of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Religious leaders should play a larger role in politics." Four response categories ranging from "1=completely disagree" to "4=completely agree" were available. While there is no theoretical prediction as to how this variable will behave, one may surmise that if respondents view terrorists or their organizations as a manifestation of religious leadership *and* if respondents believe that religious leaders should have greater role in politics, then larger values for this variable should correlate with higher support for terrorism. While a priori ambiguous, this variable is important because it helps characterize the legitimacy and authority that religious leaders play within politics and therefore may identify potential partners in a public diplomacy campaign.

*Threat perception variables.* Two variables were also included that represent two different kinds of threat perceptions as predictors for support of terrorism. First, a variable was included that indicated agreement with the statement "The influence of other religions is the greatest threat to Islam today." Individuals who agreed with this were given a value of "1;" all others received a value of "0."

The second threat variable instruments the influence of nationalist threats that are not explicitly imbued with religious sentiment on support for terrorism. The individual's agreement or disagreement with the statement that "There are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to (respondent's country)" was used. The four response categories ranged from "completely agree" (a value of 1) to "completely disagree" (a value of 4). This variable is important because it often argued that pivotal conflicts (e.g., Palestine,

Chechnya, Kashmir) animate the sentiments of those who support terrorism and even motivate those who perpetrate the tactic. Presumably, explicating the role of these threat perceptions on support for terrorism may identify potential opportunities for public diplomacy interventions. (The empirical hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.)

In addition, dummy variables were included for each country to control for state-specific effects that are not explicitly controlled for in the model. Each regression model is benchmarked to Mali, which is the excluded case. (Mali was chosen as the benchmark case because support for terrorism in that country is nearly identical to the overall sample mean.) Thus all country coefficients and the corresponding analysis are relative to Mali. Because the affect of some variables on support for terrorism may depend on characteristics of the particular country, various interactions were permitted (e.g., between gender and the state in question) with these country-level dummy variables. However, most of these interactions proved to be statistically insignificant, as is apparent in the appropriate tables. The first model estimate contains no interaction variables whereas the second through the fifth examine various interactions effects.

Because the outcome variable is dichotomous, the logistic regression method was used to estimate the five models. Because of the nonlinear basis of logistic regression, the regression results cannot be used to predict the direct effect of various variables in the model in a straightforward way.

Instead, the marginal effects of each of the variables must be calculated. In the case of a dichotomous variable (value of 1 or 0), the marginal effect indicates the change in probability when that dummy variable value is changed (e.g., from zero to one), while holding all other variables at their sample means. In one case (role of religious leaders), the variable is a polychotomous variable (values 1, 2, 3, 4). To estimate the marginal affect of this variable, the change in predicted probability of support was calculated when that value is changed from 1 to 4, holding all other variables at their sample means (the marginal effect for this variable will be different if you use different reference points, say changing the variable from 1 to 2, 2 to 3, 3 to 4, etc.). In estimating the effect of age, which is a continuous variable, the probability of supporting terrorism for various values of age holding all variables at the sample means was predicted and these predicted values were graphed as a function of age.

In all analyses a generalized weight was applied, which was supplied by PEW. Sample sizes (which are affected by the application of the weights) are held constant within the regressions but vary in other areas, such as the presentation of the descriptive statistics. The number of valid respondents is presented in the relevant tables. SPSS version 11.0 for Windows was used for this analysis.

## **Descriptive Statistics**

Across the 14 countries studied, the support for terrorism had a sample mean of 2.05. (Recall that a value of 2 indicates that terrorism is “rarely justified.”) The country with the highest support for terrorism was Lebanon with a mean of 3.15 out of a maximum value of 4. The country with the lowest support was Uzbekistan with a mean of 1.22. The overall summary statistics for terrorism support among respondents of these 14 countries, as well the sample size and nation-wise composition of the sample is given in Table 2.

Support for terrorism was next disaggregated within the 14 countries by age (those younger than 40 and those 40 years and older), gender, and marital status. To do so, pair-wise *t*-tests were performed on the sample mean on the outcome variable (support terrorism). These results are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5. (The Levene’s Test for

**Table 1**  
Table of empirical hypothesis

Variable	Hypothesis
Female	There is no explicit prediction as to how gender would influence support for terrorism despite the popular belief that females are less likely to be involved in terrorism.
Age	There is no explicit prediction as to how age would influence support for terrorism, despite the widespread perception that older people are less likely to be involved in terrorism.
Married	Conventional wisdom holds that married persons would be less likely to support suicide terrorism although there is no explicit prediction as to how marital status would influence support for terrorism.
No money for food	The literature on terrorism suggests that extremely poor persons may be less interested in social events such as terrorism given their immediate preoccupation with survival.
No money for clothes	There is no explicit prediction as this variable. One could argue that if one has enough money for food but not enough for clothing, he/she may be more concerned with social events such as terrorism. If this is the case, affirmative answers would predict an increase in support for terrorism. However, if this variable indexes extreme poverty, it could decrease support for terrorism.
Religious leaders should play larger role in politics	There is no explicit prediction for this variable. Outcomes will depend upon whether or not the respondent believes that terrorists and/or terrorist organizations comprise any source of legitimate religious leadership.
Influence of other religions is a threat	Agreement with this statement would increase the likelihood of supporting terrorism.
There are parts of neighboring countries that belong to us	In countries with outstanding territorial disputes, agreement with this variable should increase likelihood of supporting terrorism.
Ownership of cell phone	There is no explicit predicted affect on support for terrorism.
Ownership of computer	There is no explicit predicted affect on support for terrorism.

