Securing Afghanistan

Getting on Track

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About This Report

This Working Paper examines the security environment in Afghanistan, assesses the programs put in place to address these threats, identifies existing gaps, and offers possible solutions. The report was vetted by top experts on Afghanistan in an extensive review process.

The authors are C. Christine Fair and Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation. USIP’s Afghanistan Security Assistance Mapping Project was directed by Beth Ellen Cole, a senior program officer in the Institute’s Center for Peace and Stability Operations.

Jones and Fair visited Afghanistan to conduct field work for this report in March, May, and November 2008. They met with a variety interlocutors including, leadership of EUPOL and NATO/ISAF, CSTC-A, officials in UNAMA, UNODC, the Canadian Embassy, the British Embassy, the American Embassy, and the EU Mission to Afghanistan. They also visited PRTs in Konar, Gardez, Khowst, Nangarhar, and Nuristan, where they met with military, State Department, and USAID personnel. They interviewed implementers working on a variety of USAID sponsored democracy and governance projects. They met with governors, members of the Afghan National Security Council, retired ministers as well as NGO workers. In addition, they met with officials at the U.S. Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council and interacted with numerous persons in the intelligence community. Jones and Fair have several years of experience in the region and drew from previous rounds of fieldwork in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

About This Series

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INTRODUCTION

More than seven years after U.S. forces entered Afghanistan, important gains made in bringing stability and democracy to Afghanistan are imperiled. While there have been some positive developments in such areas as economic growth, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have gained some ground in the country and in neighboring Pakistan, the drug trade remains a significant problem, and corruption has worsened in the Afghan government. According to United Nations data, insurgent incidents have increased every year since the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime. The situation in parts of Afghanistan’s south and east is particularly concerning because of the twin menace of insurgent and criminal activity. Despite these challenges, the insurgency remains deeply fractured among a range of groups, and most have little support among the Afghan population. This presents an opportunity for Afghans and the international community to turn the situation around.

RECOMMENDATIONS: URGENT STEPS REQUIRED

This working paper examines the security environment, assesses the programs put in place to address these threats, identifies existing gaps, and offers possible solutions. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of all security programs or programs in other areas, such as the economy and health. But it briefly examines some of the most important security programs, especially ones that concentrate on building Afghan capacity. In addition, it focuses on U.S. assistance, though it does note the activities of other countries and international organizations. The findings are based on several research trips to Afghanistan in 2008, as well as research in Afghanistan in previous years. The report argues that urgent steps are required to establish security and stem the insurgency. They are fleshed out in more detail in the final section:

• Adopt a bottom-up strategy to complement top-down efforts: Security and stability in Afghanistan have historically required a balance between top-down efforts to create a central government, and bottom-up efforts to secure local support and protect the population. Since 2001, the U.S. and international community have focused predominantly on top-down security efforts, including the establishment of an Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. But the deteriorating situation and local nature of the insurgency require supporting district-level institutions that are Afghan-led and locally appropriate, with safeguards and oversight to establish order and deliver services.

• Shift from direct action to mentoring Afghan security forces: Successful counterinsurgency efforts hinge on the competence of local security forces, not international ones. More U.S. forces in Afghanistan may be helpful, but only if they are used to build Afghan capacity and to protect the local population. One critical need is to address the international partnering gap that has plagued efforts to improve Afghanistan’s police and army. There is currently a 70 percent shortfall in international mentors for the police and a 30 percent shortfall for the army. This requires a crash effort to identify, train, and support mentors. European governments, the United States, and the UN should also devote more resources to mentoring and professionalizing the Ministry of Interior.
• **Adopt a robust anti-corruption strategy and end impunity by prosecuting and removing corrupt officials:** Pervasive corruption at all levels of the Afghan government is one of several factors fueling the insurgency by undermining local confidence in the government. Addressing this problem requires a serious and sustained campaign to prosecute corrupt officials through the justice system. This can include building better anti-corruption guarantors in all ministries, such as inspectors general offices, with mentoring and support from the U.S. and other NATO members. Recent Afghan efforts, such as the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption, have failed to undermine corruption. The Ministry of Interior is a logical place to start since corruption in this ministry has undermined police reform, counter-narcotics efforts, and border security.

• **Use the Afghan central budget:** The chief problem in Afghanistan is not necessarily a lack of resources, but a better use of resources and one that builds governance, not weakens it. One key change would be to coordinate assistance through the Ministry of Finance and to develop a database that compiles and monitors international assistance to the country.

• **Address relations with neighboring states and improve border security:** Too few programs focus resources on fortifying Afghanistan’s porous borders through which insurgents, narcotics, and other illicit goods travel with ease and often with the complicity of officials from Afghanistan and neighboring states. Greater programmatic attention should be devoted to improving Afghan-Pakistan relations and stabilizing the tribal belt. Admittedly, these efforts will not succeed without dedicated efforts to persuade Pakistan to fully engage in the effort to disable the Taliban and other militant groups.

### ASSESSING THE THREATS

This section characterizes the security threats in Afghanistan. Security is the cornerstone of a viable state. Some have broadened the definition of security to include “human security,” which can involve a range of issues such as political security, economic security, food security, health security, and environmental security.¹ The *Human Security Report 2005* divides human security into two types. The first focuses on “violent threats to individuals,” while the second argues that the “threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease, and natural disasters because these kill far more people, than war, genocide, and terrorism combined.”²

This report focuses on a bounded definition of security to include issues related to personal safety rather than broader conceptualizations. First, establishing a safe environment is a critical precondition for accomplishing other goals in states like Afghanistan that are engaged in state-building and counterinsurgency. Other objectives, such as economic growth, effective

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democracy and state legitimacy generally require security as a precondition. The absence of security makes it difficult to rebuild political, economic, and other sectors. In the health sector, for instance, a lack of security can impede progress in the construction of hospitals and health clinics, slow immunization campaigns, and affect the labor force if healthcare providers are intimidated or threatened with kidnapping. Patients can also be deterred from seeking healthcare because of security concerns. Second, a bounded definition of security allows us to focus more deeply on aspects of safety, which would be skimmed over in a broader study.

Complex Adaptive System

There are several striking themes about the security situation in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most significant is the diffuse, highly complex nature of the threat environment, which is perhaps best described as a “complex adaptive system.” The term refers to systems that are diverse (made up of multiple interconnected elements) and adaptive (possessing the capacity to change and learn from experience). There are at least five categories of actors in this system.

The first are insurgent groups, who are motivated to overthrow the Afghan government and coerce the withdrawal of international forces. They range from the Taliban to smaller groups such as the Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, and al Qa’ida. A second category includes criminal groups that are involved in a range of activities, such as drug-trafficking and illicit timber and gem smuggling. The third includes local tribes, sub-tribes, and clans. A fourth category involves warlords and their militias, many of whom became increasingly powerful after the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime. A fifth category includes government officials and security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other neighboring states, which have provided support to insurgent groups or become involved in criminal activity.

Over the course of the conflict since early 2002, there has been a notable increase in the number of groups active in Afghanistan, including the migration of some groups that have been active in other fronts. For example, Laskhar-e-Taiba (or Army of the Pure), which has historically focused its activities on Kashmir and India, is now active in such provinces as Kunar and Nuristan. This proliferation of groups has led to an increasingly complex system, similar in some respects to the state of the Iraq insurgency after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. The interaction of these elements is dynamic and facilitated by the ease of communications between and among individuals and groups. For example, drug traffickers have developed close links with both insurgent groups and government officials in moving drugs along cross-border routes. Tribes and sub-tribes have collaborated with insurgent groups in rural areas of the country, often changing sides depending on whether the Afghan government and NATO forces are able to clear and hold territory. The nature of the threat environment marks a striking contrast from the 1990s, when the Taliban insurgency was more hierarchically structured. Today, groups are able to organize into sprawling multi-organizational networks, yet still retain the ability to communicate when necessary. They tend to be dispersed but allow individuals to communicate, coordinate, and conduct their activities with minimal central command. This distinguishes groups operating in complex adaptive systems from hierarchical organizations, where authority and communication are vertically structured.

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The emergence of a complex adaptive system in Afghanistan has largely occurred because of a weak government. Afghanistan has historically lacked a strong central government, putting it at the mercy of regional powers like British India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. A series of violent civil wars beginning with the 1979 Soviet invasion and continuing through the Taliban conquests in the 1990s further weakened whatever vestigial state was in place. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, governance remained weak.

Governance woes worsened in the first few years after President Hamid Karzai’s government was established. As one World Bank study concluded, the primary beneficiaries of assistance were “the urban elite.” This triggered deep-seated frustration and resentment among the rural population. Indeed, the Afghan government suffered from a number of systemic problems, including fragmented administrative structures, and had difficulty attracting and retaining skilled professionals with management and administrative experience. Weak administration and lack of control in some provinces made tax policy and administration virtually impossible. In many rural areas, the government made no effort to collect taxes. The Afghan government also struggled to provide security outside of the capital. The result was a weak security apparatus after the overthrow of the Taliban regime that could not establish a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within the country.

*Mapping the Threat: A Multi-Front Conflict*

The complex adaptive system, which has flourished in a weak state, can be divided along three geographic fronts: a northern front, central front, and southern front. As Figure 1 illustrates, all of these fronts span both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, indicating that the security challenges are regional in nature.

