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## Looking for Individual-Level Evidence for the Ethnic Security Dilemma Revisited: A Study of Balochistan

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### ABSTRACT

We look for micro-level evidence of the security dilemma in Pakistan's Balochistan province using data derived from a 2011/2012, nationally representative survey of 16,279 Pakistanis as well as 2017 Pakistani census data. Using mixed effects generalized linear model for a binary dependent variable to identify determinants of individual perceptions of insecurity, we find that respondents who distrust the government are significantly more likely to feel insecure. Respondents in districts with greater in-group shares are significantly less insecure while those residing in districts with greater out-group share feel more insecure. We find modest evidence that cross-cutting cleavages can mitigate perceived insecurity.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

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In 1951, John Herz<sup>1</sup> and Herbert Butterfield<sup>2</sup> independently put forth a concept of inter-state conflict which became known as the security dilemma.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, under conditions of anarchy, persons and groups will undertake actions to make themselves feel safe from others. However, those groups in turn will view those defensive measures as offensive and undertake defensive measures of their own which are, in turn, viewed by others as offensive. Thus, despite the ever-increasing accumulation of power, safety and security remain elusive for both parties. Applied to states and inter-state rivalry, “the security dilemma describes how the actions that one state takes to make itself more secure—building armaments, putting military forces on alert, forming new alliances—tend to make other states less secure and lead them to respond in kind. The result is a tightening spiral of hostility that leaves neither side better off than before.”<sup>4</sup> Jervis succinctly says of the security dilemma that “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”<sup>5</sup> Decades later in 1993, Barry Posen argued that the features of the inter-state security dilemma may be applied to intra-state violence, taking the particular cases of the Serbs and Croats after the breakup of Yugoslavia.<sup>6</sup>

In subsequent years, scholars have offered further refinements to this model, such as the “societal security dilemma”<sup>7</sup> and the “ethnic security dilemma” and have continued to expand the aperture of inquiry to evermore new cases<sup>8</sup>. Most of these scholars have studied the explanatory power of such an ethnic security dilemma using case studies of countries spanning eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union as well as Africa

and Asia. Another cluster of scholars have used multi-country or multi-ethnic group datasets to identify which features of the state or rebelling group best predict violence or the attributes of that violence.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the important contributions of these proliferating qualitative and quantitative analyses, none of the extant studies provide evidence for the critical component of the hypothesized causal mechanism for ethnic violence: *the individual perception of insecurity*. Scholars have largely assumed individual perceptions of insecurity exist because the groups investigated behave as the authors' theory predict, i.e. groups' retreat into defensible enclaves, they engage in violence, seek to politically marginalize, or exclude rival groups, etc. In this paper, we are not interested in intervening in the contentious scholarly debates among varied scholars about the nature of the posited security dilemma and how it should be understood and described; rather we seek to discern whether individuals perceive insecurity, and if so, whether these perceptions vary in ways that are predicted by the proliferating theoretical and empirical literature on the ethnic security dilemma.

We look for this evidence in the case of the seemingly interminable Baloch ethnic insurgency in Pakistan's restive Balochistan province. To do so, we employ survey data derived from 2,384 interviews with Muslim respondents in Balochistan collected by Fair et al. (2018)<sup>10</sup> in 2011/2012. This sample was collected as a part of their nationally representative face-to-face survey of 16,279 Pakistanis. We augment these data from Pakistan's 2017 census.<sup>11</sup> As we describe at length below, Pakistan generally does not truly present a situation of anarchy which many theories of the security dilemma assume or require. However, few states do in the international system and even the international system itself is not truly anarchic<sup>12</sup>. Nonetheless, as we show herein, salient aspects of this conflict can be approximated by anarchy.

Using mixed effects generalized linear model for a binary dependent variable to identify determinants of individual perceptions of insecurity, we find strong support for key contentions of the ethnic security dilemma. We find that respondents who distrust the government are significantly more likely to feel insecure. Moreover, respondents who live in districts with greater in-group shares are significantly less insecure while those who live in districts with greater out-group share feel more insecure. We find modest evidence that cross-cutting cleavages can mitigate this perceived insecurity. While we recognize the modesty of our claims, we hope that this study may catalyze similar investigations of other cases.

We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. Next, we describe features of the Balochistan ethnic conflict and note why this is a productive site to look for respondent-level evidence of an ethnic security dilemma. In the third section, we review the extant literature to draw out testable hypotheses. Next, we describe the data we analyze and our methods to do so. Fifth, we present our results. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and their salience for ongoing debates about the so-called ethnic security dilemma.

### ***The Balochistan Case***


With appropriate data, Balochistan is an ideal place to look for micro-level evidence of an ethnic security dilemma. First and foremost, the Baloch comport with Smith's definition

of an ethnic community which is "a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity."<sup>13</sup> Second, Balochistan hosts an active Baloch ethnic insurgency rooted in British colonization and subsequent decolonization of the erstwhile British Raj in South Asia as well as the subsequent breakup of Pakistan in 1971 when it lost East Pakistan. Third, whereas most of the ongoing conflicts in Pakistan involve Islam and Islamism (i.e. sectarian violence, communal discord, the Pakistani Taliban's efforts to bring Sharia to all of Pakistan, etc.), this conflict squarely centers on the Baloch ethnic group and Baloch claims to an independent state based upon their ethno-linguistic identity and posited historical ties to the land they inhabit. Fourth, as a group, the Baloch appear to engage in activities consistent with key propositions in the literature on the ethnic security dilemma, such as espousing myths of a greater homeland, moving into enclaves along with their competing communities, fearing demographic decline and perpetrating violence against outgroups and Baloch collaborators.

There are several posited tap-roots of Baloch grievance. One source is a belief in a historical greater Baloch homeland that was lost in large measure through colonialization and decolonization. Second, the Baloch fear being demographically displaced in what they view as their own province. Third, after becoming included in the independent state of Pakistan, the Baloch and Balochistan have consistently been deprived of state investment and the province and its people consistently remain among Pakistan's most under-developed. At the same time, the state has exploited the province's vast natural resources to the benefit of Punjabis and other non-Baloch, most recently the Chinese. While scholars debate the long periods of peace that existed at different times, there is agreement that conflict was initiated by federal overreach, particularly by the Pakistan army.<sup>14</sup> During these periods of unrest, the state has brutally suppressed dissent in the province including the use of military force which further alienates the Baloch from the state. While scholars debate what best explains long periods of peace, the most recent spate of conflict began in the early 2000s under President Musharraf. Below we exposit these issues in turn.

### *Origins of the Conflict*

The Baloch peoples are distributed across territories in contemporary Sistan-o-Balochistan province in Iran, Pakistan's Balochistan province, and in parts of the south-western Afghan provinces of Nimruz, Helmand, and Kandahar. (Figure 1 depicts a popular version of so-called "Greater Balochistan, based upon a map of the distribution of Baloch speakers.) Despite the claims of Baloch nationalists to the contrary, at no point did a singular geo-political entity cover this entire expanse. Instead, it was (and remains) variously governed by political entities based in Iran, Afghanistan, and the Indian Sub-continent (the British Raj until August 1947, and Pakistan thereafter). The current geographic entity of Pakistani Balochistan was formed by the British, who amid competing British, French, and Russian interests characterized by the "Great Game," sought to control this region to secure the transit routes between Afghanistan and British India.<sup>15</sup> By the twentieth century, even as the British were consolidating their presence in Balochistan during the early decades of the twentieth century, agitations for independence began to develop across British India.<sup>16</sup>



**Figure 1.** Common depiction of “greater Balochistan”.

Source: Ann Wilkens, “The Crowded-Out Conflict: Pakistan’s Balochistan in its fifth round of insurgency”

After World War II, a war-weary Britain resolved to decolonize South Asia and acquiesced to the demands of the Muslim League to partition British India into the successor states of India and Pakistan. The 1945 general elections and the 1946 provincial assembly elections were referendums on the concept of partition of the Raj into India and Pakistan generally and a means by which the provinces could indicate their preferences for either of the new dominions. However, elections were not held in Balochistan both because there was no Balochistan assembly for the one-third of Balochistan that came under direct British rule and because the remainder of the province was governed by the Khan of Kalat, which was treated as one of the some five hundred-fifty princely states in India where elections were not held.<sup>17</sup> The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, sought independence because, unlike the hundreds of other principalities in British India, he had a treaty with Whitehall rather than the British Indian government. Many (including Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s ostensible founding father who served as Kalat’s lawyer during negotiations with the British) argued this permitted him to remain independent of either of the new dominions as his was not governed by the Indian Independence Act of 1947.<sup>18</sup> Khan declared independence one day after Pakistan came into existence. Ultimately, Pakistan annexed the

Khanate by force.<sup>19</sup> These factors gave rise to Baloch opposition to their inclusion in the new dominion.

