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The US–Pakistan relations after a decade of the war on terror

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This essay examines the arc of the US–Pakistan relations amid the developments of the last decade of the war on terror. It argues that Washington’s pursuit of dehyphenated relations with India and Pakistan, and failure to follow through on early promises to Pakistan, made it more likely that Pakistan would again return to a policy of supporting the Taliban and increase Pakistan’s dependence upon Islamist terror groups to prosecute its security interests. After a decade of fraught ties, culminating in a particularly tumultuous year in 2011, the US and Pakistan seemed poised for collision. With no remedy in sight, this rupture in the US–Pakistan relations will have enormous implications for regional and international security.

Keywords: The US–Pakistan relations; war on terror; Indo-Pakistan relations; South Asian Regional Security

Introduction

On 10 September 2001, Pakistan, encumbered by sanctions imposed in response to nuclear and missile proliferation as well as General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 military coup, teetered on the edge of pariah status (Rennack 2001). The horrific events of 11 September 2001 afforded then-President Musharraf the opportunity to cast off these sanctions and rehabilitate Pakistan’s standing in the community of nations (CNN 2001). Musharraf – who had little actual choice – agreed to support the United States in its war on terror by working to round up al Qaeda operatives and, more specifically, by facilitating the US-led war effort in Afghanistan (Musharraf 2008). To do so, Pakistan afforded the United States widespread access to naval, air, and army bases and permitted Pakistan to be the logistical conduit through which the war was supplied (Fair 2004).

In the course of the past decade, the United States provided some $21 billion in defense assistance and reimbursements as well as economic assistance to Pakistan (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011). Despite the large investments made by the United States in Pakistan, Pakistanis are more anti-American than ever.1 Even the Pakistan military is deeply anti-American, despite the fact that the United States has provided considerable quantities of weapon systems that could improve Pakistan’s position in a war with India. The military and intelligence cooperation that undergirded this relationship – howsoever fraught from the outset – now is in tatters. The future of
the US–Pakistan relationship is dark, with observers in both countries wondering whether the other is a problematic and treacherous friend or an outright foe.

The past year was particularly traumatic for the US–Pakistan relations. In early 2011, Raymond Davis, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contractor, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore. The circumstances of the event are still in dispute: American officials claim that Davis had diplomatic immunity and that he shot the two men in self-defense after they menaced him and brandished weapons. Pakistani officials counter that Davis was a cold-blooded murderer. Pakistan-based analysts suspect that the two men were contractors from Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI, Pakistan’s internal and external intelligence agency) and that the entire episode was likely staged by the ISI to bring intelligence cooperation to a standstill after ISI leadership learned that the CIA was conducting unilateral operations in Pakistan (Wairach 2011).

The two countries had barely managed to resolve the impasse, when, in the early hours of 2 May 2011, the United States inserted a Navy SEAL team into the cantonment town of Abbottabad (home of the country’s premier military training institution, the Pakistan Military Academy) to kill Osama bin Laden. The Navy SEALs managed to execute the heliborne raid, sustain a 40-min firefight, and leave Pakistan with Bin Laden’s corpse before the Pakistan army even knew of the operation. The military was humiliated for its failure both to know of Bin Laden’s presence in an army garrison town and to detect – much less repulse – the US raid. Rather than exploit the army’s position of weakness, Pakistan’s civilian leadership ultimately rallied around the beleaguered military and intelligence agencies (Mazzetti, Cooper, and Baker 2011).

Several months later, Pakistan–US relations were further damaged when a US/ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strike killed 24 Pakistani military personnel in Mohmand in November 2011 (BBC News 2011). Despite gross US/ NATO negligence, the United States refused to apologize (Fair 2011a). Pakistan responded by shutting down ground-based logistical supply routes to Afghanistan and ousting Americans from Shamsi airfield, one of the two Pakistan air bases from which the Americans flew drone operations. At the time of publication (early March 2012), logistical resupply routes remained closed but drone operations had resumed. The Pakistani parliament also created a commission to review the conditions under which Pakistani military and intelligence cooperation with the United States may resume (Yasin 2012). American Embassy officials interviewed by the author in early January in Islamabad termed these proposed conditions unacceptable.