*Figure 1: The Insurgent Front*

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First, a northern front stretches from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province and northern parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), to such Afghan provinces as Nuristan, Konar, and Nangarhar. The largest of the groups in this region is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami. It was built on the Ikhwan model of Islamic revolution, which stresses the establishment of a pure Islamic state and utilizes a highly disciplined organizational structure built around a small cadre of educated elites. There are a range of other groups operating on this front including the Pakistan-based Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, whose objective is to enforce sharia law in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2007, the group took over much of the Swat Valley in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, giving it a reliable sanctuary which was formalized in the spring of 2008 when the government entered into a peace deal with the militants there. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was involved in the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, is active on this front, albeit in small numbers. Finally, al Qa’ida and several top commanders, such as Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, have operated on this front. Abu Ikhlas is an Egyptian who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s and married a woman from one of the local tribes, helping embed him in the tribal culture.

There are also various criminal organizations active on this front, especially groups involved in smuggling timber and gems into Pakistan. Interlocutors report that both Afghanistan and Pakistan government officials appear to profit from the illicit timber trade, as do militant and tribal groups. These groups have developed fluid relationships with a range of government officials, local tribes, sub-tribes, and clans.7

Second, a central front lies further south along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and stretches from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas to such eastern Afghan provinces as Paktika, Khowst, and Lowgar. One of the most significant groups is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, who was linked to a range of audacious attacks in Afghanistan such as the luxury Serena Hotel in January 2008, the assassination attempt against President Hamid Karzai in April 2008, and the Indian embassy bombing in July 2008. Haqqani’s organization appeared to have some links with Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, from which it received aid, and has become lethal at conducting attacks deep into Afghanistan. Another group on this front is Hezb-i-Islami Khalis, which is led by Anwar ul Haq Mujahid. Across the border in Pakistan, an umbrella organization of groups began to emerge called Tehrek-e-Taliban-Pakistan, which was nominally led by Baitullah Mehsud. Its goals mirror those of Mullah Omar and include establishing an emirate under Mehsud’s conception of Islamic law. There is some cooperation across organizations on this front. Radio broadcasting, for example, creates opportunities for joint operations, such as in Swat. These “Mullah Radio” outposts have the potential to create unity of action and unity of messaging as militant groups attempt to consolidate power.

Al Qa’ida also operates on this front, along with a range of other foreign groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Al Qa’ida’s goals remain uniting Muslims to fight the United States and its allies (the far enemy) and to overthrow Western-friendly regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia (the near enemy) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, al Qa’ida leaders based out of Pakistan had three main objectives in Afghanistan. First, they wanted to overthrow the “apostate” regime of Hamid Karzai who, in their view, was doubly guilty of failing to establish a “true” Islamic state and of cooperating with Western governments. Second, al Qa’ida leaders wanted to replace the Afghan regime – and increasingly the Pakistan government – with one that followed a radical

7 Author interviews with provincial reconstruction officials in Asadabad, May 2008.
version of *sharia* law envisioned by Sayyid Qutb and others. Third, al Qa'ida leaders wanted to weaken the United States and other Western governments, and push them out of Muslim lands. For al Qa'ida, an Islamic state in Afghanistan was part of a broader goal of establishing a pan-Islamic caliphate across the Muslim world. This goal differentiated al Qa'ida leaders from those in the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami, whose objectives were largely parochial.

Al Qa'ida's primary role has been as a “force multiplier” for the insurgency. Foot soldiers from Afghan groups – such as the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, and the Haqqani network – have conducted the vast majority of fighting, while al Qa'ida has improved their capabilities and lethality. Al Qa'ida operatives have assisted them make more sophisticated improvised explosive devices, encouraged the use of suicide attacks, conducted fund-raising from the international jihad, and assisted Afghan groups to conduct more effective information operations using the internet and video recordings. Al Qa'ida has been instrumental in improving the communications capabilities of Afghan groups, who have leveraged Al-Sahab, al Qa'ida’s media enterprise, to distribute video propaganda and recruit supporters.

Finally, there is a southern front in such Afghan provinces as Helmand and Kandahar, as well as in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. The security situation has been particularly challenging in the south because of a nexus between the Taliban, allied tribes, criminal organizations, and poor governance. The largest group on this front is Mullah Omar's Taliban, which is based in the vicinity of Quetta, Pakistan. The Taliban have evolved into a strikingly different organization from what existed in the 1990s. Though its goals remain similar in establishing an Afghan state under their interpretation of *sharia*, the group’s tactics evolved to include the use of suicide attacks, more sophisticated improvised explosive devices, and media-savvy practices such as enhanced public relations, use of night-letters and DVDs. The Taliban has also linked up with a number of Pashtun tribes, especially Ghilzai tribes, which provide logistical support, fighters, and local legitimacy. Its strategy involves approaching local tribes and commanders at the village and district level. In some cases, Taliban commanders have been well received because of common tribal affinities or because locals have become disillusioned with the Afghan government, unhappy about the slow pace of reconstruction and the paucity of security. Where they aren’t well received, they sometimes resort to brutal tactics such as targeted killings.

The southern front also hosts numerous criminal groups, especially drug-trafficking organizations, which operate on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and run criminal networks through Iran and Central Asia. Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of several grades of brown heroin. Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals for the conversion of opium into morphine base. Acetic anhydride, which was the most commonly used acetylating agent in heroin processing, is smuggled into Afghanistan from Pakistan, India, Central Asia, China, and Europe. The skyrocketing trade in poppy has been a boon to insurgent organizations such as the Taliban, as well as to Afghan government officials who are involved at all levels.

Drug and other criminal groups have developed an intricate transportation network connecting Afghanistan to Pakistan and other neighboring countries, which are used by the Taliban and other insurgents. The Taliban have been involved in cooperating with drug traffickers at all levels: with farmers, opium brokers, lab operators, smugglers, major drug barons, and involvement in export to international markets. For instance, the Taliban levy a tax

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on poppy farmers, and offer farmers protection from the government’s eradication efforts. The Taliban are often paid to provide security for drug-trafficking organizations along key routes, and Taliban fighters are also directly involved in the poppy harvest, rendering them unavailable to fight until the harvest season ends in the spring.

While the bulk of the insurgency is restricted to parts of the south, east, and center, other regions face a fragile security situation. In the north, for example, warlords and regional commanders remain strong. Individuals such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad have established strong power bases and control significant resources and militia forces, weakening the power of the central government. Security threats are especially acute for Afghan women and girls. The Taliban have bombed schools and assassinated teachers because Taliban leaders oppose education for girls. As one night letter left at a school in Wardak warned: “Respected Afghans: Leave the culture and traditions of the Christians and Jews. Do not send your girls to school.” Otherwise, it noted, the Taliban “will conduct their robust military operations in the daylight.” Women have been targeted during election campaigns because “the elections are a part of the American program” and those who participate in the elections “are the enemies of Islam and the homeland.” Violence against women by family members also remains widespread and includes verbal and psychological violence, beatings, sexual violence, and murder. Many acts of violence involve traditional practices such as the betrothal of young girls in infancy, early marriage, giving (often very young) girls in marriage to alleviate narcotics debt, and crimes of “honor” – where a female is punished for having offended custom, tradition, or honor.

**Differing Threat Perceptions**

These threats are perceived differently by a range of international and domestic actors, and the different perceptions may account for the lack of a coordinated Afghan and international response. For some in the international community, such as the United States, the primary threat comes from terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and jihadist groups who cooperate with it. For others, especially some of Afghanistan’s domestic stakeholders (e.g. government officials, business elites), key threats to the state include actors that jeopardize the central government’s power base, which can include the international community. This has manifested itself several times, such as in President Hamid Karzai’s decision to expel European Union diplomat Michael Semple and United Nations official Mervyn Patterson for allegedly negotiating with the Taliban outside of the government’s purview. For still others, the primary threat to Afghanistan comes from the skyrocketing drug trade, which flows into Western and Eastern Europe.

There are also important debates regarding the role of neighboring states in destabilizing Afghanistan. All major powers in the region – including Iran, Russia, India, and Pakistan – have provided support to either the Afghan government or sub-state actors to pursue their own national interests. Perhaps most contentious is the role of Pakistan’s intelligence and paramilitary organizations in supporting the Taliban and other groups, such as the Haqqani network. The differences in threat perception among the key stakeholders in Afghanistan have hampered forging unified strategies and policies to contend with these threats, including developing a consensus on what types of assistance and programmatic activities they are willing to provide. Failure to forge a unified threat assessment and to establish better unity of effort has been a serious failing of the international and Afghan efforts to stabilize the country. In the absence of such coordination, preferred policies and projects will remain inefficient and, at times, counterproductive.
RESPONDING TO THE THREATS

In response to these threats, international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan appear staggering at first blush. More than 80 countries and international organizations pledged over $20 billion to Afghanistan at the June 2008 Paris conference. In addition, 39 countries are contributing to security under the umbrella of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is not the whole picture, however. Many of these countries have not met their commitments because of domestic politics or other constraints. This section unpacks these contributions by providing a brief overview of international assistance to Afghanistan. It then focuses on several security activities: national defense, police, disbandment of illegally armed groups, justice sector, counternarcotics, and Afghanistan-Pakistan programs. Since the success of counterinsurgency operations has historically depended on the competence of the indigenous government, we focus on programs that build Afghan capacity rather than U.S. and other international military operations in Afghanistan.