**Table 2**  
Descriptive statistics for support for terrorism  
(higher mean indicates greater support for terrorism)

Country	Mean	<i>n</i>	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.	% of total <i>n</i>
Lebanon	3.15	554	1.05	1	4	7.06
Ivory Coast	2.55	98	1.13	1	4	1.25
Bangladesh	2.47	476	1.13	1	4	6.07
Nigeria	2.44	318	1.13	1	4	4.05
Jordan	2.34	873	1.06	1	4	11.12
Pakistan	2.20	1522	1.29	1	4	19.39
Mali	2.06	602	1.02	1	4	7.66
Senegal	1.91	644	1.09	1	4	8.21
Ghana	1.91	85	1.01	1	4	1.08
Uganda	1.83	110	1.04	1	4	1.40
Indonesia	1.77	925	0.97	1	4	11.79
Tanzania	1.61	230	0.92	1	4	2.93
Turkey	1.44	847	0.85	1	4	10.79
Uzbekistan	1.22	566	0.60	1	4	7.21
Sample mean	2.05	7849	1.16	1	4	100.00

*Source:* Author tabulations using data obtained from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002.

Equality of Variances was used to determine whether equal or unequal variances should be assumed.) On the main it was found that there were relatively few statistically different group means (at the 0.1 significance level or lower). This was surprising given the large sample sizes in some of these countries. However, it must be kept in mind that these comparisons are not fully controlled. For instance, whereas marital status is controlled in one comparison, individuals vary in all other respects (age, gender, SES, etc.) In a more fully controlled analysis where similar individuals are compared (e.g., regression analyses), the impact of any one characteristic (e.g., age, gender, marital status, SES) may become prominent both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.

The descriptive analysis has produced the following general observations:

- **Variation within Age Groups.** Statistically significant between-group variation was found in only in five countries. In Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, respondents under 40 years of age were more likely to support the tactic than those who were 40 years or older (see Table 3 for details).
- **Variation by Marital Status.** Statistically significant between-group variation was found in three countries. In Ghana married persons were more likely to support terrorism than unmarried persons. In Pakistan and Tanzania, unmarried persons were more likely to support terrorism (see Table 4).
- **Variation by Gender.** Statistically significant variation between groups was found in only four countries. In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Jordan females were more likely than males to support terrorism whereas females in Nigeria were less likely to do so (see Table 5).

The impacts of these variables were then explored more rigorously in the following discussion of the regression analyses.



**Table 3**  
Support for terrorism among those 40 years  
and above and those below the age of 40

Country name	> = 40 mean (n) (Std. error)	<40 mean (n) (Std. error)	T statistic
Bangladesh	0.67 (160) 0.037	0.71 (293) 0.027	-0.808
Ivory Coast	0.80 (11) 0.128	0.73 (87) 0.048	0.458
Ghana	0.64 (28) 0.092	0.45 (56) 0.067	1.707
Indonesia	0.46 (283) 0.030	0.43 (642) 0.020	0.897
Mali	0.62 (186) 0.036	0.60 (406) 0.024	0.560
Nigeria‡	0.75 (115) 0.41	0.69 (203) 0.032	1.024
Pakistan‡	0.45 (419) 0.024	0.52 (1048) 0.015	2.378**
Senegal‡	0.40 (208) 0.034	0.53 (436) 0.024	-2.995*****
Tanzania	0.39 (112) 0.046	0.33 (115) 0.044	0.977
Turkey‡	0.21 (295) 0.024	0.26 (550) 0.019	-1.655*

(Table continues next page)

**Table 3**  
Support for terrorism among those 40 years  
and above and those below the age of 40 (*Continued*)

Country name	> = 40 mean (n) (Std. error)	<40 mean (n) (Std. error)	T statistic
Uganda	0.46 (28) 0.096	0.39 (76) 0.056	0.634
Uzbekistan	0.12 (204) 0.023	0.15 (362) 0.019	-1.109
Lebanon <sup>‡</sup>	0.83 (178) 0.029	0.90 (367) 0.016	-2.163**
Jordan <sup>‡</sup>	0.63 (344) 0.026	0.76 (529) 0.019	-4.010****

<sup>‡</sup>Indicates that equal variances were not assumed. \*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\*at the 0.05 level and \*at the 0.1 level. Derived from author tabulations of data from Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2002.