Despite some Baloch' misgivings about their forcible inclusion into the Pakistani state, the province was relatively peaceful until 1955 when Pakistan's first military dictator General Ayub Khan promulgated the "One Unit Scheme," which abolished all the provinces in what was then West Pakistan. This change was intended to combine the strength of the western provinces to electorally balance the ethnically homogenous and politically powerful ethnic Bengalis of East Pakistan who had begun to mobilize to protest the various exploitative policies of the Pakistani state.<sup>20</sup> But the strategy, which denied provinces their own territorial identity and local governance, met resistance and was ultimately abandoned in advance of the 1970–71 general elections.<sup>21</sup> However, this was too little too late as ethnic groups such as the Baloch who opposed the Punjabi-dominated state realized the extent to which the state would seek to marginalize the electoral power of ethnic minorities to protect the interest of Punjabis.

Another source of conflict in the province has been over the province's vast natural resources. Within several years of Pakistan's creation, a few Baloch *sardars* (tribal land-owning notables) became wealthy after the discovery of natural resources on their lands. In 1958, a dispute arose about royalties from natural gas located in the area controlled by the Bugti tribe, which is one of the most powerful tribes in the province. In that year, some members of the Bugti tribe tried to disrupt the supply of gas from the Sui area to increase the royalty fees from the government. Responding to unrest resulting both from Bugti efforts to manipulate the gas market and protests against the One Unit scheme, the government launched a military campaign that lasted until the early 1960s.<sup>22</sup>

Following the 1970 elections, the ethno-nationalist National Awami Party (NAP) won the largest block of seats in both Balochistan and what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and formed governments in both provinces with the political support of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, which is an Islamist party associated with the Deobandi interpretive tradition.<sup>23</sup> With the conclusion of the 1971 war, the Bengalis in East Pakistan secured an independent Bangladesh with Indian military assistance.<sup>24</sup> After the war, the NAP government came to power in Balochistan and tried to ameliorate some of the developmental, economic, and political problems of the province. However, with the loss of East Pakistan, president and chief martial law administrator Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, despite being an ethnic Sindhi, opposed the NAP's reforms, fearing that they would undermine the economic and political interests of the Punjabis, who comprise Pakistan's dominant ethnic group, as well as other non-Baloch who controlled businesses in the province.<sup>25</sup> In 1973, the Pakistani authorities manufactured a reason to invade Balochistan when they raided the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, discovering 300 Soviet submachine guns and 48,000 rounds of ammunition. Although Pakistani and American officials knew the weapons were intended for Baloch rebels in Iran to enable them to punish Iran for supporting Kurdish rebels in Iraq, Bhutto's government claimed that Iraq was planning to transfer the arms to Pakistan's Baloch. The elected provincial government was dismissed, Governor's Rule was imposed, and the central government dispatched 80,000 troops to fight 55,000 Baloch guerrillas.<sup>26</sup>

Over the ensuing decades, several Baloch militant organizations emerged around Baloch tribal personalities to fight for greater autonomy, with devolution of power to

the province and a fair share of financial resources and recompense for provincial resources, or to attain outright independence.<sup>27</sup> The most lethal groups include United Baloch Army, Baloch Republican Army, Baloch Liberation Front, Balochistan Liberation Army.<sup>28</sup>

### *Fears of Demographic Decline*


While the Baloch lay claim to Balochistan, they are not the only significant ethnic group in the province historically or now. Baloch warily eye the ethnic distribution of the province because they fear becoming a minority in their eponymous province due to the influx of ethnic Pashtuns, coming from Afghanistan over multiple periods of turmoil, who augment the historical population of Pashtuns in the state, as well the influx of so-called Punjabi settlers.<sup>29</sup> Pakistan's census suggests that some of these fears are not unfounded (Table 1). Note that the Pakistan census does not ask people to identify their ethnicity; rather, it queries their mother tongue. This is consistent with the common practice of South Asians to identify their ethnicity in terms of their mother tongue. This means that ethnic Baloch generally will claim Baloch as their mother tongue; Punjabis will indicate Punjabi; Pashtuns will identify Pashto etc. Figure 2 depicts percentages of mother tongue spoken in Balochistan per the 1998 and 2017 census results. Figure 2 depicts the languages of Pakistan by district using data from the 2017 census. Figure 3 shows the extent to which Balochistan's ethnic groups are not homogeneously distributed owing both to historical reasons but also due to more recent moves of individuals into ethnic enclaves.

At first blush, it looks as if the proportion of Baloch speakers retrenched substantially between 1998 and 2017. The reason for this is that speakers of the Brahvi language (also transliterated as Brahoi, Brahui) were not enumerated distinctly from speakers of Baloch, despite its linguistic distinctiveness, prior to the 2017 census. Brahvi speakers would have likely indicated that Baloch was their mother tongue as they politically identify with Baloch as an indigenous population in the area. When one adds the percentage of Brahvi and Baloch speakers in 2017, one finds that 52.61 % identify as speaking languages associated with Baloch identity compared to 54.76 % in 1998. While this decline may seem insignificant, it must be viewed relative to the growth of others, most notably the Pashtuns who increased from 29.64% in 1998 to 35.34% in 2017.


**Table 1.** Various demographic indicators.

Indicator	Pakistan	Balochistan	Punjab	Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	Sindh
Labor Force Participation Rate <sup>32</sup>	32.26 %	27.23	34.86	27.63	30.86
Literacy rate for persons ten years old and above <sup>33</sup>	58.91%	43.58%	64.01%	54.02%	54.57%
Percent of households using electricity for lighting <sup>34</sup>	87.87%	69.62%	93.95%	89.89%	80.44%
Use wood for cooking <sup>35</sup>	58.44%	75.07%	57.85%	72.70%	49.50%
Use gas for cooking <sup>36</sup>	37.86	21.43%	37.92%	25.52%	47.39%
No toilet <sup>37</sup>	15.02%	20.63%	13.69%	12.15%	17.99%
Toilet: Pit with Slab <sup>38</sup>	21.74%	31.88%	22.59%	29.76%	13.80%
Moderate or Severe Food Insecurity <sup>39</sup>	16.44%	23.36%	15.66%	14.44%	17.52%
Tap as main source of drinking water (2014–2015) <sup>40</sup>	27%	18%	33%	35%	41%
Full immunization (2014–2015) <sup>41</sup>	82%	51%	90%	78%	73%

Source: a. Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, n.d.b.



**Figure 2.** Percentage of population of Balochistan by mother tongue, census-1998 and 2017. Note: Brahvi, along with Kashmiri and Hindko, were first included in 2017. Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (n.d.)<sup>30</sup>



**Figure 3.** Dominant mother tongue by district using 2017 census data. Source: This figure has been modified from the original source to remove the Indian Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh for which there are no Pakistani data because they are administered by India.<sup>31</sup>

**State Exploitation**

Even though Balochistan is resource rich as noted earlier, Balochistan remains the most consistently under-developed province in Pakistan, largely due to processes by which Pakistan awards funds to the provinces, which is generally based upon provincial population. This necessarily means that Balochistan will receive few resources. Table 1 presents various development measures. It is notable that Balochistan not only fares



poorly compared to the Punjab, which generally fares the best among Pakistan's four regular provinces, it is usually the most deprived province. This data buttress Baloch arguments that the Pakistani state extracts the province's resources to develop other provinces at the expense of the Baloch.

The scarcity of development in the province has further fueled the indignation of ethnic Baloch who resent "settlers" coming into their province who reap the rewards of what little development takes place, almost all of which occurs at the behest of the loathed army with the cooperation of foreign entities, such as those operated by the Chinese. Consequently, within the province, Baloch militant groups have long targeted Punjabi civil servants, military and paramilitary personnel and Chinese personnel working in the region.<sup>42</sup> Baloch have also migrated outside of the conflict-torn province, looking for opportunities elsewhere although the vast majority of Baloch reside in Balochistan.

Baloch concerns about outsiders colonizing their province have intensified since the April 2015 announcement of the so-called China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which at that time promised \$46 billion for energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including development of the deep-sea port at Gwadar, in Balochistan. At that time, the enterprise promised \$46 billion for energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including the afore-mentioned development of the deep-sea port at Gwadar.<sup>43</sup> While Baloch have long decried the unfair distribution of the economic and developments from the central government, they now also repine about the negligible benefits of CPEC for the Baloch in their own province. As Ismail and Camba note, Balochistan shoulders a disproportionate burden for CPEC by affording 62% of the requisite land, including the Gwadar coastline where traditional communities used to earn their livelihood. However, Balochistan gets only 4.5% of the budget. In contrast, the more developed provinces of Sindh and Punjab will get most of the lucrative CPEC highways and projects.<sup>44</sup>

From the point of the view of Punjabis who have come to the state, they resent being called "settlers" in their own country and they do not see themselves as a tool of Pakistan's "deep state" to colonize the province. In many cases, the "Punjabi settlers" are government servants who are moved out to the province as a part of the public service commission and are as unhappy about the posting as the Baloch are about having them. For reasons of cultural and ethno-linguistic ease as well as sense of greater security, they prefer to organize themselves into Punjabi-dominated enclaves.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Current Wave of Insurgency***

The most recent insurgent violence began following General Pervez Musharraf's seizure of power in 1999 and concomitant proroguing of the national and provincial assemblies. Musharraf outraged many in the province when he announced several large development projects in partnership with the Chinese and the construction of two army cantonments.<sup>46</sup> While many Baloch see the army cantonments as part of Pakistan's "colonizing presence," the Pakistan army has long sought to increase the number of Baloch in its ranks. This desire stems from the army's long-held belief that the institution must reflect the population from which it draws. Achieving this goal has proved a challenge because few Baloch meet the army's educational standards and/or wish to

join (a similar situation prevails in Sindh). In response, the army-built cadet schools in Quetta in the hopes of increasing the number of recruits from the province while also reducing the various recruitment requirements and standards.<sup>47</sup> However, the Baloch see this as a means of expanding the army's control over the province.