During the same period, a parallel scandal, known as Memogate in Pakistan, has further strained the US–Pakistan relations and threatened to bring down Pakistan’s civilian government, led by the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). At the center of the Memogate maelstrom are a shady Pakistani–American businessman named Mansoor Ijaz and the former Pakistani ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani. In mid-2011, Ijaz delivered a memo to Admiral Michael Mullen, then the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which requested the US help to stave off an alleged coup in the wake of the 2 May 2011 raid. The memo’s anonymous author suggested that Pakistan’s civilian leadership, once freed of the nefarious influences of the army and ISI, would abandon Pakistan’s long-standing policy of Islamist militancy under its nuclear umbrella, pursue better ties with India, and provide assistance in ensuring that nuclear black market activities do not resume. Ijaz ultimately claimed that the memo’s author was Husain Haqqani. Haqqani,
proclaiming his innocence, voluntarily returned to Pakistan, where his passport was seized. He was subsequently placed on the Export Control List, as the Supreme Court considers the memo’s provenance in response to a writ filed by Nawaz Sharif (Al Jazeera 2012; Fair 2012). Haqqani remained under virtual house arrest until he was surprisingly freed in February 2012. Though no charges were filed, Pakistan’s press continues to depict him as a stooge who sold Pakistan’s sovereignty to the United States (Pakistan Express Tribune 2012).

Memogate triggered a sustained contest between the military, which seeks to oust the current government through judicial means, and the government, which seeks to push the military as far as possible by exploiting its weakness since 2 May 2011 (Fair 2012). The government is also under pressure from the Supreme Court, which is demanding that it implements a 2009 court ruling overturning the National Reconciliation Order (NRO). The 2007 NRO, issued by Musharraf, lifted criminal charges against President Zardari and other PPP leaders and thus cleared the way for their return to politics. The Supreme Court now wants those charges reinstated, potentially disqualifying Zardari from office (Pakistan News Service 2012).

This seemingly irreparable impasse between Pakistan and the United States has long been anticipated by analysts in both countries, and both leaderships privately concede that their strategic views differ in significant ways. Nonetheless, until recently the two countries found ways of focusing upon the ever-vanishing areas of common interest, such as the fight against al Qaeda, while deferring the growing areas of disagreement (Schaffer 2002; Staniland 2011). The events of 2011 made these emergent differences impossible to ignore, with publics and leadership alike outraged by the relationship and its serial disappointments. With the United States ever more committed to drawing down major military operations in Afghanistan, the current crisis with Pakistan will hinder the US efforts there. At the same time, as the United States lessens its dependence upon Pakistan, it will likely turn to a more aggressive set of policies aimed at containing the threats posed by Pakistan rather than engaging the troubled nation (Riedel 2011).

In this essay, I next provide an historical account of how this – perhaps preventable – impasse came to be. I argue that the roots of the current problems with Pakistan began in the early days of the US war on terror. I then discuss Pakistan’s regional calculus, as the United States considers its endgame in Afghanistan. Regrettably, the US miscalculations and its pursuit of independent policies toward India and Pakistan likely caused Pakistan to conclude that its regional security picture had degraded rather than improved as a consequence of the US policies in the region. I conclude with a discussion of some implications that the events of the last 10 years will have for South Asian security in the near future and the planning demands that these developments may well impose.

The antecedents of the US–Pakistan conflict: the US policies toward South Asia before 11 September 2001

The events of 11 September 2001 occurred amid an historic realignment of the US interests in South Asia. President Bill Clinton understood India to be an important rising power and put considerable effort into trying to forge a US–India rapprochement. In 1997, his administration launched a strategic dialogue that would culminate in a presidential visit to India in the spring of 1998 (Business Standard 1997; Fair 2005). The March 1998 election of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, added a layer of complexity as the BJP ran on a platform of national security and promised to obtain a nuclear weapons’ capability. The newly elected Indian government sought to calm the Clinton administration, explaining that the BJP knew the difference between ‘campaign rhetoric and the pragmatic demands of governing’ (Barry et al. 1998). As is now well known, this was subterfuge. India staged nuclear tests in May 1998, motivating Pakistan to do the same a few weeks later.

