Military Operations in Urban Areas: The Indian Experience

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In recent years, the United States military has become increasingly interested in military operations on urbanized terrain. This attention has been motivated by the concern that future opponents of the US military are likely to maneuver conflict into urbanized areas to vitiate much of the US military’s edge in high-technology firepower. Moreover, the events of September 11, 2001, have heightened this awareness, because future adversaries are likely to include non-state actors seeking to exploit weaknesses of the United States. As the US struggles to contend with the growing threat posed by warfare on urbanized terrain, the experiences of countries like India may be instructive. This research effort will explicate several dimensions of the Indian encounter with urban operations in order to make the Indian experience and lessons learned more accessible to the general reader.

To prepare the US military for meeting the challenges of urban conflict, RAND conducted a multi-country study that examined the production and consumption of doctrine concerning military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).1 This study argued that most potential state and non-state adversaries do not have the resources required to develop, innovate, and promulgate MOUT doctrines. Thus, they are more likely to borrow and/or adapt MOUT thinking as it has been produced in states with larger military educational infrastructures and considerable operational experience than to develop their own. Such infrastructure includes full-fledged military staff academies with the resources necessary to analyze MOUT problems, reflect on previous operations and draw out lessons learned, and develop innovative solutions and doctrines. A robust military educational infrastructure is also fundamental to the production of professional journals, potential vehicles for the dissemination of such innovation and analysis.2

India satisfies three criteria for adopting its own MOUT doctrine. First, India has an extensive system of military academies where

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indigenous and other Asian and African soldiers receive training. Second, the nation also has numerous professional journals that serve as forums for discussion and dissemination of doctrine. Third, India has had much operational experience in low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency^ operations and peacekeeping operations. Several of these operations have had significant urban components. For example, Operation Bluestar, conducted in 1984 during the Punjab insurgency, included storming the most important religious center of the Sikh faith – located in the heart of the city of Amritsar. The early phases, and many subsequent battles, in the Kashmir insurgency took place in Srinagar city. Additionally, much of India’s troublesome encounter with the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) during Operation Pawan, a peacekeeping operation, occurred in the Sri Lankan city of Jaffna. Finally, India, like its adversaries Pakistan and China, has undergone rapid urbanization.

In addition to these past insurgency operations, India increasingly must confront the urban threat posed by terrorism. As recent events (such as the attacks on Delhi’s Red Fort in December 2000 and the Indian Parliament in December 2001) demonstrate, militant groups that previously operated largely within Kashmir are now even more capable of operating within India proper. Moreover, Indian intelligence officials claim to have disrupted some 100 cells outside Kashmir. Some of these cells have sought to target India’s information technology centers, political leadership (e.g., the recent cell targeting Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi), and tourist destinations. Some intelligence analysts have even asserted that such groups are deliberately targeting Indian cities that are prone to communal violence.

Despite recent events, urbanizing trends, and some insightful suggestions by indigenous authors discussed later in this essay, there is little evidence that India is adopting a formal MOUT^ doctrine to contend with these developments. US army officers who have attended the Indian army’s Junior Command Course at the College of Combat in Mhow (Madhya Pradesh) have noted that while the Indian army knows it must confront conflict in built-up areas, and despite its numerous lessons learned in this area, the army has not formalized India’s extensive experience into a formal doctrine.

Even though India does not have a conventional MOUT doctrine per se, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from India’s extensive experience in urban operations, particularly in the contexts of low
intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operations. This paper elaborates upon these findings and aims to investigate in greater detail the dimensions of urban conflict as expounded within the Indian defense literature. Moreover, due to the constant presence of visiting soldiers from other countries in its various defense educational establishments, India’s role in disseminating information must be considered.

Specifically, this article examines various Indian efforts to determine the unique demands the urban environment exerts on its forces in a range of military operations. It reviews the work of Indian defense analysts who address operations in urban areas, highlighting key Indian innovations and observations, drawing upon analyses of important urban encounters during the Kashmir crisis, the Punjab insurgency (Operation Bluestar), and Operation Pawan in Jaffna City. The paper concludes with summary observations and recommendations for further research. One of its central findings is that, despite a long history of urban conflict within the Indian army and India’s various paramilitary and police organizations, Indian institutions have generally been unable to absorb and disseminate the various lessons learned from India’s rich experiences. In particular, there are few, if any, joint mechanisms to ensure that all of India’s security apparatus can draw from accumulated operational knowledge.

Background

Regional Trends in Urbanization

India has undergone rapid urbanization since independence in 1947. While the rate of urbanization has not been as dramatic as that observed for other countries in South Asia, as is shown in Figure 1, India has steadily urbanized over the past several decades. India’s failure to develop a conventional MOUT doctrine is surprising, given that both of India’s major security competitors, China and Pakistan, have outpaced India in urbanization.10 Rather than focusing on the external threat, Indian defense analysts have concentrated their attention upon the effects of India’s urbanization on its own internal security. As recent events dramatically demonstrate, civilian militant groups have expanded their areas of operation to include India’s major urban areas. It remains to be seen what type of force structure India will adopt to address these new and proliferating challenges.
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FIGURE 1
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS, COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA (AND CHINA)


While there is no evidence (other than Pakistan’s adamant assertions) that India has a specific policy of fomenting unrest in Pakistan’s urban centers such as Karachi and Lahore, India is nonetheless suspected of supporting violence related to the Muttaheda (formerly Mohajir) Quami Movement’s political objectives in Karachi. Pakistan has employed a policy of encouraging insurgency within India, particularly with respect to the disputed disposition of Kashmir, but there is no evidence that Pakistan has a specific policy to foment sectarian violence in urban areas of India. Pakistan, however, does make heavy use of civilian militants (also called jihadi elements or mujahideen) in its proxy war with India over the disposition of Kashmir. Regional experts in the intelligence and defense communities have cautioned that these asymmetric strategies are simply means by which both India and Pakistan can exploit each other’s weaknesses, rather than deliberate efforts to prosecute an external low intensity conflict doctrine for urban operations. For example, in the case of Pakistan, the built-up and population-dense city of Karachi is such a point of weakness. In India, the burgeoning information technology centers, tourist destinations,
and governmental targets are becoming highly attractive targets in Pakistan’s proxy war.

