such travel. An increased U.S. presence in Tripoli is slated to participate in Libya’s disarmament. While this is a meager beginning, it may lay the groundwork for a limited American presence in Libya to work out the modalities of normalization. The Bush Administration’s decision to engage in diplomatic discussion with the Libyans in London in February is a positive and welcome step in which to create a public forum where Washington can raise its other concerns vis-à-vis the regime in Tripoli. Once a productive dialogue is established, full normalization cannot be far behind—nor should it.

Demographics and Security: The Contrasting Cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh

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Introduction

Pakistan and Bangladesh, united until a 1971 civil war, have evolved in very different ways over the last three decades. Pakistan’s failure to develop robust democratic institutions contrasts sharply to Bangladesh’s establishment—albeit flawed—of a parliamentary democratic system. Bangladesh remains largely regarded as a reasonably moderate state unmarred by mainstream Islamist extremism. Alternatively, Pakistan, mired in Islamist extremism and violence, serves as a major front for the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

Though Bangladesh and Pakistan continue to share many characteristics, they diverge greatly regarding their security environments. Pakistan’s main security issues stem from active border disputes with Afghanistan and India, a nuclear arms rivalry with India and hostile relations with Iran. In comparison, Bangladesh distrusts and occasionally has had disputes with India, but Dhaka has never had strategic ambitions towards its neighbors.

This paper argues that many of the observed dissimilarities between Pakistan and Bangladesh stem, at least in part, from demographic differences, some of which can be attributed to the two countries’ diverse human development policies. Each nation, for example, has had notably different relations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We examine the

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*According to discussions with a senior U.S. government advisor on Middle East policy, travel by U.S. nationals to Libya is viewed with much greater suspicion than is travel to Iran—this despite the increasing hostility with the regime in Teheran. Personal conversations held with the author, spring 2004.

ways in which demographic factors have affected the security postures of Bangladesh and Pakistan. To do this, we first discuss the various ways in which demographic factors have shaped the states of Bangladesh and Pakistan and note the key demographic features of each country. We next assess how demographic considerations have affected Bangladeshi and Pakistani security policies, drawing on a framework of how demographics can affect sources of national power, causes of conflict, and the nature of conflict. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for U.S. security and foreign aid policies.

I. Key Demographic Trends Shaping Bangladesh and Pakistan

We define demographic variables as those representing population size and composition and also population dynamics. Population composition refers to the distribution by age or geography, ethnicity and human capital (e.g., education, employment). Population dynamics deal with changes over time, including changes in absolute size or relative population composition. Key aspects of population dynamics include natural increase or decrease, i.e., the difference between births and deaths, and migration, whether internal or international.

Demographic changes, by themselves, do not cause armed conflict, but in political environments that are already tense as a result of territorial disputes, ethnic rivalries, ideological divides, or still other causes, they can exacerbate existing tensions and increase risks of violence and compromise security. Interactions between population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, resource depletion, forced refugee flows, nationalism, and urbanization can all affect the likelihood and types of conflict that are present in a given region. Understanding the dynamic role of demographic variables in regional security issues can help both the United States and regional governments understand the most effective options for regional security.

How Demographics Have Helped Shape South Asia

Demographics have played an important role in shaping South Asia. Religious demography guided the 1947 partition of British India into the overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistan and the predominantly Hindu India. Geography split Pakistan further into West Pakistan and Bengali (East) Pakistan. Ethnic tensions between the population of the Bengali East and Western Pakistan's complicated ethnic mix of Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch and Muhajirs roiled the country for almost a quarter of a century. In Pakistan's general elections of December 1970, Bengali Pakistan's Awami League won an overwhelming majority. In all the years prior to the 1970 elections Western Pakistan dominated the government and had no intention of relinquishing its power. As a result, Bengali Pakistan demanded independence, which led to a civil war. Demographic events: the uncontrolled flow of refugees fleeing civil unrest in East Pakistan to India, spurred Indian intervention on behalf of Bangladeshi separatists in the ensuing 1971 Indo-Pakistani War that culminated in the creation of the two separate states of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

In the 1970s and '80s, demographics influenced the security postures of both Pakistan and the newly independent Bangladesh. Pakistan's complicated ethnic mix fostered numerous internal security problems that, combined with the ongoing security competition with India, compelled Pakistani leaders to adopt a military-oriented international posture to safeguard its national security interests. In contrast, Bangladesh's internal ethno-religious homogeneity minimized internal security problems and allowed Dhaka to focus more on economic development to ensure national security and prosperity.

