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# Assessing the War on Terror

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*For  
Lou Anna K. Simon for her vision,  
Paulene Granberry-Russell for her support,  
and both for their friendship*

21. World Bank, *Afghanistan: State-Building, Sustaining Growth and Reducing Poverty*.

22. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 191.

23. World Bank, *Transition in Afghanistan*.

24. Figures are taken from United Nations Development Programme, *Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004*, *Human Development Report 2002*, and *Human Development Report 2011*.

25. Figures quoted for postintervention levels are from the 2011 UNDP *Human Development Report*. However demographic indicators have become part of the controversy over the extent of progress in Afghanistan. The USAID-supported 2010 Mortality Survey, published in late 2011, produced the most optimistic set of indicators yet. These included 38 percent of births attended, under age five mortality at 97 per 1,000, pregnancy-related mortality at 372 per 100,000, and total fertility rate at 5.0, all significantly better than estimates previously used. There is a continuing debate on whether the 2010 survey reflects real improvements, lack of baselines, or persistent difficulty of obtaining accurate indicators.

26. "The Afghan constitution is the most modern and democratic in the Muslim world" (Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 217).

27. United Nations, *Press Release*.

28. Clark, *No Shortcut to Stability*.

29. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), *Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women in Afghanistan*, Kabul, December 2012.

30. The October 2011 report on conflict-related detainee conditions is based on the most extensive survey yet conducted of Afghans who have been held by the NDS and national police in terrorism-related cases. Over an eleven-month period, UNAMA/OHCHR interviewed 273 NDS detainees and found that 46 percent had been tortured (UNAMA, *Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody*).

31. Sari Kouvo, *Transfers and Torture: The British Army Holds Transfers of Detainees to the NDS*, December 11, 2012, <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3150>.

32. Clark, *The Takhar Attack*.

33. Open Society Foundations, *Confinement Conditions at a US Screening Facility at Bagram Airbase*.

34. Stewart, *Can Intervention Work?*

## 5

### Pakistan: Perfidious Ally in the War on Terror

C. Christine Fair

By any metric, after more than a decade of the war on terror, Pakistan is less safe than it was on September 10, 2001. Despite Pakistan's historic contributions to the US-led war effort in Afghanistan and its assistance in apprehending al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan, its continued reliance upon the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, among others, has placed Pakistan at increasing odds with the international community, which has come to see Pakistan as both the firefighter *and* the arsonist.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, notwithstanding the US-Pakistan alliance and the large investments made by the United States in Pakistan, Pakistanis are more anti-American than ever before.<sup>2</sup> Even though the United States has provided crucial weapon systems to Pakistan (thus improving Pakistan's chances in a war against India), even the Pakistani military is deeply anti-American. The military and intelligence cooperation that has undergirded this relationship—howsoever fraught from the outset—is now in tatters. The future of the US-Pakistan relationship is uncertain, with observers in both countries wondering whether their counterpart is a treacherous friend or an outright foe.

Neither US nor Pakistani officials and elites would have predicted that twelve years after 9/11, Pakistan would be worse off, or that the bilateral relationship between the two countries would be just as challenging as it was before ties were restored in September 2001. In this chapter I seek to trace the arc of Pakistan's dangerous descent

over the last decade and the implications of that descent for US interests, regional security, and, equally important, prospects for security and peace within Pakistan.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I recap the important policy decisions regarding India and Pakistan prior to 9/11, as well as critical US decisions in the early years of the war on terror. Second, I discuss several missteps in the wake of 9/11 that shaped the future possibilities for stability in the region. I argue that early decisions by the United States changed the Pakistani calculus in ways that Washington either never considered or did not take seriously. Third, I discuss the historical antecedents of Pakistan's current crisis in terms of Pakistan's long-standing reliance upon Islamist militancy in Afghanistan and India. As Pakistan moved from being a covert nuclear power (1979–1998) to an overt one (1998), it became more emboldened in its use of such proxies. Fourth and finally, I discuss Pakistan's regional calculus as the United States considers its endgame in Afghanistan.

### The Antecedents of the US "War on Terror": US Policies Toward South Asia

The events of September 11, 2001, occurred amid an historic realignment of US interests in South Asia. President Bill Clinton concluded that India was an important rising power and put considerable effort into trying to forge a US-India rapprochement. In 1997, his administration launched a strategic dialogue that was meant to culminate in a presidential visit to India in the spring of 1998. However, due to India's nuclear test, this planned presidential visit did not take place until March 2000. The March 1998 electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which, under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had run on a national security platform, promising to make India a nuclear power, added another layer of complexity to Indo-American relations.

Reflecting Clinton's personal belief in the importance of US-India relations, Clinton telephoned Vajpayee on March 20, 1998 (the second day of the BJP administration), and proposed "a relationship for the twenty-first century." Aware of the BJP's electoral pledges, Clinton reportedly asked for restraint with respect to nuclear testing and explained that "my man, Bill Richardson" (the US ambassador to

the UN) would come to Delhi to discuss the matter. Richardson asked Vajpayee for a "strategic pause" in testing. Vajpayee reassured Richardson that New Delhi planned to conduct a "strategic review" and set up a national security council before a decision on nuclear testing was made. According to US officials, Vajpayee told Richardson that there was no need to worry.<sup>3</sup>

The Indian home minister L. K. Advani similarly soothed Richardson by explaining that the BJP knew the difference between "campaign rhetoric and the pragmatic demands of governing."<sup>4</sup> Richardson stressed Indian restraint in the face of Pakistan's provocative test of the medium-range Ghauri missile. In private, Richardson reportedly urged Jaswant Singh, India's foreign minister, as follows: "For God's sake, let's not do anything to screw up the president's visit [planned later that spring]." Singh reassured him that there was no cause for concern.<sup>5</sup> Officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that I interviewed in the spring of 1999 held the view that the BJP government had deliberately misled the United States.<sup>6</sup>

On April 10, 1998, Vajpayee formed a three-person task force to begin a comprehensive strategic review—one of his campaign pledges. They were tasked with determining how to establish a National Security Council and with conducting a strategic defense review, another electoral promise of the BJP. Observers fretting about a new round of tests reassured themselves that Vajpayee would not act without a strategic defense review. They were further comforted by the fact that in India such a review could take years. Thus, many believed the official Indian statements and concluded that Vajpayee was trying to create an exit strategy that would allow him to move away from the nuclear position of the hard-line members of the BJP toward a more moderate wing focused on strengthening the Indian economy and engaging the international community.