Planning for Military Operations in Urbanized Areas

India has fought two limited-objective wars with Pakistan (1947 and 1965), a war of unlimited\textsuperscript{13} objectives (1971), a protracted proxy war\textsuperscript{13} with Pakistan (from 1989 to present), and a territorial war with China (1962). Most recently, India and Pakistan came into conflict in the Kargil-Dras sectors in the summer of 1999. Some analysts would consider the Kargil crisis to be a limited-aims war in several key respects.\textsuperscript{14} Yet precise characterization of the conflict remains a challenge, as Pakistan, the only entity that can articulate its objectives, will not acknowledge any active role in the conflict. Such ambiguity has motivated one analyst to describe Kargil in the following manner:

The military operations around Kargil in the summer of 1999 fall in a gray zone between low-intensity conflict and full-scale war. On the one hand, the scale, intensity and significance of the fighting exceeded even the upwardly distorted standards of the India-Pakistan Kashmir confrontation, where extended artillery duels and ten-person-a-day body counts often have been the norm. On the other hand, the combat was intentionally confined by both sides to a restricted segment of the volatile Kashmir Line of Control (LOC), the proportion of forces engaged was relatively small, the duration was limited, and, captivating television news coverage notwithstanding, the conflict did not require either country to commit extraordinary resources beyond those immediately available to their standing militaries.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite the growing trend toward urbanization, neither the Indian defense literature nor information garnered during discussions with key individuals in the United States Department of Defense and intelligence communities suggests that India has a MOUT doctrine. Analysts in the United States point out that, during India’s conventional conflicts with Pakistan, Indian troops did fight in small towns, villages and thickly settled agricultural areas. While the regional experts consulted in this study were not aware of any Indian efforts to provide “battle inoculation” in urban environments, they found it plausible that such efforts were under way.
The Indians have paid considerable attention to urban operations in the contexts of low intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operations. One contact indicated that India does produce doctrine that specifically addresses urban low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency operations and that this guidance is taught at India’s military schools. The doctrine is also provided to soldiers and officers from African and other Asian countries who attend these schools. While I found no detailed discussion of these training materials in the defense literature, I did locate several articles in which Indian authors endeavored to theorize the unique features of urban operations in these unconventional types of conflicts.

Overview of the Indian Force Structure
Despite the formidable size of the Indian army, it is important to note that the force claims that it anticipates leaving India only in two contexts: conflict with a neighbor, or a UN mandate for peacekeeping. The Indian army is one of the largest contributors of “blue helmets” to the UN. However, Indian armed forces also operate internally; both regular and irregular forces are employed to carry out internal security operations.

To understand the range of India’s operational capabilities, a brief description of the Indian force structure is given below. The Indian army has an overall active strength that exceeds 1.2 million and includes another 300,000 ready reserves. The army is divided into six commands – five operational headquarters and the Army Training Command (ARTRAC). The five operational commands are Southern Command (based in Pune), Eastern Command (based in Calcutta), Central Command (based in Lucknow), Western Command (based in Chandimandar), and Northern Command (based in Udhampur). The Indian army established ARTRAC in 1991 because it felt that there was a requirement for a separate headquarters responsible solely for doctrine development and training for the entire army. ARTRAC oversees all of Indians’ numerous major training institutions.

A perusal of the literature over the past decade suggests that there is considerable concern and indecision as to whether counterinsurgency operations should be the purview of the police, paramilitary, or armed forces. Technically, internal security duties are the responsibility of India’s police and numerous paramilitary forces, the latter of which numbers over 1.5 million personnel. India has promulgated a number of
these paramilitary forces to shield the Indian army from “aid to civil” operations and to minimize the involvement of the army in law enforcement exercises which both degrades readiness for its main function – war fighting – and renders the army vulnerable to politicization and perhaps even communalization. The Rashtriya Rifles is a 35,000-strong entity raised by the Ministry of Defense for internal security duties. Another internal security organization is the Assam Rifles, a 52,500-strong organization initially raised to battle insurgency in the northeast. This organization, led by army officers, has been deployed against insurgents in Kashmir with great success.

While a large number of these central police and paramilitary organizations exist and were arguably conceived to relieve the regular army of such operations, they are plagued by deficient command-and-control arrangements. Significantly, command-and-control arrangements between police and paramilitary organizations and the armed forces are poorly defined. Deployment of these multifarious forces has been ad hoc and often at odds with the types of operations for which they were conceived and trained.

India has also developed organizations to deal specifically with international border patrol. One such entity is the 185,000-strong Border Security Force (BSF). Despite this primary tasking, the BSF has also been deployed to Kashmir and Assam for internal security duties. Another such organization is the 35,000-strong Indo-Tibetan Border Police, which was conceived to police the Indo-Tibetan border. It too has been deployed to other parts of the country.

These paramilitary forces complement large numbers of police forces, such as the Central Reserve Police Force, as well as state police and provincial armed constabularies. Drawing from across its force structure, India has formed an elite anti-terrorist contingency deployment force, the National Security Guards. This group numbers some 7,500 and is manned by personnel from the armed forces as well as from the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force.

Despite the proliferation of such paramilitary and central police organizations, the army’s involvement in internal security operations has increased since the mid-1980s. While some writers argue that only the army has the reputation and capabilities for effectively handling insurgency, others contend that continual deployment for internal security operations degrades the army’s war-fighting readiness. The army has increasingly recognized internal security as a core mission and
is making concomitant doctrinal changes.\textsuperscript{25} In April 1997, the Indian army completed a reassessment of military threats to promote the development of operational doctrine and long-term procurement policy. Moreover, in this finalized ten-year plan, the army acknowledged its commitment to low-intensity internal security operations. Such operations were prioritized above external military threats from China and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{26} (It remains unclear whether this prioritization will persist, given the ongoing “coercive diplomacy” against Pakistan).