### Regression Analyses

The first logistic regression model that was examined includes support for terrorism as the dependent variable. Independent variables include the demographic, socioeconomic, political, religious, and threat perception variables as well as the dummy indicators for each country. (The regression results, along with sample means, are presented in Table 6.) As described earlier, the marginal effects were calculated for those variables that were significant in the regression at least at 0.1 level of significance (These predicted marginal effects are presented in Table 7). This higher cutoff threshold was used because cell sizes are small in many of these models.

Among the demographic variables explored in this model (age, gender, marital status), only age and gender were significant. The marginal effect of being female (relative to being male) was 7.65 percent (see Table 7). Using data from this model, the probability of supporting terrorism as a function of age was also predicted (this graph is given in Figure 1 and is derived by calculating the marginal effect of age for different years, holding all other variables at their sample means).

These data suggest that older respondents were less likely to support the tactic than those who were younger. It is notable that even at the highest age in the sample's range (62), predicted support is still above 45 percent.

The analyses of variables on SES yielded interesting and complex results. Individuals

**Table 4**  
Support for terrorism among married and unmarried respondents

Country name	> = 40 mean (n) (Std. error)	<40 mean (n) (Std. error)	T statistic
Bangladesh	0.77 (107) 0.041	0.69 (369) 0.024	1.550
Ivory Coast‡	0.78 (61) 0.054	0.67 (36) 0.079	1.121
Ghana	0.33 (21) 0.105	0.57 (63) 0.063	1.909*
Indonesia	0.46 (193) 0.036	0.43 (732) 0.018	0.566
Mali‡	0.58 (237) 0.032	0.62 (365) 0.025	1.051
Nigeria	0.68 (96) 0.048	0.73 (222) 0.030	-0.952
Pakistan‡	0.54 (410) 0.025	0.49 (1106) 0.015	1.844*
Senegal	0.51 (304) 0.029	0.47 (341) 0.027	0.969
Tanzania	0.47 (62) 0.064	0.32 (168) 0.036	2.060**
Turkey	0.26 (260) 0.027	0.23 (585) 0.017	0.829

(Table continues next page)

**Table 4**  
Support for terrorism among married  
and unmarried respondents (*Continued*)

Country name	> = 40 mean (n) (Std. error)	<40 mean (n) (Std. error)	T statistic
Uganda	0.32 (22) 0.102	0.47 (88) 0.053	-1.247
Uzbekistan	0.14 (164) 0.027	0.14 (402) 0.018	-0.171
Lebanon <sup>‡</sup>	0.86 (282) 0.021	0.88 (269) 0.020	-0.933
Jordan	0.72 (229) 0.030	0.70 (637) 0.018	0.572

<sup>‡</sup>Indicates that equal variances were not assumed. \*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\*at the 0.05 level and \*at the 0.1 level. Derived from author tabulations of data from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002.

who reported having insufficient funds for food during the course of the past year were *less* likely to support suicide terrorism than those without such problems (marginal effect of -6.6 percent). However, those who reported having inadequate money for clothing were more likely to support terrorism with a marginal effect of 4.28 percent. Individuals who owned their own cellular phone and their own computers were also more likely to support terrorism than those without such technologies with marginal effects of 4.25 and 8.75 percent, respectively. Thus whether one views these variables as denoting SES or informational access, both ownership of a cell phone and a computer indicate increased support for suicide terrorism, all else equal (see data in Table 7).

Respondents who felt that religious leaders should play a larger role in government were significantly *more* likely to support terrorism. The marginal effect of moving between complete disagreement (1) and complete agreement (4) was 20.91 percent.

Among the threat variables, in the un-interacted model (model 1), territorial disputes were not significant. (Note that in ongoing work, the authors are examining country-specific models. In some of these within-country models, this variable *is* significant even though it is not significant in this model of across-country effects.) The variable indicating respondent perceptions that Islam is under threat was significant (at .05 level) with a marginal effect of 6.77 percent.

**Table 5**  
Support for terrorism among males and females

Country name	> = 40 mean (n) (Std. error)	<40 mean (n) (Std. error)	T statistic
Bangladesh‡	0.65 (229) 0.031	0.76 (247) 0.027	2.649***
Ivory Coast	0.78 (47) 0.062	0.70 (51) 0.065	0.822
Ghana	0.56 (54) 0.068	0.42 (31) 0.090	1.205
Indonesia	0.44 (446) 0.024	0.44 (479) 0.023	0.153
Mali‡	0.58 (316) 0.028	0.64 (285) 0.029	1.456
Nigeria‡	0.76 (174) 0.032	0.65 (144) 0.040	2.178**
Pakistan	0.43 (922) 0.016	0.62 (600) 0.020	7.300****
Senegal	0.51 (337) 0.027	0.47 (307) 0.029	1.115
Tanzania	0.35 (121) 0.043	0.38 (109) 0.047	-0.456
Turkey	0.23 (429) 0.020	0.25 (418) 0.021	-0.539

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**Table 5**  
Support for terrorism among males and females (*Continued*)

Country name	> = 40 mean ( <i>n</i> ) (Std. error)	<40 mean ( <i>n</i> ) (Std. error)	T statistic
Uganda	0.47 (62) 0.064	0.40 (48) 0.071	0.749
Uzbekistan	0.15 (290) 0.021	0.14 (276) 0.021	0.204
Lebanon	0.87 (300) 0.020	0.88 (254) 0.021	-0.395
Jordan <sup>‡</sup>	0.65 (462) 0.022	0.78 (411) 0.020	-4.362****

<sup>‡</sup>Indicates that equal variances were not assumed. \*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\*at the 0.05 level and \*at the 0.1 level. Derived from author tabulations of data from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002.