Overview of International Assistance

In January 2006, there was a significant reorganization of assistance with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan Compact. The compact and the development strategy aimed to reorder the efforts of the Afghanistan government and the international community “to consolidate peace and stability through just, democratic processes and institutions, and to reduce poverty and achieve prosperity through broad based and equitable economic growth.” The compact laid out three major pillars of vertically-integrated activities: security; governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development. In addition, it identified counter narcotics, regional cooperation, anticorruption, environment and gender equity as “crosscutting” areas of work.

The Afghan National Development Strategy laid out a number of ambitious goals and even more ambitious benchmarks to be achieved by 2010, though progress has been slow. The programmatic costs to successfully meet all of the declared obligations and commitments of the Afghan Compact were never calculated, although the development strategy was priced out at nearly $20 billion for five years. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, which is co-chaired by a presidential appointment and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, is tasked with overseeing progress towards the benchmarks. A Policy Action Group was also established to help coordinate security and reconstruction, and includes President Karzai, Afghan ministers, and senior representatives from UNAMA, coalition forces, and key NATO countries.

It would be useful to know the amount of domestic and international resources dedicated to various programs to meet these benchmarks. However, no comprehensive data exists. In recognition of this problem, Ashraf Ghani, former Minister of Finance, helped establish the Donor Assistance Database (DAD) to aggregate donor information. DAD was established within the Ministry of Finance and was intended to help monitor commitments and disbursements to specific projects. Unfortunately, many donors failed to provide information about which projects they were undertaking and with what resources. For those who did provide information, they often failed to provide full information. Consequently, DAD has fallen into disuse and

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9 Several other areas, such as intelligence, would also be useful to examine, but there is little unclassified information on international efforts to improve Afghanistan’s intelligence capacity.

significantly underestimates the real flows of aid. As a result of poor coordination and reporting, the government of Afghanistan does not know how much money has been spent since 2001 or how it has been spent. With so many countries and with so little coordination, it is impossible to determine the total resources committed to Afghanistan. According to incomplete data available through DAD, the international community committed approximately $30 billion between 2001 and 2008. (See Appendix A for DAD data.) The incomplete nature of DAD is particularly obvious because U.S. government reports indicate that the United States, the largest donor to Afghanistan, has disbursed over $30 billion in total assistance, as indicated in Appendix B.

But most countries have failed to honor their commitments by actually disbursing promised funds. In some cases this is due to unfulfilled promises, while in other instances it is due to poor execution rates related to low absorptive capacity, high corruption, technical requirements of the contractor, and problems in the security environment. There is considerable variability in donor disbursement. While Japan and Canada have delivered approximately 90 percent of their committed resources, India and the Asian Development Bank have disbursed only about a third of their commitment in the same period. According to data in the donor database, only 30 percent of the funding has been dispersed.

National Defense

The United States military is providing most of the training for the Afghan National Army, which includes more than 57,000 soldiers, through Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). In August 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates supported expansion of the Afghan National Army to 122,000 active duty troops, to be completed between 2010 and 2014. The plan also called for an additional pool of 12,000 Afghan trainees, which would bring the overall size of the army to 134,000.

The new goal will require an aggressive re-optimization of the current training pipeline. Currently, Afghan army training consists of a 10-week initial training program called basic warrior training, which focuses on elementary soldier and infantry skills such as weapons handling, shooting, guard duty, land navigation, first aid, mines, and prisoner processing. Upon graduation, 30 percent of the soldiers go through an advanced combat training program that focuses on combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. The course lasts for six to eight weeks and has a limited capacity of about 8,000 students per year. In addition to regular training courses, ANA units are assisted by Operational Mentor and Liaisons Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). At least fourteen other countries are contributing to the mentoring teams.

There are several important structural challenges in building the Afghan National Army. One of the most significant is the shortage of international mentors working with Afghan forces in the field, which is critical in establishing a competent indigenous force that can take the lead in counterinsurgency efforts. By November 2008, CTSC-A estimated that it had a 22 percent shortage in mentors for the Afghan army. Increasing the size of the Afghan National Army will

13 Waldman, Falling Short.
compound this shortfall. In addition, while the Afghan army appears to be increasingly capable of conducting its own battalion-strength operations, there are continuing reports of personnel problems (desertions and absenteeism), drug abuse, and other forms of poor discipline. And there are shortages of equipment, maintenance, and logistics. Concerns still persist about ethnic imbalances in the army, especially disproportionate Tajik representation, which largely stems from political patronage rather than an active ethno-political agenda.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite these challenges, most reports on the army’s performance remain fairly positive. Senior U.S. military leaders report that some ANA kandaks in the east are nearly capable of operating on their own. U.S. Special Operations Forces are also training the ANA’s elite commando force, which is taking the lead in some counter-insurgency operations in the east. The Afghan National Army appears to have performed reasonably well in a range of operations, such as during the May 2007 riots in Sheberghan, the August 2007 Uruzgan emergency airlift, and June 2008 operations in Arghandab district after the Taliban take-over of several villages.

Fiscal sustainability is – and will remain – an issue. The Afghanistan Compact calls for a “nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army” that is “democratically accountable, organized, trained and equipped to meet the security needs of the country and increasingly funded from Government revenue” by 2010.\textsuperscript{17} However, the government of Afghanistan will not be able to afford the armed forces any time soon. While not ideal, Afghan soldiers are cheaper than American or other NATO soldiers. Thus, in principle, the international community should be willing to continue supporting Afghan armed forces for the foreseeable future. The United States supports militaries around the world that are less strategically important than Afghanistan, and sustaining Afghan forces is cheaper than sustaining the NATO forces in Afghanistan over the long run. The investments in this sector have been the heaviest, and the United States has spent over $10 billion to train the Afghan army and rebuild the Ministry of Defense between 2002 and 2008.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Police}

The constant state of war in Afghanistan beginning in the late 1970s meant that Afghan police had little training and a weak Ministry of Interior. After the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime, a legitimate police and judicial system had to be established \textit{de novo}. The Afghanistan Compact declared that by the end of 2010 there should be a “fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000” to meet “the security needs of the country effectively” which will be “increasingly fiscally sustainable.”\textsuperscript{19} (Despite the specified end-strength of 62,000 in the Afghan istan Compact, CTSC-A now maintains that the desired force size is 82,000.\textsuperscript{20})

But the road to achieving this goal has been challenging. In 2002, Germany became the lead nation for police training, and its primary activities centered on the National Police Academy which reopened in Kabul in August 2002. The German program focused on police


\textsuperscript{17} The Afghanistan Compact: Building On Success, the London Conference on Afghanistan, London 31 January-1 February, 2006.


leadership, but Germany did not implement any significant program for rank and file police.\textsuperscript{21} By 2003, the United States stepped in to address this gap by establishing a network of regional training centers around the country. The United States also equipped the Afghan National Police with individual and unit equipment, including uniforms, handguns, vehicles, and communications equipment. The agency that initially took this lead was the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). It contracted DynCorp International to construct a Central Training Center in Kabul and regional training centers, as well as to staff them with trainers. However, progress was slow and the quality of training was low.\textsuperscript{22}

But by 2004, officials in the White House and the Department of Defense expressed concern that the State Department effort was failing. Key problems included the failure to conduct follow-on mentoring of Afghan police, provide significant institutional reform in the Ministry of Interior, and curb deep-seated corruption in the police and Ministry of Interior. In 2005, the U.S. military took the lead in providing training, equipment, and other assistance to the Afghan National Police. While soldiers are not ideal for training police, the U.S. military filled a vacuum that no other government or agency was willing or able to fill.\textsuperscript{23} The task of building the police is now overseen by Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Apart from police training, the United States has worked with the Ministry of Interior to restructure police pay, adjust the rank structure, and reorganize police deployments. A range of organizations such as MPRI have been involved in reforming the Ministry of Interior, such as helping build personnel, finance, communications, and logistics systems.\textsuperscript{24} As Figure 2 shows, U.S. assistance to the Afghan police increased significantly from 2002 to 2007.

**Figure 2: U.S. Defense Department and State Department Support to Train and Equip Afghan Forces (Dollars in Millions)**\textsuperscript{25}

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The most recent effort to improve Afghan policing is the focused district development program, which began in the fall of 2007 under CSTC-A. The program was established to break the chain of corruption within the Afghan National Police and strengthen community policing, and was founded on the assumption that the district is the building block for the Afghan police. Police are temporarily removed from their districts and replaced with Afghanistan National Civil Order Police units, which are gendarmerie-type police trained to deal with urban unrest, civil disorder, and national emergencies. After receiving several weeks of intensive training at one of the regional training centers, they are returned to their districts under the attention of embedded mentors. The focused district development program also includes a range of reforms within the


\textsuperscript{23} On policing training abroad and the importance of civilian trainers see, for example, David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

\textsuperscript{24} Author interviews with CSTC-A officials, November 2008.

Ministry of Interior, such as rank reform, pay reform, biometric identity cards, and electronic funds transfer.