The army’s heavy involvement in internal security operations is evident when one looks at the number of divisions dedicated to such missions. In 1996, for example, eight to nine divisions of a total of 33 organizations were on internal security duty in Kashmir. Another one to two divisions was performing counterinsurgency duties in India’s northeast. Earlier in the 1990s, some nine divisions were employed in Punjab against Sikh separatists.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Peacekeeping Operations}

The Indian army also has extensive experience in peacekeeping missions. While the bulk of India’s peacekeeping operations have not been on urbanized terrain, India’s infrastructure offers an important means to disseminate guidance, training, and lessons learned to Indian and international troops. For this reason, an overview of this capacity is provided below.

Over the past fifty years, India has taken part in some thirty such UN undertakings. India also has executed peacekeeping operations in the Maldives and in Sri Lanka that were not part of a UN mandate. India’s recent UN peacekeeping activities include several with significant urban components.\textsuperscript{28} India provides considerable peacekeeping operation training for both for its own troops and representatives of other militaries. For example, in 1996 India hosted a UN Regional Training Workshop for Peacekeeping Operations in New Delhi. In 1999 India held an international seminar on UN Peacekeeping in New Delhi in which 17 Asian-Pacific countries participated. India provides training opportunities to military officers from several countries and presently maintains army-training teams in Seychelles, Laos, Mauritius, Botswana, Zambia, and Bhutan. Officers from numerous countries have also participated in course offerings at various Indian military training institutions.
India has institutionalized training of UN peacekeepers by establishing a Peacekeeping Training Centre in New Delhi under ARTRAC’s guidance. Officers who have taken part in UN missions provide instruction. Training content and methodologies disseminated at the Peacekeeping Training Centre are updated to reflect the experience and feedback of these officers. India’s extensive infrastructure for developing, innovating, and disseminating peacekeeping operational doctrine ideally situates India to share its experiences in urbanized areas and elsewhere.

**Operations in Urban Areas**

*Preparation for Combat in Urbanized Areas*

Indian defense analysts argue that, despite the nation’s extensive operational experience, its military is not prepared for low-intensity conflicts, particularly in urban environs. Such analysts suggest that India fails to draw lessons from previous experience and has been lax in addressing serious C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) logistics and intelligence gaps.\(^29\) One writer, Bhashyam Kasturi, lauds the establishment of ARTRAC as a potential means to “put operational experience into perspective for the whole army,” while noting that this arrangement would not make operational experience available to the other services in the Indian armed forces.\(^30\) Kasturi argues for a joint training command devoted to low-intensity operations. Major General Afsir Karim, reflecting upon India’s forays into Sri Lanka and the Maldives, echoes the need to consolidate and share operational experience with the goal of evolving new concepts and operational doctrines. Karim, writing in the aftermath of the Sri Lanka peacekeeping operation, advocates that it may be beneficial to “build special facilities like urban training centres and model ‘Tin Cities’.”\(^31\)

To contend with deficiencies identified in Indian preparedness for low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency and other operational requirements, Indian defense analysts call for the coordination of Special Operations Forces. (India has no equivalent to the US Special Operations Command).\(^32\) These special operations forces are to have a range of capabilities to support both sub-conventional to conventional operations:

- They should be able to fight in rural and urban environments;
- They should be prepared to fight low-intensity conflicts abroad and
at home; and

- They should support the conventional armed forces in both covert and overt operations.

Authors have suggested that such Special Operations Forces could have had great utility during the 1984 Operation Bluestar and during India’s Operation Pawan peacekeeping foray into Jaffna. Kasturi argues that such units, trained in urban guerilla warfare and close-quarter battle fighting, could be utilized advantageously in the Kashmir insurgency as well.34

Lieutenant General P. N. Kathpalia specifically addresses concerns about internal security and counterinsurgency operations in urban areas, arguing that Indian urban environments are particularly conducive to insurgency. Some Indian cities, he notes, have significant economic and social tensions among their populations. Such tensions can motivate large segments of the population to join or support insurgent movements. Elaborating this point, Kathpalia writes,

The side streets and by-lanes of the cities become the concrete jungle where the terrorist/insurgent establishes his bases and concentration points. Existing transportation and telephone facilities of the city provide the terrorist/insurgent a comparatively higher degree of mobility than his rural counterpart. ... The local insurgent has the advantage of merging with the population, making it extremely difficult for the authorities to isolate the rebel.35

The same author writes that urban centers are localities where even the most minor of incidents get wide media coverage, affording limited numbers of motivated terrorists or insurgents a large degree of publicity.

However, Kathpalia notes, while an urban setting provides the insurgent/terrorist with considerable advantages, the same environment also imposes unique constraints – constraints that can be exploited by the state. For example, the insurgent is vulnerable to exposure by informants and infiltrators, and the terrorist or insurgent leader cannot operate with the same degree of command and control over his personnel as in other environments. Additionally, urban-based insurgencies are especially vulnerable to efforts to foment dissension and defame the insurgency.
Major S. K. Mahajan analyzes several aspects of urban insurgency and terrorism with respect to the training and development of urban terrorism. He defines the “basic urban guerilla unit” as a firing group comprised of four to five individuals. Two such groups comprise a firing team. The basic tactics of the urban guerilla include multidirectional hit-and-run and attacks that preclude security forces’ ability to concentrate their forces. To the urban guerilla is attributed the advantages of better intelligence about the terrain, greater mobility, and speed of information exchange. Misinformation dissemination is a key feature of their psychological warfare efforts, which are aimed primarily to discredit prevailing political regimes. After surveying several urban guerilla efforts, Mahajan concludes that India should take this urban threat seriously, although he does not proffer guidance regarding how to do so.

Managing the Population Terrain
Several Indian authors have developed and explicated the concept of population terrain management. Madan, however, offers the most developed articulation of the topic. He argues:

Population should be considered in the same manner as terrain is in any military planning and appreciations [sic]. ... [An] examination of the “population terrain” factor would lead to deducing the important segments of the population which must be dominated and which ... could be ignored or handled in a latter [sic] time frame. The insurgents too, from the very start of their movement, endeavor to dominate the “population terrain” and usually score over the CI [counterinsurgency] forces, who start on the wrong foot by expending all their energies and resources on trying to dominate only the insurgents.