To allow the affect of key variables to vary within the specific states, several models were run wherein select variables were interacted with the country-level indicators. This is done during the statistical programming process by forming new variables comprised of products, for example: female × Bangladesh. The calculation of the total marginal effect for being female in Bangladesh would require the use of estimates for the female variable as well as this Bangladesh-specific cross term. Specifically, country indicators were interacted with gender, threat perception, and the variable indicating the respondent owns computer. These variables were selected based on an examination of the *t*-test analyses, significance and magnitude of the variables in the un-interacted model, and upon the analysis of state-level models. The regression coefficients and the list of variables for these models are given in Table 6. Calculated marginal effects are given in Tables 8–10.

- Model 2 includes all variables used in Model 1 as well as six variables that are interactions between the gender variable and the state-level dummies. In general, these interactions were not significant. Only four interactions were significant at the 0.1 significance level. Analysts who prefer a significance-level cutoff of 0.05 would not consider these interactions to be significant.
- Model 3 consists of all variables used in Model 1 as well as six variables that are interactions between the threat (to Islam) perception variable and the country

**Table 6**  
Logistic regression results for support for terrorism (Models 1–5) and weighted sample means

Variable	Model 1 (B)	Model 2 (B)	Model 3 (B)	Model 4 (B)	Model 5 (B)	Sample mean (weighted)
Female	0.308***	0.444**	0.314***	0.307***	0.458**	0.44
Age	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.008***	35.127
Married	-0.018	-0.01	-0.023	-0.018	-0.014	0.68
No money for food	-0.247***	-0.251***	-0.257***	-0.253***	-0.27***	0.4
No money for clothes	0.172**	0.172**	0.182**	0.18**	0.191**	0.41
Respondent owns a computer	0.356***	0.365***	0.354***	3.144*	3.17*	0.12
Respondent owns cell phone	0.171**	0.143*	0.17**	0.1620*	0.132*	0.23
Religious leaders should play a larger role in politics	0.283***	0.281***	0.283***	0.275***	0.273***	2.78
(1 = completely agree, 4 = completely disagree)						
There are parts of neighboring countries that belong to X.	-0.004	0.004	0.000	-0.015	-0.0020	2.96
(1 = completely agree, 4 = completely disagree)						
Influence of other religions is a threat to Islam ((thtrsn2)	0.275**	0.285**	-1.472***	0.289**	-1.463***	0.05
(1 = yes, 0 = no))						
Bangladesh	0.146	0.076	0.075	0.233	0.109	0.0533
Ivory Coast	0.482*	0.85**	0.366	0.43*	0.697*	0.0149
Ghana	-0.253	0.031	-0.254	-0.238	-0.016	0.0058
Indonesia	-0.633***	-0.431**	-0.733***	-0.632***	-0.532***	0.1422

(Table continues next page)

**Table 6**  
Logistic regression results for support for terrorism (Models 1–5) and weighted sample means (Continued)

Variable	Model 1 (B)	Model 2 (B)	Model 3 (B)	Model 4 (B)	Model 5 (B)	Sample mean (weighted)
Nigeria	0.336*	0.532**	0.248	0.404**	0.556**	0.0311
Pakistan	-0.621***	-0.707***	-0.724***	-0.519***	-0.711***	0.1696
Senegal	-0.333**	-0.085	-0.382***	-0.326**	-0.121	0.0919
Tanzania	-0.955***	-1.01***	-1.035***	-0.945***	-1.064**	0.0209
Turkey	-1.594***	-1.355***	-1.673***	-1.508***	-1.327***	0.1096
Uganda	-0.386	-0.035	-0.414	-0.364	-0.072	0.0086
Uzbekistan	-2.149***	-1.999***	-2.228***	-2.128***	-2.05***	0.0677
Lebanon	1.093***	1.205***	1.022***	1.128***	1.179***	0.0784
Jordan	0.184	0.104	0.125	0.076	-0.06	0.1374
Bangladesh*Threat	—	—	1.67**	—	1.554**	0.0032
Ivory Coast*Threat	—	—	4.927	—	6.169	0.0005
Ghana*Threat	—	—	-2.791	—	-3.472	0.0002
Indonesia*Threat	—	—	3.118***	—	3.108***	0.0034
Nigeria*Threat	—	—	1.89**	—	1.767**	0.003
Pakistan *Threat	—	—	2.124***	—	2.218**	0.0127
Senegal*Threat	—	—	0.962	—	0.955	0.0031
Tanzania*Threat	—	—	1.774**	—	1.732**	0.004
Turkey*Threat	—	—	1.837***	—	1.828**	0.0038
Jordan	0.184	0.104	0.125	0.076	-0.06	0.1374
Uganda*Threat	—	—	1.353	—	1.606*	0.001
Uzbekistan*Threat	—	—	2.131**	—	2.052*	0.0005
Lebanon*Threat	—	—	1.69**	—	1.673**	0.0068
Jordan *Threat	—	—	1.501**	—	1.488**	0.008
Bangladesh*Female	—	0.198	—	—	0.175	0.0231



