

8 India

C. CHRISTINE FAIR

Prior to 1947, the Raj was the most important imperial subsystem in the British Empire. Situated strategically in the middle of the Indian Ocean, the British deployed civil servants, police, military forces as well as bonded and other forms of labor to Africa, Southeast, and Northeast Asia and even the British West Indies from British India. From its sinecure in the South Asian subcontinent, imperial Britain built an elaborate security architecture which it used to protect its treasured colony while also contesting and thwarting Russia and various Chinese dynasties as it continued to expand. The Indian Army, whose rank and file were largely native, fought wars throughout the British Empire. The British enlisted millions of Indians (mostly voluntarily) to fight and die on all fronts in World Wars I and II and extracted food resources to feed its globally deployed army, even though this policy caused deadly food shortages in the very areas that sent their sons to fight for the interests of their imperial masters. Without this abundant wealth of usurped South Asian manpower, it is quite possible that Britain would have been unable to hoist the Union Jack from the Caribbean to Cape Town to Canton.¹ In fact, writing at the apex of British imperial power in South Asia, Lord Curzon, a Viceroy of India and British Foreign Secretary, observed that

the master of India, must, under modern conditions, be the greater power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it must be added, in the world. The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, its great trading harbours, its reserve of military strength . . . are assets of precious value.²

When India became independent in 1947, with Britain in a postwar retrenchment and divesting of its colonial assets, India could have been the inheritor of this massive ability to project power throughout the Indian Ocean and beyond. However, unlike Pakistan, which retained much of the British grand strategy it inherited from the departing British with a paltry fraction of the resources, India charted a different course. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, a prominent leader of the Indian National Congress and independence movement who became India's first prime minister, India forewent its extraordinary influence throughout the South Asian subcontinent and abutting areas. Nehru forged a grand strategy that comprised three

elements: adoption of federal democracy as a means to preserve India's political unity; an economic strategy that privileged so-called "self-reliance" which was overseen by a statist system of central planning as the most expedient path to technological modernization and poverty alleviation; and a foreign policy of nonalignment as the preferred route to construct a favorable international environment which would enable India to avoid military entanglements and focus upon mitigating the various privations of the public.³

Nehru governed India until he died in 1964. During his long tenure, he fortified bureaucratic arrangements to secure these objectives and oversaw the absolute subordination of the armed services to the civilians. Nehru's grand strategy perdured until the dawn of the 1990s, after which developments in the South Asian environment, ruptures in the international system, and shifting visions of key Indian political leaders prompted a re-examination of this grand strategy. Since then, numerous Indian strategists have risen to prominence who have offered their vision of what India's grand strategy should be. But, as I argue here, despite the passage of several decades and the various ink that has been spilled on this topic, India remains in search of a grand strategy. This is not due to a paucity of strategic thinking as some have posited; rather, it is due in considerable measure to the momentum of the vast infrastructure built by Nehru and his successors, which political leadership has been unable to reform due to the complex domestic politics of modern India.

In this chapter, I map out India's quest for a new grand strategy and the obstacles that have precluded a new grand strategy from fructifying. I first describe the lineaments of Nehru's grand strategy and the systems and procedures that India adopted in to pursue them. Second, I exposit the factors that have galvanized a debate about discarding these Nehruvian commitments. Third, I describe the various schools of thought about what India's grand strategy should be. Fourth, I detail the various bureaucratic and political hindrances that impeded this transition. Finally, in the concluding section, I submit that what has resulted is a form of incrementalism that has precipitated important changes in India's behavior politically, diplomatically, and militarily away from these past Nehruvian commitments. While many are optimistic that India's current prime minister, Narendra Modi, will be able to muster the requisite political will to overcome the significant ambivalence about these changes that exists across India's varied political classes and public alike, I am less persuaded that Modi will be able to do so given the nature of India's vociferous democracy and its various centers within each state and at the center absent a serious exogenous event that catalyzes more agreement across these stakeholders and requisite political will to effectuate change more rapidly.

8.1 Nehru's enduring legacy

In 1992, an American scholar at the RAND Corporation named George K. Tanham alleged that “Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about national strategy”⁴ and moreover Indians’ “acceptance of life as a mystery and the inability to manipulate events impedes preparation for the future in all areas of life, including the strategic. The Indian belief in life cycles and repetitions, in particular, limits planning in the Western sense.”⁵ While some Indians agreed with Tanham at the time, more recently, several scholars have repudiated his assertion, often in language that would be dismissed as Orientalist today, that India lacks a grand strategy.