Amidst, these distal concerns, the event that precipitated this ongoing duration of ethnic violence occurred in 2005, shattering a peace that had perdured since 1980. Specifically, the flashpoint involved the rape of Dr. Shazia Khalid, a Baloch female doctor from the Bugti tribe who was working at the Sui gas plant, in the most remote reaches of Baluchistan. Baloch, who were already antagonized by Musharraf's various moves in the province as well as the long-standing grievances noted above. The Bugti clan responded in outrage because the alleged rapist was a captain in the loathed Pakistan army. Bugti militants attacked the gas fields with rockets, mortars and myriad AK-47 rounds. Musharraf responded by deploying tanks, helicopters as well as 4,500 soldiers to guard the gas facility.<sup>48</sup> The conflict has continued since.

To rule Balochistan, Pakistan has retained features of the colonial administration it inherited.<sup>49</sup> The Frontier Corps (FC), a colonial-era paramilitary force, performs so-called "law and order" duties in much of the province with backup by Pakistan's army. The 50,000-person FC has also been the lead organization in human rights abuses of the Baloch. The FC—along with Islamist militias and Pakistan's intelligence service, the Inter-services Intelligence Directorate or ISI—are accused of engaging in a nearly twenty-year-long campaign of "pick up and dump" in which Baloch nationalists, militants or even innocent bystanders are picked up, disappeared, tortured, mutilated and then killed."<sup>50</sup>

In addition to these kinetic means, numerous Pakistani leaders beginning with Bhutto have used political Islam as a tool to create a supra-national identity that would supersede if not suppress ethnic identities such as the Baloch. The state continues to do so to date by using an array of Islamist and Islamist militant groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and its varied "charity wings" to operate without constraint in Balochistan, who augment the efforts of the state's intelligence and security organizations.<sup>51</sup> These kinetic and non-kinetic measures have denervated Baloch rejection of their inclusion in Pakistan and buttressed their beliefs that Pakistan and its allegedly Punjabi-dominated security and intelligence services are occupying forces.

Notably, the state can silence Baloch dissidents through whatever means possible, with little to no public backlash in the rest of the country. Most Pakistanis are completely indifferent to the brutalities experienced by their Baloch citizens. Given that the National Assembly is on a population-representative basis, the Baloch have little power in the most powerful of the two houses. While they have equal representation to the other federating units in the Senate, the Senate has few powers. While Balochistan has a state assembly, it is usually the least productive legislative body.<sup>52</sup>

### ***An Inter-National Theory for Intra-State Ethnic War***

In 1951, John Herz and Herbert Butterfield independently and contemporaneously formulated a concept of inter-state conflict that subsequently became known as the "security dilemma."<sup>53</sup> For Herz, the security dilemma arises from the fundamental quest

for security. Humans must be “concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals.” To avoid such outcomes, they acquire increasing power. However, these security-seeking initiatives make others feel insecure and they, in turn, undertake preparations to protect themselves from such outcomes. Consequently, despite the acquisition of increasing power, no one can feel “entirely secure in such a world of competing units” and consequently “power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”<sup>54</sup>

Although Butterfield used the term “Hobbesian fear” instead of “security dilemma;” his conceptualization is similar to that of Herz. Butterfield’s Hobbesian Fear describes the dread that one has of another party. Butterfield says of this fear that even though one may mean the other no harm and may want nothing from the other than a guarantee of one’s safety, one can never have such guarantees. Nor can the other party have such assurances. Butterfield argues that “neither party sees the nature of the predicament he is in, for he only imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable.”<sup>55</sup>

Applied to states and inter-state rivalry, “the security dilemma describes how the actions that one state takes to make itself more secure—building armaments, putting military forces on alert, forming new alliances—tend to make other states less secure and lead them to respond in kind. The result is a tightening spiral of hostility that leaves neither side better off than before.”<sup>56</sup> Jervis (p. 169) succinctly says of the security dilemma that “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”<sup>57</sup>

Decades later in 1993, Barry Posen argued that the features of the inter-state “security dilemma” may be applied to intra-state violence, taking the particular case of Yugoslavia. He asserted that a state of anarchy can exist in a state, for example when states collapse. This emerging anarchy motivates groups of persons to fear for their safety and undertake defensive measures to bolster their safety unaware that other groups may view these initiatives as hostile. When such a situation obtains, more powerful groups may have incentives to strike preemptively. This is how Posen described the conflict between Serbs and Croats in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse.<sup>58</sup>

While Posen (1993) posited that features of the inter-state “security dilemma” may be applied to intra-state violence, he didn’t justify the ease with which he did so.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, several scholars have questioned the very premises of his central argument. Saideman et al. (2002) observes that Posen’s explanation begins with the anarchy that ensues following state collapse but fails to explain why states collapse in the first instance.<sup>60</sup> (For another critique of the failures of extant scholarship to properly characterize the role of the state in ethnic conflict, see Cederman et al. 2010.) Visser and Duyvesteyn (2014) are perhaps the most direct in their criticism: they cast it aside and the subsequent scholarship that seeks to refine and thus retain the explanatory utility of the ethnic security dilemma by arguing that it is irrelevant.<sup>61</sup> Visser and Duyvesteyn (2014) are the outliers. Most scholars have offered refinements of the ethnic security dilemma while engaging in critical and nuanced discussions of previous scholars’ efforts.<sup>62</sup>

Some scholars have used case studies to bolster their arguments while others have used multi-country or multi-ethnic group datasets to look for country-specific or

group-specific evidence to explain the emergence of ethnic conflict, the brutality or longevity of that conflict, as well as mitigating factors that dampen the prospects of conflict or limiting its lethality in time or space. Unfortunately, none of these studies have sought to develop or micro-level hypotheses arguably because of a general paucity of data of individual-level data that are most salient to the ethnic security dilemma.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, it has been impossible to discern whether members of groups that appear to be in a security dilemma indeed perceive themselves to be in a security dilemma. In this section, we review the extant literature with the goal of identifying testable hypotheses at the group or individual levels.

Some critics of the ethnic security dilemma may argue that this and similar cases do not meet the standards of anarchy; however, the Balochistan case does meet the inclusion criteria offered by Kaufman who argues that this state of anarchy can be approximated if “ethnic groups effectively challenge the government’s legitimacy and control over its territory.”<sup>64</sup> Job (1992) similarly contends that a state need not be disintegrating for the intra-state security dilemma to obtain: the state needs merely be weak.<sup>65</sup> By this he means that there is a lack of affinity between the state and the affected societal groups.<sup>66</sup> Lacking such affinity, the regime must rule through coercion rather than by consensus. As the previous discussion attests, the Pakistani state lacks such authority especially for ethnic Baloch against whom the state has long used kinetic and non-kinetic tools to subdue their resistance to the state.

### *Distrust of the Government*

Saideman et al. (2002) posit that the “ethnic security dilemma starts with the idea that the government of any state is the greatest potential threat to any group inside its boundaries” because it usually requires a “state’s resources to commit genocide, and the fear of group extinction is an important element of ethnic identity and group conflict.”<sup>67</sup> Groups worry that if other groups control the government, they may use their resources against them or deny them public goods. Consequently, groups seek security in divided societies either by trying to control the state or to secede if the state’s neutrality is in question.<sup>68</sup> Necessarily when one group seeks such control, other groups are fearful of their intentions and seek to do the same resulting in a spiraling contest for control with the incentive for competitive outbidding that results in violence.

For the Baloch in particular, the state is biased against them. Consequently, the state is a source of insecurity rather than security. In the Pakistan context generally and the Balochistan case in particular, as detailed above, groups that believe the government cannot or will not protect them during times of duress are likely to express distrust in the appropriate level of government, which will therefore directly influence perceptions of insecurity. As already noted, the state has shown its willingness to engage in every form of punishment and extraction with few consequences and the Baloch have no chance whatsoever of controlling the Pakistani state. They are too outnumbered and their representation in the national assembly reflects this. Indeed, this may be why some Baloch feel as if violence is their only recourse as Saideman et al. (2002) suggest.<sup>69</sup>

This discussion gives rise to our first testable hypothesis.