As is well known, this was subterfuge. India indeed tested in May 1998, motivating Pakistan to do the same a few weeks later. Despite the confusion, disbelief, and embarrassment that permeated the Clinton administration after the tests, Clinton launched a sustained strategic dialogue with India, led by Strobel Talbott, US deputy secretary of state, and Foreign Minister Singh. The two met nearly one dozen times in the year and a half following the 1998 blasts. As time has shown, these numerous rounds of bilateral meetings enabled the

BJP to fashion a new foreign policy for India that jettisoned its non-aligned status and embraced the notion of a strategic relationship with the United States. Such a relationship began to take shape under the Clinton administration, beginning with the president's visit to India in March 2000. The contours of this *détente*, which arose in great measure from the Talbott-Singh talks, were laid out in the Joint India-US Statement co-signed by Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton, titled "India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century."<sup>7</sup>

In this document, both leaders proclaimed that in the new century, India and the United States would be partners in peace, with a common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. They promised to engage in regular consultations on, and work together for, strategic stability in Asia and beyond; bolster joint efforts to counter terrorism and meet other challenges to regional peace; strengthen the international security system, including in the United Nations; and support the United Nations in its peacekeeping efforts.<sup>8</sup> But given President Clinton's continuing commitment to nonproliferation, there were real limits as to how far the United States could pursue strengthened ties with India. The advent of the George W. Bush administration, with its initial enthusiasm for reconsidering well-worn US positions on international commitments (e.g., the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), presented greater opportunities for robust relations between the two states. President Bush, recognizing India's strategic value, was quick to woo India early in his presidency. The Bush administration was eager to gain India's support for a US plan to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and seek a space-based defense system. India, in muted but clear words, expressed support for this position and its tremendous satisfaction that President Bush viewed India as a "to-call" state. India's support was a notable departure from its historical stance on this and related issues and, in my opinion, signaled a willingness to explore new nuclear regimes of which India could be a founding member. In short, the Indo-US strategic relationship, particularly after the events of 9/11, has grown in depth and breadth at a pace that few India watchers would have imagined possible before 9/11.

Ashley J. Tellis was one of the intellectual architects of this new relationship. While at the RAND Corporation, Tellis contributed to a

2000 document offering policy guidance for the incoming Bush administration.<sup>9</sup> Tellis argued for a South Asia policy that delinked America's relations with India from its relations with Pakistan. Such a policy would have three distinct features. First, US calculations would systematically decouple India and Pakistan—that is, US policies as regards each state would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to US interests, rather than by fears about how US relations with one would affect relations with the other. Second, the United States would recognize that India is on its way to becoming a major Asian power of some consequence and, therefore, that it warrants a level of engagement far greater than was the norm earlier, as well as an appreciation of its potential for both collaboration and resistance across a much larger canvas than simply South Asia. Third, the United States would recognize that Pakistan is a country in serious crisis and that it must, among other things, reach out to Pakistani society in addition to the Pakistani state to achieve a "soft landing" that dampens the currently disturbing social and economic trends. The new administration embraced this concept: when Ambassador Robert Blackwell was appointed as the US envoy to New Delhi, he selected Tellis as his adviser. Throughout the summer of 2001, the United States vigorously pursued the policy of "dehyphenation"—an end to the US pursuit of a policy toward India that linked such a policy to US policy toward Pakistan thus treating both states as equals. To promote better US-Indian military ties, the United States decided to formally remove the Glenn-Symington Amendment Sanctions imposed upon India to punish it for its nuclear tests of 1998.

The same interagency process also reviewed the status of similar sanctions on Pakistan. By 2001 Pakistan was burdened by multiple layers of sanctions: the Pressler Amendment Sanctions, the Glenn-Symington Sanctions, and those imposed following violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime and General Pervez Musharraf's coup in 1999. The interagency review concluded that it would be appropriate to lift Glenn-Symington Sanctions from Pakistan as well, in recognition that it was India that commenced the reciprocal nuclear tests of 1998 and that Pakistan would not have tested had India not done so. Moreover, removing Glenn-Symington would only be of symbolic impact due to the layers of redundant sanctions on Pakistan. These policy shifts were going to be announced at the UN Gen-

eral Assembly meeting on September 13, 2001. That meeting was postponed due to the terror attacks on New York and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001.<sup>10</sup>

### Early Missteps in the Wake of 9/11

After the events of 9/11, the United States presented Pakistan with a clear ultimatum. As the United States unfolded its war plans for Afghanistan, Pakistan could either be with America or against it.<sup>11</sup> That military operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, commenced on October 7, 2001. Many US officials signaled at least implied support for three assurances demanded by Pakistan in return for its support for Operation Enduring Freedom. But within a few years of Pakistan's decision—however forced—to provide its support, the United States had reneged on all three promises.<sup>12</sup>

First, Pakistan wanted assurances that the Northern Alliance, the only militia that had successfully countered the Taliban, would not take Kabul. But the United States, which had only a few hundred Special Operations personnel in the country at the time, could not prevent the Northern Alliance from seizing Kabul. This was extremely disconcerting for Pakistan; the dominance of the Northern Alliance triggered fears that the Taliban's overthrow would not be to Pakistan's advantage. After all, the Taliban was Pakistan's erstwhile ally and, with Pakistan's support, had been able to seize nearly all of Afghan territory (with the exception of the Panjshir Valley, which was held by the Northern Alliance). Critically, India—along with Iran, Russia, and Uzbekistan—provided overt support to the Northern Alliance. This assistance included a military adviser, with the rank of a brigadier of the Indian Army, posted in Uzbekistan. The aviation unit of India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), helped the Northern Alliance maintain its helicopter fleet. And when Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud was attacked by an al-Qaeda suicide bomber on September 9, 2001, he was taken to an Indian field hospital across the border in Uzbekistan.