For example, Ashley Tellis, a doyen of South Asian strategic studies, concedes that India lacks a document that articulates India’s grand strategic objectives and the means by which to achieve them; this is a ludicrous measure by which to assess the question. After all, the United States is an exception in that it does have such a document, which is available to the American public to consider and debate. Most democracies do not. Tellis argues that despite the absence of such a document India’s grand strategy can be inferred from the country’s actions over the course of its history. To make this claim, Tellis mobilizes Paul Kennedy’s useful definition of grand strategy as comprising a set of policies that reflect “the capacity of [a] nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of [a] nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests”⁶ to assert that “independent India has always possessed a grand strategy.”⁷

While it is true that India may not have been successful in prosecuting its most ambitious goals and that it selected suboptimal instruments to pursue them; these shortcomings are an artifact of India’s grand strategy rather than evidence of its absence. In fact, “from the moment it gained liberty from the Raj, India pursued a grand strategy focused on preserving political unity amid its bewildering diversities and potential rifts, protecting the nation’s territory from internal and external threats, and realizing the economic development that would transform the country into a genuinely great power.”⁸ K. Subrahmanyam, India’s first grand strategist, agrees and furthers that

India is unusual in having had a grand strategy at Independence to meet the external and internal challenges to its growth in order to become a major international actor. The Constituent Assembly’s oath in 1947 implied that India would promote world peace for the welfare of mankind, including its own population, and it would assume its rightful global position by developing itself to the standards of the industrialised world. This was the strategic goal. It had to be achieved in a world recovering from a war-ravaged economy and entering the Cold War. At Independence, India was a downtrodden former colony with 80 per cent poverty, a life expectancy of 31, food

174 COMPARATIVE GRAND STRATEGY

shortages and low literacy. India's grand strategy during the second half of the 20th century, therefore, involved a policy of non-alignment to deal with external security problems, the adoption of the Indian Constitution to address governance challenges, and a partly centrally planned development strategy to accelerate growth.⁹

There are several aspects of Indian strategic thought that are encapsulated by the rubric of "Nehruvian" approaches to grand strategy.

First, India's early leadership led by Nehru adopted democracy as the system of self-rule. Prior to independence, the Indian National Congress (INC) was able to establish itself as a genuinely grass-roots party throughout the expanse of British India. It stood in notable contradistinction to its primary rival, the Muslim League, which could never overcome its elitist roots centered in the north of India.¹⁰ The adoption of a federal democracy that incorporated separation of powers at the center as well as reserved powers for the states and state neutrality towards established religions was both a natural extension of the INC's pre-partition positions and it was instrumentally the best way of managing a massive population across a large landmass riven with economic disparities, differing levels of education as well as bewildering diversity based upon caste, ethnolinguistic, as well as religious differences.¹¹

Second, India embraced an autarkic economic strategy of "self-reliance" and a statist system of centralized planning. Nehru believed that the experiences of the Soviet Union offered the "quickest path to technological modernization, rapid economic growth, and the defeat of immiseration."¹²

Third, Nehru believed that it could best achieve its domestic goals of consolidating democracy and economic uplift of its massive population by steering clear of external conflicts. For this reason, he avoided aligning with either of the two blocs during the Cold War in a policy that came to be known as "nonalignment." When it suited India's purposes, it reached out to the United States or the Soviet Union for various forms of political, diplomatic, military, or economic assistance, and the two hegemony either acquiesced or rebuffed these entreaties per their own interests. Nehru believed that it was imperative to avoid needless arms-racing which diverts resources that would be better deployed in the service of bolstering India's economy, mitigating poverty, and tempering other forms of socioeconomic differences across India's complex polity.¹³

An additional feature of this grand strategy espoused by Nehru pertained to nuclear weapons. India inherited a civilian nuclear program from the British. While Nehru did not necessarily feel comfortable with nuclear weapons specifically or military force more generally, Homi Bhaba—one of the early architects of India's nuclear program—argued successfully for keeping the option of nuclear weapons alive even while India campaigned, perhaps disingenuously, for a nuclear-free world.¹⁴

In retrospect, this grand strategy generally served India's interests well into the latter half of the twentieth century. By 1990 when the Cold War ended,

India managed to remain intact despite various insurgencies and institutional stresses while Pakistan, which was also cleaved from the Raj, had broken into two in 1971. Moreover, India generally remained a democracy (with the notable exception of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Emergency¹⁵) and committed to its peculiar form of secularism, while its neighbors failed to do so. Nonalignment generally allowed India to reap the benefits of exploiting superpower rivalry on its own terms without the costs of entanglement. Economically, the autarkic strategy proved less fruitful: India, unable to increase its growth rates or otherwise modernize its economy, failed in significant measure to mitigate poverty much less become a significant economic or military power.