To explore the ways demographics have influenced the evolution of Pakistan and Bangladesh, this essay examines trends in several demographic factors, including those in population growth, urbanization, age structure, education and migration. We describe each of these below and then draw out the implications for both states' evolution.

This paper assumes the significance of the basic differences between the security environments of Pakistan and Bangladesh. From its inception, Pakistan has seen itself as a weak state compared to India for a number of reasons, including competition over Kashmir. It has pursued strategic parity with India and has developed asymmetric strategies to wrest Kashmir from India. Bangladesh has never had such concerns with any of its neighbors nor has it had regional strategic ambitions. However, as we describe, demographic factors to some extent can explain these structural differences in the kinds of nations and security environments that Pakistan and Bangladesh have inherited. See Stephen Phillip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings Press, 2004); J.N. Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace (New Delhi: Ashok Chopra, 2002); Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997); Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
Population Growth

In 1971, Bangladesh's population was 68 million, five million more than that of Pakistan's 63 million. In subsequent decades, these populations more than doubled, with that in Pakistan growing even faster; by 2000 the population of Pakistan was 138 million, while that in Bangladesh was 131 million.

High fertility rates have contributed to rapid population growth in both countries. The total fertility rate (i.e., the number of children that would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates of that year) was about 7 in both countries in the early 1970s. While they remain above that needed for replacement (about 2.1 children per woman), by 2000 they had decreased to 3.1 children per woman in Bangladesh and 4.7 in Pakistan.

The fairly high population growth rates that result from high fertility rates have prompted both states to seek to limit fertility. Family planning associations have existed in Pakistan since the early 1950s. During the 1960s, Pakistani president Mohammed Ayub Khan made family planning one of his main domestic concerns but with little effect; a 1969 survey found only 6 percent of married couples practiced contraception. During the 1970s, Pakistani leadership vacillated on family planning policies. In the 1980s the government, under Zia ul-Haq, became openly hostile to family planning, as Zia sought the support of religious parties who opposed birth control programs. Economic growth during the 1980s (6.3 percent per year, compared to 4.7 percent in the 1970s) also lulled the government into a sense of complacency about the effects of population growth and hence about family planning issues.

By contrast, following a catastrophic famine in 1974, Bangladeshi leaders gave priority to limiting population growth. In 1976, Bangladesh president Zia ur-Rahman promulgated a comprehensive family planning program that he saw as necessary to address the most pressing concern for the nation—high and increasing population density (discussed below)—and he welcomed bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs that provided funding for family planning and other social programs. Unlike Pakistani leaders, Rahman and his successors did not have to contend with religious parties, who had been discredited by their support for Pakistan during the movement for Bangladeshi independence. The differing approaches to family planning programs have had predictable effects. The proportion of women of childbearing age using contraception in Bangladesh has been about twice that in Pakistan, resulting in a considerably lower fertility rate in Bangladesh.

Also contributing to population growth in both states has been increasing life expectancy, reflecting decreases in mortality rates due to general health improvements. Between 1970 and 2000, life expectancy at birth increased 13.6 years, from 49.4 to 63.0, in Pakistan, and 17.0 years, from 44.2 to 61.2, in Bangladesh. One reason for the higher life expectancy in Pakistan but the greater increase in Bangladesh may be the pattern of health expenditures in both nations. While total health expenditures have been higher in Pakistan, likely contributing to higher overall life expectancy, public health expenditures, more likely to benefit those with the lowest life expectancy, have been higher in Bangladesh leading to the greater absolute increases in life expectancy.

The areas over which the populations of Bangladesh and Pakistan are distributed have produced markedly different population densities. The area of Bangladesh (133,910 km2) is about one-sixth that of Pakistan (778,720 km2), and hence its population density (1,007 persons per km2) is nearly six times that of Pakistan (179 persons per km2) and, in fact, is one of the highest in the world. The ever-shrinking amount of arable land in rural Bangladesh is particularly disconcerting. In the past quarter century, arable land per capita has declined by about half (from 0.12 hectares to

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2World Bank, World Development Indicators. In the mid-1980s, 25 percent of Bangladeshi women 15 to 49 years of age were using contraception, as were 11 percent of Pakistani women of childbearing age. By 2000, contraceptive prevalence had increased to 54 percent in Bangladesh and 28 percent in Pakistan.
3Ibid.
0.06 hectares); it is expected to decrease by another third in the next quarter century.\textsuperscript{8}

**Urbanization**

In both countries population growth has been greatest in the largest cities, resulting in rapid urbanization. Between 1970 and 2000, in Bangladesh, Dhaka grew from 1.5 million to 10.2 million, and Chittagong increased from 0.7 to 3.3 million, while in Pakistan, Karachi grew from 3.2 to 10.0 million, and Lahore increased from 2.0 to 5.5 million. During this period the population living in urban areas increased from 11 to 23 percent in Bangladesh and from 25 to 33 percent in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{9}