Unfortunately, the United States did not fully understand that Pakistan viewed the Northern Alliance as India's proxy. With the Northern Alliance's seizure of Kabul in December of 2001, Islamabad saw the keys of the city being placed in the hands of India. To

make matters worse, under the US–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security umbrella, India was able to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan's Pashtun belt in the south and east of Afghanistan—territories of great strategic importance to Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

Second, Pakistan expected the United States to take a more proactive stance in resolving the ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over the disposition of Kashmir. For Pakistan, partition of British India is inherently incomplete as long as the bulk of the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir remains in Indian hands, leaving Pakistan's foundational—though long battered—Two Nations theory unrealized. (For India, partition is now complete, and thus India seeks to ratify the status quo.) Secretary of State Colin Powell in particular took a keen interest in the Kashmir dispute and made several trips to the region. In hindsight, his optimism was unfounded, as these efforts were never likely to bear fruit.<sup>14</sup> Despite Secretary Powell's personal interest in the issue, the United States had virtually abandoned the pledge by mid-2002. Since then, the United States has shown remarkable quiescence in the face of India's mounting disregard for the disaffection of its citizens in Kashmir<sup>15</sup> and the significant discrimination faced by Indian Muslims outside of Kashmir.<sup>16</sup>

Third, Pakistan expected and the United States agreed that its “strategic assets” (nuclear weapons and delivery systems) would remain intact. While this assurance was technically honored, it was greatly eroded by the 2005 Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. This deal was bomb-friendly and was a part of the ongoing US efforts to help India become a global power, including military assistance, missile cooperation, and other forms of military and civilian technical cooperation. This support was a part of the Bush administration's strategy of managing China's uncertain rise by encouraging India to do what it could do in pursuit of its own strategic interests.<sup>17</sup>

It would be impossible for any decisionmaker in Islamabad not to realize that although Islamabad was rewarded handsomely for supporting US activities, Pakistan's strategic interests were greatly degraded by the global war on terror. By 2004, Pakistan had already concluded that the emergent leadership in Afghanistan would welcome India's expanding presence and was likely to be hostile to Pakistan. Indeed, Afghans are deeply suspicious of Pakistan because of its largely negative influence on stability and on quality of life for average Afghans. Pakistan for its part tends to be ignorant of this feeling, noting the “hospitality” extended to Afghans when they

sought refuge in Pakistan during the anti-Soviet jihad. While Afghans acknowledge this, they also note that they were looked down on and subjected to abuse by Pakistanis who saw these refugees as coming to Pakistan “to clean Pakistanis’ shoes” (referencing the large numbers of Afghan males who could be found in Pakistan’s cities eking out a meager living polishing shoes).

In short, a dehyphenated policy, under which Washington managed relations with India and Pakistan without regard to their bilateral issues, had an obvious logical appeal that has been consistently undermined by the fact of Indo-Pakistan security competition. Simply put, dehyphenation in practice is and will remain nearly impossible because both India and Pakistan continue to see relations with the United States as a zero-sum game vis-à-vis each other. Furthermore, this perspective obviously affects how India views its interests in Afghanistan. The limitations of a policy of dehyphenating US relations with India and Pakistan are most starkly clear when one considers US military endeavors to stabilize Afghanistan. US efforts, centered on the war in Afghanistan, to forge and sustain a tactical relationship with Pakistan at whatever price have irked India. Calls made by prominent US commentators and analysts to encourage India to expand its role in stabilizing and rehabilitating Afghanistan have similarly vexed Islamabad, which demands the opposite.<sup>18</sup> Both states are verging on a proxy war at Afghanistan’s expense, as both seek to deny the other access to the country. Perhaps among the most visible signs of this proxy war are the two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul by militants tied to Pakistan in 2009 and 2010.<sup>19</sup>

### Pakistan’s Slow but Certain Descent into Violence

Pakistan has used Islamism and Islamist militants to shape events in Afghanistan since 1960.<sup>20</sup> Pakistan has also used Islamist militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir since the early days of independence. While Pakistan’s efforts in this line were modest until 1989, in that year its involvement deepened profoundly.

Pakistan’s opening was provided by the nascent Kashmir insurgency, which developed indigenously in response to India’s mismanagement of the state. Several genuinely Kashmiri militant groups emerged, some of which enjoyed Pakistani support. Yet when some

indigenous groups began espousing independence rather than union with Pakistan, and when several turned from violence toward political activism, a new coterie of Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based groups, introduced under the expanding Pakistani nuclear umbrella, began to compete directly with older, more ethnically Kashmiri groups. Many indigenous proindependence insurgents were eliminated by Pakistan-based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami.

By the mid-1990s, the conflict in Kashmir had been taken over by several Pakistan-based militant groups, which were implementing Islamabad’s agenda of wresting Kashmir from India. At present, only one set of militant groups is largely Kashmiri in ethnicity (Hizb-ul-Mujahidin and related factions such as al-Badr). All other groups are dominated by Punjabis and Pashtuns from Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> While these militant groups have long served Pakistan’s strategic interests, they are also to a large extent the root of Pakistan’s current internal security problem.