Many of the institutions that Nehru and his successors built have proven extremely difficult to reform despite the burgeoning interest from various quarters in the Indian security elite to adopt a post-Nehruvian grand strategy. This is likely due to the nature of India's domestic politics as much—if not more—than the suitability of those institutions for a modern state that aspires to be a rising power. Nehru's aversion to military force and the institutional arrangements he promulgated to circumscribe the power of the armed forces have proven particularly obdurate. Nehru was chary of the Indian military because the British used it to enforce their enslavement during British rule. It took the 1947–48 war in which the Indian Army protected India against Pakistan for Nehru to relax his distrust of the armed forces he inherited from the British.¹⁶

While Congress' secular and democratic moorings buttressed its popular legitimacy, Nehru was so concerned about the potential for a coup that he deliberately studied the factors that contributed to coup-making in postcolonial states. Nehru initiated several steps with the explicit goal of coup-proofing the Indian army, some of which were undertaken prior to independence. For example, he altered the "symbolic structure of power . . . by altering the status of the army in the warrant of precedence and in public life, by limiting the wearing of uniforms in public, and by personally taking over the commander in chief's house in New Delhi as his new prime ministerial residence."¹⁷ His new government also took steps to restrain the army's ability to coordinate against the state. Given the immediate security threat posed by Pakistan, Nehru was unable to simply disband the "martial class" army that India inherited or to undertake steps to significantly widen the recruitment base. Instead he took steps to balance within the army by "continuing the British system of having the majority of the army's infantry battalions structured in 'fixed class' units, in which each of the four companies was ethnically cohesive, but the battalion as a whole contained at least two different ethnic groups."¹⁸ Wilkinson details Nehru's thwarting innovations that would facilitate mobilization along ethnic or provincial lines while decreasing army cohesion by maximizing ethnic diversity among the senior officers to ensure that the

command was more diverse than it would have been otherwise and to exploit ethnic differences between the officers and the enlisted ranks.¹⁹ This was particularly evident with regards to Punjabis, who were overrepresented in the ranks in the officer corps. To prevent Punjabis generally or Sikhs specifically from wielding too much influence, there was a “de facto policy of ensuring that they were less successful than they would have been otherwise been in getting appointed to the top corps commands, and in particular to the top job of”²⁰ chief of army staff. In addition to increasing the number of recruitment streams in an effort to diversify the officer corps and increase training opportunities to develop their professionalism, Nehru—working through his Defense Ministers—ensured that the Intelligence Bureau surveilled the generals as well as some retired generals.²¹

While Nehru took many of these steps within the first decade of independence, China’s shocking defeat of India in the 1962 war (see section 8.2) forced India to reverse the retrenchment that had taken place since independence: it nearly doubled the army, raised a fighting air force (as opposed to the previous transport fleet) and eschewed its previous opposition to forging relationships with outside powers like the United States and the Soviet Union.²² With the military forces effectively more than doubled, Congress Party leadership feared that extant coup-proofing efforts would be inadequate. In response, the state bolstered intelligence capabilities and redoubled monitoring of senior army leadership and army movements. Nehru even brought in a close ally to “coup proof” the capital and prepared a variety of contingency plans to remove political leadership at the first sign of trouble.²³

Perhaps one of the most enduring legacies of Nehru’s reforms was restructuring the system of higher defense organization, which Lord Ismay—a staff member of the last Viceroy Mountbatten—developed. Nehru, working with his Ministry of Defense, restructured the military command to render it less cohesive and less able to mobilize against civilian leadership. In 1947, Nehru’s government removed the Commander in Chief from the cabinet and subordinated him to the Defense Minister, which along with the Ministry of Finance retained expenditure decisions. This decision subordinated the army chief both to elected representatives of the people and to Ministry of Defense bureaucrats. In the structure that India inherited, the Chief of the Indian Army held the position of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces. This position was abolished, which rendered the chiefs of the three services coequals with the title of Commander in Chief. In 1955, the title “of Commander in Chief” was replaced with “Chief of Staff.” Downgrading the position of the army Commander in Chief and making all service chiefs coequals had the desired effect of intensifying interservice rivalries.²⁴ Moreover, Nehru promulgated a three-tiered system that extended from the cabinet level to that of the three