**Age Structure**

Due to simultaneously decreasing fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, the percentage of the population that is young (e.g., under age 15) is decreasing in both nations, especially in Bangladesh. U.N. population statistics indicate that the population under 15 in Bangladesh has decreased from 45 percent in 1970 to 39 percent in 2000 and 37 percent in 2005, while that in Pakistan was 42 percent in 1970 and 2000 and 41 percent in 2005. (The comparable figure for Asia as a whole is 28 percent in 2005.) Hence, around the time of independence, Bangladesh had a higher percentage of its population under the age of 15 than Pakistan, but it has fallen much more than Pakistan's and been lower in recent years.

Despite the decreases in the relative proportion of the youth population, the absolute size of this population has increased substantially in both countries. The number of persons less than 15 years of age in Bangladesh increased from an estimated 30 million in 1970 to 56 million in 2005 and is projected to increase to 58 million in 2020.\textsuperscript{10} The Pakistani youth popula-


-\textsuperscript{11}World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.


-\textsuperscript{14}World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.


\textsuperscript{17}World Bank, *World Development Indicators*.
882 thousand in Bangladesh and 6.6 million in Pakistan in 1990. Referees have constituted about half the foreign-born population in Pakistan, numbering nearly 3.3 million in 1990 and 2.0 million in 2000. In recent years the refugee population in Pakistan has fluctuated between 1.2 and 2.2 million. Estimates for 2003 indicated that Afghan refugees in Pakistan numbered about 1.1 million, with many returning to Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban.

Nonetheless, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have net emigration; i.e., in both nations, the number of persons emigrating each year exceeds the number of persons immigrating, offsetting a very modest extent the population growth due to natural population increase. Net emigration in 2000 was estimated to be 70 thousand from Pakistan and 60 thousand from Bangladesh. The loss each nation is experiencing through net emigration is likely by 2050 to have reduced the total population in each nation by four to eight million below what would be expected if there were no emigration.15

While emigration appears to have been quantitatively greater in Pakistan, in some ways its effects on population composition have been greater on Bangladesh, with emigration helping to increase the numerical dominance of Muslims. Prior to partition in 1947, Muslims comprised just over two-thirds of the population of what is now Bangladesh, while Hindus comprised nearly one-third. Migration following partition reduced the Hindu population percentage, as did subsequent wars between Pakistan and India. By one estimate, between 1964 and 1991, Bangladesh lost 5.3 million, or one third, of its Hindus due to emigration, primarily to India.16

While not affecting the overall population of these nations, internal migration, often prompted by the lack of social and economic opportunities in rural areas, has affected distribution of the population within these nations. As noted earlier, the urban populations of Bangladesh and Pakistan have each grown much more rapidly than the rural populations.

II. Effects of Demographics on Security

The demographic variables discussed above are likely to affect security in Bangladesh and Pakistan in several ways. They may affect:

- sources of national power: the ways in which states and other bodies in conflict seek to create an maintain military power.
- causes of conflict: new and evolving triggers of conflict linked to population flows and other movements.
- the nature of conflict: the ways in which wars and other armed conflicts are conducted as well as the means and ends of conflict.

Demographics and the Sources of Power

Demographics can affect the sources of power within developing states in several ways. The demands of domestic politics, such as calls for greater investment in education and other youth services because of a growing youth population, can conflict with those for military capability.

Ethnic Composition in the Military

In addition to playing its traditional roles as a shield against external threats and a guarantor of internal stability, the military in many large multiethnic developing states is also called upon to serve as a vehicle for increasing social cohesion and promoting patriotism.

For Pakistan, the military has been a major player in ethnic and national politics and has attempted to promote social cohesion, but with only mixed results. The Pakistani military’s longstanding reliance on Punjabis and Pashtuns for its manpower, largely to the exclusion of other groups, has not helped to forge a national identity amongst the nation’s various ethnic groups and has thus weakened Pakistan’s overall national power.