Madan identifies three key population segments for consideration: the “Important Segment,” the “Friendly Segment,” and the “Hostile Segment.” The important segment is comprised of the uncommitted portion of the population, but Madan cautions that it is not a neutral segment without interest in the conflict. Rather, it is the part of the community that has not yet taken sides, usually the largest section of the population. This segment should be “captured” first, just as important ground would be seized first in conventional operations.
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The friendly segment is identified as the “firm base and the launch pad for the CI forces to launch their operations to win the important segment.” The motivations as to why this group opposes the insurgents may be highly varied. This segment must be protected, as it will be the insurgents’ primary target. Madan argues that ensuring these individuals’ protection is one of the first steps required to win over the important segment.

The hostile segment is comprised of persons who, for a variety of reasons, support the insurgents but have not taken up arms. Madan suggests that while this segment is best ignored, initiatives are needed to isolate it from the others.

Madan is critical of most counterinsurgency operations in India and identifies several problems with how they are conducted. First, commanders take the hostile segment as their primary initial target, arguing that once this segment is won, the others will follow. Second, the friendly segment is taken for granted. Third, too little attention is paid to the use of propaganda and to psychological and civil means to win over the important segment while continuing to protect the friendly segment. A final problem that Madan identifies is intelligence failure. Identifying members of the segments is a major challenge, one that requires very specific kinds of intelligence – such as detailed and intimate knowledge of the people, political entrepreneurs, opinion makers, civil administrators, police, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, and anything else that may be germane to understanding the population terrain.

Psychological Operations: Winning Hearts and Minds

Much has been written about psychological operations in Indian defense journals, particularly in the context of managing the population terrain. In the Indian context, psychological operations generally implies “winning hearts and minds,” a common phrase in the literature. A 1996 editorial in the Indian Defence Review argues for the need to use psychological operations to counter the effects of insurgent activities. The author cites the use of psychological operations by insurgents: In the Punjab insurgency, militant leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale distributed cassettes, pamphlets, posters, and speeches to influence the masses. Militants operating in Kashmir also make use of posters, pamphlets, and coerced newspaper content to intimidate and terrorize. The author of the editorial notes the value of misinformation or
deception, stressing the role of television as an important means to disseminate propaganda to target audiences at home or abroad."

Major Arjun Ray takes the length of an entire book to elaborate a thorough “hearts and minds” strategy in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{40} One of the key features of Ray’s strategy is “media management.” In his chapter “Media, Military and Militancy,” Ray describes the uneasy relationship between the press and the military. He posits that the militants have devised specific media goals and a publicity strategy that necessitates that the military do the same. One of the problems he identifies with the military-media relationship is that attention is given first to the international media and then to the English national press. This is a major oversight, because in low intensity operations the vernacular press has more influence than international or English national media.

Interviews with Urdu newspaper publishers in Srinagar in September 2002 confirm that, in many cases, local papers have become the explicit mouthpieces of militant organizations through intimidation and overt threats of violence. In the past, militant organizations explicitly dictated the headlines that would run and the content of articles. Publishers explained that, more recently, the threats have been “softer.” That is, publishers are intimidated to avoid certain content areas (e.g., articles critical of the militants or in support of the elections or election candidates). The information campaign must tactically weaken the militants and isolate them while winning over the people. Simultaneously, information objectives must keep the nation informed and instill in the people a sense of confidence in their troops.

Much insight can also be gained by examining the various treatments of India’s experience with conflict on urbanized terrain. The following section provides a sampling of observations about urban components of three major engagements: the Kashmir insurgency in Srinagar, Operation Bluestar in Amritsar, and the problems associated with India’s forays into Jaffna during its peacekeeping mission to Sri Lanka. Each of these operations is detailed below.

\textit{The Kashmir Insurgency}

While much of the Kashmir insurgency has taken place in rural locations in recent years, it began as a largely urban movement. Ajay Darshan Behera describes the support that the Kashmiri militants enjoyed among the local populations, enabling them to rely heavily on urban guerilla warfare. He writes:
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This support not only provides them with operational flexibility, but they have also used it tactically. By firing from crowded places like demonstrations and processions, the militants have been able to provoke para-military forces to fire back indiscriminately, causing massive civilian casualties. ... In this manner, the militants have tactically taken advantage of mass protests.\textsuperscript{41}

India has made extensive use of the “cordon-and-search operation” to contend with the insurgency. While this technique was conducted initially in Srinagar and other urban areas, it was later employed in rural environs as well. Indeed, this tactic has been the mainstay of Indian counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir.

Anthony Davis provides a vivid description of these urban cordon-and-search operations, which were nearly daily events in Srinagar. These operations provided essential intelligence from captured militants. According to Davis, the typical operation would begin between 3.00 a.m. and 4.00 a.m. when BSF troops (typically in battalion strength) cordoned off an area. At 6.00 a.m., the troops would call out the males, assemble them in a large area (e.g., a sports ground, a mosque compound, or a street), and segregate them by age. Identification parades would take place throughout the morning and afternoon and each typically involved parading the male population one by one before a hooded informant. This technique, popularly known as concealed apprehension technique, made heavy use of former insurgents who had been turned by the intelligence authorities. Identified suspects were removed for interrogation.\textsuperscript{42} The Indians’ ability to break the back of the militancy in Srinagar, “the nerve-center” of the revolt in 1989–92, is attributed to these unrelenting cordon-and-search operations.

While the cordon-and-search technique accounted for much of the Indians’ success in Srinagar, the Indians also made use of other methods. For example, the domination of Srinagar by the BSF was achieved by an extensive use of bunkers as well as foot and vehicle patrols through which the insurgent infrastructure and mobility was retarded. Consequently, according to Davis, insurgent factions transferred their bases outside of the city of Srinagar by the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{43}

Another concurrent factor contributing to this movement to rural terrain is the increasing presence of “guest militants” from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arab countries, and elsewhere. These infiltrators have become more prominent in the insurgency from the early 1990s onward.
They do not speak Kashmiri and have different habits of dress and appearance, thus they do not blend in with the Kashmiri population. As such, they are largely dependent upon their hosts for sustenance, which has increasingly become coerced rather than voluntarily granted. Consequently they find it easier to operate in more isolated areas than in Srinagar, where they may be easily identified and targeted.