Despite the confusion, disbelief, and embarrassment within the Clinton administration, Clinton launched a sustained strategic dialogue with India, led by Strobe Talbott, the US deputy secretary of state, and Jaswant Singh, India’s foreign minister. The two met nearly one dozen times in the year and a half following the 1998 blasts. As time has shown, these numerous rounds of bilateral meetings enabled the BJP to fashion a new foreign policy for India that jettisoned the Non-Aligned Movement and embraced the notion of a strategic relationship with the United States. This relationship began to take shape under the Clinton administration, beginning with the president’s visit to India in March 2000. The contours of this détente, which developed largely from the Talbott–Singh talks, were laid out in the Joint India–US Statement co-signed by Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Bill Clinton, titled ‘India–US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century’ (Fair 2005; Talbott 2006).²

Considering President Clinton’s staunch nonproliferation positions, this evolution of the bilateral relationship was a welcome surprise. However, given Clinton’s unwillingness to re-evaluate the US nonproliferation commitments, he was unable to substantively deepen military and other ties with India. With the advent of the George W. Bush administration and its initial enthusiasm for reconsidering the US positions on international commitments (e.g., the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), India saw greater opportunities for robust relations with the United States. President Bush, recognizing its strategic value, was also quick to woo India early in his presidency. The Bush administration, desperate for international support for its plan to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and seek a space-based defense system, was eager to have India as an ally.

Ashley J. Tellis was one of the intellectual architects of this new relationship. While at the RAND Corporation, Tellis contributed to a 2000 document putting forth proposed policy guidance for the incoming Bush administration (Tellis 2001, 88; 2008). Tellis argued that a dehyphenated policy in South Asia would have three distinct features: First, the US calculations would systemically decouple India and Pakistan; that is, the US relations with each state would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to the US interests, rather than by fears about how the US relations with one would affect relations with the other. Second, the United States would recognize that India is on its way to becoming a major Asian power of some consequence and, therefore, that it warrants a level of engagement far greater than it had previously received, as well as an appreciation of its potential for both collaboration and resistance across a much larger canvas than simply South Asia. Third, the United States would recognize that Pakistan is a country in serious crisis that must be helped, through methods including engagement with Pakistani society rather than simply the state, to a ‘soft landing’ that mitigates the current disturbing social and economic trends.

The newly elected Bush presidency embraced this concept and dispatched Ambassador Robert Blackwell as the American envoy to New Delhi. Blackwell
selected Ashley Tellis as his advisor. Throughout the summer of 2001, the United States vigorously pursued the policy of dehyphenation. As part of promoting better the US–Indian defense ties, a US interagency process concluded that the United States would formally remove the Glenn–Symington Amendment sanctions imposed upon India in response to its 1998 nuclear tests. The same process also addressed the status of similar sanctions against Pakistan. By 2001, Pakistan was encumbered by layers of sanctions, including Pressler Amendment sanctions, Glenn–Symington sanctions, and sanctions pertaining to violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime and General Musharraf’s coup. The interagency review concluded that the US would remove Glenn–Symington sanctions from Pakistan as well, in recognition of the fact that it was India that commenced the reciprocal nuclear tests of 1998 and that Pakistan would not have tested had India not done so. In addition, removing the Glenn–Symington sanctions would have largely symbolic value due to the layers of redundant sanctions on Pakistan. These policy shifts were going to be announced at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 13 September 2001. That meeting of the UNGA was postponed due to the terror attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001 (Fair 2004).

Early US misjudgments in the wake of 11 September 2001

After the events of 11 September 2001, the United States presented Pakistan with a clear ultimatum. As the United States unfolded its war plans for Afghanistan, Pakistan would either be with the United States or against it (Musharraf 2008). Pakistan formally broke with the Taliban and provided wide-reaching assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, the US war in Afghanistan that began on 7 October 2001. It is important to acknowledge that Pakistan offered unprecedented access to the United States, including to ports and airfields, ground lines of control, and air space. Without Pakistan’s support, the US’s ability to launch Operating Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 would have been in question (Fair 2004). Moreover, Pakistan assisted in the capture of numerous high-value al Qaeda operatives. Notably, however, Pakistan did not remand high-level Taliban to the United States. Quite the contrary: from at least 2004 onward, Pakistan resumed its support for the Taliban. Indeed this support was likely an important factor in the Taliban’s resurgence in 2005, the consequences of which the United States, as well as its Afghan and other partners, continue to suffer.