### Pakistan’s Evolving Militant Networks

Prior to September 11, and the US-mandated changes in Pakistani policy that followed it, Pakistan’s militant landscape could be meaningfully parsed by sectarian orientation, theater of operation, and ethnicity.<sup>22</sup> For example, there were militant groups (*askari tanzeems*) that traditionally focused on Kashmir, including the Deobandi groups (Deobandism is one interpretative tradition within Sunni Islam) Jaish-I-Muhammad (JM) and Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuA/HuM); and Ahl-e-Hadith (Ahl-e-Hadith is another interpretative tradition within Sunni Islam) organizations such as the Punjab-based LeT.<sup>23</sup> While these outfits are often referred to as “Kashmiri groups,” this is a misnomer because they include few ethnic Kashmiris among their ranks and most do not operate exclusively in Kashmir. Indeed, LeT and JM have long operated throughout India, and in recent years Deobandi groups have begun operating in Pakistan. LeT and several Deobandi militant groups have also been operating in Afghanistan against US, NATO, and Afghan forces.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, some Kashmiri groups operating under the influence of the Islamist political party Jamaat-I-Islami (JI), such as al-Badr and Hizb-ul-Mujahidin, are composed of ethnic Kashmiris and have retained a focus on Kashmir.

Other *askari tanzeems* (paramilitary organizations) have traditionally been sectarian in nature, including the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).<sup>25</sup> Both these groups are under the sway of the Deobandi organization Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) and receive funding from wealthy Arab individuals and organizations. Notably, these sectarian *tanzeems* have overlapping membership with other Deobandi militant groups, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, all of which have strong connections to the JUI.<sup>26</sup> In addition, Shia sectarian groups, once lethally active although now largely defunct, targeted Sunni Muslims and obtained funding from Iran.

Since 2004 and possibly before, Pakistan has witnessed the development of a cluster of militant groups, labeling themselves "Pakistani Taliban," that have successfully established regimes based on sharia (Islamic law) across large swathes of the Pashtun belt. Despite recent media coverage characterizing the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) in monolithic terms, analysts do not believe that the TTP has command and control of these groups.<sup>27</sup> The media often describe the TTP as an umbrella organization for nearly all anti-Pakistan Islamist militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as well as in key settled Pashtun areas such as Swat, Upper and Lower Dir, Buner, and Peshawar.<sup>28</sup> However, Rahimullah Yusufzai, a leading Pakistani journalist and expert on the TTP, dismisses these assertions and contends that the organization is hardly coherent, much less disciplined.<sup>29</sup>

Officially the TTP came into being in late 2007, when several Pakistani militant commanders, led by Baitullah Mehsud, announced that they were operating under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban Movement). Most of Mehsud's many allies sought to establish various degrees of sharia within their personal areas of operations within the Pashtun belt. In late February 2008, two dissident commanders, Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, temporarily set aside their differences with Mehsud and forged the Shura Ittehad-ul-Mujahidin. The alliance was short-lived, however, and collapsed almost as soon as it was announced.<sup>30</sup>

Following Baitullah Mehsud's death in a US drone strike in August 2009, TTP leadership announced that Hakimullah Mehsud would succeed him.<sup>31</sup> Under the leadership of Hakimullah, the TTP has been surprisingly coherent and has actually intensified its suicide campaign against Pakistani security and intelligence agencies.<sup>32</sup> (Sev-

eral reports, however, some as recent as January 2012, suggest that Hakimullah Mehsud may be dead.<sup>33</sup> These reports coincide with others concerning the TTP's potential fragmentation.<sup>34</sup> Likewise, TTP campaigns against civilian targets have become more vicious, singling out Shia and Ahmediis, who are respectively considered *munafiqeen* (apostates whose killing is condoned). Important Sufi shrines have also not been spared.<sup>35</sup> This development no doubt reflects Hakimullah's long-term association with the sectarian terrorist group, SSP.

Several militant commanders rose to prominence prior to the official consolidation of the TTP, thereby providing the necessary conditions for the formalization of the TTP network. Nek Mohammad Wazir (from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in Wana, South Waziristan) was perhaps the first Pakistani militant to achieve some degree of distinction. Although the so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, the phenomenon next spread to Bajaur. Pakistani Taliban surfaced in areas that had previously been free of such activity, including Mohmand, Orakzai, and Kurram agencies.<sup>36</sup> The Pakistani Taliban also emerged in the frontier areas of Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Swat. Throughout the summer of 2007, the Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary battled Pakistani militants associated with the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), which seized the Swat valley in late October.<sup>37</sup>

Militant groups under various local leaders have effectively exploited socioeconomic grievances (such as the failure of the state to provide services, including rule of law and access to justice) and frustration with the corrupt colonial-era governance structures in place in the FATA. The Pakistani Taliban in Swat reportedly pursued a system of redistributive justice, seizing the land of wealthy landowners and rewarding landless peasants who signed up to support the group.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, militant commanders in the FATA have pressured political agents to provide services without demanding a bribe. They have established a functional—albeit draconian—police system and process of dispute resolution. The much-maligned *qazi* court system (courts run by *qazis*, or Islamist jurists) established in Swat required the addition of new *qazis* should their case load exceed 150 cases. No such provision exists for the mainstream judicial system. The Pakistani Taliban . . .



marriages. This measure appeals to youth who resent forced marriages and it reduces the high economic barrier to marriage created by bride prices.<sup>39</sup>

In April 2009, news reports proclaimed the arrival of the “Punjabi Taliban,” referring to the various militant groups ensconced in the Punjab, the most populated province in Pakistan. Despite its ostensibly recent coinage, the term “Punjabi Taliban” has a long and complex history.<sup>40</sup> Since 2009, however, it has acquired significant political importance. Many Pashtuns support the use of the term to emphasize that Pakistan’s insurgency is not entirely “Pashtun” in essence. However, many Punjabis reject the term for the same reason, as some Punjabis prefer to attribute the violence to the “Pashtun other,” often characterized in stereotypical terms as “uncivilized,” “warlike,” and “violent.”<sup>41</sup> In reality, the movement comprises both Pashtuns and Punjabis, as well as foreign elements.