In contrast to other opinions expressed in the Indian defense literature, Maroof Raza cites the 1990 foray into Kashmir as an example of the army demonstrating great strides in applying lessons learned from previous counterinsurgency operations. Specifically, he praises this operation for its employment of organizations with counterinsurgency experience, such as the 8 Mountain Division. He also singles out the army’s efforts to check human rights abuses, its employment of specialized troops for special operations, and its initiative in sharing intelligence among units. Additionally, Reza lauds the establishment of a unified command even though it had only limited success in coordinating civil and military relations.

Operation Bluestar
Lt. General K. S. Brar of the Indian army has written the most comprehensive account of Operation Bluestar. Major General E. H. Dar, of the Pakistani army, also provides an insightful military analysis of the operation. This operation, led by Brar himself, was conducted in the Golden Temple complex in the city of Amritsar during the Punjab insurgency. Its objective was to wrest the temple complex from the militants who had captured it. The charismatic Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale led the militants, assisted by retired Indian army Major General Shahbeg Singh.

Brar identifies numerous problems in his description of Operation Bluestar. First, the police forces (e.g., Central Reserve Police Force) and paramilitary organizations (such as the BSF) had been unable to control the growing militarization at the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. The reasons for this failure are numerous and include the fact that insurgents had infiltrated or threatened these institutions (especially the police) so thoroughly as to render them ineffective. The decision was therefore made to use the Indian army to take control of the situation.

According to Brar, Bhindranwale strongly believed that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi would never employ the army to dislodge him. Rather, Bhindranwale anticipated that she would employ the police or,
at most, the paramilitary forces. Bhindranwale did expect that the central government would mobilize the police to lay siege to the temple complex. In anticipation of this event, Bhindranwale tried to marshal support from Sikhs in and around Amritsar by distributing cassettes throughout Punjab. The message on these cassettes claimed that such an operation was likely to occur and that it would constitute a direct attack on the Sikh community. The cassettes directed those committed to his cause to remain alert in the event of an invasion. Bhindranwale believed that hundreds of thousands of supporters would flood into Amritsar to swamp the police in the event of an invasion. (Unfortunately, Brar does not make clear at which point the army came to know of this information offensive and thus provides no insight as to whether or how the army countered Bhindranwale’s effort.)

Brar identifies the massive failure of civil institutions to deal with the situation prior to the entry of the army and the incomprehensible failure of Indian intelligence to acquire accurate information about the militants inside the Golden Temple complex. This lack of intelligence was particularly odd, because the temple complex was completely open to visitors, and therefore agents had considerable opportunity to gather information. Nevertheless, no one knew how many militants were in the complex, the extent of their fortifications, the number of worshipers in the temple, the number and types of weapons in the complex, or the pattern of defenses established by those in the compound.

In addition to the fortifications within the temple, there were significant concerns regarding the surrounding neighborhood. Armed participants had forcibly occupied up to seventeen three- and four-story buildings within the built-up area around the temple (located in a five hundred to eight hundred yard radius of the temple complex). These buildings were generally well fortified, had good fields of observation and fire, incorporated early warning posts, and were manned by militants equipped with light machine guns and other automatic weapons. Militants were able to monitor activities in and around the temple from these locations. Brar was critical of the police because they had not ordered the destruction of these posts; the army subsequently paid heavily for this lack of action. One of the more important observations that would emerge from this operation was that the effective coordination of civil and military institutions in this type of situation is essential.

Operation Bluestar employed the Indian army as well as key police and paramilitary organizations, such as the Central Reserve Police
Force. Indeed, all police and paramilitary forces were placed under the army’s command. Additionally, there was a curfew imposed throughout the state from the night of June 3, 1984, onward, and Punjab was effectively cut off from the rest of the nation; the army stopped transportation into or out of the state, expelled journalists, and cut off phone communications.55

Brar planned the operation based on the assumption that there were 1,500 militants in the complex, of which 500 were assumed to be highly trained and motivated. Upon considering the strength, dispositions, fortifications, and firepower of the militants, it was assessed that the mission would require four infantry battalions and specialist commandos of a strength equivalent to two companies. In addition, one squadron of Vijayanta tanks was allotted to minimize Indian army casualties at the commencement of operations. Brar states that these tanks initially were to be used only as a protective shield for the leading infantry elements and to neutralize roof-top defenses to provide further immunity for the advancing troops. It was also hoped that the tanks would exert psychological influence on the militants to precipitate a hastened surrender.56

According to Brar, the operation was to be conducted in three phases and preceded by a preliminary operation that was to be launched late in the evening of June 5, 1984, to eliminate observation posts held by militants. These preliminary efforts were to employ the BSF and Central Reserve Police Force. Phase 1 was planned to commence on June 6, 1984. The objectives of this first phase included securing the northern wing of the temple complex and securing lodgments within Akal Takht and Harimandir Sahib. Phase 2 was planned to commence at 4 a.m. on June 6 and primarily aimed to complete “mop up” operations. Phase 3, which would extend operations to the remaining hostel complex, was to commence later that day.57

The operation called for the use of mechanized elements. Three tanks were grouped with the 10 Guards in support of the approach to the Akal Takht’s main entrance. Upon reaching the entrance, they were to provide protection and support by eliminating militant fortifications with machine gun fire. Three tanks were also grouped with the 26 Madras, which entered the complex from the east, to neutralize militant fortifications and to provide close fire support to the assaulting infantry with machine gun fire. In addition, four Russian-produced infantry fighting vehicles, each capable of carrying a squad of soldiers,
were assigned to the 10 Guards to transport Para Commandos and divers.\textsuperscript{58} Four additional vehicles and three armored personnel carriers were initially grouped with 26 Madras and would subsequently serve as a reserve.\textsuperscript{59}