**H1:** *Perceived insecurity is greater for those who distrust government.*

### ***Fear of the Ethnic Others***

In the context of intra-state conflict, Kaufman<sup>70</sup>, Snyder<sup>71</sup> focus upon the creation of strategic myths which allow elites to construct an exaggerated threatening image of rivals group. By creating compelling narratives about the inherently evil nature of the rival, aggressive elites not only justify widely held chauvinist attitudes, but they also justify violence. The above exposition details the various strategic beliefs the Baloch espouse about their various rival groups, whether the Pashtuns, Punjabis, the Pakistani army and other security forces as well as the Chinese.<sup>72</sup> Baloch separatists imagine a greater Balochistan that spans the Baloch areas in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (see Figure 1) that has been snatched from them before and after Pakistan's independence. That such a political entity never existed, and that the British did much to consolidate Balochistan belies the veracity of this strategic myth.

Narratives about loss of the Baloch ethnic character of the state, relative demographic decline (founded or not) as well as narratives about the state and outside elites exploiting Baloch resources while the Baloch are denied the benefits of the same are continuously rehearsed by Baloch political and militant elites. For the Baloch, which includes the Brahvi speakers, other ethnics are interlopers in their own province. Baloch nationalists believe that they are demographically under threat and are essentially colonized by the Pakistani state.

Similarly, Baloch view state-sponsored Islamism as well as ethnic Pashtuns who overwhelmingly embrace the Deobandi interpretative tradition as inherent threats to Baloch traditional ethno-religious affiliations. These fundamental identity issues have been acerbated by the introduction of the Chinese into the province. Consequently, various ethnic groups in Balochistan tend to prefer to organize themselves in ethnic enclaves. The Chinese also have their own enclaves complete with their own security facilities.

Drawing from the review of Balochistan and the myths that they harbor as well as fundamental elements of the posited ethnic security dilemma, we posit the following testable hypotheses.

**H2a:** *Perceived insecurity is lower in districts with greater ingroup shares*

**H2b:** *Perceived insecurity is greater in districts with greater outgroup shares*

However, as the data given above demonstrate, the Baloch are not well educated and most only know Baloch. This limits the kind of jobs they can obtain within or without the province and it limits their ability to engage with ethnic others. We posit that those Baloch who know the national language (Urdu) may be in a better place to socialize with non-Baloch and also secure better employment among non-Baloch. Competence in Urdu conveys a dimension of cosmopolitanism and ability to feel less isolated and vulnerable, economically, socially, and politically. This gives rise to a related testable hypothesis, namely:

**H2c:** *As cross-cutting cleavages between ethnicity and language increase, perceived insecurity decreases as individuals can forge bonds of understanding with those who are not in their group.*

## **Data and Methods**

In this section we discuss the data we employ, the variables we use to instrumentalize for the above-delineated hypotheses as well as the model specifications that form the bases of this effort.

### **Data**

To empirically evaluate our hypotheses, we use two sources of data. Our primary source of individual-level data was collected by Fair et al. (2018) from a unique face-to-face survey, which included 13,282 interviews in the four normal provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and KPK), as well as 2997 interviews in six of seven agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, and South Waziristan) for a total of 16,270 persons.<sup>73</sup> The survey was fielded in January and February 2012 in the four normal provinces. Data collection in the FATA was postponed until April due to severe winter weather and the seasonal migration of residents to warmer areas of the country. Data were collected by a local survey firm using mixed gender teams who traveled to each primary sampling unit (PSU). Female enumerators traveled in groups accompanied by the field supervisor, while male enumerators traveled in teams of two. Female interviewers conducted surveys with female respondents, while male interviewers conducted surveys with male respondents. This procedure optimally accommodated concerns about safety and social customs.


In the four normal provinces, they surveyed district-representative samples of 155–675 households in 61 districts: 15 in Balochistan, 14 in KPK, 12 in Sindh, and 20 in Punjab. Within each province, we sampled the two largest districts and then chose additional districts using a simple random sample. In the FATA, they collected agency-representative samples of 270–675 people in each of the six agencies where enumerators could travel. The Pakistan Bureau of Statistics provided the sampling frames. The overall response rate was 71%, with 14.5% of households contacted refusing to participate in the survey while another 14.5% of the targeted households were not interviewed because no one was home.<sup>74</sup> While these data were collected in 2012, we do not believe this affects are analysis despite the passage of time because we are looking for micro-level evidence of the ethnic security dilemma at the time of the survey.

In this analysis, we focus upon the individual as well as the tehsil in which that person resides. Administratively, Pakistan is divided into four regular provinces. Each province is divided into divisions, which are further subdivided into districts. In turn, each district is subdivided into tehsils. The province of Balochistan consists of six divisions, 32 districts, and 137 tehsils. The survey data includes respondents from 15 districts and 29 tehsils. [Figure 4](#) below depicts the area included in the survey and in our analysis.

Our second source of data is from the recently released 2017 Pakistani census. The Pakistani Bureau of Statistics has released detailed census reports on numerous important measures aggregated at the tehsil level.<sup>75</sup>

### **Variable Instrumentalization**

One of the main variables we use in operationalizing our other key variables is ethnicity. For the purposes of our paper, we measure ethnicity using the



**Figure 4.** The spatial distribution of surveyed areas for Balochistan only.  
 Source: In-house data-manipulation.

respondent's mother tongue as a proxy, which is consistent with the practice of Pakistan's Bureau of Statistics. [Table 2](#) below presents the breakdown of our sample in Balochistan by ethnicity/mother tongue. (All survey items used in our analysis are in [Appendix A](#)).


The dependent variable in our analysis is *perceived insecurity* at the individual level. The survey includes a question on whether interviewees feel secure in their living location: "Do you feel safe in your city/village?" The interviewees can answer with "yes" or "no" to this question. Since the primary goal of this study is explaining citizens' *perceived insecurity*, we reverse the responses to the question about feeling safe to measure the perceived insecurity.<sup>76</sup> Higher values represent insecurity; therefore, we code both variables 1 for "No—do not feel safe" and 0 coded for "Yes—feel safe".<sup>77</sup>

[Figure 5](#) depicts the uncontrolled distribution of perceived insecurity by respondent's mother tongue, which proxies ethnicity. These data evince considerable variation in perceived insecurity: while those who speak Baloch, Urdu, Kashmir, and Pashtu exhibit considerable insecurity speakers of Punjabi, Sindhi, Brahvi and Saraiki evidence greater security.

**Table 2.** Breakdown of mother tongue in Balochistan in survey data.

Mother tongue (ethnicity)	Percentage in sample
Baloch (Baloch)	53.48%
Brahvi (Baloch)	6.24%
Kashmiri (Kashmiri)	0.38%
Other (Other)	3.14%
Pashto (Pashtun)	29.80%
Punjabi (Punjabi)	1.53%
Saraiki (Saraiki/Punjabi)	2.25%
Sindhi (Sindhi)	2.08%
Urdu (Muhajir)	1.10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: In-house data-manipulation.



**Figure 5.** Perceived insecurity inside locality, across mother tongue (for Balochistan only).

Source: In-house data-manipulation.

To evaluate **H1**, which suggests that persons who feel that rule of law is not functioning in Pakistan will be more insecure, we use a question in the survey on whether the respondent feels the rule of law is operative throughout Pakistan. Similar to *perceived insecurity*, the answer to this question is “no” or “yes,” and we reverse the responses to this question to measure the distrust in governance (i.e. higher value represents distrust<sup>78</sup>)

To test both H2a and H2b, we need measures of ethnic diversity. There are many measures of ethnic diversity in social science literature. One group of measures primarily focus on fractionalization, or how many groups there are, such as the Hirschman-Herfindhal Index (HHI)<sup>79</sup>, Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF)<sup>80</sup>, or a Gini coefficient (BGI).<sup>81</sup> Another group of measures focuses on polarization, or the population shares of different ethnic groups within a population. Some examples of polarization measures include ER polarization,<sup>82</sup> RQ polarization,<sup>83</sup> and peripheral diversity or polarization.<sup>84</sup> When comparing all these measure, Steele et al. (2022) conclude that a measure of ethnic diversity needs to account for fractionalization (or variety) and polarization (or balance).<sup>85</sup> Koopmans and Schaeffer’s (2015) measure of



general entropy combines variety, balance, and disparity using a parameter, alpha.<sup>86</sup> This parameter, alpha, varies from 0 to infinity. Researchers can choose lower levels of alpha if they value variety (fractionalization) over balance (polarization) and higher levels of alpha if they value balance over variety.

Looking closely at the demographics of Balochistan at the Tehsil level, obtained from 2017 Pakistani Census, most of the tehsils are what Koopmans and Schaeffer (2015) define as quasi-monoethnic, where there is a clear majority and a number of small minority groups.<sup>87</sup> To see this clearly, we provide a table of the proportion of individuals that make up each disparity, which we measure using mother tongue in [Appendix C \(Table C1\)](#). In an effort to find a measure of ethnic diversity that (1) captures both variety and balance and (2) differentiates Baloch living in Baloch-majority tehsils from Baloch living in Baloch minority tehsils, we opt to use a relational measure of ethnic diversity.<sup>88</sup>

For each respondent, we calculate an In-Group share and a relational Out-Group share using tehsil level census data. The In-Group Share for each individual is  $\frac{n_i}{N_k}$ , where  $n_i$  is the number of in-group individuals,  $i$ , in the tehsil and  $N_k$  is the overall population in all ethnic groups,  $k$ , in the tehsil. In other words, the In-Group shares is simply the proportion of individuals in each tehsil speaking the Respondents' mother tongue (See [Appendix C, Table C1](#) for the measures broken down by Tehsil and Ethnicity).