Pakistan’s political leaders have sought to exploit the controversy surrounding the “Punjabi Taliban” for political gain. Leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) object to the term, in part because of the PML-N’s ongoing support, driven by electoral considerations, for groups such as SSP and LeJ. The Punjab chief minister of the PML-N, Shahbaz Sharif, accused Interior Minister Rahman Malik of using the terms “Punjabi Taliban” and “Punjabi terrorist” to foment conflict between provinces—a tactic he argued was tantamount to a condemnation of the people of Punjab.<sup>42</sup>

While it is tempting to view the Punjab as a new theater or even as a future locus of Talibanization, militancy across Pakistan in fact is interrelated. Punjab-based groups such as the Deobandi LeJ and JM are components of the TTP and conduct attacks on its behalf. In fact, the so-called Punjabi Taliban groups form the backbone of the TTP and have played an important role in attacking Sufi, Shia, Ahmedi, and other civilian targets, particularly in the Punjab.<sup>43</sup>

In addition to these Pakistani groups, Pakistan also hosts elements of the Afghan Taliban, with *shuras* (leadership councils) in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi.<sup>44</sup> The Afghan Taliban remains focused on ousting foreign forces in Afghanistan, overthrowing the Hamid Karzai regime, and reclaiming a role in governing Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, whose operatives are known to reside in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, and other areas in the Pashtun belt, also uses Pakistani territory. In addition, many al-Qaeda operatives (such as Abu Zubaidah and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed) have

been arrested in Pakistani cities.<sup>45</sup> US commandos in a raid in Abbottabad in Punjab killed bin Laden himself in May 2011.

Since late 2001 and 2002, many of Pakistan’s militant groups—particularly those with a Deobandi background—have either splintered or changed their targets and tactics. Many Deobandi groups are tightly allied to the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban organizations and are increasingly aiming their attacks at the Pakistani state, even though some elements within these groups continue to enjoy state support (both formal and informal). Their targets have included former president Musharraf, as well as other high-profile military and civilian leaders. Al-Qaeda leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu al-Yazid, also continue to operate and plan attacks from the tribal areas. Recently executed and preempted attacks attest to these linkages (e.g., the foiled 2010 European attack planned in North Waziristan, the disrupted plan to attack US and German targets in 2007, and the preempted trans-Atlantic plot in 2006, as well as the successful July 2005 attack in London). All these conspiracies were sponsored at least in part by militant networks based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.<sup>46</sup>

The Pakistani people were slow to embrace the government’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. Public opinion surveys in Pakistan conducted in 2007 and even later demonstrate that, in general, Pakistanis overwhelmingly supported peace deals with militants and believed that such efforts would secure peace, despite consistent evidence to the contrary. Equally important, Pakistanis remained opposed to the army’s offensives against Pakistan’s own militants. These trends remained more or less constant until April 2009, when public opinion dramatically shifted after the Taliban reneged on the “sharia-for-peace” deal in Swat and overran Buner. Survey results in May 2009 and July 2009 suggest that the public has become opposed to peace deals and is increasingly supportive of military action.<sup>47</sup> Polling by the Pew Research Center in April 2010, however, found some slippage in these numbers, although most Pakistanis remain worried about Islamist extremism.<sup>48</sup>

### Pakistan’s Support for the Militants

US policies that seek to compel Pakistan to cease its support for militant groups assume that the country could do so if it mustered the requisite political will. They are also undergirded by the assumption

that Pakistan could do more to counter the various groups it currently supports. It is far from obvious that any combination of carrots and sticks can induce Pakistan to muster such will, and even if it did it is doubtful that Pakistan could reverse the course of militancy after decades of nurturing violent extremism.

In this section, I advance several propositions about the degree of state support for various groups and assess the state's ability to control or counter them. This assessment draws overwhelmingly on my fieldwork in Pakistan (including discussions with military, intelligence, and civilian officials, as well as with journalists and analysts) over several visits since 2000, fieldwork across Afghanistan since 2007, and extensive interactions with US officials over the same period.

Pakistan's intelligence agencies and army tend to sort the country's militants into a range of groups over which the state exercises varying degrees of control. Pakistan is widely assumed to wield significant influence over the Afghan Taliban, including the North Waziristan-based Haqqani network, holding Taliban leaders' families hostage in Pakistan to ensure compliance. Since 2001, however, the Afghan Taliban has undergone significant change due to the constant turnover of midlevel commanders.<sup>49</sup> New commanders are less beholden to Pakistan in part because of their age: they were children when the ISI was nurturing the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the tribal base and ties of the Afghan Taliban are also changing. Thus, Pakistan is struggling to cultivate influence among the evolving Afghan Taliban elements, even while seeking to control elements of Mullah Mohammed Omar's Quetta Shura, the top leadership council of the organization.<sup>50</sup> Islamabad worries that members of the Quetta Shura may seek a separate peace with Afghan president Karzai that does not take Pakistan's interests into account. Exemplifying its efforts to prevent such an agreement, Pakistan arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi in February 2010 because he was negotiating with Karzai independent of Islamabad.<sup>51</sup>

US analysts tend to believe that Pakistani intelligence agencies also maintained reasonably tight control over LeT. But LeT has developed proxies in India (principally through the Indian Mujahidin) and logistical bases in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal, among other countries. Some LeT cells within India are partially independent of LeT's headquarters in Muridke, according to US and Indian officials.<sup>52</sup> One important indication of the relation-

ship between the ISI and LeT is the fact that after the Indian parliament was attacked by JM in 2001, signals traffic indicated that the ISI was angry with JM for launching the attack. In contrast, after the November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, significantly less traffic was detected. Such traffic could have been a strategy used by Pakistan to avoid being linked with the 2001 attack. But if Pakistan uses signals traffic as an instrument of perception management it is puzzling that it did not employ this strategy in 2008.<sup>53</sup>