Apart from the United States and Germany, more than two dozen other countries and multilateral organizations contribute in some measure to the police effort. Some donors provide financial contributions to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, which the United Nations Development Program established in May 2002 to "enable police to return to operation throughout the country, with the following priorities: (i) Nationwide payment of police staff remuneration; (ii) Acquisition of non-lethal equipment; (iii) Rehabilitation of police facilities; (iv) Gender Mainstreaming and (v) Institutional development." Other countries such as Egypt, Russia, and Hungary have provided "in-kind" contributions, such as weapons, ammunition, and other police equipment. And most countries with military forces in Afghanistan provide additional police training, mentoring, and equipment in the field through civilian or military personnel. The United Nations, which has been at the fore of police training in the Balkans and Haiti, has fewer than ten police officers working in an advisor unit in UNAMA.

In 2007, the European Union established an EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), which remains small and purports to "build upon the efforts of the GPPO [German Police Project Office] and other international actors in the field of police and the rule of law." It aims to aggregate "individual national efforts under an EU hat, taking due account of the relevant Community activities. Its activities cover the whole of Afghanistan." EUPOL consists of approximately 230 personnel, mainly police, law enforcement, and justice experts. But interviews with high-level EUPOL officials suggest that it has serious limitations including inadequate staff and a failure to deploy mentoring teams to districts where they are desperately needed. The general consensus of stakeholders is that EUPOL can provide limited help, such as enhancing the criminal investigatory skills of Afghan police, but it has played only a marginal role.

Despite multiple efforts to build a competent Afghan police reform, the results have been disappointing. A range of assessments have suggested that the poor performance of the police has contributed to the rising levels of violence in Afghanistan. As a joint U.S. Defense Department and State Department Inspectors’ General report concluded, “the readiness level of the ANP to meet its internal security and conventional law enforcement and community-policing mission remains low.” This concern is particularly acute because of the increasingly complex nature of Afghanistan’s threat environment. Violence has increased virtually every year between 2002 and 2008, especially in southern Afghanistan. It increased 27 percent between 2006 and 2007, and another 32 percent between 2007 and 2008. The low level of U.S. and international forces has contributed to the rising violence, and international force levels are among the lowest of any stability operation since World War II. Indeed, there are three times the number of international forces in Iraq as in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is larger in terms of population (31,056,947 compared with 26,783,383) and geography (647,500 square kilometers compared with 432,162). Figure 3 highlights the number of security incidents from January 2003 to June 2008.

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26 United Nations Development Programme, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).
27 Wilder, Cops or Robbers?
Figure 3: Security Incidents in Afghanistan, January 2003–June 2008

There are several reasons for police challenges. One is sub-optimal coordination. There is no agreement on the course of instruction for police, including training in the field. A second challenge is mentoring Afghan police. CSTC-A estimated that it had a 67 percent shortfall in international mentors. The Ministry of Interior appears to have a surplus of mentors in Kabul, while there is a dearth of mentors in the field. The lack of mentors has the potential to undermine the focused district development program over the long run. Indeed, American and other NATO officials interviewed have lauded the focused district development program. They maintain that police who have been through the program have improved, the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police have performed even better than expected, and focused district development is a good way of mediating between the previous efforts to churn out poorly trained police quickly and the slow German effort to turn out small numbers of well-trained officers. While there appear to be short-term benefits, the challenge will be translating them into long-term ones. For example, it is unclear whether a few weeks of additional training can undermine corruption and improve community policing without adequate mentoring in provinces. This concern is particularly acute since some Afghan National Police are involved in illicit drug trafficking, cooperate with insurgent groups, and operate illegal tolls along roads where they harass local citizens.

Disagreements also exist within the international community about whether it should build a paramilitary or civilian police force. Many European actors prefer a force that is focused upon community-policing and providing civilian protection. They view with concern efforts to build a paramilitary force geared predominantly towards counter-insurgency operations.

32 Data are from the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.
33 Wilder, Cops or Robbers?: author interview with EUPOL officials, May 2008.
34 Author interview with member of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, November 2008.
Proponents for a gendarmerie-like force contend that the Afghan National Police suffer more casualties than the Afghan National Army and face a range of well-equipped criminal organizations. Therefore they argue that it would be egregious not to prepare the police for the kind of adversaries that they encounter in the field in Afghanistan violent south and east. The lack of consensus in objectives and coordination among countries has resulted in the wide variation in the type of police being trained, mentored, and equipped.

Finally, police reform has taken place in a vacuum. There has been too little coordination with the Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for financing the force. Inadequate coordination with the finance ministry is a pervasive problem across many reform programs. In addition, police reform has never been well integrated with efforts to reform the Ministries of Justice and Interior. The result is that police are being trained to operate without a functional justice system – including a criminal justice system – which has inadequate human, material, and infrastructure resources at the sub-national level. There are too few judges (and fewer with appropriate training), little regularized interaction between police and prosecutors, and little vision to coordinate the creation of a police force with reforms in the Ministries of Justice and Interior. This is particularly concerning because of acute corruption within the Ministry of Interior. The failure to deal with corruption stems from the reality that reforming the Ministry of Interior is not merely a resource issue, but a political one as well. Few within the international community have been willing to use their significant financial leverage to encourage President Karzai to address corruption and make important high-level personnel changes in the ministry.

In sum, the report of the Inspectors General of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense was accurate in concluding that “until the Afghan criminal justice system, including law enforcement, judiciary, and corrections, has matured and is synchronized and coordinated from the national to the local level such that laws are standardized and uniformly applied, the ANP will function more as a security force than as a law enforcement organization.”

**Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups**

In April 2003, the United Nations Development Programme created the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program to assist the Afghanistan government implement the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants in conjunction with UNAMA. DDR focused on groups which were formerly on the Ministry of Defense payroll and initially aimed to demobilize some 100,000 fighters. Under the program, nearly 56,000 fighters chose to reintegrate and took advantage of assistance programs for starting small businesses, farming, and transitioning into other professions. UN officials reported that one in four of those found long-term sustainable employment. The Afghanistan New Beginnings Program claimed that under DDR it collected some 70,000 weapons, including more than 12,000 “heavy weapons.”

The DDR program permitted payment in exchange for weapons, which encouraged individuals to surrender weapons that were often non-functional, decrepit, or out-dated. And since militia commanders were paid to disband and demobilize combatants, some created “ghost soldiers” that never existed. Corruption was also significant, since some Afghans purchased small arms and resold them under the DDR program for a higher profit. Other criticisms of DDR included the failure to prevent some militia forces from stockpiling weapons

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36 International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police; Wilder, Cops or Robbers?.
and munitions, and rehiring some militia forces into programs run by the United States and coalition forces. The total DDR effort cost about $141 million, funded by Japan, Canada, Britain, and the United States. DDR was seen as a necessary precondition for holding presidential and parliamentary elections. At its inception DDR was inhibited by the over-representation of Tajiks in senior ranks of the Ministry of Defense, which dampened Pashtun recruitment into the program. In September 2003, Karzai replaced 22 senior Tajiks in the MoD with Pashtun, Uzbek, and Hazara. 39

In 2006, the Afghan government began a new program focused on the disbandment of illegally armed groups. National Security Advisor Zalmai Rassoul declared before a meeting of provincial reconstruction team commanders that “the disarmament and demobilisation element of the DDR process is now complete and we must tackle the disbandment of non-statutory and the illegal armed groups.” 40 The program has included the further collection of weapons and ammunition, disbandment of illegal groups, and registration of private security companies. In addition, it has involved community development in districts that were compliant in disbanding illegally armed groups, with the assistance of local community leaders and the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

Progress has been underwhelming. By May 2008, 53,000 weapons had been destroyed under the program; 19 illegally armed groups had been disbanded; and nearly 28,000 metric tons of ammunition had been collected and destroyed. 41 But Afghanistan was still awash in weapons and ammunition, and there was an increase in the number of insurgent and other illegal groups. A range of commanders retained large militia forces, such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad in the north. Even Ismail Khan, who was brought to Kabul by President Karzai to serve as Minister of Water and Energy, retained a formidable militia force in western Afghanistan. DIAG clearly failed to reach its stated goal of disbanding “all identifiable illegal armed groups…by the end of the year 2007.” 42 The meager results speak for themselves. Many international analysts within embassies and NGOs interviewed by the authors were dismissive of the program and some analysts described it as “all but moribund because of international reluctance to challenge senior Afghan officials over lack of compliance.” 43

Perhaps the most serious challenge to disarming illegally armed groups is the continuation of war, which has provided an incentive for commanders to retain their forces. Virtually all successful disarmament programs in such countries as Mozambique, El Salvador, and Namibia took place after the war ended. Expecting disarmament to work in the midst of an insurgency is naïve, especially given Afghanistan history. Taliban successes in southern and eastern Afghanistan in the mid-1990s led to subsequent advances in the west and north, creating an incentive for commanders there today to retain their forces in case the insurgency spreads. In addition DIAG has been even less well resourced than DDR, and has only received about $11 million in operating funds. In addition, NATO forces have been unwilling to enforce disarmament. DIAG relies upon persuasion rather than force or payments, since it does not formally allow compensation for weapons that are turned in. With meager resources, DIAG

aimed to disarm as many as 150,000 fighters of some 1,800 groups. The result is that DIAG is largely an anachronism, and has not succeeded in disbanding the most powerful groups that threaten Afghanistan.