Only the preliminary operations were executed on schedule.\textsuperscript{60} Phase 1 was launched at 10:30 p.m. However, by the early morning of June 6, the Akal Takht had still not been taken. The eastern assault by the 26 Madras was seriously retarded by militant fire; the Special Frontier Force and commandos were consistently beaten back by the militants. In light of the prevailing conditions, the decision was made to bring three tanks into the complex as well as an armored personnel carrier. A rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) immobilized the latter. (Indeed, the Indian army did not know that the militants had anti-tank weapons, later discovering that they had two Chinese-made RPG-7s.) By 5:10 a.m., clearance was given to use the machine gun fire of three tanks to bring down Akal Takht defenses. Nevertheless, the fortifications and positions of the militants’ automatic weapons enabled them to withstand the firepower of the tanks. The Indian army launched a commando operation to take out the machine guns that were exacting a heavy price on its forces, but this operation failed and cost the army many additional casualties. At 7:30 a.m., the Akal Takht remained in the militants’ control, and the decision was undertaken to use 105 mm squash head shells to neutralize the Akal Takht.\textsuperscript{61} In total, it took some twelve hours to clear the Akal Takht, and three more days to clear the remaining part of the complex of suicide squads and hidden militants.\textsuperscript{62}

Both Brar and Dar suggest that there were some shortcomings in the night attack. Dar suggests that despite the army’s overwhelming firepower and end strength, the night attack was unlikely to succeed in this heavily built-up area. First, the army was unable to assess the extent of fortifications of the Akal Takht. The peculiar nature of combat in built-up areas (e.g., narrow streets, restricted deployment area impacts the number of troops that can be employed, domination of upper floors by the enemy) hindered the ability of Indian forces to make headway. Fighting in the rest of the complex took place under very stressful conditions, exacerbated by the cover of darkness as militant squads occupied rooms, halls, and balconies of the large multistoried buildings about the complex. Troops tasked with clearing these rooms often entered hand-to-hand combat in the darkness. Yet another problem that confronted those trying to clear the temple of militants was the
difficulty in separating worshipers trapped in the temple complex from combatants, a task rendered even more difficult by the absence of light. From this operation, Dar concludes that night attacks in built-up operations simply may not be effective.63

Brar and Dar are also critical of deficiencies in the Indian preparations for the operation, in particular the lack of intelligence about the militants’ fortification. One of the numerous problems encountered by the Indian army was the militants’ effective use of underground positions. Troops tried to clear the rooms along the Parikrama while under heavy fire. Occasionally, militants would re-take an area by exploiting concealed underground passageways that connected various rooms and even outside verandas. The Indian army was not aware of this infrastructure.64

The Indian military’s ability to draw out, disseminate and operationalize lessons learned from Operation Bluestar is ambiguous at best. Subsequent to Operation Bluestar, there were several instances of militants taking armed refuge in religious shrines both in Punjab and in Kashmir. Sumit Ganguly, reflecting upon two such confrontations, argues that as a result of the “calamity of Operation Bluestar,”65 civilian authorities and security forces handled “Operation Black Thunder” and the Hazratbal Mosque66 crisis with considerable skill and dexterity.

Yet the government experienced a setback in February 1995, when Mast Gul (an Afghan insurgent), along with 60 or so other armed militants, holed up near Charar-e-Sharif (a town located some 20 miles away from Srinagar hosting a shrine marking the burial spot of a local Sufi saint). In this standoff, security forces moved quickly to strengthen deployments around town. They also initiated a phase of psychological warfare against the insurgents. Early in March 1995, the army cordoned off the entire town and, along with the BSF, also began regulating access to the built-up area. In response, the insurgents fortified the shrine with improvised explosive devises. Fearing that the militants would blow the shrine up, the security forces opted out of military action. Instead, they offered safe passage to those militants who would voluntarily leave the shrine and persisted in the standoff with the remaining militants for another two months. The ongoing conflict occasionally involved exchange of fire, with army snipers trying to inflict serious causalities.67

The standoff came to an end on May 8, 1995, when the militants set fire to homes adjacent to the shrine to enable them to escape from the security forces. Due to rearguard shooting by the militants, however,
firefighters were unable to approach the shrine. In the end, some one hundred houses burned with the shrine. The destruction of the religious site set off a round of communal unrest in the valley. Ganguly is very critical of the way in which this was handled. He does not lay blame on the army or BSF, however; rather, he posits that the civilian authorities should have had institutional mechanisms and operating procedures already in place to defuse such crises – particularly since there has been no paucity of similar situations in the past. What these types of operations suggest is that there needs to be extensive multi-agency coordination in preparing for such operations; yet this type of coordination is not common in India’s bureaucracies.

Operation Pawan
By the late 1970s, Sri Lankan Tamil grievances with the Colombo government were numerous. Political measures to seek redress failed to achieve the Tamils’ objectives. The abject inability of previous political initiatives to resolve their grievances compelled the various Tamil organizations to converge into a single national movement, the Tamil United Front. This group contested the 1977 general election on the platform of Tamil secession and won eighteen of twenty-four seats contested. The demand for an independent Tamil homeland, Tamil Eelam, would spawn various militant groups. Over time, one group would emerge and secure dominance, the Jaffna-based Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Under the direction of its founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE grew in strength and launched its first militant attack in 1983 – an ambush on a police patrol northeast of Jaffna. The LTTE’s sophisticated organizational structure permitted it to dominate Jaffna and wide areas of the northeast. On May 26, 1987, the Sri Lankan armed forces launched Operation Liberation to wrest the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE.

As the conflict raged on, India’s security interests came under threat. Delhi was highly concerned about the impact that the insurgency in Sri Lanka – and the refugee flow it generated – was having on the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. In light of the Sri Lankan military’s inability to achieve victory against the LTTE and the economic burden placed on Colombo from the costs of the conflict and the loss of tourism and tea revenues, Colombo finally consented to the Indian presence in the conflict. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, and the first elements of the Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) arrived in Sri Lanka the next day.
India’s position initially was sympathetic to the LTTE. The Indian government offered to broker peace after the Sri Lankan military had pushed the LTTE forces back into Jaffna city. However, in an effort to keep the peace, India soon found itself fighting the LTTE. The Indian army launched Operation Pawan with the objective of capturing the LTTE’s headquarters in Jaffna city, thus rendering the LTTE ineffective. Analysts such as Alan J. Bullion have noted that this operation marked the unmasking of Indian partiality as India became an integral part of the conflict.72

It is generally acknowledged that the Indian army dramatically underestimated the scope of the operation and therefore was inadequately prepared and manned for success.73 Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister during Operation Pawan, had said that “it should be a short, sharp exercise and our boys should be back home soon.”74 The initial July 30, 1987, deployment to Sri Lanka included some 3,000 troops. This “peacekeeping force” grew to over 10,000 troops by August 1987 and to 50,000 in 1988. The Indians were increasingly seen, by Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese alike, as an “army of occupation.”