Ivory Coast*Female	—	-0.659	—	—	-0.693	0.0077
Ghana*Female	—	-0.83	—	—	-0.659	0.0018
Indonesia*Female	—	-0.401*	—	—	-0.396*	0.0733
Nigeria*Female	—	-0.471	—	—	-0.533	0.013
Pakistan*Female	—	0.334	—	—	0.33	0.0513
Senegal*Female	—	-0.536**	—	—	-0.546**	0.0415
Tanzania*Female	—	0.121	—	—	0.115	0.0088
Turkey*Female	—	-0.455*	—	—	-0.484*	0.0546
Uganda*Female	—	-0.923*	—	—	-0.913	0.0032
Uzbekistan*Female	—	-0.311	—	—	-0.321	0.0311
Lebanon*Female	—	-0.233	—	—	-0.244	0.0369
Jordan*Female	—	0.214	—	—	0.207	0.0648
Bangladesh*OwnComp	—	—	—	-4.365*	-4.369**	0.0016
Ivory Coast*OwnComp	—	—	—	1.165	1.073	0.0009
Ghana*OwnComp	—	—	—	NA	NA	0
Indonesia*OwnComp	—	—	—	-2.309	-2.317	0.0055
Nigeria*OwnComp	—	—	—	-3.605*	-3.736*	0.0013
Pakistan*OwnComp	—	—	—	-3.494*	-3.522*	0.016
Senegal*OwnComp	—	—	—	-2.311	-2.347	0.0032
Tanzania*OwnComp	—	—	—	NA	NA	0
Turkey*OwnComp	—	—	—	-3.173*	-3.213*	0.0157
Uganda*OwnComp	—	—	—	NA	NA	0
Uzbekistan*OwnComp	—	—	—	-2.833	-2.917	0.0007
Lebanon*OwnComp	—	—	—	-2.796	-2.818	0.0376
Jordan*OwnComp	—	—	—	-2.199	-2.208	0.0405
Constant	-0.105	-0.197	-0.053	-0.096	-0.139	—
n (Weighted)	6,205	6,205	6,205	6,205	6,205	—
Nagelkerke R-squared	0.238	0.244	0.243	0.245	0.256	—

\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*at the 0.01 level, \*at the 0.05 level, \*at the 0.1 level. Derived from author tabulations of data from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002. Unweighted sample size was 6,019.

**Table 7**  
Marginal effects of various variables on support for suicide terrorism


Country	Marginal effect of variable
Female	7.65%****
Age	See figure 1****
No money for food	-6.6%***
No money for clothes	4.28%**
Respondent owns a computer	8.75%***
Respondent owns cell phone	4.25%**
Religious leaders should play a larger role in politics (1 = completely agree, 4 = completely disagree)	-20.91% (Difference between complete agreement (1) and complete disagreement (4))****
Influence of other religions is a threat to Islam	6.77%**

\*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\*at the 0.05 level and \*at the 0.1 level. Derived from author tabulations of data from Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002. Marginal affect calculated using estimates from Model 1, evaluated at the sample means.

indicators, many of which were significant even at the rigorous 0.01 significance level.

- Model 4 employs all variables used in Model 1 as well as the interactions between the country indicators and computer ownership. (Note that in three countries, no respondent owned a computer.) Four interactions were significant at the 0.1 significance level.
- Model 5 contains all the variables from Model 1 and all 16 interaction variables were added (e.g., dummy variables with threat, gender, and computer ownership). Many of these interaction variables were significant.

To examine the country-specific marginal effects of gender, threat, and computer ownership within the 14 countries, the probability of supporting terrorism was predicted



**Figure 1.** Predicted probability of supporting terrorism by age, all else constant (*Note:* Predicted probabilities calculated using estimates from Model 1, evaluating all variables at the sample means.)

**Table 8**  
Marginal effects of being female  
upon support for terrorism

Country	Marginal effect of gender
Uganda	-17.47%*
Ghana	-15.03%
Senegal	-7.89%**
Turkey	-4.98%*
Ivory Coast	-4.07%
Uzbekistan	-1.50%
Nigeria	-0.57%
Lebanon	-0.27%
Indonesia	1.07%*
Tanzania	8.14%
Jordan	8.79%
Pakistan	13.50%
Bangladesh	14.01%

Country-wise marginal effects calculated using estimates from Model 2, evaluated at the sample means. All results are relative to the benchmark case of Mali. \*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*at the 0.01 level, \*at the 0.05 level, and \*at the 0.1 level.