service chiefs. At the apex was the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) under which was the Defense Minister's Committee (DMC). (In 1978, the DCC became the Political Affairs Committee of the cabinet.) At the third level was the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC), in which the three service chiefs have formal equality despite enormous differences in the sizes of the forces and their respective share in the budget. This structure, which excludes the service chiefs from apex decision-making structures, has remained intact over the decades even though many Indian security elites believe that this structure is no longer appropriate for contemporary India. Specifically, some defense professionals and commentators alike believe that an overall commander would better coordinate the services, afford greater jointness, and bring more coherence to strategy, defense planning, and procurement.²⁵

During Nehru's time and for decades after his death, the Indian leadership generally avoided confrontation in what analysts have dubbed "strategic restraint." Nehru understood that sometimes force was necessary; however, it was not the preferred means. As Raghavan scrupulously details, Nehru preferred "measures the demonstrated resolve without recklessness, for coupling military moves to pressure the adversary with diplomatic ones to explore opportunities for a settlement."²⁶ This approach best suited Nehru's chariness about the exercise of power and his belief that this approach could avoid war without sacrificing India's core interests. By most metrics this policy of "strategic restraint" persists to date, with notable exceptions when the Indian leadership episodically and briefly engaged in brief periods of what Cohen and Gupta call "strategic assertion." An example of such strategic assertion is afforded by India's test of a nuclear device in 1974, which was precipitated by the American decision to dispatch US Navy Task Force 71 of the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengali during the 1971 war. Prime Minister Gandhi was convinced that the United States would not have dispatched the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier if India had nuclear weapons. But India did not conduct further tests until 1998, even though the scientists understood the 1974 test was inadequate to confer upon India a thermonuclear capability.²⁷ Other episodes of "strategic assertion" include: the 1984 occupation of Siachen Glacier before Pakistan could do so, the 1986 massive military exercise called Operation Brasstacks during which Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi sought to punish Pakistan for its significant support to the Sikh insurgency in the northern Indian state of Punjab,²⁸ and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1987 decision to dispatch the Indian Army to enforce a defunct peace deal between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. Because of the latter, a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber killed him in 1991. The gambit ended in a chastising fiasco which convinced India to never leave India unless it did so under a United Nations mandate or if required to respond to a belligerent neighbor.²⁹

8.2 The Cold War and beyond: Caught between the past and an uncertain future

Several events in the South Asian region as well as the international system have caused some Indian security elites to reflect upon the salience of this Nehruvian grand strategy for contemporary India. Perhaps one of the first strains to Nehru's beliefs about the world and the need for the exercise of force came as early as 1962 when India went to war with China. Nehru welcomed the revolution in China and saw India and China as potential collaborators in Asian security. Nehru seriously misread the potential for conflict, and the defense structure that he carefully built to ensure civilian domination proved to be inadequate to protect India's interests.³⁰ The conventional narrative of the 1962 war suggests that India lost due to excessive intrusion of the civilians into military affairs. With this lesson duly learned, when Pakistan instigated war with India in 1965, civilians stood back, providing political guidance but avoided micro-managing the conflict of war. Pakistan's failure to defeat India and inability to significantly change the territorial status quo was taken as evidence that this lesson was well learned.³¹ Relying upon archival material, Raghavan counters that while the civilians indeed had little to offer in the conduct of the 1962 war and indeed were responsible for the conflict in the first instance, the military's policy of defense of depth, by which Indian defensive lines were well within Indian territory, offered no protection against Chinese incursions. Moreover, civilians' absence in the conduct of the 1965 war resulted in India prematurely seeking a ceasefire in part because the army chief mistakenly reported that the army had run out of ammunition. More generally, he argues that had there been greater civilian oversight and management of the 1965 war, India was in a position to deliver a decisive defeat to Pakistan which could have altered the course of Pakistan's relentless security competition with India.³²

Despite the 1962 fiasco, Nehru's legacy endured without domestic challenge throughout the Cold War. However, several events took place in short succession that prompted many observers within and without India to question whether or not India needed a new grand strategy and if so, what would that strategy look like? First, the so-called anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan ended with the 1988 Geneva Accords. On February 15, 1989 the last Soviet soldier crossed the Friendship Bridge spanning the Amu Darya river leaving Afghanistan. The Geneva Accords replaced the pro-Soviet Dr Najibullah as president to the unending ire of Pakistan's General Zia, who wanted an Islamist in power. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. Najibullah was able to hang onto power until April 1992, when Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, could no longer continue financially supporting him.