**Justice Sector Reform**

Reforming the justice sector is critical to curtailing Afghanistan’s multi-faceted threats, since a primary cause of the insurgency is poor governance and a weak rule of law. Mitigating insurgent efforts to expand and consolidate their support base will likely require serious progress in providing good governance and access to justice, in addition to security. After all, the ability of the Taliban and other groups to provide security and justice was the ballast of the Taliban’s appeal. Resources dedicated to police reform without meaningful prosecutorial and judicial capabilities have diminishing margins of return. The best trained police are of minimal utility in securing public safety if the attorney general’s office and judiciary are not adequately functional. Yet this is precisely the state of affairs in Afghanistan.

Progress in justice sector reforms has been slow, especially when compared to building national security institutions. National and international efforts generally have been directed at three formal state institutions: the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General’s Office. The Italian-funded Independent National Legal Training Center is another important justice institution. Established by presidential decree on June 9, 2007, it is responsible for providing induction training for the other governmental judicial institutions. According to the donor assistance database, $712 million has been committed to justice sector reform between 2001 and 2008, although only $155 million has been disbursed. This is significantly less than funding for internal security. Italy was nominally the lead nation for this effort, although it dedicated few financial and human resources to this challenge, and failed to coordinate efforts among a disparate range of countries, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations.

Since 2002, the U.S. Agency for International Development spent $67 million on rule of law programs. (This exceeds Italy’s entire pillar 2 contribution.) The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs also funds the Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program. Of the fiscal year 2008 U.S. funds designated for democracy and good governance, some $116 million support the “Justice for All Program” and related ANDS programs. Some $68 million will focus upon linking informal customary justice systems with the formal justice sector and strengthening access to justice at the provincial level by building capacity. Finally, some portion of the $382 million disbursed through provincial reconstruction teams is dedicated to rule of law projects. In total, between 2002 and 2008 the United States spent more than $1.9 billion on a combination of rule of law, democracy, and governance programs in Afghanistan.

But the formal justice system has been dysfunctional. According to the World Bank, the effectiveness of Afghanistan’s justice system actually worsened over the period of Italy’s tenure. By 2007, for example, Afghanistan ranked in the top 99.5 percent of most ineffective justice systems worldwide. It compared poorly even to other countries in the region, such as Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The World Bank also ranked

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Afghanistan in the top 2 percent of most corrupt countries worldwide every year between 2002 and 2006, with little difference between the late Taliban years. And Transparency International ranked Afghanistan 172 out of 179 in its corruption index. Only a few countries – such as Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia – were more corrupt than Afghanistan.\(^47\) The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), which was created by President Karzai in August 2007 purportedly to help improve governance, may help counter corruption through its ability to appoint and monitor provincial and district governors. Some national and international actors in Afghanistan are dubious about the IDLG noting that that it’s mandate does not address corruption more broadly in the country. This is likely because the IDLG program is in many ways a vehicle to facilitate Karzai’s re-election in 2009. Critics fear that it may not realize its full potential once the elections are held.

Several factors have contributed to the poor state of justice sector reform. One is a vacuum in coordination. Italian policymakers had difficulty coordinating a disparate range of aid from states, major international organizations such as the UN and the World Bank, and non-governmental organizations. Another problem is too few suitably trained judges and prosecutors. Most provinces and districts lack the legal infrastructure to function properly, and these deficits include buildings, vehicles, communications equipment, appropriate copies of Afghan laws, and even such basic items as pens and paper. While there has been progress in building and rehabilitating infrastructure, the majority of the buildings in the justice sector still require repair. Most justice professionals work in areas where there are no dedicated justice buildings or facilities. In a majority of provinces (26 of 34), the attorney general’s office doesn’t have a single vehicle to transport prosecutors to courts or crime scenes, or to bring witnesses and victims to hearings. Judges and other justice officials are poorly paid and often corrupt.

Underpaid and under-resourced, justice personnel also lack adequate provisions to guarantee their personal safety. Vulnerable to the influence and coercion of warlords, many judges and prosecutors make decisions preferential to these power brokers. The National Justice Sector Strategy identifies the necrosis of corruption as a particular problem, noting that “corruption thrives where there is a lack of clarity regarding appointment processes, career progression and transfers. A lack of credible mechanisms to enforce standards and codes of conduct governing accountability, discipline and ethics and lack of attention to and control over quality of services also contributes to a culture of impunity.”\(^48\) These challenges undermine the independence and impartiality of the justice institutions and foster public distrust in this system. In addition, there are too few detention and correctional facilities in Afghanistan, and those that do exist are sub-standard. This is a serious problem as detention facilities are an essential component of any criminal justice system. Donor attention, until quite recently, was focused elsewhere while the country’s dilapidated prisons and staff struggled to “accommodate the thousands of people held for long periods in poor conditions, violating basic international human rights standards relating to the treatment of detainees.”\(^49\) Until March 2003, when prisons were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice, there was no international donor taking the lead on this issue. Nominally, Italy has responsibility for this; however, Italy has dedicated few resources to this problem.

By Afghan law, each provincial center should have a prison and a detention center and each district center should have a detention center. Whereas prisons are under jurisdiction of


the Ministry of Justice, detention centers are under the ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{50} Currently, there are 34 provincial provinces as mandated by law in addition to Pul-e-Charkhi in Kabul. However, these provincial prisons are often on properties that do not belong to the Ministry of Justice and most are in unacceptable conditions. In particular, there is inadequate housing for female inmates and children, since most prisons do not have dedicated capacity as required by law. Out of the 374 districts, there are only 242 district detention centers with limited capacity. Most fall far short of international standards. Since 2001, when there were only 600 prisoners, the prison population has exploded. By March 2005, there were 5,500 recorded prisoners and 10,400 by March 2007. Of these 10,400, more than 300 are female, most of whom have dependent children incarcerated with them. Thus the number of imprisoned children nearly total those of imprisoned women.\textsuperscript{51}

In addition, illegal detentions of persons persist, and the lack of an independent bar and state-subsidized legal aid system impedes access of justice for all. The traditional dispute resolution institutions, as the name implies, dispense “traditional justice,” which frequently is discriminatory towards women and children. There is widespread agreement that the international community and the Afghan government must revive its commitment to this sector to achieve a “functional, fair and sustainable justice sector that provides justice, safety, and security for Afghans,” as called for by the 2008 National Justice Sector Strategy.\textsuperscript{52}

The vertical, sectoral approach has imposed opportunity costs on all programs by separating efforts in the police, prosecutorial and justice sectors. Without a functioning justice sector and ministry of interior, police forces are merely a security service. And as noted, other aspects of security and governance have received considerably fewer resources \textit{en toto} than police forces have received. Equally problematic has been the failure to integrate counter-narcotics concerns into all of these efforts, even though in January 2005 the Counter Narcotics Criminal Justice Taskforce became operational to “ensure that high level drug offenders do not continue to operate with impunity.”\textsuperscript{53} While there is widespread concurrence that this vertically integrated, sectoral approach is a debilitating approach, there have been few meaningful efforts to do things differently.

\textbf{Counternarcotics}

In the late 1990s, Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer of opium and the source of 82 percent of illicit poppy grown worldwide.\textsuperscript{54} In 2002, Britain accepted the role of “lead nation” for counternarcotics, but struggled to deal with rising levels of poppy cultivation, production, and trafficking. In 2003, the government of Afghanistan adopted a National Drug Control Strategy, which was updated in 2006 and poignantly argued that “the drug trade fuels corruption and it undermines the very rule of law that is key for bringing safety and security to our people, it jeopardises the prospects for long-term economic growth, and it impoverishes thousands of farmers who become indebted to drug traffickers, money-lenders and criminals.” The strategy comprised eight pillars: institutional capacity-building, law enforcement and

\textsuperscript{50} Amnesty International, Afghanistan Crumbling Prison System Desperately In Need of Repair, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{53} UNAMA, Afghanistan Justice, p. 29
interdiction, demand reduction, criminal justice reform, public education, regional cooperation, alternative livelihoods, and poppy eradication.\textsuperscript{55}

One of the key organizations in implementing the strategy is the Afghan government's Counternarcotics Police, which is located in the Ministry of Interior. It includes approximately 3,000 police and is the lead law enforcement agency charged with reducing narcotics production and distribution in Afghanistan. The Counternarcotics Police include investigation, intelligence, and interdiction units, and focus on key drug-trafficking areas through the establishment of seven provincial offices. In addition to law enforcement, there is also a criminal justice component. The Afghan government’s Criminal Justice Task Force investigates and prosecutes narcotics traffickers under the December 2005 Counter Narcotics Law, with assistance from the United States, United Kingdom, and other donors. Narcotics cases are tried before the Counter Narcotics Tribunal, which has exclusive national jurisdiction over mid- and high-level narcotics cases in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.\textsuperscript{56}

The United States is involved in counternarcotics through such organizations as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The DEA's strategy includes several components. First, it collects and disseminates intelligence on narcotics activity. DEA has also established a Kabul Country Office, which interacts with the Afghan government’s Counternarcotics Police. Second, DEA provides drug enforcement training to the Counternarcotics Police. Third, DEA's foreign-deployed advisory and support teams conduct counternarcotics operations. These teams, which consist of DEA special agents and intelligence research specialists, help Afghan units identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle transnational drug trafficking operations in the region. They also conduct bilateral investigations into the region’s trafficking organizations. The foreign-deployed advisory and support teams also help with the destruction of opium poppy storage sites, clandestine heroin processing labs, and precursor chemical supplies. Fourth, DEA has implemented Operation Containment to prevent processing chemicals from entering the country, and opium poppy and heroin from leaving. Operation Containment involves nearly two dozen countries in Central Asia, Caucasus, Middle East, and Europe.