**Table 9**  
Marginal effects of threat perception  
upon support for terrorism

Country	Marginal effect of threat perception
Ghana	2.03%
Bangladesh	4.21%**
Ivory Coast	25.57%
Uzbekistan	28.38%***
Turkey	33.97%***
Senegal	43.81%
Tanzania	55.38%**
Uganda	60.25%
Pakistan	70.62%****
Jordan	75.07%**
Nigeria	78.72%**
Indonesia	82.58%****
Lebanon	89.89%**

Marginal effects calculated using estimates from Model 3, evaluated at the sample means. All results are relative to the benchmark case of Mali. \*\*\*\*Indicates significant at the 0.001 level, \*\*\*at the 0.01 level, \*\*at the 0.05 level, and \*at the 0.1 level.

**Table 10**  
Marginal effects of computer ownership  
upon support for terrorism

Country	Marginal effect of threat perception
Bangladesh	-29.57%*
Nigeria	-10.99%*
Pakistan	-9.11%*
Turkey	-7.95%*
Lebanon	-0.37%
Uzbekistan	-0.36%
Senegal	8.39%
Indonesia	22.79%
Ivory Coast	28.66%

Marginal effects calculated using estimates from Model 4, evaluated at the sample means. All results are relative to the benchmark case of Mali. Countries where respondents did not own computers not included. Indicates significant \*at the 0.1 level.

using the appropriate models. In the case of gender and its interaction with country-level dummies, models were built to calculate the relative predicted probability of supporting terrorism for females and males in each state using results from Model 2. The authors were of mixed minds in performing this analysis and presenting results for all countries, as only four of the interactions were significant. Ultimately, they chose to present the estimated state-specific marginal effect for in Table 8, with the appropriate significance indicators. What is notable is that although the overall affect of gender predicted using Model 1 was positive, in three of the four statistically significant interactions, women were less likely to support terrorism than males. In Uganda, Senegal, and Turkey, females were less likely to support it with marginal effects of -17.47, -7.89, and -4.98 percent, respectively. In Indonesia, females were slightly more likely to support terrorism with a marginal effect of 1.07 percent. These findings underscore the importance of understanding with great clarity the particular impact of particular demographic variables within specific target audiences.

The marginal effect of threat perception on the predicted probability of supporting terrorism in countries examined was similarly calculated using regression results from Model 3. These data are provided in Table 9. As these data illustrate, the impact of threat perception varies significantly within the states, but in all cases it is associated with increasing tendency to support terrorism. In Pakistan, Jordan, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Lebanon the marginal effect of having this threat perception was over 70 percent. As noted earlier, many of the interaction variables were statistically significant.

Finally, the marginal effect of computer ownership on predicted probability of supporting terrorism was calculated, using regression results from Model 4. These values are given in Table 10. (Note that several of the African countries had no respondents with computers and thus were not included.) In Model 1, the un-interacted model, computer ownership tended to suggest increased likelihood of supporting terrorism. However, when the effect was allowed to vary within states through the use of the interaction variables,

a much more nuanced picture emerged. In the four countries for which interactions were statistically significant, computer ownership predicted a *decreased* likelihood of supporting terrorism, all else constant.

## Conclusions

These analyses, at least modestly, contribute to understanding segments of the demand for terrorism (e.g., the supporters for this tactic). The descriptive and regression analyses suggest the following conclusions holding all other characteristics constant:

- In un-interacted models, females are more likely than males to support the tactic. However, interaction models suggest that the effect of gender may vary within the countries.
- Older people are less likely to support terrorism. However, the predicted probability of supporting terrorism for persons over 60 is still high at over 45 percent.
- Respondents who believe that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics are substantially *more likely* to support terrorism.
- In none of the models did the territorial threat variable appear significant. (This was not the case for individual state-level models, which comprise the subject of the authors' forthcoming work).
- Although persons who are low SES (indicated by inadequate funds for food) are less likely to support the tactic, those with somewhat higher SES are more likely to support it generally. Unfortunately, these data do not permit a more nuanced analysis of the affect of SES upon support for terrorism. In other words, how do those who are low SES compare to those who are high SES in terms of demand for terrorism?
- Individuals with phones and/or computers (which dually code for higher SES and increased accessed to information) are more likely to support terrorism than those who do not own these items in general. Interaction models suggest that the effect of computer ownership may vary across states and in some cases computer ownership may predict decreased propensity to support terrorism.
- Those who believe that Islam is under threat are much more likely to support terrorism than those who do not share this view. Although the intensity of this finding varied across the states in question, there were no statistically significant exceptions.