In recent years, Punjabis have comprised 65 percent of officers and 70 percent of other ranks, but only 56 percent of the total population. Pashtuns are even more highly overrepresented, comprising 25 percent of the Pakistani military but only 8 percent of the total population. This imbalance leaves the Sindhi and Baloch ethnic groups greatly underrepresented, particularly in the officer corps. The dominance of Punjabis and Pashtuns in the military originated with their classification by the British as martial races during the imperial era. The destructive legacy of this system...
became evident during the 1971 secession of East Pakistan, when the poorly trained and equipped Bengali government troops (in comparison to their Pashtun and Punjabi comrades) garrisoning the East had to bear the brunt of the insurrection and were unable to subdue the local Bengali rebels.\(^7\)

Popular perceptions of the Pakistani military as a Punjabi-Pashtun fraternity are very damaging to the country’s social cohesion and help promote ethnic and tribal strife at a time when Islamabad already faces sectarian Sunni-Shia cleavages and a political challenge from radical Islamists. Given the enormous political power of the Army, reformers have called for new recruiting policies that promote diversity.\(^8\) Indeed, in recent years, the military has been recruiting among a broader range of socioeconomic backgrounds and ethnicities, but it remains to be seen if the policy shift will result in major changes in the military’s ethnic composition.

Bangladesh does not face any similar problems since the military’s ethnic composition (overwhelmingly Bengali) mirrors that of society as a whole.

**Youth Bulges and Education**

As noted above, both states have large “youth bulges” that have strained their educational systems. To ensure productive employment of these youth, a good educational system is essential. High levels of human capital would be critical sources of national power for both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Effective human capital would also undercut the forces of political Islam in both states. Unfortunately, in the case of Pakistan, militant educational networks have been reducing human capital levels and national power potential, thus feeding the instability upon which political Islam thrives. Pakistan’s response to the growing youth population’s educational needs has been the development of madrasahs, or religious schools. (While the word “madrasah” merely means “school,” the term is often used by security analysts to refer to “religious schools.”) Some madrasahs became sources of young recruits for the mujahadeen in the 1980s when Islamic guerrillas battled the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Many of these same madrasahs continue to support armed militant groups in Indian-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan.

One official estimates there are about 10,000 madrasahs in Pakistan, containing as many as 1.7 million students. Quite apart from the question of whether madrasahs impart militant doctrine and propaganda is the generally low-quality education they provide. Madrasahs tend to focus on religious subjects and rote memorization rather than the analytical skills needed for students to be productive in a modern economy.\(^9\)

Although the radical madrasah problem has historically been a minor one in Bangladesh due to that nation’s historically tolerant form of Islam, some analysts are now observing an increase in the number of radical madrasahs in that country and are warning that this trend raises the specter of Islamist militancy developing roots in Bangladesh.\(^10\)

**Demographics and the Causes of Conflict**

Demographic changes can cause conflict by increasing tensions between states in a region or by altering the domestic politics of a state so that it becomes a security problem for its neighbors, or a host to ethnic, communal or class-based violence. Demographic variables that can increase tensions between nations include flows of migrants and refugees, conflicts over resources in areas facing population pressures and differential sizes


and growth rates of population subgroups.

**Migrant and Refugee Flows**

The effects of migration on regional security vary by whether migration is voluntary (generally linked to economic motives) or involuntary (generally linked to refugee movements). Involuntary flows tend to have greater effects on security. Some involuntary flows are uncontrolled; they are not the result of any deliberate government decision but result from land overuse, environmental degradation, resource scarcity, famine or communal violence. Refugees and, on occasion, voluntary migrants can pose security problems for the home or host country. The host state faces the risk that the migrating population will seek to mount from abroad political or military actions aimed at weakening or overthrowing the government. The host state must contend with the burden such populations place on infrastructure and natural resources as well as the possibility such populations might launch separatist or other political movements of cultural identity.

As noted earlier, Pakistan has had a large, fluctuating refugee population, primarily Afghans. This refugee population has posed security problems for Pakistan since the onset of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, which forced many to seek refuge in Pakistan. As we discuss later in this essay, urban areas of Sindh and rural areas of Punjab may also prove to be sites of future conflict between native residents and foreign arrivals. About one in four recent migrants to these areas was born in foreign lands.21

In Bangladesh, migration has affected both internal security and that with neighboring states. In the southeast, internal security has been threatened through encroachments on land of the small minority of indigenous Buddhists, particularly the Jumma concentrated in forested land in Chittagong in southeastern Bangladesh.22 Geographical isolation has afforded the Jumma the opportunity to preserve their traditions and culture. Inexorable population pressures, however, have broken down the relative isolation of the Jumma and led to tensions between them and small farmers and peasants who have moved into these areas after being disposessed elsewhere. In response to land seizure and clearing, the Jumma have formed crude militias and attacked Bengali settlers. The military has intervened to protect the settlers, committing a variety of human rights abuses against the indigenous people in the process. A 1997 peace agreement has kept the violence under control, but its roots have not been eradicated. Increasing population density and accompanying land shortages remain a chronic problem and will provide continuing temptation for Bengali settlers to seize indigenous lands.