Operation Pawan initially included only the 91st Brigade. This unit consisted of three battalions, each of which was considerably under strength. Moreover, the forces did not expect to fight; none of the battalions had heavy weapons. LTTE’s guerillas heavily resisted the IPKF movement into Jaffna. The city represented a formidable challenge, and it had been “fortified and extensively mined during the 3 years of war with the Sri Lankan army.”75 The roads approaching Jaffna had been sewn with Claymore mines and buried drums filled with explosives. Indeed, the entire area was saturated with improvised explosive devices that were detonated remotely by radio control.76

One of the bloodiest battles in Jaffna was India’s attack on Jaffna University, the tactical headquarters of the LTTE. The objective of the operation was to employ a short commando raid to capture the LTTE leadership. According to one account, the Jaffna University area was densely built-up, with only two open areas of any size – a football field and a smaller playing field. The plan called for a company of seventy men from 10 Para Commando to land and secure the football field, followed by a company of the 13th Sikh Light Infantry (LI). It was anticipated that the heliborne troops would be
linked with the 13th LI approaching by land. However, the LTTE had intercepted IPKF radio communications and was waiting at the landing zone.\footnote{77}

When the first wave of Mi-8 helicopters flew in with the Para Commandos, the LTTE immediately opened up with heavy fire using 0.50 caliber machine guns. In the words of one soldier, Lok Ram,

We thought everything was fine but as we were sliding out of the helicopter we came under heavy fire from all sides. It was an impossible situation, as people would come out of the houses fire at us and disappear right back. There were gunmen on treetops, including coconut trees. Since we were ordered not to use heavy weapons it was impossible to advance. We were fighting an enemy we could not even see.\footnote{78}

A second wave of helicopters brought in a platoon of Sikh LI under cover of darkness and encountered heavy LTTE machine gun fire. The platoon landed on a playing field a few yards from Jaffna University, apparently directly within LTTE defensive positions. The helicopters came under heavy fire, and the pilots barely managed to escape to Palaly. There the pilots assessed that the platoon was likely to be wiped out, as would any reinforcements, and the commanders chose to abandon the platoon. All but one of the men in the platoon perished.\footnote{79}

It took the Indian peacekeeping forces two weeks to seize control of Jaffna and other built-up areas from the LTTE. The LTTE fled the city, moving southward into the jungles, where it demonstrated its proficiency and ability to innovate in guerilla warfare.\footnote{80}

Anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices, and snipers (equipped with infrared telescopic sights) operating from buildings and treetops further frustrated the IPKF’s operations in Jaffna. In particular, helicopters flying below 2,000 feet were vulnerable to the snipers’ fire. The LTTE snipers deliberately targeted officers and radiomen in an effort to disrupt Indian advances.\footnote{81} The IPKF also found it difficult to distinguish the LTTE enemy from civilians. One soldier said, “It was impossible to say who was a Tiger and who was not. Everyone, male or female, above the age of 10 could be armed and dangerous. We saw little girls producing guns from under their frocks and shooting at us. How do you fight them?”\footnote{82}
Conclusion
Low intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operation have provided India’s armed forces with significant experience in urbanized and built-up environs. Indian analysts have undertaken extensive efforts to understand urban insurgency and to think through the responses of their military and civil institutions. As a result, they have developed some novel approaches to the challenge. A unique contribution from Indian analysts is the notion of population management in counterinsurgency operations, which calls for identifying and managing key population segments. Another important thread in Indian thought is the role of psychological operations to counter insurgent information offensives while “winning hearts and minds” among members of the population. This strategy emphasizes the importance of misinformation or deception – particularly the role of television to disseminate a controlled message to a broad spectrum of potential audiences.

While India has had much experience countering insurgency in urbanized environs, it remains less clear that it has incorporated these lessons and operationalized them across the spectrum of forces employed in low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operations. Some have suggested that the Indian security forces, incorporating their experience during Operation Bluestar, handled the 1993 Hazratbal Mosque siege differently. The ability of the security forces to disseminate lessons learned battling the twelve-year-long insurgency in Kashmir remains ambiguous. To date, there is no mechanism to effectively coordinate the various security forces employed across the counterinsurgency grid in Kashmir and elsewhere. It also remains to be understood what impact India’s foray into Jaffna had on war-fighting stratagems.

An area of continuing concern is the potential for increased urban terrorism and determination of appropriate actions to counter this threat. Pakistan-based militant organizations fighting in Kashmir have evinced an interest in expanding their areas of operation to include India’s major urban complexes and have demonstrated a clear ability to do so.

It seems highly likely, based upon my interviews with non-state actor-representatives in Pakistan and with analysts in Pakistan, India, and the United States, that jihadi elements will continue to strike India in places that will inflict the most pain. These places include India’s
emerging information technology centers, its popular tourism destinations, important state and central government buildings, and the nation’s leadership. It remains to be seen what type of doctrine, training, and force structure India will adopt to address these new and proliferating challenges, and whether the lessons from the past will offer a foundation for success in the future.

NOTES

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1. Russell Glenn et al., Understanding Future Threats in Urban Warfare (Santa Monica, California: RAND, forthcoming). This document will not be available to the public.
3. India has been battling insurgent elements since independence in 1947. While these insurgencies have generally taken place in rural areas, many have occurred in urbanized areas or have distinct urban elements.
5. The Indian government alleges that the attack on the Red Fort was perpetrated by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and that the Parliament attack was executed jointly by the LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammed.
6. Based on conversations with various police intelligence agencies in New Delhi and Srinagar, with analysts and former heads of India’s Research and Analysis Wing, with the Intelligence Bureau, and with analysts at the Center for Conflict Studies in New Delhi during September 2002.
7. Within India, the term “MOUT” is not used; rather, this doctrine is known as “FBUA” (Fighting in Built-up Areas). The acronym MOUT is employed in this paper to conform to usage prevalent in the United States and other countries.
8. This course most closely resembles the US army’s Infantry Officer Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.
9. The author has corresponded with several attendees of this course. This particular anonymous communication is dated September 2001.
10. Even though China is not in South Asia, it is included here due to its strategic significance to the South Asian subcontinent.
11. See Ashley Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).
12. I am using the phrase “war of unlimited objectives” to refer to conflicts in which India’s objective was to destroy the state of Pakistan as it existed at the onset of military engagement.
13. In the context of South Asia, proxy war has tended to include “extension of war by other means,” such as Pakistan’s support of insurgency in Kashmir and supporting militants in their cross-LOC and cross-border activities.
14. See Ashley Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
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... presented at Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, May 29–June 1, 2002. Cited with the author’s permission.