There have been some positive results. Poppy cultivation is confined almost entirely to Afghanistan’s insecure south, and three provinces that were heavily involved in poppy growing – Balkh, Badakhshan, and Nangarhar – slashed or eliminated cultivation altogether in 2007. The U.S. Department of Justice has also arrested, extradited, and indicted several senior-level drug traffickers: Khan Mohammad, Haji Bashir Noorzai, Mohammad Essa, and Haji Baz Mohammad.

But the overall results of counternarcotics efforts have been mixed. Virtually no major drug traffickers have been prosecuted in Afghanistan, and the cultivation, production, and trade in opium poppy has significantly increased over the past several years, a testament to failed efforts. After explosive growth in poppy cultivation, Afghanistan is now home to 93 percent of the world’s poppy production and involves 14 percent of Afghanistan’s population. As Figure 4 illustrates, poppy cultivation has increased virtually every year since 2001, though it decreased 19 percent between 2007 and 2008. The number of poppy-free provinces increased by almost 50 percent between 2007 and 2008, and 98 percent of Afghanistan's poppy was grown in only seven provinces: Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, Nimroz, Daykundi, and Zabul). Some of these gains were due to provincial leadership. However, the biggest drivers of success were likely draught and food shortages, which made the terms of food production more lucrative than

\textsuperscript{55} Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, \textit{National Drug Control Strategy} (Kabul: Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, 2006).
poppy. Unfortunately, some of these gains are mitigated by the fact that the decline in poppy cultivation has been accompanied by substitution towards hashish, which offers a higher net income as it is less input intensive. The impact of narcotics is significant. Poppy has eroded efforts to improve governance, fostered widespread corruption throughout the government and have hampered the development of a licit economy. UNODC officials stress that the international community must also turn its attention to the burgeoning cultivation of poppy.57

Figure 4: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1991-200858

![Graph showing opium poppy cultivation from 1991 to 2008]

There have been several challenges with counternarcotics. Perhaps the most significant is the lack of political will among Afghan leaders to prosecute major drug traffickers, including government officials involved in the drug trade. Some U.S. officials have argued that the paucity of prosecutions within Afghanistan is caused by challenges in building Afghan capacity to gather evidence, remove suspects, and try complex cases.59 However, Afghan capacity to prosecute drug-traffickers – or even remove them from office – has improved, including within the Ministry of Interior.60 A much more serious problem is the unwillingness of the Afghan government to prosecute or remove major drug-traffickers, including government officials involved in the drug trade. In the rare cases in which drug traffickers were convicted, they often paid a bribe and were released. In addition, it is not clear that the international community and Afghan government uniformly believe that counternarcotics is critical, since some are concerned that eradication, interdiction, and other measures will alienate local Afghans and worsen the insurgency.

Pakistan

Nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighbors impact its security. This report does not offer a comprehensive assessment of regional cooperation. Rather, it focuses on several cross-border programs, especially with Pakistan. Animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan was apparent as early as 1947, when Afghanistan opposed Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, a motion it eventually rescinded. Since then, Kabul has continued to antagonize Pakistan by refusing to recognize the Durand Line, which was established in 1893 and is the internationally-recognized border separating the two states. While no Pashtun government has ever recognized the Durand Line, Pakistan continues to believe that only a Pashtun-dominated government will act in its interests. Pakistan has never resigned itself to having Afghanistan as a neighbor. Rather, Pakistan has tried to cultivate Afghanistan as a client, as demonstrated by its support for anti-Soviet mujahadeen in the 1980s, various jihadi factions in the early 1990s (most notably Gulbadin Hekmatyar), and finally the Taliban through the mid- to late-1990s.

Since 2002, tensions between Kabul and Islamabad have escalated. While the Taliban successfully kept India out of most of the country, Karzai has welcomed India’s assistance. Karzai and many of his close advisors have forged strong ties with New Delhi, and India has become increasingly active in reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan, including along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In addition, Afghanistan has frequently alleged that Pakistan’s ISI and Frontier Corps actively and passively support some insurgent groups, such as Mullah Omar’s Taliban and the Haqqani network. United States and NATO assessments have come to similar conclusions. American and Pakistani forces engaged in several firefight in 2008, escalating tensions along the border. During a June 10, 2008 firefight, for instance, U.S. forces killed roughly a dozen Pakistani Frontier Corps soldiers who were shooting at them. One local villager from Suran Dara, located a few hundred yards from the fighting on the Pakistan side, remarked that “When the Americans started bombing the Taliban, the Frontier Corps started shooting at the Americans ... They were trying to help the Taliban. And then the American planes bombed the Pakistani post.”

There are several programs that have tried to address Afghanistan-Pakistan concerns, especially along the border. While these efforts may not appear to be, at first blush, internal security assistance programs for Afghanistan, they are critical to international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. While Afghanistan’s domestic concerns are pressing, Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan is debilitating. Thus efforts to dampen Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions are critical enablers to securing Afghanistan. One such effort is the Tripartite Commission – which includes Pakistan, Afghanistan, and ISAF – where they discuss matters of mutual concern and exchange information. This forum has had little impact upon the strategic picture and has done little to foster confidence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2006, Pakistan sent the highest ranking army official ever to attend any Tripartite Commission, the Pakistan Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ehsan ul Haq. However, the occupant of this post is largely symbolic and Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Kayani, has not attended. Moreover, with the April 2008 effort to assassinate President Karzai and Kabul’s adamancy that the ISI was responsible, Karzai had refused to participate further in this effort. Pakistan, for its part, was hesitant to engage following U.S. retaliatory attacks on Frontier Corps positions in June of 2008. Despite misgivings in Kabul and Islamabad, U.S. officials report that the commission has resumed meeting.

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61 Author interviews with NATO officials, May and November 2008.
A second program is the Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), which aim to facilitate security cooperation between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and NATO officials. Their objective is to improve communication in monitoring licit and illicit cross-border traffic and to “counter efforts by our common enemies from using their superior knowledge of the terrain to skirt both sides of the rugged border to avoid engagement.”\(^{63}\) The BCCs are to be staffed by NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani military personnel. The program called for a total of six centers, with three each within Pakistani and Afghan territory. The first of these opened at the formal border-crossing point at Torkham. A second is planned to be built also on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan has resisted permitting BCCs on its territory, which seriously undermines the program’s objectives.

A third major program is the peace jirga, which came out of commitments made by Presidents Karzai and Musharraf in September 2006 when President Bush hosted them in Washington to dampen escalating tensions. In August 2007, the peace jirga was held in Kabul. President Musharraf riled Washington and surprised many when he at first declined to attend, dispatching Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in his stead. At the last minute, President Musharraf announced his intent to arrive at the end of jirga.\(^{64}\) After languishing in neglect for well over a year, Pakistani and Afghan leadership have recently reaffirmed their commitment to the process.\(^{65}\)

Finally, the European Commission has a program to establish new and more effective posts along the borders with Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran, which includes a €3 million ($4.6 million) training program on the Afghan-Iran border. Such increased formalization of border crossing points is needed both to control the flow of illicit goods (especially narcotics) as well as to increase customs duties, which would be enormously effective for the Afghan government budget. In all, the European Commission has programmed €20 million ($31 million) to assist the Afghan Customs Department up to 2010. While there have been several Asian Development Bank and World Bank projects intended to provide technical assistance to Afghanistan to help build capacity at the level of policy-formation for regional issues, this is one of the few projects that focus upon expanding the security dimensions of Afghanistan’s borders with its neighbors. U.S. and partner efforts to train the Afghan Border police (which are authorized to have an end strength of 12,000) may help with some of these issues as well. However, the border police are not likely to be an effective mitigation tool for insurgency-related cross-border movement as they are unlikely to have the skills or equipment to act effectively against these kinds of threats.

These programs have not successfully addressed regional tensions because they fail to address the root causes of instability in the region. In particular, as long as security competition persists between Islamabad and New Delhi, Afghanistan will suffer the consequences. Indeed, tensions have become more acute despite these initiatives, especially following the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

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CONCLUSIONS: “GAME CHANGING” STEPS

All is not lost in Afghanistan. Since 1945 it has taken an average of 14 years for governments to defeat insurgent groups, so the Afghan insurgency is barely at its half-way point. In addition, the insurgency remains fractured among over a dozen militant groups, none of whom has much support from the Afghan population. But urgent measures – what might be called “game changing” steps – are now needed to stem an increasingly violent insurgency.