Increasing population density is also leading to migration from Bangladesh to India. The Indian provinces to the northeast of Bangladesh have a population density about one-eighth that of Bangladesh.23 These relatively open lands have attracted hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi migrants. This uncontrolled migration poses three security threats. First, organized crime groups exploit the border area to smuggle weapons, narcotics and other contraband. Second, the influx of Bengali Muslims has caused a backlash among the Hindus and Christians of the Indian provinces. A number of militias have been formed to harass and eject Bengalis settled in these areas. Some of these factions are seeking not only to evict the migrants but also to assert local autonomy at the expense of Delhi. Third, reportedly the pervasive lawlessness has drawn international Islamist terrorists into the area, a claim that Dhaka denies. If this destabilization continues, Delhi may pressure, or threaten, Dhaka to slow the flow of migrants.

Finally, migration to Bangladesh has created tensions between Bangladesh and Burma. Over the past decade, the Burmese military has mounted several campaigns to drive the Rohingyas, a Muslim community of around a half million persons with deep roots in Arakan in western Burma, into Bangladesh. This has led to the creation of large refugee camps filled with Rohingyas in Bangladesh.24

**Competition for Renewable Resources**

In addition to the pressures and resulting conflict that it places on land, population growth is also increasing the competition for renewable sources

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22While no exact count of Jumma is available, there were 575 thousand Buddhists in Chittagong, of a total of 623 thousand nationwide, in 1991, the latest census year for which religious information is currently available. See Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Bangladesh Population Census, 1991, Volume I: Analytical Report.


24See Lintner, “Diversionary Tactics: Anti-Muslim Campaign Seen as Effort to Rally Burmans.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there were 20 thousand refugees from Burma in Bangladesh in 2003. See UNHCR, “Population Statistics.”
such as water. Pakistan’s disputes with India over the use of water from the Indus River system with its headwaters in Kashmir, exemplify how demographic pressures on renewable resources exacerbate the extant conflict in Kashmir and contribute to new dimensions of this enduring dispute. Like the rest of South Asia, Pakistan and India have dwindling water supplies. Moreover, depletion of groundwater aquifers is posing grave threats to agriculture in both countries. In many areas, water tables are falling 2 to 3 meters per year because of the creation of about one million irrigation wells each year. By one estimate, renewable water per capita decreased by half in Pakistan between 1975 and 2000, and will decrease to levels just above “water scarcity” (defined by having less than 1,000 per capita cubic meters of internal renewable water) by 2025. Per capita availability of renewable water in India is currently similar to that in Pakistan, but projected slower population growth there means per capita water availability will not decrease as rapidly in coming years. About 40 percent of all Pakistani water originates from outside of Pakistan. The five major rivers constituting the Indus River system all originate or pass through India before reaching Pakistan. British colonial administrators built a series of canals within this river system that resulted in the largest canal-irrigated region in the world. Most of this region was in Pakistan, prompting India to expand the canal system after partition. By the mid-1950s, the newer canals were affecting the supply of Indus water to Pakistan, which in turn demanded its downstream riparian rights be respected. Following intervention of the United States and the World Bank, the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 stipulated that water of the three eastern rivers of the system (the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) could be diverted for Indian use, while waters from the other rivers (the Chenab, the Indus and the Indus headwaters) were to be for Pakistani use.

The Indus treaty has been one of the few areas of cooperation between India and Pakistan, even in the midst of other conflicts between them. The success of the treaty has been due in large part to the fact that it has required little or no interaction between the adversarial states. In recent years, however, use of Indus water has again become a source of contention, and the treaty provides no viable means to address these nascent concerns. While an increasing Pakistani population seeks more water, India seeks to address its energy shortage through hydroelectricity generation. Political leaders in Indian Kashmir have been particularly provocative in pressing the central government to significantly alter the treaty, if not abandon it altogether, in order to divert more water for hydroelectricity.

In May 2002, at the tensest moment in the Indian military buildup along the Pakistani border, India openly raised the possibility of revoking the Indus Water Treaty, as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy with Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan contends India effectively suspended the treaty when the Indian Commissioner for the treaty severed all contacts with his Pakistani counterpart and cancelled a December 2001 visit by Pakistani engineers to investigate the possible effects of a proposed Indian power plant on Pakistani water.

While the 2002 conflict subsided, water issues have not. In January 2004, after several rounds of bilateral talks failed, Islamabad requested World Bank intervention to address Pakistan’s allegation that India violated the Indus Water Treaty by building the Baglihar Dam. This move underscores Pakistan’s fears that India seeks to deprive Pakistan of its much-needed water resources. More concerning is the fact that many within Pakistan view such prospects of water deprivation as casus belli. These developments all suggest that Kashmir’s water might exacerbate this core area of conflict between India and Pakistan.