In an effort to validate our results, we measure Out-Group Shares two ways: one using the complement of a relational Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, and the second way using Relational (Out-Group) Entropy.<sup>89</sup> The first Out-Group share, the Relational HHI (or RHHI) =  $1 - \sum_{j=1}^G \left(\frac{n_j}{N_g}\right)^2$  (see [Appendix C, Table C2](#) for these values for each tehsil and ethnicity). The second Out-Group share, Relational Entropy (or RE) =  $RE_{i=1}^\alpha = \sum_{i=1}^g \left(\frac{n_j^\alpha}{N_g^\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}$  (see [Appendix C, Tables C3–C6](#) for these values for each tehsil and ethnicity at different values of alpha).

In both equations,  $n_j$  is the number of out-group individuals,  $j$ , in the tehsil, and  $N_g$  is the overall population in the Out-Groups,  $g$ , in the tehsil. The measure of  $\alpha$  represents a parameter, which we vary between 0.5 and 3.<sup>90</sup> For these two different relational Out-Group measures, higher values indicate less representation of each mother tongue in their tehsil. For instance, a Baloch living in a tehsil where 99% of the population is made up of Balochis will have a very low Out-Group Share (close to the minimum value), while a Baloch living in a tehsil where only 2% of the population is made up of Baloch will have a very high Out-Group Share (close to maximum value).

To test **H2c**, which posits that perceived insecurity is lower when there are more cross-cutting cleavages. Our measure of cross-cutting cleavage uses education, in particular whether an individual is a matriculate, as a proxy. Persons are considered matriculates when they pass an exam at the end of their tenth year of education. These exams are administered in Urdu. Thus, anyone of any ethnicity who is a matriculate is functionally literate in Urdu, Pakistan's national language. Being a matriculate bestows upon the person a far-reaching ability to communicate in the national language which

in turn creates job opportunities throughout the country. It is a crucial cross-cutting cleavage that separates them from co-ethnics who only know their mother tongue or other regional dialects.

In Balochistan, 43.8% of persons, ten years old and above, are literate among whom 33.8% are matriculates (17.6%) or beyond (7.9% for intermediate, 5.5% for graduate and 2.7% for masters and above). By way of comparison, 58.9% of Pakistanis who are ten years and above are literate among whom 37.8% have attained their matriculation (19.0%) or beyond (9.1% intermediate, 6.2% for graduates, and 3.3% for MA and above) (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017).<sup>91</sup>

We also include several control variables at the individual level from the survey data to minimize the effects of omitted variables, which can lead to biased estimation. We control for gender, age, marital status, household income, a Baloch dummy, the number of Attacks in each Tehsil three years before the survey was conducted (2009–2011),<sup>92</sup> and personal safety. We do not include religion as our sample is comprised only of Muslims.

### Model Estimation

We estimate all modes using mixed effects generalized linear model for a binary dependent variable. We employ mixed effect modelling (or multilevel modeling) for three reasons. First, our variables are measured at two different levels—individual level (level 1) and tehsil level (level 2). Second, our dependent variables are at level 1 while our independent variables are at both level 1 and level 2. Third, we want to produce unbiased parameters, which multilevel modelling corrects when we have data at different levels.<sup>93</sup> (Guo and Zhao, 2000; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

The general specification of the individual level (or level 1) model being estimated is:

$$\log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{1-p_{ij}}\right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} * \text{Distrust in Government} + \beta_{2j} * \text{Cross-Cutting Cleavages} + \text{controls} + r_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where  $p_{ij}$  is the probability that respondent  $i$  in tehsil  $j$  is insecure (the dependent variable = 1). We assume that all independent variables are fixed effects, or that they have the same effect in all 29 tehsils within Balochistan.

The general specifications of the tehsil level (or level 2) model is:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * \text{Group Shares} + \dots + u_{0j} \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} \\ \beta_{2j} &= \gamma_{20}, \dots \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Combining Equations (1) and (2) produces our model (as seen in Table 4):

$$\begin{aligned} \log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{1-p_{ij}}\right) &= \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} * \text{Distrust in Government} + \beta_{2j} * \text{Cross Cutting Cleavage} \\ &+ \gamma_{01} * \text{Group Shares} + \text{controls} + r_{ij} + u_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Table 3 summarizes our independent variables. We include a correlation matrix of our variables in Appendix B (Tables B1).

We estimate three models using insecurity inside village as our dependent variable. The only difference between the models is group shares. There is a high correlation between our In-Group and Out-Group shares (see Appendix B, Table B2), therefore we only include one measure of group share in each model. Model 1 includes the In-Group Share measure, Model 2 includes the Relational HHI Out-Group measure, and Model 3 includes the RE Out-Group measure for  $\alpha = 0.5$ . Table 4 also includes marginal effects of the predicted probabilities for all three independent variables in each model.<sup>94</sup> We also produce a graph of predicted probabilities (see Figure 5).<sup>95</sup> We also run three additional models using RE Out-Group shares with  $\alpha = 0.75$ ,  $\alpha = 2$ , and  $\alpha = 3$  and the predicted probabilities for these additional models. The descriptive statistics, results, and graphs can be found in Appendix D: Additional Results (Tables D1 and D2 and Figure D1).<sup>96</sup>

## Discussion of Results

Results in Table 4 include 2110 respondents from 29 tehsils in Balochistan. We produce three different models, one for each measure of group share.<sup>97</sup> The inter-class correlation (ICC) in Table 4 for all three models indicates that respondents from the same tehsil are more similar to each other than respondents from different tehsils, which further justifies our use of multilevel modeling.<sup>98</sup> Specifically, our models produce an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) between 0.31 and 0.33, which indicates that approximately 31% to 33% of the variation is occurring between tehsils controlling for trust in government, group shares, cross cutting cleavages, gender, area, age, income, marital status, Balochi mother tongue, number of attacks, and personal safety.

Turning to our hypotheses, H1 posited that perceived insecurity is greater for persons who have more distrust in government. Our estimates across all models provide strong and significant support for this hypothesis at the 0.001 level.

Hypothesis H2a posited that perceived insecurity would be lower in those districts with greater in-group shares. Model 1, which is the only model which included this

**Table 3.** Summary statistics of individual level variables.

	Min	Max	Mean	Median	SD
H1: Trust in Government (1=Distrust)	0	1.00	.65	1	.48
H2A: In Group Shares	0	0.99	.83	.96	.28
H2B: Out Group-Relational HHI	0	1.00	.1	0	.26
H2B: Out Group-RE .5	.01	1.00	.11	.05	.2
H1C:CCC (1=Education is Matric and higher)	0	1.00	.32	0	.47
Respondent Gender (1=Female)	0	1.00	.47	0	.5
Area (1=Urban)	0	1.00	.31	0	.46
Age	18	80.00	34.11	33.5	10.49
HH Income	1500	100000.00	19004.01	16000	11082.98
Marital Status (1=Married)	0	1.00	.79	1	.4
Balochi Mother Tongue (1=Yes)	0	1.00	.61	1	.49
# Attacks 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	0	562.00	86.4	11	160.66
Personal Safety (1=Not Safe)	0	1.00	.16	0	.31

**Source:** In-house tabulations,  $n = 2198$ .

**Table 4.** Results of mixed effects analysis and marginal effects: Dependent variable = insecurity inside village.

	Model 1:		Model 2:		Model 3:	
	In-Group Shares		Relational Out-Group Shares		GE Out-Group alpha = 0.5	
	Coefficient (St. Error)	Marginal Effects	Coefficient (St. Error)	Marginal Effects	Coefficient (St. Error)	Marginal Effects
H1: Trust in Government (1 = Distrust)	1.85*** (0.17)	0.34	1.85*** (0.17)	0.34	1.85*** (0.17)	0.34
H2A: In Group Shares	-1.12** (0.38)	-0.21				
H2B: Out Group-Relational HHI			1.16*** (0.31)	0.21		
H2B: Out Group-RE $\alpha=0.5$					1.19*** (0.36)	0.22
H1C:CCC (1 = Education is Matric and higher)	-0.32* (0.16)	-0.06	-0.32* (0.16)	-0.06	-0.33* (0.16)	-0.06
Respondent Gender (1 = Female)	-0.26* (0.13)		-0.27* (0.13)		-0.27* (0.13)	
Area (1 = Urban)	0.06 (0.14)		0.04 (0.14)		0.04 (0.14)	
Age	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	
HH Income	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)	
Marital Status (1 = Married)	-0.28 (0.17)		-0.29 (0.17)		-0.28 (0.17)	
Balochi Mother Tongue (1 = Yes)	1.31*** (0.29)		1.27*** (0.27)		1.21*** (0.27)	
# Attacks 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)	
Personal Safety (1 = Not Safe)	-0.41 (0.21)		-0.42* (0.21)		-0.42* (0.21)	
Constant	-2.66 (0.49)		-3.69 (0.46)		-3.70 (0.47)	
Level 2 Intercept	1.49 (0.51)		1.51 (0.52)		1.60 (0.54)	
ICC	0.31		0.31		0.33	
-2 Log Likelihood	-949.2		-946.6		-948.0	
N (Level 1)	2198		2198		2198	
N (Level 2)	29		29		29	

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$


variable, provides support for this hypothesis at  $p < 0.01$ . Hypothesis H2B suggested that perceived insecurity would be greater in those districts with greater out-group shares. Models 2 and 3, which both include different measures of out-group shares, provide significant and stronger evidence for hypothesis (at  $p < 0.001$ ).