According to Indian officials who interrogated him after his indictment, David Headley, an American involved in the Mumbai attacks, conceded ISI involvement.<sup>54</sup> US officials have not endorsed this claim. But according to some reports, the current director general of the ISI, Shuja Pasha, acknowledged that persons connected to the ISI were involved in the attacks but insisted that the operation was rogue.<sup>55</sup> It should be noted that LeT has never attacked foreign or domestic targets within Pakistan and that the literature of the organization remains strongly pro-state.<sup>56</sup>

The Deobandi groups lie at the other extreme: Pakistan's ability to control these groups varies, and is tentative at best. The Bahawalpur-based network of Masood Azhar's JM is perhaps the most tightly leashed of all the Deobandi groups. Pakistani analysts explained to me in July 2010 that the army is keen to continue supporting Azhar because he has remained adamantly pro-Pakistan and has refrained from attacking the state. Azhar demonstrated his pro-state bona fides as early as 2001, when he opposed calls from within his organization to attack Western targets in Pakistan, as well as the Pakistani government, and informed the ISI of these conspiracies.<sup>57</sup> Pakistani analysts argue that as long as he can maintain the coherence of his following in the Punjab, members of his group are less likely to join the TTP. However, elements of JM have already split from Azhar and launched attacks against foreign and domestic targets in Pakistan.

Other, intimately interrelated Deobandi groups, such as the network of commanders under the umbrella of the TTP, are beyond the grasp of the state, as evidenced by their sustained attacks within Pakistan. The military and the ISI have tried to manage this complex web of allied foes by cultivating or aggravating disagreements among commanders. For example, Pakistan cultivated Mullah Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir to counter the anti-state elements of the TTP, particularly Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.<sup>58</sup> Pakistan has also

tried engaging and placating the militants with various peace deals, while at other times it has sought to defeat them militarily (with varying degrees of determination and success).<sup>59</sup>

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that Islamabad will have the ability—much less political will—to significantly degrade these groups. Despite its seeming dedication to combating those elements of the TTP that target the state, Pakistan will likely remain unable to eliminate even those actors. This failure is a function both of the overlap in membership between vehemently anti-state organizations and the Deobandi groups that Pakistan still views as assets—JM, the Haqqani Network, and the Afghan Taliban, among others—and of the military's anticipation of a future battle against India, whether in India or Afghanistan, which makes Islamabad reluctant to fully cut ties with its proxies.

### Pakistan's Endgame in Afghanistan?

The unfolding of the war in Afghanistan has witnessed many developments deeply discomfiting to Pakistan, especially its military and intelligence agencies. First and foremost is the growth of Indian influence. There is no doubt that the actual level of “nefarious” Indian activities is far below that alleged by Pakistan. However, there should also be no doubt that the Indians are more involved in Afghanistan than New Delhi claims. India denies doing anything other than development work. However, this “development work” has taken place along the southern borders abutting the sensitive Baluchistan province—which has been a historical theater for Indian interference—as well as the Pashtun areas of FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Given the intermittent agitation among Pashtuns for various degrees of autonomy, their episodic demands to be reunited with Pashtun territories in Afghanistan, and other anti-state movements, Pakistan fears Indian and Afghan interference in these areas.<sup>60</sup> While the Taliban delivered very few tangible achievements to Islamabad in exchange for its support, it was able to ensure that Indian influence was restricted to the Panjshir area.

As the United States begins to assemble its strategy for Afghanistan in the near term, all of Afghanistan's near and far neighbors are engaging in multiple-level games to discern their own best options. India is considering its own options under a diminishing US

security umbrella as the United States moves away from large-scale counterinsurgency operations and toward counterterrorism, with a continued focus upon training security forces and on institutional capacity building. Some Indians believe that Afghanistan is a test case: if India cannot shape events in its own backyard, how can it be a genuine regional power—much less a global power? At the other extreme are those who believe that India has few important interests in Afghanistan and that the risk of loss of life and treasure is not justified by any possible gains. Those occupying the middle ground will most likely prevail. These observers argue that Afghanistan is important to Indian interests, that it is a test case for India's claims to be a regional and extra-regional power, and that India must remain engaged there in order to shape the environment to India's advantage. However, they argue that India needs to take security issues much more seriously, fortifying Indian missions and protecting its citizens employed in Afghanistan.<sup>61</sup>

Pakistan, for its part, will resist such moves at all costs. Pakistan's revisionism no longer centers on the territorial dispute over Kashmir; rather, Pakistan now focuses on resisting Indian claims of hegemony in South Asia. As Afghanistan is a key theater for Indian influence, Pakistan will not abandon its activity there. That said, much has changed since September 11, including the Taliban itself. While Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura may be loyal to Pakistan (or can be forced to act so by pressuring family members in Pakistan), the newer commanders who fill out the middle and lower ranks thinned by sustained US/NATO raids dislike Pakistan as much as they do the United States. They are not going to be reliable allies.

For this reason, the network of Jalaluddin Haqqani (now controlled by his son Siraj) is Pakistan's most reliable proxy. The Haqqani Network has been behind the most lethal attacks in Afghanistan, including attacks on the Indian and US embassies, among others.<sup>62</sup> Because Pakistan's preeminent concerns in Afghanistan pertain to India's ascent, Pakistan will seek to undermine any effort at reconciliation that bypasses Islamabad. This is no doubt the motivation behind the assassination of key Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani (for which Western officials hold the Haqqani Network responsible).<sup>63</sup> The strategy paid off. In the wake of Rabbani's death, Afghan president Karzai broke off talks with the Taliban in preference to dealing directly with Pakistan, the force behind the Taliban.<sup>64</sup>

All of this suggests that Pakistan has a greater determination to influence events in Afghanistan than the United States or its NATO allies, and that Pakistan will not relent until a political disposition is reached in Afghanistan that maximizes Pakistani influence and minimizes that of India.