Demographic variables can affect policies and relations among peoples within states, as evinced by the ongoing violence against Bangladesh’s shrinking Hindu minority. Relations between the Muslim majority and Hindu minority in Bangladesh are stressed, and demographic trends in the country are serving to increase this tension. As noted earlier, the Hindu proportion of the population in Bangladesh has shrunk considerably in recent decades, in large part because of Hindu emigration. The small and decreasing Hindu proportion of the Bangladeshi population is increasing.

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Author interviews with leadership in Kashmir in September and October 2002.

ly vulnerable to attack by radical Islamic fundamentalists and resentful small farmers and peasants. Because there are no other significant religious minorities in Bangladesh—Christians, Buddhists, and those of still other religions comprise only about one percent of the population—Hindus have no opportunity to form a countervailing coalition for diversity.

**Youth Bulges and Economic and Social Infrastructure**

As noted above, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have large “youth bulges,” which continue to exert pressure on their economic and social infrastructure. Some analysts of Pakistan fear that such large cohorts of youths unable to find work may turn to radical political alternatives causing domestic unrest. Jobs in the Pakistani economy have not increased as fast as the population. Moreover, Pakistan’s public education system has been long neglected, with religious schools filling the void left by the state’s abdication of responsibility. Not only do these schools fail to impart the requisite training to enable these youths to become productive contributors to society, some of these madrassahs propagate militant ideologies and facilitate the recruitment of youth by militant groups. Terrorist attacks in India by groups based in Pakistan remain the single-most likely spark to ignite hostilities between Pakistan and India. Concerns about Pakistan’s youth bulge are further exacerbated by the fact that no functioning democracy or system of accountability is likely to develop in the near future. Rather, the Army will likely continue to run the state and can be expected to continue cultivating the use of militants for prosecuting its foreign policy towards India.

It is possible that Bangladesh, with its comparatively more democratic politics and slightly smaller youth bulge, may be in a better position to handle its demographic pressures than Pakistan. Even during the first military dictatorship in Bangladesh, Zia ur-Rahman sought to stitch together various interest groups into a single coherent political movement. Nevertheless, there are also limits to democratic efficacy in Bangladesh.

**Demographics and the Nature of Conflict**

Demographic trends also affect the nature and conduct of conflict by influencing the environment (e.g., by creating new areas of conflict, such as urban areas) or instruments of conflict (e.g., diasporas that may seek to advance the interests of their home states or other powers).

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lords. Aspiring Sunni politicians highlighted this religious divide as they competed with Shi’a landlords for the allegiance of Sunni peasants. Reinforcing this division was the establishment of numerous militant seminars that have transformed many urban settlements into sectarian battlegrounds.23

Population Distribution and Strategic Depth

The geographic distribution of a country’s population may also shape future conflict. For example, the concentration of Pakistani agricultural, industry and urban centers near the Indian border limits the strategic depth of Pakistan. Conceivably, capture of even a limited Pakistani area near the border could help India obtain large concessions on Kashmir or water rights. This and other strategic considerations of “state integrity” have persuaded Pakistani leaders to accelerate their nuclear arms programs. Under the umbrella of its nuclear assets, Pakistan has become more aggressive in the proxy war that it has waged in Kashmir. India, in turn, has sought to develop a strategic space wherein it can punish Pakistan for its prosecution of the conflict in Kashmir. This has resulted in India’s efforts to promulgate a doctrine of a limited-aims war.23 These developments prompt U.S. fears that an Indo-Pakistan conflict, once started, will not remain limited but escalate to the nuclear threshold.

Renewable Resources

Demographic patterns and shifts are increasing the importance of two nontraditional instruments of conflict: renewable resources and ethnic diasporas. Political scientists have long recognized that access to nonrenewable resources (e.g., petroleum) can lead to conflict between states, and that limiting access to these can serve as a means of coercion by one state against another. Recent analyses have also recognized renewable resources such as water can be used for instruments of coercion. Similarly, just as renewable sources can exacerbate conflict between South Asian states, as we discussed above, so could effective control of these resources provide an instrument for advancing a state’s interests in conflict. For instance, in any war with Pakistan, India could strike at Pakistani irrigation facilities with tactical aircraft, artillery and missiles; seek to divert the flow of certain rivers in the Indus water system away from Pakistan, or simply reduce fresh water flow into Pakistan.