Finally, H2c posited that those who know Urdu would feel less-secure all else equal both because they could forge bonds of understanding with the outgroup but also because they could more easily find employment outside of Balochistan or within, diminishing their sense of economic precarity. Across all three models, we find support for this claim at the 0.05 level.

Among the control variables, females are less likely to feel insecure ( $p < 0.05$ ) and Balochi speaking are more likely to feel insecure ( $p < 0.001$ ) in all three models. We also see respondents who feared for their personal safety are more likely to feel insecure ( $p < 0.05$ ) in only Models 2 and 3. Notably, political violence in the tehsil is not significant, all else equal.

Looking at the marginal effects in Table 4, we find the largest impact on predicting insecurity is distrust in government (H1 where the marginal effects equal 0.34 in all three models), followed by group shares (H2a and H2b where marginal effects range from 0.21 to 0.22), followed by cross cutting cleavages (H2c, where the marginal effects equal -0.06 in all three models).

Turning to the predicted probabilities, we further investigate the relationship between the most influential independent variables in our model on insecurities (Figure 6). As



**Figure 6.** Predicted probabilities of perceived insecurity—group shares and distrust in government.

we can see from the In-Group Share and Out-Group Share measures for each tehsil, reported in [Appendix C](#), most tehsils in Balochistan are quasi-monoethnic, where there is a clear majority and a number of small minority groups. Therefore, we limit our discussion of the graphs and predicted probabilities to either very low or very high group shares. First, we turn our attention to individuals who live in tehsils where fewer individuals speak the same mother tongue as the respondent (i.e. lower values of in group shares or higher values of out-group shares). For these ethno-linguistic minorities who distrust government have a 0.60 predicted probability of feeling insecure, while those who trust government have a predicted probability of 0.27. Next, we turn our attention to individuals who live in tehsils where a majority of the individuals speak the same mother tongue (i.e. higher values of in-group shares and lower values of out-group shares). Members of the ethno-linguistic majority who distrust government have a predicted probability of 0.41 of feeling insecure compared to those who trust government, where the predicted probability of 0.12.

### Conclusions and Implications

Among proponents and opponents of an intra-state security dilemma there are numerous debates about the very existence of an intra-state security dilemma and if such a concept exists, what characterizes it.<sup>99</sup> Rather than intervene in these ongoing disputes, we seek to address a more fundamental lacunae in the extant literature: the complete absence of evidence of individual perceptions of insecurity. All studies simply assume it must exist based upon observed group behavior.

To look for micro-evidence for the existence of the ethnic security dilemma, we took the case of Pakistan's fissiparous Balochistan province which has long hosted an ethnic insurgency waged by Baloch ethnics who variously resist inclusion of the

Pakistani state or the terms of that inclusion. The Baloch harbor national myths of a greater Balochistan, fear demographic decline and the repressive and extractive policies of the Pakistani state. We use data from a novel survey of Muslims in Balochistan as well data from Pakistan's 2017 population census.

In general, we find strong individual-level evidence for key propositions of the ethnic security dilemma in this particular case. Persons who do not believe that rule of law operates in Pakistan—a measure of distrust of the government—are significantly more likely to feel insecure. Critically, groups who live in ethnically homogenous areas report feeling more secure than those who live in more ethnically diverse locations. We find modest evidence suggesting that cross-cutting cleavages can mitigate perceived insecurity. These findings align with key suppositions in studies of the ethnic security dilemma.

We must note that the nature of Balochistan may limit the generalizability of our findings. For historical reasons as well as more recent efforts to move into ethnic enclaves, the various ethnic groups in Balochistan are not homogeneously distributed. As the data in [Figure 3](#) illustrates, ethnic groups in the province tend to be geographically clustered. What does make Balochistan different from Pakistan's other provinces is that Pakistan's other provinces tend to be dominated by one ethnic group, also shown in [Figure 3](#). This feature of Balochistan may limit the generalizability of our findings.

While our findings are modest, we hope that this study will prompt other scholars of the ethnic security dilemma to refocus the lens of their inquiries from states or groups to individuals.

## Notes

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76. Therefore, if an interviewee feels safe in their city/village, we assumed that the response to whether you feel insecurity is no, and thus recorded zero in the dataset. Similarly, if the answer to “do you feel safe in your city/village” is no, then we assume the interviewee feel insecurity, so it is recorded one in the dataset.
77. The survey also asks the question “do you feel safe outside your city/village. We decide not to include this variable in our paper because as we know little about what “outside the

village or city” means to the respondent or what characterizes these imagined localities. For example, some localities may have attributes that make the respondent feel more secure while others may have the opposite effect.

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89. The complement of the HHI is referred in literature as ELF (Ethnic-Linguistic Fractionalization). There are many problems with using ELF as a measure of fractionalization (see Steele et al, 2022). In an effort to come up with better measures, Koopmans and Schaeffer (2013, 2015) come up with a measure of relational HHI (or RHHI), and Relational Out-Group Entropy. These measures are preferred over the traditional calculations of ELF because it measures the variety, balance, and disparities among the population subgroups (Koopmans and Schaeffer, 2013, 2015; Steele et al, 2022).

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92. We use the number of Attacks in each tehsil as a control variable to measure violence. We gathered data on violence from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) security database, <https://www.pakpips.com/about-pips-database>. We calculated the number of attacks, the total number of individuals killed, and the total number of individuals injured 2009–2011 in every tehsil in Balochistan. See Appendix C, Table C7 for the number of attacks, injured, and killed in each tehsil. These three measures are highly correlated (see Appendix B, Table B3) so we opted to use just the number of attacks in each tehsil as a control.
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94. We calculate the marginal effects by taking the difference in the predicted probabilities at the maximum values (1) minus the predicted probability at the minimum values (0) while holding all other variables constant at their median. We decided on doing it in this manner instead of looking at a one standard deviation change because our three independent variables of interest have the same minimum and maximum values which allows us to compare the marginal effects to see which variable is the most influential in predicting insecurity.
95. In the graphs, we calculate the predicted probabilities by varying our two most influential independent variables—group shares and distrust in government—holding all other variables at their median.
96. The results remain almost unchanged (in sign and sig) for all the different alphas.
97. The measures of group shares are highly correlated so we did not include them in the same model (see Appendix B, Table B2 for correlation matrix of all group share measures).
98. This is true as long as the ICC is not zero (Gelman and Hill, 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). The ICC is calculated using an approximation for binomial models using the following formula:  $\frac{r^2 + \sigma^2}{3}$ , where  $r^2$  is the tehsil level variance component and  $\sigma^2$  is the individual (or respondent) variance component. The multilevel logit is similar to this formula, except the level-1 variance (or the individual level variance in this case) is equal to  $\frac{\pi^2}{3}$  (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Gelman and Hill 2007; Lüke, 2004).
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## Appendix A. Questions from Survey

### Ethnicity and Location Questions Used

*To Measure Ethnicity (Mother Tongue)*

D-230. Your mother tongue?

1. Urdu
2. Punjabi
3. Sindhi
4. Pashto
5. Saraiki
6. Kashmiri
7. Baloch
8. Other \_\_\_\_\_

*To Determine Location*

- A-6. Province \_\_\_\_\_
- A-7. District \_\_\_\_\_
- A-8. Tehsils \_\_\_\_\_
- A-9. Revenue Village \_\_\_\_\_
- A-10. Settlement \_\_\_\_\_
- A-11. Neighborhood \_\_\_\_\_
- A-12. Urban or Rural \_\_\_\_\_

### DVs Questions Used

[ENUMERATOR READS:]

We would also like to know what you think about public safety in your local area.

Q733A. Do you feel safe in your city/village?

1. Yes
2. No

### IVs Questions Used:

*To Measure Trust in Government (H1)*

Q734B. Do you feel the rule of law is operative throughout Pakistan outside your local areas?

1. Yes
2. No

### Controls Questions Used:

House Hold Income:

Q701. Being a little more specific, think about all the different kinds of income in your household. What is the typical monthly income of your family.

\_\_\_\_\_ Rupees

Gender:

D-005 Gender of Respondent [DO NOT ASK, JUST RECORD]

1. Male
2. Female

Education:

D-80. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

0. Less than Primary

1. Primary
2. Middle
3. Matriculate
4. Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)
5. Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
6. Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)

Age:

D-30 What is your age in years? (If you do not know your exact age, please estimate).

Marital Status:

D-40. What is your marital status? (single, married, divorced, widowed)

1. Single, never married
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Widowed

Personal Safety:

Q733D. In the last three years has your house or property ever been damaged?