## Notes

This chapter, in places, reproduces some of my previous work "Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India's Nuclear Tests" and "Militant Challenge in Pakistan."

1. See Don Rassler and Yahid Brown, *Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida*; Michael Mullen, "Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan and Iraq"; C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*; among numerous others.
2. Surprisingly, while anti-Americanism has long been high in Pakistan, it did not intensify in the wake of the controversial capture and killing of Osama bin Laden during a unilateral US raid on the Pakistani cantonment town of Abbottabad. See Pew Global Attitudes Project, "U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following Bin Laden Killing."
3. John Barry et al., "Why Only a Bomb Would Do," *Newsweek*, October 19, 1998, pp. 24–27.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Fair, "Learning to Think the Unthinkable."
7. Fair, "Learning to Think the Unthinkable"; Talbot, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*.
8. "India-US Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century," *India News*, March 21, 2000, [http://www.indianembassy.org/india/news/april\\_2000.pdf](http://www.indianembassy.org/india/news/april_2000.pdf).
9. Tellis, "South Asia: U.S. Policy Choices," p. 88; also see Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation."
10. See discussion in Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*.
11. Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*.
12. See discussion in Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*.
13. Fair, "Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella."
14. See Ahmed, "Colin Powell Tries His Hand Again"; John Chertian, "Diplomatic Concerns," *Frontline*, October 27–November 9, 2001.
15. "Kashmir's Troubles," *The Economist*, December 2010.
16. Prime Minister's High Level Committee, *Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India*.

17. For the most articulate version of this vision, see Tellis, *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States*.

18. Bouton and Ayres, "We Need India's Help in Afghanistan"; see also "WikiLeaks Cablegate: India Should Reduce Footprint in Afghanistan, Says Pak," *IBNLive.com*, December 11, 2010, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/wikileaks-cablegate-india-should-reduce-footprint-in-afghanistan-says-pak/136264-53.html>.

19. M. Karim Faiez and Mark Magnier, "Taliban Claims Responsibility for Kabul Embassy Attack," *Los Angeles Times*, October 9, 2009; Jack Healy and Alisha J. Rubin, "U.S. Blames Pakistan-Based Group for Attack on Embassy in Kabul," *New York Times*, September 15, 2011.

20. This section is reproduced from Fair, "Militant Challenge in Pakistan." See Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, pp. 171–175.

21. See Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" and "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qaeda and Other Organizations."

22. This section is reproduced from Fair, "Militant Challenge in Pakistan" and draws from Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?" and Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan."

23. Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith are two Sunni schools of thought. An exception of the differences between these and other groups is beyond the scope of this essay. See Husam Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," pp. 12–26.

24. See Fair, "Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack upon Mumbai."

25. Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to reemerge and operate under new names. This chapter uses the names that are likely to be most familiar to readers.

26. Abou Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*; and Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan," pp. 489–504.

27. One long-time observer of militancy in Pakistan, Mariam Abou Zahab, strongly discounts the claim that the TTP is a coherent alliance. She argues that the constituent parts of this inchoate alliance are driven by local factors and constrained, in good measure, by tribal boundaries that circumscribe the leadership. Thus, she discounts claims that the TTP is a unified organization running the length and width of the Pashtun belt. This view is buttressed by the author's field interviews in Pakistan, February and April 2009.

28. FATA includes the seven tribal agencies of South and North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur agencies.

29. Rahimullah Yusufzai, "A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province."

30. See Hassan Abbas, "Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies," pp. 1–5; Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban

Pakistan," pp. 1–4; Syed Shoath Hasan, "Profile: Baitullah Mehsud." Pakistan considers Maulvi Nazir an ally because he helped oust or kill numerous Uzbekis in South Waziristan. He is also seen as a dedicated foe of US and NATO forces, as he sends fighters to Afghanistan. Gul Bahadar has had a number of differences with Baitullah Mehsud. It is not clear what this alliance means for Pakistan or for the United States and allies in Afghanistan. See Saeed Shah, "Taliban Rivals Unite to Fight US Troop Surge," *The Guardian* (London), March 3, 2009.

31. Zahid Hussein, "Hakimullah Mehsud Named as New Pakistan Taliban Leader," *TimesOnline.com*, August 23, 2009.

32. Pak Institute for Peace Studies, *PIPS Security Report 2009*; and "Hakimullah Mehsud," *NYTimes.com*, April 29, 2010, [http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/m/hakimullah\\_mehsud/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/m/hakimullah_mehsud/index.html); "Pakistan Blast Sharpens Concern on Taliban," *PBS Newshour*, April 1, 2010, [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june10/pakistan\\_01-01.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june10/pakistan_01-01.html).

33. "Hakimullah Dead in Drone Strike?" *The Nation* (Pakistan), January 16, 2012.

34. Ahmad, "The Realignment of Jihadist Groups in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Region."

35. Since 2005, Pakistani militants have launched more than seventy suicide attacks against Sufi shrines, killing hundreds. Attacks have intensified in recent years. For example, Lahore's prominent Datta Ganj Bakhsh—perhaps the most important Sufi shrine in the Punjab—was attacked in late June 2010. See Owais Tohid, "In Pakistan, Militant Attacks on Sufi Shrines on the Rise," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 2010; Sabrina Tavernise, "Suicide Bombers Strike Sufi Shrine in Pakistan," *New York Times*, July 1, 2010.

36. It should be noted, however, that Kurram has long been the site of sectarian violence due to the large population of Shia in that agency. See Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan," pp. 115–128.