Diasporas

Ethnic diasporas have long existed, but recent advances in transportation and communications have increased their size, visibility and impact.24 More rapid and widespread long-range transportation has permitted larger migratory flows, increasing the size of diasporas abroad. By their very nature, diasporas tend to forge extensive transnational networks that are useful for moving funds, humans, weapons and war materiel, and other licit and illicit goods. These networks may be used for well-intentioned purposes such as human development and charity work in the homeland but may also be deployed in the service of terrorism and other organized crime.

To be sure, numerous legitimate organizations have arisen to help foster expatriate Pakistani communities and to encourage human development in them as well as their investment in Pakistan. The Musharraf government has sought to strengthen the ties of such organizations with Pakistan through a recently established Human Development Fund that seeks the help of Pakistani-American professionals and entrepreneurs in fostering new business initiatives in Pakistan.25

Nevertheless, some elements of its diaspora have had less salubrious effects for Pakistan. Many expatriate Pakistanis have been an important source of funding for madrassahs, contributing to sectarian violence and militancy. The fall of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International exposed financial apparatus to funnel monies to Pakistani guerrillas in


26The project is currently headed by Dr. Nasim Ashraf, an expatriate who has returned to Pakistan to run this organization, and enjoys the full and complete support of President Musharraf (See, <http://www.nchd.org.pk/nchd/>). This program is based on the notion of “teaching how to catch fish” and makes extensive use of Pakistani-American professionals and entrepreneurs. Indeed, this organization has been described as a “...totally transparent private effort of Pakistani Americans, and well-known Pakistan philanthropists like Abdul Sattar Edhi (See, <http://www.pabe.org/news12.htm>).
Pakistan. Extreme Islamic groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayab and Jaish-e-Mohammad collect as much as $7.4 million annually from British mosques to support Kashmiri fighters. Support of such groups by Pakistani expatriates enables these groups to pursue their own interests even when at odds with the Pakistani government, and possibly pose a new threat to relations between India and Pakistan.36

The Pakistani diaspora in the Persian Gulf might change the nature by which radical Islamic movements are spread among the masses in Pakistan and elsewhere, possibly leading to new means and ends of religious conflict. A large number of Pakistani guest workers in the Persian Gulf are continually exposed to Islamic fundamentalism, which some of these workers may embrace and seek to spread when returning home. Their status as remittance providers may increase the appeal of such extremism within Pakistan.37

Bangladesh too has a large expatriate community, which contributes to the development of the country in numerous ways. Remittances from the Bangladeshi diaspora account for nearly one third of the foreign exchange reserve. While the government of Bangladesh believes that the economic and social interaction of the diaspora can be beneficial for migrants, host countries and home countries, there is relatively little information about the Bangladesh diaspora. As a consequence, Dhaka is taking active efforts to expand its understanding of the nature of the Bangladeshi diaspora and the various linkages that bind the expatriates to the homeland.38

Unfortunately, little is known about the involvement (if any) of Bangladeshis diasporans in the support of militant groups such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami.39

III. Conclusions

From a common history prior to Bangladeshi independence, several demographic variables continue to shape security issues in Pakistan and Bangladesh in similar ways. Both nations have overwhelming Muslim majorities, and both have wrestled with questions of integrating religious politics with more secular demands. Both have had to deal with increasing levels of urbanization and the security questions posed by migration. Both have had to address issues of infrastructure needed to support rapidly growing populations.

At the same time, the differing demographic conditions of the two nations have affected how both have been able to address their most pressing population problems that directly influence their national security. Some of the more prominent features of the relationship between demographic and security variables in Bangladesh include a very high population density, the role a more moderate Islam has played in shaping politics and responses to population pressures and recent changes in how religion has affected responses to population pressures, including the effect of religion on migration politics. Some of the more prominent features of the relationship between demographic and security variables in Pakistan include population distribution limiting strategic depth in conflict with India; the pressure population growth has placed on renewable resources, particularly the water drawn from the Indus River system originating in India; the role the Pakistani military plays in social integration; a large refugee and youth population creating a demand for education met in part by madrassas; and a large diaspora with the potential to affect security issues at home and abroad.

The demographic trends in each nation appear to have created or reinforced differences that may become self-perpetuating. One comparative survey of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis found Pakistani respondents desire more children than Bangladeshis.40 Regarding development issues, while most Bangladeshi and Pakistani respondents said they believe the chief aim for their country should be a high level of economic growth, Pakistani are

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40See Ronald Inglehart et al., World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, (machine readable file), Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 2004. More specifically, the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted in late 2002 in Bangladesh and in late 2001 and early 2002 in Pakistan, found only 42 percent of Pakistani respondents but 91 percent of Bangladeshi respondents said their ideal number of children was two or fewer.
more likely to view the need for strong defense forces as the most important aim that their government should pursue. Pakistanis are also more likely than Bangladeshis to view authoritarian rule favorably.