1. Yes
2. No

Q733E. Have you been physically assaulted in the last three years?

1. Yes
2. No

## Appendix B. Correlation Tables

**Table B1.** Correlation of individual level variables.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
(1) H1: Trust in Government(1 = Distrust)	1.00									
(2) H1C:CCC (1 = Education Matric and Higher)	-0.26	1.00								
(3) Respondent Gender (1 = Female)	0.16	-0.27	1.00							
(4) Area (1 = Urban)	0.05	0.11	0.07	1.00						
(5) Age	0.17	-0.22	-0.13	-0.01	1.00					
(6) HH Income	-0.14	0.26	0.02	0.06	-0.03	1.00				
(7) Marital Status (1 = Married)	0.10	-0.22	-0.01	-0.03	0.42	-0.09	1.00			
(8) Balochi Mother Tongue (1 = Yes)	0.02	-0.18	-0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.23	0.11	1.00		
(9) # Attacks 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	0.07	0.14	0.03	0.17	-0.06	0.08	-0.11	-0.13	1.00	
(10) Personal Safety (1 = Not Safe)	-0.14	0.07	-0.10	0.00	0.03	0.08	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	1.00

**Table B2.** Correlation matrix of in-group and out-group shares.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) In Group Share	1.00								
(2) Out Group-Relational HHI	-0.94	1.00							
(3) Out Group RE-a=.1	-0.35	0.49	1.00						
(4) Out Group RE-a=.25	-0.54	0.68	0.96	1.00					
(5) Out Group RE-a=.5	-0.82	0.94	0.70	0.86	1.00				
(6) Out Group RE-a=.75	-0.88	0.96	0.52	0.71	0.96	1.00			
(7) Out Group RE-a = 1.5	-0.27	0.20	-0.41	-0.25	0.06	0.17	1.00		
(8) Out Group-RE a= 2	-0.24	0.16	-0.51	-0.34	0.01	0.13	0.98	1.00	
(9) Out Group-RE a= 3	-0.22	0.12	-0.59	-0.41	-0.03	0.10	0.95	0.99	1.00

**Source:** In-house tabulations

**Table B3.** Correlation matrix of attacks, injured, and killed data.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) # Attacks 2009–2011	1.00		
(2) # Killed 2009–2011	0.98	1.00	
(3) # Injured 2009–2011	0.97	0.99	1.00

**Source:** In-house tabulations

## Appendix C. Tehsil Level Tables

**Table C1.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of in group shares in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.95	0.02
Chaghi	Dalbandin	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.97	0.00
Chaghi	Taftan	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.89	0.00
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.94	0.00
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Gawadar	Gawadar	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.93	0.01
Gawadar	Pasni	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.97	0.00
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	0.00	0.12	0.15	0.01	0.72	0.01
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohmmad	0.00	0.24	0.27	0.01	0.48	0.01
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.98	0.00
Kech/Turbat	Tump	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Kharan	Kharan	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.98	0.00
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.95	0.00
Khuzdar	Nal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Khuzdar	Wadh	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.97	0.00
Kohlu	Kahan	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.98	0.00
Kohlu	Kohlu	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.23	0.75	0.00
Kohlu	Mawand	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00
Mastung	Dasht	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.92	0.03
Mastung	Mastung	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.94	0.01
Musakhel	Musakhel	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.00
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.98	0.01	0.00
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.03	0.00
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.47	0.28	0.14
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.00
Zhob	Zhob	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00
Ziarat	Ziarat	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.98	0.01	0.00

**Source:** In-house tabulations.

**Table C2.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of out group shares (Relational HHI) in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	1.00	0.97	0.99	0.92	0	0.87
Chaghi	Dalbandin	0.99	0.92	1.00	0.71	0	1.00
Chaghi	Taftan	0.98	0.97	1.00	0.62	0	1.00
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	1.00	0.70	0.99	0.92	0	1.00
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	0.80	0.99	0.83	1.00	0	1.00
Gawadar	Gawadar	0.99	0.90	0.94	0.96	0	0.98
Gawadar	Pasni	0.98	0.88	0.92	0.99	0	0.98
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	1.00	0.83	0.73	1.00	0	1.00
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohmmad	1.00	0.79	0.73	1.00	0.14	1.00
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	0.93	1.00	0.87	0.98	0	0.97
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	0.92	1.00	0.89	1.00	0	0.91
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	0.93	1.00	0.83	1.00	0	0.95
Kech/Turbat	Tump	0.98	1.00	0.81	1.00	0	0.88
Kharan	Kharan	0.98	0.92	0.97	0.95	0	0.97
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	0.99	0.97	0.98	0.65	0	1.00
Khuzdar	Nal	0.94	0.99	0.96	0.95	0	0.95
Khuzdar	Wadh	0.97	0.95	0.98	0.81	0	1.00
Kohlu	Kahan	0.98	1.00	0.84	0.92	0	0.99
Kohlu	Kohlu	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.18	0	1.00
Kohlu	Mawand	0.96	0.99	0.82	0.98	0	0.98
Mastung	Dasht	0.99	0.96	0.99	0.89	0	0.90
Mastung	Mastung	1.00	0.99	0.98	0.73	0	0.96
Musakhel	Musakhel	0.93	0.97	1.00	0	0.90	0.95
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	0.96	0.95	0.98	0	0.91	0.98
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	0.99	1.00	1.00	0	0.29	1.00
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.22	0.73	0.93
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	0.86	0.98	0.99	0	0.91	0.99
Zhob	Zhob	0.97	0.53	1.00	0	0.99	1.00
Ziarat	Ziarat	0.82	0.98	1.00	0	0.91	0.99

**Source:** In-house tabulations.**Table C3.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of out group shares (RE-alpha = 0.5) in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	1	0.87	0.95	0.76	0.05	0.69
Chaghi	Dalbandin	0.92	0.73	0.96	0.48	0.02	1
Chaghi	Taftan	0.88	0.84	1	0.41	0.02	0.98
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	0.95	0.47	0.95	0.74	0.02	1
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	0.58	0.93	0.62	1	0.02	0.99
Gawadar	Gawadar	1	0.80	0.88	0.92	0.11	0.97
Gawadar	Pasni	0.99	0.77	0.84	1	0.11	0.97
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	1	0.60	0.50	0.99	0.02	1.00
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohmmad	0.93	0.48	0.41	0.92	0.01	0.92
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	0.78	1	0.70	0.91	0.05	0.87
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	0.76	1.00	0.72	1	0.04	0.74
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	0.79	1	0.64	0.98	0.05	0.84
Kech/Turbat	Tump	0.88	0.99	0.60	1	0.03	0.69
Kharan	Kharan	1	0.85	0.95	0.90	0.13	0.95
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	0.96	0.87	0.91	0.45	0.04	1
Khuzdar	Nal	0.85	1	0.91	0.87	0.10	0.88
Khuzdar	Wadh	0.86	0.80	0.87	0.58	0.02	1
Kohlu	Kahan	0.94	1	0.67	0.79	0.07	0.96
Kohlu	Kohlu	1	0.96	0.99	0.11	0.01	1.00
Kohlu	Mawand	0.89	1	0.66	0.93	0.09	0.95
Mastung	Dasht	1	0.88	0.99	0.73	0.07	0.76
Mastung	Mastung	1	0.97	0.91	0.53	0.05	0.84
Musakhel	Musakhel	0.77	0.88	1	0.04	0.73	0.81
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	0.94	0.90	1	0.13	0.82	1.00
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	0.91	0.98	1	0.01	0.17	0.98
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	0.87	0.79	0.88	0.04	0.40	0.66
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	0.70	0.93	1	0.08	0.78	1
Zhob	Zhob	0.86	0.34	1	0.03	0.94	0.99
Ziarat	Ziarat	0.62	0.91	1	0.05	0.74	0.96

**Source:** In-house tabulations.



**Table C4.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of out group shares (RE-alpha = 0.75) in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	1	0.99	1.00	0.98	0.00	0.95
Chaghi	Dalbandin	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.84	0.00	1
Chaghi	Taftan	1.00	0.99	1	0.77	0.00	1.00
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.00	1
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	0.91	1.00	0.93	1	0.00	1.00
Gawadar	Gawadar	1	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.00	1.00
Gawadar	Pasni	1.00	0.96	0.98	1	0.00	1.00
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	1	0.93	0.86	1.00	0.00	1.00
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohammad	0.79	0.70	0.66	0.79	0.00	0.79
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	0.98	1	0.96	1.00	0.00	0.99
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	0.98	1.00	0.97	1	0.00	0.97
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	0.98	1	0.93	1.00	0.00	0.99
Kech/Turbat	Tump	1.00	1.00	0.92	1	0.00	0.96
Kharan	Kharan	1	0.98	1.00	0.99	0.00	1.00
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.80	0.00	1
Khuzdar	Nal	0.99	1	0.99	0.99	0.00	0.99
Khuzdar	Wadh	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.92	0.00	1
Kohlu	Kahan	1.00	1	0.94	0.98	0.00	1.00
Kohlu	Kohlu	1	1.00	1.00	0.26	0.00	1.00
Kohlu	Mawand	0.99	1	0.92	1.00	0.00	1.00
Mastung	Dasht	1	0.99	1.00	0.96	0.00	0.97
Mastung	Mastung	1	1.00	1.00	0.86	0.00	0.99
Musakhel	Musakhel	0.98	1.00	1	0.00	0.97	0.99
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	0.99	0.99	1	0.00	0.97	1.00
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	1.00	1.00	1	0.00	0.41	1.00
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	0.68	0.68	0.68	0.00	0.54	0.67
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	0.95	1.00	1	0.00	0.97	1
Zhob	Zhob	1.00	0.67	1	0.00	1.00	1.00
Ziarat	Ziarat	0.92	1.00	1	0.00	0.97	1.00