By 2004, Pakistan had also initiated a selective set of operations against Pakistani Islamist militants (Jones and Fair 2010). While a full description of the changing militant landscape in Pakistan and of Pakistan’s internal security challenges is beyond the scope of this essay, a few important points merit inclusion here. As is well known, Pakistan has long supported an array of militant groups in an effort to achieve its foreign policy goals in Afghanistan and in India. Following the crisis that resulted from a Pakistani terrorist attack on India’s parliament in December 2001, the United States pressured Pakistan to curb the actions of its jihadi proxies. President Musharraf subsequently adopted a ‘moderated jihad’ strategy under which groups would be allowed to exist, recruit, train, and raise funds but that limited their activities (Howenstein 2008).

While some groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), complied, other Deobandi groups did not. In fact, many of them splintered, with some elements targeting the Pakistani state for reversing course on the Taliban and other jihadi goals and for
helping the United States. By 2006 several militant leaders had begun calling themselves the ‘Pakistan Taliban.’ Some Pakistan Taliban leaders continued focusing their efforts on repulsing foreigners from Afghanistan (e.g., Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur, among others), while others focused most of their activities against the Pakistani state. While these anti-state attacks began in Pakistan’s tribal areas, some of the most vicious were enabled by groups based in Pakistan’s heartland, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the Punjab. Many of these militant commanders organized under the rubric of the Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan or TTP) in 2007 (Fair 2011b). Fighting under the TTP or groups allied to the TTP has expanded from the tribal areas into Swat and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkwa as well as Punjab. The Pakistan army has conducted an array of military operations in the tribal areas as well as Swat, with mixed outcomes (Jones and Fair 2010).

Pakistani media claims that, since 11 September 2001, Pakistan has lost some 35,000 citizens to jihadi violence (The News 2011). (These figures have not been independently verified.) While Pakistan has suffered many civilian and military deaths in this domestic conflict, it is too often forgotten that Pakistan’s war against its own terrorists and insurgents is and remains selective. It focuses upon those commanders within the Pakistani Taliban who will not cease targeting Pakistan while considering those (e.g., Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur) who target American forces in Afghanistan to be allies. Unfortunately, while it is true that the US-led war on terror and Pakistan’s participation in that effort galvanized the current insurgency, it is also true that had Pakistan not cultivated these proxies in the first place the Pakistani Taliban would be far less capable – if it even existed at all.

Whether Islamabad and/or Rawalpindi believed that Pakistan’s abandonment of the Afghanistan Taliban in 2001 would be temporary or whether this overture signaled a genuine willingness to change course will likely never be known. However, a perusal of President Pervez Musharraf’s 19 September 2001 speech reminds us that Pakistan acquiesced to the US demands not because of an inherent strategic alignment but rather to counter any Indian advantages. He explained to the Pakistani public that

They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state … In this situation if we make the wrong decisions it can be very bad for us. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam. (Musharraf 2008)

While the United States greeted this speech as a sign that Pakistan would actively cooperate, a close reading reveals a tone of resignation. The ultimate aim of the speech was not to reverse decades of dangerous Islamist politics (including supporting militancy) but to convince Pakistanis that Pakistan must act to counter Indian advantages in a post-11 September 2001 global order.

The United States did little to ensure that Pakistan would undertake permanent reform, inclusive of strategically abandoning Islamist militancy as a tool of foreign policy. In fact, the United States made three assurances to Pakistan, all of which were broken within a few years of Pakistan’s decision – however constrained – to support the United States. I argue that these missteps ensured that Pakistan and the United States would find themselves on a collision course before the decade closed.

The first assurance made by Washington to Musharraf was that the Northern Alliance would not take Kabul as the Taliban fell. The Northern Alliance was the
only militia organization that successfully countered the Taliban. As is now well known, the United States had only a few hundred Special Operations forces in the country at the time and could not prevent the Northern Alliance from seizing Kabul. This was extremely disconcerting for Pakistan and created early doubts that this venture would turn out to Pakistan’s advantage. The Taliban were Pakistan’s erstwhile ally and, with Pakistani support, had been able to seize nearly all of Afghan territory with the exception of the Panjshir Valley, which was held by the Northern Alliance. Critically, the Northern Alliance received overt support from India, as well as Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan. India’s assistance included a military advisor posted to Uzbekistan from the Indian army with the rank of a Brigadier. The aviation unit of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, helped the Northern Alliance maintain its helicopter fleet. When Ahmad Shah Masood was attacked by an al Qaeda suicide bomber on 9 September 2001, he was sent to an Indian field hospital across the border in Uzbekistan.