37. Fair, "Pakistan Loses Swat to Local Taliban."

38. See Jane Perlez, "Landowners Still in Exile from Unstable Pakistan Area," *New York Times*, July 27, 2009; and Khan, "Imperialism, Religion and Class in Swat." Khan's article expands on an earlier piece, "Behind the Crisis in Swat," *The News* (Pakistan), November 27, 2008. For a countervailing view, see Farhat Taj, "No Class War in Swat," *The News* (Pakistan), December 18, 2008.

39. This information was obtained by the author during fieldwork in February and April 2009 in Peshawar, Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, and in August 2010 in Peshawar, Mingora, Islamabad, and Lahore.

40. See Sabrina Tavernise et al., "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," *New York Times*, April 13, 2009. See also Abbas, "Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network," pp. 1–4.

41. Author fieldwork in Peshawar, Mingora, Islamabad, and Lahore in June and July 2010. For a sample of the controversial coverage of the group and the term, see South Asian News Agency, "Rehman Malik Asserts He Used No Term Like 'Punjabi Taliban,'" *South Asian News Agency*, June 4, 2010, <http://www.sananews.net/english/2010/06/04/rehman-malik-asserts-he-used-no-term-like-%E2%80%98punjabi-taliban-%E2%80%99/>.

42. Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Discourse on Punjabi Taliban," *The News* (Pakistan), July 6, 2010.

43. Bill Roggio, "Suicide Bomber Kills 60 at Mosque in Pakistan's Northwest."

44. See, for instance, Levin, "Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan"; Ian Katz, "Gates Says Militant Sanctuaries Pose Biggest Afghanistan Threat," *Bloomberg News*, March 1, 2009, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aehmlRXgKi2o&refer=home>; and Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan."

45. See comments made by National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, cited in BBC, "Al-Qaeda 'Rebuilding' in Pakistan," *BBC News*, January 12, 2007; see also Kronstadt, *U.S.-Pakistan Relations*.

46. Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, p. 31.

47. Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks."

48. Because the Pew Research Center's questions and sampling approach differed from those used by the other polls cited here, the results are not strictly comparable. See Pew Research Center, "America's Image Remains Poor." Unlike the International Republican Institute (IRI) polls, the 2009 poll conducted by Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob Shapiro, or the 2009 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll (in which Fair was a collaborator), the Pew survey sample is overwhelmingly drawn from urban residents (55 percent). Only one in three Pakistanis, however, live in urban areas.

49. For an excellent exposition of how the Afghan Taliban has evolved, see Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop*, pp. 81–96.

50. Although the Afghan leadership council retains this moniker, its key leaders have long taken up residence elsewhere, such as in Karachi, under the ISI's protection and monitoring. Chishi, "The Karachi Project."

51. Dean Nelson and Ben Farmer, "Hamid Karzai Held Secret Talks with Mullah Baradar in Afghanistan," *The Telegraph* (London), March 16, 2010.

52. Fair, "Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen"; and Roul, "Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Strategy of 'Encircling' India."

53. Author discussions with US military, state, and intelligence officials in 2010 and earlier, as well as with Indian intelligence officials in April 2010.

54. Jason Burke, "ISI Chiefs Aided Mumbai Terror Attacks: Headley," *The Hindu*, October 19, 2010; Jane Perlez, Eric Schmitt, and Ginger Thompson, "U.S. Had Warnings on Plotter of Mumbai Attack," *New York Times*, October 17, 2010.

55. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, pp. 46–47.

56. This discussion draws on the author's ongoing research into published LeT texts. Exposition of these texts will be the subject of a forthcoming work.

57. Howenstein, "The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan," pp. 28–31.

58. See Yusufzai, "The Emergence of the Pakistani Taliban" and "A Who's Who of the Insurgency." For details about the various commanders, see Wadhams and Cookman, "Faces of Pakistan's Militant Leaders."

59. These deals and military efforts are detailed extensively in Jones and Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, pp. 33–84.

60. For a historical account of Indo-Afghan relations, see Dilip Mukherjee, "Afghanistan Under Daud"; de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan"; and Vaidik, "India and Afghanistan." Indian covert operations are rarely discussed in public and have attracted little media attention. Nonetheless, see Scott Baldauf, "India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 12, 2003; M. H. Ahsan, "'RAW Is Training 600 Baluchis in Afghanistan': Mushahid Husain," *Boloji.com*, July 2, 2007.

61. Fair, "Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella."

62. Rassler and Brown, *Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida*.

63. "NATO Says Top Haqqani Leader Killed in Strike," *CNN.com*, October 5, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/05/world/asia/afghanistan-violence/?hpt=T2>.

64. See "Karzai Rules Out More Taliban Negotiations—Afghan President Says Killing of Peace Envoy Burhanuddin Rabbani Has Convinced Him to Change Focus," *The Guardian*, October 1, 2011.

# 6

## The Arab World: Grappling with Multiple Consequences

Andrew Flibbert

The United States has been waging a war on terror since 2001, with far-reaching consequences at home and abroad. An assessment of the results in one critical domain—the Arab world—requires both a general understanding of the war and a close analysis of its most pronounced and potentially transformative effects on this particular front. Given the Arab world's distinctive profile compared to the larger Islamic world, one cannot assess the impact of 9/11 and its aftermath without focusing directly on the region. Toward this end, I set the stage by offering a brief interpretation of the war on terror's origins and nature, follow that with a discussion of the definitional and analytical challenges of addressing the Arab world, and then provide three clusters of observations about what can be called the war's first-, second-, and third-order effects. An analysis of the war on terror's ordered effects explains the varied and dynamic impact of US actions, as one set of effects produces others, which in turn have additional consequences far removed from the original events. This chapter is an effort to disentangle the many strands of the story in the hope of achieving a better understanding of 9/11 and its aftermath.

### The War on Terror in US Grand Strategy

The 9/11 attacks presented an extraordinary challenge to the George W. Bush administration in 2001, but the US response—whether in