The United States and its international allies must re-examine their core objectives in Afghanistan. The first objective should be to eliminate the use of Afghanistan and Pakistan as a base of operations for international terrorist groups (like al Qaeda) and their allies (like the Taliban). As the September 11, 2001 attacks demonstrated, terrorist groups need a conducive environment in which to operate, and the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship remains fairly strong. The second objective should be to relax the U.S. and international community’s hope of building a central government strong enough to establish order throughout the country. Afghanistan’s history suggests that stability has required a power-sharing arrangement between the central government and local entities.

Since September 2001, the Afghan and international community have responded with a range of steps in such areas as defense, police, disbandment of illegally armed groups, justice sector reform, counternarcotics, and Pakistan. As Figure 5 highlights, however, critical gaps remain.

Figure 5: Gap Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Example of Response to Threats</th>
<th>Gaps</th>
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| Insurgent groups (e.g. Taliban, Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, al Qaeda, and Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan) | • Redoubled efforts to build Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, including focused district development  
  • Reconciliation program                                               | • Too few international partners  
  • Little effort to support tribes, sub-tribes, and clans              |
| Criminal groups (e.g. drug-, timber-, and gem-trafficking organizations) | • Multi-pillared strategy to deal with counternarcotics  
  • Regional efforts to involve neighbors through which products moves | • Justice sector reform has been lagging  
  • Little political will to deal with corruption                       |
| Warlords and their militias                                             | • Disbandment of illegally armed groups (DIAG) program                                       | • Most key warlords have retained their militia forces  
  • Program is under-resourced financially and politically             |
| Regional problems: including tensions with neighbors and state sanctuary | • Tripartite Commission  
  • Border Coordination Centers  
  • Peace jirga                                                            | • Broader regional tensions, including between Pakistan and India, continue to impact Afghanistan  
  • Most programs are now defunct                                         |

66 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica; RAND, 2008).
This section offers recommendations to fill in some of the most egregious security gaps, though it does not deal with economic and political steps that are also necessary. Several steps are critical.

Adopting a bottom-up strategy: Because of the local nature of the insurgency, a bottom-up approach is necessary to complement top-down efforts. Security and stability in Afghanistan has historically required a balance between top-down efforts from the central government, and bottom-up efforts from local actors. During the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973), for example, security was established using a combination of Afghan national forces – police, military, and intelligence – and tribal entities. Much has changed since then. But the weak nature of the Afghan state, the inadequate level of international forces, and the local nature of the insurgency require building a bottom-up capacity to complement national forces. Since 2001, the U.S. and its allies have focused almost exclusively on top-down nation-building. But this strategy has not worked. One of the most serious problems in Afghanistan’s violent south and east is the inability of Afghan and international forces to “hold” territory once it has been cleared as part of a “clear, hold, build” strategy.

What should a bottom-up strategy include? The nascent Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) provides a useful model in trying to create stronger bonds between the central government and local communities. The program establishes “district shuras” beginning in Wardak Province and is being run through the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. ASOP’s objective is to “support communities to work effectively together to solve their own problems, and to work in partnership with government agencies to improve the provision of the services they need.” One concern with ASOP – and for local engagement efforts more broadly – is that there is no unified approach across Afghanistan to deal with tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and other local institutions. There are already a range of programs that deal with tribes and other local actors (such as the Community Development Councils), Afghan ministries (such as the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Tribal and Border Affairs), and international efforts. How will they be coordinated, if at all? There is also wide variation among NATO countries in supporting ASOP, especially among continental European countries. Many believe that President Karzai is using ASOP to further his own political agenda – including winning the 2009 presidential election – rather than improving local governance. Many are also concerned about the creation of the Community National Guard Force to help establish security in districts where ASOP is implemented.

The most effective bottom-up strategy in Afghanistan is likely to be one that taps into already-existing local institutions in two ways: by helping legitimate local actors provide services to their populations, and by better connecting them to the central government. Figure 6 illustrates the tribal breakdown in eastern Afghanistan. Local tribal and religious leaders best understand their community needs, but need help in delivering services. In some areas they also need security, since many have been killed by insurgent groups or forced to flee to urban areas. If organized and run appropriately, district-level institutions that include legitimate local actors, district and provincial governors, and the central government can effectively (a) assess local needs, (b) design aid programs to meet these needs, (c) help ensure sufficient security for their projects and their participants, and (d) monitor the adequate completion of programs. Where necessary, Afghan and international security forces may need to provide protection to local leaders.

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But providing arms to local actors and creating local militias – under whatever name – is bound to be counterproductive. Such an initiative will likely undermine international and domestic commitments to DDR and reverse the limited progress that has been achieved thus far. The early U.S. reliance on warlord militias to provide security, as well as the 2006 effort to build the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), suggest several problems to avoid. First, the focus of bottom-up efforts should be on local leaders and their jirgas and shuras, not on individuals. The growth of warlords and their private militias quickly alienated Afghans, since many terrorized the local population and became involved in criminal activity. The ANAP was problematic since tribes were never empowered to control them, and the ANAP quickly deteriorated into militia forces controlled by local commanders. Second, assistance efforts should avoid significantly strengthening some tribes over others and unnecessarily re-igniting tribal rivalries. Third, the U.S. and international community should work with a range of local rule-of-law entities like Saranwali, which perform many functions associated with the police in common-law countries. This means embedding advisors into the Saranwali to aid in criminal proceedings. Proponents of this bottom-up strategy emphasize the need for accountability within Afghan governance structures to minimize the likelihood that they will evolve into future security challenges.

A bottom-up strategy can be effective in reconciling key tribes, sub-tribes, and clans that have cooperated with the Taliban and other insurgent groups. There are numerous disenchanted and aggrieved tribes that exercise a historical tendency of defying the central government. Their motivations are usually local, defensive, and non-ideological. And their struggle is aimed at re-establishing an equilibrium that has been disrupted at the local level, or to returning to a previous political and social arrangement that has been compromised.
President Karzai’s reconciliation process has tended to focus on negotiating with insurgent groups, such as the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, that do not have compatible goals with the Afghan state. But reconciling with tribes and aiding them in turning against the Taliban and other groups is likely to be a more effective strategy.

**Shifting from Direct Action to Partnering.** It is unlikely that the United States and NATO will defeat the Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Virtually all counterinsurgency studies – from David Galula to Roger Trinquier – have focused on building the capacity of local forces. Victory is usually a function of the struggle between the local government and insurgents. Most outside forces are unlikely to remain for the duration of any counterinsurgency, at least as a major combatant force. Most domestic populations tire of their forces engaged in struggles overseas, as even the Soviet population did in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In addition, a lead outside role may be interpreted by the population as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions that impede success. And a lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they – and not foreign forces – control their destiny.

More U.S. forces in Afghanistan may be helpful, but only if they are used to build Afghan capacity. A key need is to address the partnering gap that has plagued Afghan police and army efforts. It does not appear likely that organizations such as the European Union will fill this vacuum. A few steps may be helpful with the limited resources. One is to concentrate on mentoring senior-level police in the field, not rank-and-file, since they have influence over subordinates. Corruption is often a top-down phenomenon. This means embedding partnering teams with district-level police chiefs and their deputies. It also means focusing on areas where the insurgency is most severe, especially in Afghanistan’s south and east. A second step is to push incoming military units into partnering roles, rather than engaging in direct action. This will be easier for U.S. and other international units to do with Afghan army than with police forces. Most soldiers are not ideal for police mentoring and training, since there are stark differences between the police and military cultures. But a shortage of resources in Afghanistan requires coming up with sub-optimal solutions. This could be done in several ways: providing incoming brigade combat teams with several months of training to play a mentoring role; and reallocating Military Police companies to do mentoring and training, as the United States did in Iraq. European governments, the United State, and the UN should devote more human, technical and financial resources to mentoring and professionalizing the Ministry of Interior. Given the serious personnel shortages crippling police training, the international community will have to redouble efforts to reform the Ministry of Interior. Without significant reform, the ongoing efforts to build a competent police force will be undermined.

In addition, NATO should more directly involve Afghans in campaign planning and operations, including integrating Afghan military and intelligence personnel into joint operations centers. The Afghan parliament should also be brought into the discussion about additional troops. Parliamentary debate may be useful in deterring Afghans from concluding that additional forces represent a further step towards foreign occupation, as insurgents argue.

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Adopting a Robust Anti-Corruption Strategy. The United States must work with the Afghan government to counter corruption, which is weakening governance, hindering counter-narcotics efforts, and undermining counterinsurgency operations. U.S. intelligence indicates that senior Afghan officials are involved in the drug trade, and that narco-traffickers have bought off hundreds of police chiefs, judges, and other officials. Clearly, the Ministry of Interior is a logical place to start since corruption in this ministry has undermined police reform, counter-narcotics efforts, and border security. While there are no universally applicable anti-corruption strategies, there are a number of insightful lessons from successful cases, such as Singapore, Liberia, Botswana, and Estonia. Anti-corruption bodies are usually credited with much of the progress in fighting corruption, though complementary economic and institutional reforms have also been critical. In most cases, the process has included the immediate firing of corrupt personnel, the professionalization of the staff, new control systems, and modern incentive and performance assessment systems. Even then, broader reforms played an important role. In Uganda, for example, the Museveni government that came to power in 1986 implemented a strategy that encompassed passing economic reforms and deregulation, reforming the civil service, strengthening the auditor general’s office, empowering a reputable inspector general to investigate and prosecute corruption, and implementing an anti-corruption public information campaign.