Unfortunately, the United States did not appreciate that the Northern Alliance was seen as India’s proxy. With the Northern Alliance’s seizure of Kabul in December of 2001, Islamabad saw the keys of Afghanistan being placed into the hands of India. To make matters worse, under the US/NATO security umbrella, India was able to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan’s Pashtun belt along the south and east – the territories which are most sensitive for Pakistan (Fair 2011c).

The second promise made by the United States was that it would take a more proactive stance in resolving the ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over the disposition of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. For Pakistan, India’s control over part of Kashmir means that partition is inherently incomplete because Pakistan’s founding – although battered – concept of the two nations is unrealized. For India, partition has been completed, and it seeks to ratify the status quo. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in particular, took a keen interest in the Kashmir dispute and made several trips to the region. His optimism in hindsight was without merit as these efforts were never likely to fructify (Ahmed 2002; Cherian 2001). In addition, Powell was a declining asset in the Bush cabinet. By mid-2002, the United States virtually abandoned the pledge. Since then, the United States has shown remarkable quiescence in the face of India’s mounting disregard for its own citizens’ disgruntlement in Kashmir (The Economist 2010) and the high levels of discrimination faced by Indian Muslims outside of Kashmir (Government of India 2006).

Third, the United States promised Pakistan that its ‘strategic assets’ (nuclear weapons and delivery systems) would remain intact. While this promise was technically honored, it was largely eviscerated by the 2005 Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. This deal was bomb-friendly and was a part of an ongoing US effort to help India become a global power which included military assistance and missile cooperation, among other forms of military and civilian technical cooperation. This plan for India was a part of the Bush administration’s attempt to manage China’s uncertain rise by encouraging India to do what it would do in pursuit of its own strategic interests (Tellis 2005).

It would be impossible for any decision-maker in Islamabad not to understand that Pakistan’s strategic interest was seriously degraded by the Global War On Terror (GWOT) despite the handsome rewards from the United States for supporting the effort. By 2004, Pakistan had already concluded that the emerging order in Afghanistan would welcome India’s expanding presence and be hostile to Pakistan. Indeed Afghans are deeply dubious about Pakistan because of its largely
negative influence upon Afghanistan’s stability and the quality of life for average Afghans. Pakistan for its part tends to ignore this reality, noting the enormous ‘hospitality’ extended to Afghans when they sought refuge in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad. While Afghans acknowledge this, they also note that they were looked down upon and subject to abuse by Pakistanis who saw these refugees as coming to Pakistan ‘to clean Pakistanis’ shoes’ (referencing the large numbers of Afghan males who could be found in Pakistan’s cities eking out a meager living polishing shoes).

Thus, howsoever crucial Pakistan’s assistance in Afghanistan has been, it has been eclipsed by Pakistan’s contribution to the problem of instability, insurgency, and terrorism. Pakistan – despite numerous assurances to the contrary – continues to support groups like LeT, which has attacked Americans and its allies in Afghanistan since 2004 and which perpetrated the November 2008 Mumbai outrage in which several Americans were also killed. This is in addition to the terrorism campaign that LeT and numerous other groups, with support from the ISI, have sustained in India since 1990.

In short, the US effort to order its South Asian foreign policies under the rubric of dehyphenation has failed, in part because of the limits of the US national power (Fair 2011c; Tellis 2001, 2008). American strategists did not recognize the impossibility of successfully pursuing the twinned policies of cultivating Pakistan’s support in the struggle against violent Islamist extremism (at a significant cost to the Pakistani state) while also pledging American support to help India become a global power. Equally problematic, the United States has encouraged Indian involvement in Afghanistan without regard to Pakistan’s concerns and often without any genuine consideration – much less assessment – of what India is actually doing apart from its stated activities. India and Pakistan are stumbling toward a proxy war at Afghanistan’s expense as both seek to deny the other access to the country (Bouton and Ayres 2009; IBNLive 2010).