## Implications for Future Data Collection

The results of these analyses cast limited light on the impact of SES considerations on demand for suicide terrorism. The first-order effects reported here mirror those of the already-noted studies of SES impacts on supply of terrorism. However, the authors caution that these data do not tell the entire story about SES. It is entirely possible that it is not the *level* of SES at any given point in time, but *change in* SES across time periods that matters most in explaining support for terrorism. Unfortunately, as these data are not time series and represent only a cross section of respondents in these 14 countries at a particular time in 2002, this critical issue cannot be assessed. It is also possible that such change in SES may have impacts upon other variables, such as the threat perceptions. This too is a consideration that remains beyond the scope of this work.<sup>12</sup>

However, this outstanding empirical concern underscores the need for time-series

panel data to fully illuminate the impact of SES upon support for support for terrorism and specifically changes in SES across time periods.

Even though the standardized sample for the regression models contained over 6,000 observations, in many cases the cell sizes were still too small to estimate coefficients accurately in many countries. This problem of “micronumerosity” was exacerbated in many of the models with interacted variables because of the large numbers of variables added to the analysis. More robust sample sizes are required to permit the kinds of analyses that will shed most light on the determinants of support for terrorism.

Given that many of these results appear to vary by country, country-specific data are clearly needed to exposit the support that terrorism enjoys across various segments in a given state. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, Pew did not include key countries that are of utmost interest to the wider analytical community, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states. Despite their varied limitations, the Pew data *do* demonstrate a “proof of concept” that such data *can be* collected and analyzed for these purposes.

The vagaries of collecting survey data of this type doubtlessly increases the burden of the analyst to properly understand the limits of the data employed and to properly caveat the resultant findings. Reviewers of this research note were skeptical of the utility of such survey data. Although the authors appreciate these concerns, they note that survey data are an important complement to other kinds of inquiries that are equally problematic in their own rights as well (e.g., small numbers of interviews with would-be, actual, or even purported militants, abstracting from press reports, reliance on interview data with policymakers).

### ***Implications for Counterterrorism Activities***

One of the first conclusions that can be drawn from this work is that the standard stereotypes are not altogether accurate. Females in general were more likely to support terrorism than males (all else constant). It is possible that these effects vary substantially across states, but the sample sizes were still too small to estimate interaction effects accurately. In no model was marital status significant suggesting that married person cannot be assumed to be less likely to support terrorism than unmarried persons. This was true even in Model 1 where sample size was ample to estimate accurately. Older persons (all other characteristics constant) do appear less likely to support terrorism, but the decline in probability was much less than popular stereotypes would suggest. In fact, even at 62 years of age, the predicted probability of supporting terrorism was near 45 percent.

The result of the role of religious leaders is important. Those respondents who support a larger role for religious leaders in politics are more likely to support terrorism, all else constant.

Territorial threats did not appear significant in this across-country model. However, the authors caution that this not be dismissed. Their forthcoming analyses of country-specific models show that in some countries, this variable is significant.

Finally, the perception that Islam is threatened by other religions was associated with increases in likelihood of supporting terrorism, all else constant. Many of these interactions were robust, illuminating the differential impact of this threat perception across the countries in question.

Because many of these characteristics do appear to vary by country and because several of the country-level indicators themselves were significant in many models, public

diplomacy efforts and perception management campaigns need to be highly tailored to each of the key states in question. The findings of this analysis also suggest that observed country differences may reflect specific viewpoints that may be rooted to local or historical experiences as well as the larger contexts within which these experiences are situated. If so, popular aphorisms such as the “Muslim Street” or “Arab Street” may have little analytical value and may obfuscate more than they clarify.

Based on these analyses, this article argues for the requirement for detailed understanding about specific populations within states to enable effective interventions. Such nuanced understanding of the demographic and psychographic breakdown of populations within specific countries may help the United States and allies prioritize its efforts not only by states but also by sub-groups within states.

In conclusion, it is also important to note that these data were collected *prior* to the U.S. invasion and occupation in Iraq. Given the significance and magnitude of the threat variable (particularly when looking at country-specific affects of this variable), one wonders if the same individuals were to be re-surveyed in 2004, whether an increase would be seen in the support for suicide terrorism in all or a select subset of the countries in question. This question too underscores the need to enable effective demand-side interventions to mitigate the support for terrorism.