For Afghanistan, corrupt government officials, including those involved in the drug trade, need to be prosecuted and removed from office. There is no shortage of intelligence on who many of them are, though a substantial amount of information is kept at the Top Secret level or above. This means directly confronting President Karzai, de-classifying U.S. and other NATO intelligence on government officials involved in the drug trade, sharing it with the Afghan government, and supporting Afghan efforts to prosecute them. President Karzai has been unwilling to target government officials involved in corruption, most likely because he does not want to alienate people in an election year and in the midst of an insurgency. In addition, his anti-corruption efforts, such as establishing the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption and creating special anti-corruption units in the Office of the Attorney General and in the Judiciary, have been largely window-dressing.

A number of U.S. government officials have advocated establishing mobile courts that have the authority to try drug kingpins in their own provinces. The message to Karzai should come from the top levels of the U.S. government, which can also provide much-needed political and military support taking such actions as:

- Establishing sweeping anti-corruption legislation
- Arresting and prosecuting corrupt officials at the national, provincial, and district level
- Creating Inspectors General offices in key ministries
- Providing support to the justice system during the anti-corruption campaign, including protection of judges and witnesses
- Conducting a robust public information campaign

Addressing Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions. While this issue is partly beyond the remit of this assessment of internal security assistance to Afghanistan, any analysis of Afghanistan’s security must include Pakistan. Indeed, while the war could well be lost inside Afghanistan, it cannot entirely be won there. Much of the command and control structures for

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72 Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?”
Insurgent groups lie on the Pakistan side of the border. Afghanistan, by reason of its poverty, isolation, and geography, has always been a weak state at the mercy of its more powerful neighbors. When those neighbors see a mutual benefit in a peaceful Afghanistan, the country has historically been stable. At present the United States is in the puzzling position of developing a strategy for Afghanistan, but without a comprehensive strategy to deal with Pakistan or the Pakistan-India conflict. Several steps in Pakistan could improve the security situation in Afghanistan.

The United States needs to begin addressing the structural gap in Pakistan. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak, and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. Currently, international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the Afghan side of the border. But this strategy is a half-measure. International assistance needs to be directed toward Pakistan’s tribal areas, not just Afghanistan. Security options are limited without providing tangible benefit to local, disaffected communities. Without undermining the power of militant groups, however, it remains unclear who will benefit from development funds in FATA. At present, the likely beneficiaries are local religious leaders and militant leaders, as well as the military-run Frontier Works Organization. Political reform may also be critical. This includes encouraging political developments, such as evaluating the Political Parties Act and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). While the Pakistani government is keen to obtain funding for development, it has been less willing to politically liberalize the tribal areas.

In addition, the United States needs to more effectively encourage Pakistan to conduct a sustained campaign against key extremists on its soil, especially the Taliban, al Qa’ida, and Haqqani network. Particularly egregious is the lack of sustained action against the Taliban’s inner shura located in the vicinity of Quetta, Pakistan. A more effective campaign will require affecting Pakistan’s cost–benefit calculus of using militants in its foreign policy, whether in Afghanistan or in India. After September 11, 2001, senior U.S. policymakers—such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlin—presented President Musharraf with a stark choice. He had to choose between the United States or militants; there was no middle ground. This put Musharraf in a difficult position, since it meant overthrowing the very Taliban government that the ISI had painstakingly supported for nearly a decade. But the combination of a blunt threat and promise of economic assistance effectively altered Musharraf’s cost-benefit calculation. Since 2001, however, the United States has not confronted Pakistan with such a stark choice, despite the evidence of ISI continued support to groups like the Taliban and Haqqani network.

Pakistan maintains a close relationship with several militant groups operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan with considerable impunity. It has legitimate security interests in its region and it has few conventional political, military, or diplomatic tools to achieve its interests. Moreover, its key neighbors (India and Afghanistan) have shown resolute disinterest in accommodating Pakistan’s security concerns. The United States and its allies have also shown little inclination to promote regional solutions that would help resolve Pakistan’s legitimate concerns. Since joining hands with Washington, Pakistan’s security concerns have worsened rather than improved. The United States and the international community should acknowledge these realities. Realism demands that any initiative to secure greater Pakistani cooperation must involve positive and negative inducements, as well as a meaningful regional process to address its legitimate security interests. Pakistan’s security interests, however, do not justify the use of militant proxies anywhere in the region. It is difficult to justify the continued U.S. partnership with Pakistan when militant groups with direct ties to Islamabad attack U.S.
and NATO troops in Afghanistan, and Washington continues to provide massive military and economic support. Should Pakistan fail to permanently abandon its support of militant groups, such as the Taliban and Haqqani network, Washington should end significant assistance.

Despite the change in Pakistan’s civilian leadership, neither Prime Minister Geelani nor President Zardari control the military or intelligence agencies, and chief of army staff Kiyani has publicly retreated from pursuing counterinsurgency robustly. It is imperative that the United States persuade Pakistani military and civilian leaders to conduct a sustained campaign against insurgents, especially against inner shura members in Baluchistan Province. This will require Washington to identify pressure points that raise the costs of stalling. Perhaps the most significant is tying current assistance to cooperation in various measures. For example, the United States gives Pakistan over $1 billion in military and economic assistance each year. The United States could tie assistance in some of these areas – as well as implicit American support in multilateral bodies such as the International Monetary Fund – to achieving specific benchmarks in targeting key groups such as Mullah Omar’s Taliban and the Haqqani network.

Washington should also commission a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) to facilitate agreement across the U.S. government about Pakistani action and inaction, and should work with key allies to coordinate policy approaches. Pakistan currently can exploit differences in objectives and interests held by the United States, United Kingdom, China, Saudi Arabia, and others. The United States must work with these states to forge a common view of the Pakistan problem and adopt mutually acceptable approaches. Finally, Washington needs to make a concerted effort to engage both Pakistan and India, which have competing interests in Afghanistan. Transforming regional security perceptions among the Afghans, Pakistanis, and Indians will be a monumental challenge but constitutes the only way to stabilize and secure Afghanistan so that it does not again become a terrorist sanctuary. Washington will have to step up diplomacy in South Asia, with a particular focus on promoting regional cooperation among all three countries and defusing conflict between New Delhi and Islamabad, on the one hand, and Kabul and Islamabad, on the other.

**Improving Resource Allocation.** First, as this report indicates, there are clear resource shortages. There are too few mentors in developing security forces and some activities remain woefully neglected. There are clearly some areas that are deprived of adequate resources and which could absorb more resources. Second, one of the most significant problems in Afghanistan is a failure to use international resources to strengthen the Afghan government at the national and local levels. It has been often noted that Afghanistan, relative to other “nation-building” efforts, has been one of the least resourced efforts. This has led some analysts to argue that the low level of resources spent in Afghanistan have been the major reason for its security challenges. While this view has tended to dominate discussions of reconstruction, a new argument is emerging that counters this conventional wisdom. In 2004-2005, international assistance amounted to nearly 40 percent of Afghanistan’s non-opium gross domestic product compared to 5 percent for domestic revenues. This external aid dependence may corrode governance because, in its absence, the state would have to extract resources from the people and redistribute it in the form of public goods and services. This is the fundamental compact of democratic governance.

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74 Waldman, Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan.
This problem is exacerbated by the way in which aid has been distributed in Afghanistan. First, it is overwhelmingly supply-driven, producing a “Samaritan’s Dilemma” in which the donor is motivated to give but the recipient has little incentive to expend effort (e.g. reforming ministries) since aid is assured. This drives donors to put too few performance measures or other restrictions on the aid, which degrades governance rather than improves it. A second problem is that in Afghanistan, more aid is channeled outside of the government than through it. This problem is exacerbated by the refusal of donors to report their activity to the ministry of finance or use an agreed upon planning tool such as DAD. This means that the government never has a full picture of what activities are taking place or what resources are available. Often the government is unaware of construction of assets for which it will eventually have to pay recurring costs. For example, police numbers are increased or schools are built without involving relevant ministries including the finance ministry. While donors may be inclined to fund projects external to the budget because they fear ministerial incompetence, off-budget activities do little to build government capacity and may even undermine it.

The solution to this problem means increasingly working through the Ministry of Finance rather than around it. (Alternatively, the ARTF could become the leading, if not obligatory, means to channel international assistance.) And it should include developing an Afghan database to compile, monitor, and coordinate international assistance to the country. Use of the budget for such purposes would help eliminate redundant projects and assets for which there are no recurrent funds available. Finally, the Afghan parliament must be a part of this process. To date, the Afghan parliament has not been consulted on the ANDS and it has not ratified the vision it lays out, the processes developed to achieve those goals or contributed to the discussions about the resources required to fulfill the aims of the ANDS. Ensuring Afghan ownership of the country’s development is critical. Parliament involvement could have enormous utility in creating Afghan buy-in given the considerable legitimacy that the parliament enjoys.

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### Appendix A: Illustrative Data From the Donor Assistance Database for Afghanistan (Figure are Cumulative from 2000-2008)

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<th>Committed (USD)</th>
<th>Disbursed (USD)</th>
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## Appendix B: Afghanistan Program Funding Chart (In Millions of US$)

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**Source:** Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2008), p. 21
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United Nations Development Programme, Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).


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