16. According to interviews with the Integrated Defence Staff in New Delhi in September 2002, India’s peacekeeping venture in Sri Lanka, it should be noted, was not UN-mandated.


22. “Security and Paramilitary Forces, India.”

23. “Asia, India’s Security Gap,” Jane’s Intelligence Review Vol. 8, No. 3 (March 1, 1996).


27. “Asia, India’s Security Gap.”


29. To explicate India’s operational experience as well as the nation’s theoretical and/or analytical treatments of low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and peacekeeping operations in urban settings, the author undertook an extensive literature search of indexed journals and other online resources, including the following Indian defense journals: Indian Defence Review, The Defence Review Annual, The IDSA Journal, The Indian Journal of Defence Studies, Indian Journal of Strategic Studies, and The Journal of the United Service Institution of India. This literature review focused on 1980 to 2000. I conducted interviews with US intelligence analysts, retired defense attachés, US army Foreign Area Officers who attended the Junior Command Course at the College of Combat, Mbow, other civilian and military personnel with recognized expertise in South Asia, and numerous Pakistani and Indian analysts. Confidential interviews with Pakistani stakeholders and commentators were conducted in Lahore and Islamabad during December 2000. These stakeholders included both retired and current army generals, the leadership of Pakistan’s chief political parties, journalists, and think-tank and academic analysts, as well as representatives from key non-state actor groups. Topics discussed included Pakistan’s future postures with respect to its ongoing support for insurgency in Kashmir. I also conducted extensive interviews with Indian analysts, journalists, intelligence and police officials in New Delhi and in Srinagar in September 2002. Indian agencies interviewed included the intelligence functions of the Srinagar Police force, the XVth Corps in Srinagar, Intelligence Bureau, analysts and former heads of the Research and Analysis Wing, and the New Delhi police. Finally, I met with terrorism analysts at New Delhi’s Center for Conflict Management in September 2002.

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32. Major General Afsir Karim, “The Challenge of Low Intensity Conflicts: Need for Fresh Thinking,” Indian Defence Review Vol. 5, No. 3 (July–September 1990), pp. 125–28. Note that the author found no evidence that such “Tin Cities” had been built in India. One informant observed paratroopers performing rudimentary counterterrorism drills using a lone building and believes that they may do this on a routine basis, but he has not observed or heard of the Indian regular army taking on larger scale operations in urban terrain.


45. Indian army officers attending the Indian army Junior Command course have also been favorably impressed by the extensive efforts to socialize the Indian army with respect to human rights issues. One student noted, “it is evident in this setting that these men make real effort to do the right thing.” (Personal correspondence, September 2001.) Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and other human rights monitoring groups are less favorably impressed.

46. Raza, “India’s Low Intensity Conflicts,” pp. 49–51.

49. To orient the reader, a brief description of the Golden Temple is in order. The temple itself is organized around a sacred reservoir and is surrounded by a fortified wall with eighteen gates, the main entrance being on its north side. The temple building (Harimandir Sahib) is in the middle of the reservoir and accessed by a bridge that links the Harimandir with the rest of the temple. This structure has three stories. The Parikrama, or pathway, maps out a rectangular path around the reservoir. The Akal Takht is the second most important shrine in the complex and is across from the Harimandir Sahib, on the Parikrama. Off the Parikrama there are a number of other buildings and passageways. Outside the temple complex are a number of multi-story hotels, restaurants, crowded and
winding bazaars as well as other buildings affiliated with the temple (e.g., the large hostel complex).

50. Brar, *Operation BlueStar*, p. 6. Bhindranwale remains a controversial figure. To many, he was and remains a modern Sikh hero: a former seminary student, he experienced a meteoric rise to fame as a result of his charismatic personality and vigorous pursuit of Sikh “missionary” work during the tumultuous period of the late 1970s in Punjab. Others see him as nothing more than a terrorist, and assign him primary blame for the bloodshed that ravaged Punjab for a decade. What is not in dispute is that on December 15, 1983, he and his followers entered the Akal Takht in Amritsar’s Golden Temple complex. With the tactical assistance of retired Maj. Gen. Shabeg Singh, he prepared an elaborate network of fortifications inside the complex, including the stockpiles of arms, ammunition and rations. Bhindranwale and most of his cohort perished during Operation Bluestar.

56. Note that Brar’s version of this phase does not accord well with the account given by Dar, “Battle for the Akal Takht.”

58. The divers were required because of the Akal Takht’s sacred pool.
60. Brar, *Operation BlueStar*, p. 82.

75. See Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*; “Raid On Jaffna University, 12 October 1987,” available at www.bharat-rakshak.com/BATTLES/Jaffna.html. Singh writes that even the “capture of a built up area ... entails house to house fighting which is not only time consuming but ‘eats up troops and, inevitably, ends up in enormous loss to life both to the attacker and
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defender and loss of life and property to the civilian population ... [Despite these problems, Jaffna was selected as it] had come to symbolize LTTE power and authority and one that had withstood all efforts made by the SLAF [Sri Lankan Armed Forces] to capture it. Furthermore, the LTTE were urban guerillas and it was in this town that had their headquarters, training facilities, munitions making factories and caches of arms and ammunition. It was necessary, therefore, to wrest control of this symbol to bring the LTTE back into the mainstream” (Singh, *IPKF in Sri Lanka*, p. 90).

77. “Raid On Jaffna University.”
78. “Raid On Jaffna University.”
79. “Raid On Jaffna University.”
82. “Raid On Jaffna University.”
83. See Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir.*