## Notes

1. See Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review* 20(32) (14 July 2003), p. 1; Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Terrorists and Suicide Attacks* (Washington: Congressional Research Service RL32058, 2003), p. 5. Available at (<http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058.pdf>); Eli Berman and David D. Laitin, “Rational Martyrs vs. Hard Targets: Evidence on the Tactical Use of Suicide Attacks” (conference paper, University of Chicago, 26 October 2004); available at (<http://economics.uchicago.edu/download/RatMartyrs6.pdf>); see Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives,” *Journal of Political Economy* (1992), pp. 271–291; “Introduction to the Economics of Religion,” *Journal of Economic Literature* XXXVI (1998), pp. 1465–1496; “The Market for Martyrs” (working paper, 2004 Meetings of the American Economic Association, San Diego, CA, December 2003); available at (<http://gunston.doit.gmu.edu/liannacc/ERel/S2-Archives/Iannaccone%20-%20Market%20for%20Martyrs.pdf>); Mark Harrison, “An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism” (working paper, 20 January 2004); available at (<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/harrison/papers/terrorism.pdf>); David Gold, “Some Economic Considerations in the U.S. War on Terrorism,” *The Quarterly Journal* III(1) (March 2004), pp. 1–14; Kai A. Konrad, “The Investment Problem in Terrorism,” *Economica* 71 (2004), pp. 449–459; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” *NBER Working Paper #9074* (2002); Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers,” *The New Republic* (June 2002); Claude Berrebi, “Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians,” *Princeton University Industrial Relations Sections Working Paper #477* (2003); Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(6) (December 2000), pp. 838–852; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *World Bank Policy Research Paper 2355* (May 2000); Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” forthcoming in *American Journal of Political Science*, available at ([http://bdm.wustl.edu/PDF/terror\\_quality.pdf](http://bdm.wustl.edu/PDF/terror_quality.pdf)).

2. The term “demand” here to refer to the public support for terrorism, which in turn is treated as a “good” produced by terrorists and their groups and consumed by the population on whose behalf they claim to act. This is in distinction to other uses of the term “demand,” which could refer to groups demand for terrorist labor. For a more thorough discussion of demand-side issues, see Christina Paxson, “Comment on Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, ‘Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?’” (Princeton: Research Program in Development

Studies, 8 May 2002). Available at ([http://www.wws.princeton.edu/rpds/da.loads/paxson\\_Krueger\\_comment.pdf](http://www.wws.princeton.edu/rpds/da.loads/paxson_Krueger_comment.pdf)) and Iannaccone, "Sacrifice and Stigma." The authors are also cognizant of the debate about defining terrorism as a "good." For instance, some argue that terrorism is a "public good." However, although this debate is very important to understanding terrorism and terrorist groups, this distinction is not germane to the present query. For more information about this and related analytical issues, see Iannaccone, "Sacrifice and Stigma" and Harrison, "An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism."

3. See The Pew Research Center, *What the World Thinks in 2002: How Global Publics View Their Lives, Their Countries, The World, America* (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center, 4 December 2002); available at (<http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165>).

4. Such target audience specification will likely require use of demographic and even psychographic data. See for instance, R. Kim Craigin and Scott Gerwehr who argue that strategic influence campaigns require detailed psychographic and demographic intelligence about the target community. According to these authors, "Demographics include information, for example, on the age, sex, or occupation of potential audiences, whereas psychographic intelligence incorporates additional data on perceptions, interests, and opinions." See Craigin and Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2005).

5. For more information about the methodology of the survey design, sample construction, methods of fielding of the survey, as well as local partners for doing so, see The Pew Global Attitudes Project, *What the World Thinks*. In particular see the chapter on "Methodology."

6. See Princeton Survey Research Associates International, *Questionnaire Pew Global Attitudes Survey—2002* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Survey Research Associates International, 2002).

7. Testimony of Mindy Kleinberg, *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Public Hearing* (31 March 2003), available at ([http://www.911independentcommission.org/pdf/MindyKleinberg\\_03\\_31\\_03.pdf](http://www.911independentcommission.org/pdf/MindyKleinberg_03_31_03.pdf)); Bohaz Ganor, "Suicide Terrorism: An Overview" (paper, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism: Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference, Herzliya, Israel, 2000); Elizabeth Rubin, "The Most Wanted Palestinian," *The New York Times Magazine* (30 June 2002), pp. 26–31, 42, 51–55. Bruce Hoffman, "All You Need is Love: How the Terrorists Stopped Terrorism," *The Atlantic Monthly* (December 2001); Reuven Paz, "Programmed Terrorists: An Analysis of the Letter Left Behind by the September 11 Hijackers," *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (13 December 2001); available at (<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=419>); Steven A. Camarota, "The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993–2001," *Center for Immigration Studies Working Paper 21* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 2002). Available at (<http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/Paper21/terrorism2.html>).

8. See Karla J. Cunningham, "Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26 (2003), pp. 171–195.

9. This is a highly debated area in the literature. For example, see Alan Heston and Robert Summers, *PPPs and Price Parities in Benchmark Studies and the Penn World Table: Uses* (prepared remarks, Eurostat Conference on the Value of Real Exchange Rates, Brussels, Belgium, 20–21 October 1997); available at (<http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/papers/paperev.html>). See Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.1," *Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP)* (October 2002).

10. Jock Young, *The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1999).

11. Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

12. The United States Institute of Peace, Research and Studies Program, is currently undertaking an empirical follow-on to this study. This follow-on study, executed by Ethan Bueno de Mesquita under the guidance of C. Christine Fair will augment the Pew dataset used here with other sources of data. This work will be completed in late 2006.