The demographic trends and issues we have reviewed point to several broad policy implications for the United States. First, U.S. policymakers need to recognize how demographic or ethnic politics can affect the composition of the military or political parties in each nation. In Pakistan, for example, given that the army is, and will for the foreseeable future remain, the most important institution, following its cohesion and its relationship with civilian institutions is important. Equally important is the monitoring of its relationship with the now-banned mainstream political parties and the alliance of Islamist parties. Finally, as this analysis suggests, while the army is an important institution, it is critical that Pakistan be encouraged to invest in its population and civil institutions. It is difficult to foresee such social expenditures increasing as long as the military is the pre-eminent institution in that state.

Second, U.S. policymakers should also recognize other “hotspots” besides the well-known ones in the region. The Indus headwaters may add a new dimension to the intractable Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. While perhaps not as likely as military conflict between Pakistan and India, military conflict between Bangladesh and India could yet be provoked by the uncontrolled flow of Muslim refugees from Bangladesh to India. Elsewhere, the border between Burma and Bangladesh is relatively stable, but if Bangladesh was unable to maintain refugee camps for the Rohingyas, and attempted to send the refugees back against firm opposition from Burma, it could prompt a military conflict. Within Bangladesh, if attacks on Hindus escalate, one could see a progressive destabilization as armed local militias usurp the government monopoly on organized violence. In such a scenario, Bangladesh could become a haven for international Islamist terrorists seeking to exploit an anarchic environment. Finally, internal conflict involving the Jumma could become more severe if Bangladeshi politics become more corrupt, less accountable less democratic or increasingly radicalized by religious fundamentalism or if Bangladeshi leaders in light of any political changes become more willing to use force in an ultimate resolution of the conflict.

Third, improving social capital in each nation may call for adjustments in types of assistance that have been offered. Aid must also be tailored in culturally acceptable ways, a seemingly obvious lesson that nonetheless may require further study in Pakistan and even in Bangladesh, lest it result in a backlash even in areas where it has been accepted. Aid can and should be used to help rein in extremism, but a balance must be struck to avoid inciting a nationalist backlash.

Bangladeshi leaders have relied on help from Western NGOs and multinational institutions since the 1974 famine; NGOs have been welcomed and consequently have helped Bangladesh reduce its population growth. In contrast, Pakistan has not had a good rapport with the NGO community and has received comparatively fewer benefits from these organizations. Bangladesh’s reliance on NGOs, however, has given such organizations the license to criticize and threaten Bangladesh over its political decision-making. From the standpoint of demographic challenges to security, the role of foreign donors has both benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, the demands of these donors will, in the near term, likely force Bangladesh’s political elite to rein in more fundamentalist Islamic groups and protect the Hindu minority. On the other hand, the demands of Western donors may ultimately generate a backlash boosting the BNP and Islamic extremists. Such a prospect demonstrates the care with which the international donor community must pursue its goals in Bangladesh.

U.S. policies have tended to strengthen the hand of the army while fostering the central government’s attempts to weaken civilian institutions. Our analyses suggests that aid needs to serve many purposes, including restoration of democratic processes, fortifying internal security and bolstering civilian institutions such as schools. While the madrassah system may offer short-term solutions, this system should not be the primary focus of reforming Pakistan’s educational infrastructure. (Pakistan does not need more religious schools.) Instead, Pakistan’s public schools need significant resources and transformation and merits substantial expansion. It is these institutions that will be necessary to equip Pakistan with the intellectual and human capital required for a functioning and stable state. Without serious attempts to rejuvenate the Pakistani secular educational system, particularly in rural areas where education is most wanting, even a small proportion of radical madrassas may cause security concerns for years to come.

The nations of the region, as well as the United States in protecting its interests there, may face more immediate security issues, such as those involving the nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India, the conflict between these two nations in Kashmir and Al Qaeda and Taliban presence

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in the border areas of Pakistan, than those posed by demographic trends. Demographic trends, however, have contributed to some aspects of some of these threats, as well as to others that, though less immediate, can affect the security of the region in coming years. For these reasons, the demographic variables affecting Bangladesh and Pakistan cannot, and should not, be ignored.

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Book Section

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International Relations


UNIPOLAR POLITICS: REALISM AND STATE STRATEGIES AFTER THE COLD WAR. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, 350 pp. Analyzes the decisions that major powers have made since the Cold War to adapt to a rapidly changing economic and security environment.