Conclusion: the US–Pakistan standoff and implications for regional stability

As the United States begins to assemble its strategy for Afghanistan, with an eye to ceasing major combat operations in the near future, all of Afghanistan’s neighbors are engaging in multiple-level games to discern their own best options amid considerable uncertainty. As the United States moves away from large-scale kinetic counterinsurgency operations and toward counterterrorism with a continued focus upon security forces’ training and institutional capacity building, India is considering its own options under a diminishing US security umbrella. Some Indians believe that Afghanistan is a test case: if India cannot shape events in its own backyard, how can it be a genuine regional power – much less a global power? At the other extreme are those who believe that India’s critical interests do not reside in Afghanistan and that loss of life and treasure there is not justified by any possible payoff. Those taking a middle ground (the most likely to prevail) argue that Afghanistan is important to Indian interests, that is a test case for India’s claims to be a regional and extra-regional power, and that it must remain engaged in Afghanistan to shape the environment to India’s advantage. However, they argue that India needs to take security issues much more seriously and fortify Indian missions and protect its citizens employed in Afghanistan (Fair 2011c).

Pakistan, for its part, will oppose India’s engagement at all costs. Pakistan’s revisionism no longer centers on the dispute over Kashmir’s disposition. Pakistan
now resists Indian claims of hegemony in South Asia. As Afghanistan is a key theater for Indian influence, Pakistan will not abandon this mission. However, the situation, including the nature of the Taliban, has changed since 11 September 2001. While the members of Mullah Omar’s ‘Quetta Shura’ may be loyal to Pakistan (or can be forced to be so by pressuring family members in Pakistan), the newer commanders who have filled the mid- and low-level ranks following sustained US/NATO raids dislike Pakistan as much as the United States. They are not going to be reliable allies. For this reason, the network of Jalalluddin Haqqani (now controlled by his son Siraj) is now Pakistan’s most dependable proxy (Rassler and Brown 2011). All of this suggests that Pakistan has a greater determination to influence events in Afghanistan than the United States or its remaining allies and that Pakistan will not relent until it has achieved a political disposition that maximizes its influence and minimizes India’s. This will put Pakistan on the same collision course with the international community that it was on before the events of 11 September 2001 afforded Pakistan the rare opportunity to rehabilitate its international standing.

Given Pakistan’s preeminent focus upon India and its steadfast refusal to abandon its reliance upon militancy as a tool of foreign policy, Pakistan’s domestic security situation will also worsen. Pakistan will be unable to decisively defeat the Pakistani Taliban while it remains committed to retaining some groups as strategic assets against India and Afghanistan, since these very groups and their (largely Deobandi-inspired) ideology contribute to the lethality and expansion of violence. Moreover, given the episodic but important radicalization of foreign Muslims who come to Pakistan for training, Pakistan is likely to remain an epicenter of international terrorism.

With the US policymakers anticipating a lessened dependence upon Pakistan as the United States begins scaling down its presence in Afghanistan, many are calling for a tougher position regarding Pakistan’s continued support for Islamist militancy, its refusal to provide access to A.Q. Khan or information that could allay international fears about Pakistan’s nuclear black market activities, and its rapid expansion of its stock of tactical nuclear weapons and concomitant production of fissile material. Some US policymakers are calling for a complete cessation of aid to Pakistan, as the US assistance to date has seen few dividends. The looming US presidential campaign and sustained global and US economic crisis make any compromise on these positions unlikely.

At the same time, Pakistan’s deepening domestic political crisis, evolving military–civilian standoff, and looming general and presidential elections similarly encourage Pakistani military and civilian elites to take a hardened stance toward the United States. With Pakistan’s economy in shambles and the country again moving toward international pariah status, Pakistan may well become an Islamist variant of North Korea: an inward and combative state with no incentive but to use the specter of its nuclear weapons to extract rents and concessions from an international community that cannot allow Pakistan to fail.

Notes

1. Surprisingly, while anti-Americanism has long been high in Pakistan, it did not intensify in the wake of the controversial capture and killing of Osama bin Laden during a unilateral US raid on the Pakistani cantonment town of Abbottabad (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011).

2. In this document, entitled ‘India–US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century,’ both leaders proclaimed that ‘In the new century, India and the United States will be partners
in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together for, strategic stability in Asia and beyond. We will bolster joint efforts to counter terrorism and meet other challenges to regional peace. We will strengthen the international security system, including in the United Nations, and support the United Nations in its peacekeeping efforts.’

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