**Source:** In-house tabulations.**Table C5.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of out group shares (RE-alpha = 2) in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	1	339.32	275.83	356.16	366.98	360.51
Chaghi	Dalbandin	3008.06	3105.93	2821.44	3114.38	3116.83	1
Chaghi	Taftan	2790.64	2811.14	1	2838.11	2839.77	2299.00
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	2012.77	2225.22	2054.12	2216.23	2227.53	1
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	1954.04	1850.66	1953.02	1	1958.06	705.90
Gawadar	Gawadar	1	70.70	62.76	53.90	79.80	33.22
Gawadar	Pasni	17.07	71.61	67.11	1	79.16	31.11
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	1	3815.14	3817.23	2583.06	3819.94	1578.75
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohammad	1.17	28389.45	28390.56	20590.93	28393.13	20922.65
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	370.33	1	376.09	337.12	383.04	352.52
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	540.78	77.08	543.82	1	552.25	542.34
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	393.69	1	403.13	200.21	408.00	386.92
Kech/Turbat	Tump	928.42	491.05	967.79	1	972.19	964.67
Kharan	Kharan	1	47.43	27.72	41.11	59.02	29.83
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	488.03	613.38	591.20	647.47	649.37	1
Khuzdar	Nal	79.30	1	68.10	76.97	94.50	75.80
Khuzdar	Wadh	2004.60	2021.09	1997.55	2036.09	2040.28	1
Kohlu	Kahan	147.75	1	197.28	190.75	202.47	125.80
Kohlu	Kohlu	1	12313.12	10434.58	12664.85	12665.08	7181.48
Kohlu	Mawand	109.05	1	129.27	92.01	133.73	80.07
Mastung	Dasht	1	169.62	42.13	186.90	194.65	185.48
Mastung	Mastung	1	216.62	335.88	379.59	382.32	360.23
Musakhel	Musakhel	629.63	604.32	1	642.56	633.04	623.77
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	32.23	39.86	1	57.45	47.89	1.95
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	13839.54	12622.78	1	13941.71	13941.29	12284.95
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	301.67	621.62	1.29	679.10	676.68	665.65
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	138.84	102.47	1	144.83	134.99	1
Zhob	Zhob	1292.40	1328.15	1	1329.27	1195.31	571.86
Ziarat	Ziarat	469.28	423.18	1	473.74	463.90	330.54

**Source:** In-house tabulations.

**Table C6.** Tehsil level raw data in Balochistan tehsil level data of out group shares (RE-alpha = 3) in Balochistan.

District	Tehsil	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Other
Barkhan	Barkhan	1	72.46	55.10	78.47	83.85	80.33
Chaghi	Dalbandin	384.23	411.74	346.71	415.61	417.14	1
Chaghi	Taftan	371.17	377.31	1	387.93	389.01	277.72
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	268.94	322.79	277.25	318.67	324.24	1
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	292.00	261.76	291.50	1	294.35	84.73
Gawadar	Gawadar	1	22.04	18.95	15.89	26.70	9.58
Gawadar	Pasni	5.15	22.54	20.67	1	26.54	9.00
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	1	483.16	484.22	278.20	485.90	161.06
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohmmad	1.12	2185.16	2185.74	1358.17	2187.31	1384.79
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	80.46	1	82.85	69.66	86.58	74.28
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	108.28	12.99	109.54	1	113.92	108.92
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	84.04	1	88.01	36.85	90.78	81.59
Kech/Turbat	Tump	157.80	72.21	171.56	1	174.11	170.12
Kharan	Kharan	1	15.61	8.74	13.23	21.29	9.42
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	84.16	114.64	108.30	127.42	128.64	1
Khuzdar	Nal	23.23	1	19.33	22.38	30.31	21.96
Khuzdar	Wadh	289.67	295.05	287.57	301.14	303.58	1
Kohlu	Kahan	34.28	1	50.75	47.94	53.67	28.51
Kohlu	Kohlu	1	1113.43	870.19	1193.70	1193.87	557.55
Kohlu	Mawand	28.92	1	36.75	23.61	39.32	20.22
Mastung	Dasht	1	41.59	9.50	48.02	52.11	47.42
Mastung	Mastung	1	41.07	69.39	84.78	86.46	76.93
Musakhel	Musakhel	121.41	112.95	1	127.63	122.78	119.24
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	10.28	12.91	1	20.87	16.01	1.26
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	1251.66	1065.05	1	1283.03	1282.73	1024.23
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	48.39	113.01	1.21	133.03	131.57	126.72
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	38.45	25.85	1	41.75	36.77	1
Zhob	Zhob	205.88	219.39	1	220.15	181.55	76.63
Ziarat	Ziarat	98.97	83.30	1	101.54	96.57	60.93

**Source:** In-house tabulations.

**Table C7.** Tehsil-level data on terrorist incidents, injuries and fatalities.

District	Tehsil	# Attacks 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	# Injured 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	# Killed 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)
Barkhan	Barkhan	16	18	12
Chaghi	Dalbandin	7	9	2
Chaghi	Taftan	5	8	1
Dera Bughti	Dera Bughti	210	352	227
Dera Bughti	Phelawagh	1	0	1
Gawadar	Gawadar	42	45	37
Gawadar	Pasni	11	17	8
Jaffar Abad	Jhat Pat	0	0	0
Jaffar Abad	Usta Mohmmad	1	0	0
Kech/Turbat	Buleda	1	0	2
Kech/Turbat	Dasht Sub-Tehsil	0	0	0
Kech/Turbat	Kech/Turbat	118	144	115
Kech/Turbat	Tump	7	0	0
Kharan	Kharan	10	8	3
Khuzdar	Khuzdar	241	256	137
Khuzdar	Nal	2	0	0
Khuzdar	Wadh	20	17	1
Kohlu	Kahan	2	0	3
Kohlu	Kohlu	43	45	28
Kohlu	Mawand	2	3	3
Mastung	Dasht	15	3	14
Mastung	Mastung	130	108	115
Musakhel	Musakhel	9	30	38
Qila Abdullah	Chaman	36	30	29
Qila Abdullah	Gulistan	0	0	0
Quetta	QUETTA CITY TEHSIL	562	1195	598
Zhob	Kakar Khurasan	0	0	0
Zhob	Zhob	11	21	20
Ziarat	Ziarat	2	0	1

**Source:** In-house tabulations

## Appendix D. Additional Results

**Table D1.** Summary statistics of additional GE out-group shares.


	Total population	Min	Max	Mean	Median	SD
H2B: Out Group-RE .75	2095	0	1.00	.08	0	.25
H2B: Out Group-RE a=2	2095	1	28393.13	2077.8	642.56	4495.59
H2B: Out Group-RE a=3	2095	1	2187.31	245.8	127.63	372.96

**Table D2.** Additional results of out group RE more alphas.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
H1: Trust in Government (1 = Distrust)	1.62*** (0.18)	1.63*** (0.18)	1.62*** (0.18)
H2B: Out Group-RE a=.75	0.96** (0.33)		
H2B: Out Group-RE a=2		0.00*** (0.00)	
H2B: Out Group-RE a=3			0.00*** (0.00)
H1C:CCC (1 = Education is Matric and higher)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.24 (0.17)
H1: Rule of Law Operates Inside Village (1 = No)	2.46*** (0.17)	2.46*** (0.17)	2.47*** (0.17)
Respondent Gender (1 = Female)	-0.62*** (0.15)	-0.60*** (0.15)	-0.60*** (0.15)
Area (1 = Urban)	-0.06 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.15)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
HH Income	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Marital Status (1 = Married)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.19 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.18)
Balochi Mother Tongue (1 = Yes)	1.10*** (0.28)	0.88*** (0.25)	0.86*** (0.25)
# Attacks 2009–2011 (Tehsil Level)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Personal Safety 1 = Not Safe	-0.20 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.24)	-0.22 (0.24)
Constant	-4.68 (0.47)	-4.77 (0.45)	-4.88 (0.46)
Level 2 Intercept	0.98 (0.35)	0.66 (0.25)	0.65 (0.24)
ICC	0.23	0.17	0.16
-2 Log Likelihood	-805.7	-804.4	-804.1
N (Level 1)	2184	2184	2184
N (Level 2)	29	29	29

Standard errors are reported in parenthesis

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$



**Figure D1.** Predicted probabilities group shares by distrust in government of models 4, 5 and 6 in table D1.