After Najibullah fell, Afghanistan was beset by warring so-called Mujahideen factions. Pakistan continued manipulating events in the country by backing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a Pashtun, Islamist leader of a so-called mujahideen faction during the anti-Soviet jihad) until he proved unable to do Islamabad's bidding efficaciously. By 1994, Pakistan threw its weight behind the Taliban. With Pakistani assistance, the Taliban were able to take control of Kabul by 1996 and consolidate much of their hold upon power. Pakistan used Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to co-locate and train anti-India terrorist groups which it had nurtured for operations in Indian-administered Kashmir and beyond. Iran, for its part, was disquieted by the rise of militant Sunni Islam in Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics. Motivated by this convergence of interests, India and Iran began an important diplomatic opening that culminated in a series of agreements that allowed India to use Iran as a base from which it could project influence into Afghanistan and Central Asia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the recrudescence of Islamism in the successor states, India—allied with Iranians and the Russians—and Pakistan—allied with Saudi Arabia—began competing for influence.³³

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only created regional concerns for India, it also elucidated the fatal flaws of statist economic planning, which had been preferred by Nehru. In the same period, in 1990, India was wracked by a severe balance of payments crises. With the financially strained USSR unable to help and nowhere else to turn, India embarked upon a serious project of economic reforms in 1991 which paved the way for India's subsequent economic growth. During the 1990s, India's economic growth rates averaged around 6 percent, which exceeded that of its western nemesis, Pakistan, and arrested its decline relative to China. These economic resources allowed India to establish its primacy in South Asia and facilitated the aforementioned competition in India's extended neighborhood beyond South Asia.³⁴ Additionally, the 1991 American defeat of Iraq, which relied upon Russian weapon systems, persuaded India that its stock of Russian military systems may be inadequate in a war with Pakistan, which had many American systems in its arsenal. This realization, coupled with India's newfound economic heft, motivated India to launch a massive conventional military modernization even though the efficiency and efficacy of this effort has drawn considerable criticism.³⁵ Increasingly, Western countries and Israel found themselves competing for Indian business. (Below, in 8.4, I discuss the problems with India's defense acquisitions process.)

The 1990s also brought about further changes in the international system which forced India to re-evaluate its strategic options. Critically, in 1995, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which India denounced as nuclear apartheid, was indefinitely extended. At that time, India also (inaccurately) assessed that the Fissile Material Cutoff treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would come into force. India's weapons developers knew that the 1974

“peaceful nuclear explosion” was inadequate to confer upon India a nuclear weapons capability. With the global nonproliferation regime tightening and the need to test, Indian leadership assessed that delays in testing would be costlier than testing before these treaties came into force. When the Hindu-nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) campaigned in the general elections in 1998, it promised to exercise the nuclear option. In addition to these structural concerns and the willingness of the BJP leadership to test again sooner than later, the immediate precipitant of India’s 1998 nuclear test came from Pakistan. In May of 1998, Pakistan tested its Ghauri missile which could target all of India. This was a significant development for India’s security managers: many Indians did not believe that Pakistan was so capable and many more were deeply vexed by the ongoing nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan and between North Korea and Pakistan. Delhi was further disquieted about seeming American insouciance about these exchanges despite Washington’s ostensible interests during President Bill Clinton’s tenure in a so-called US–India strategic dialogue. India concluded both that its long-standing commitment to a nuclear-free world (advanced while India continued to sustain its own nuclear option) had failed and, worse, Pakistan now had a missile which could target every major Indian city. Soon thereafter, the BJP honored its promise and conducted a series of nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert. Within days, Pakistan followed suit. With these reciprocal tests, the subcontinent was not overtly nuclearized.³⁶ Even though Washington initially sanctioned India as well as Pakistan for these tests, ironically, India’s tests precipitated a sustained strategic dialogue which culminated not only in Washington accepting India’s nuclear status but, by 2005, actually dedicating its own resources to bolstering India’s nuclear weapons capabilities and the means to deliver them as a part of an overall strategy of managing China’s rise.³⁷

Despite these important exogenous and endogenous shocks to India’s system, India’s rise in the international system owing to its economy and military size, and the emergence of Indian analysts who want a different grand strategy for India, India has not entirely jettisoned the Nehruvianism of the past. While India could most certainly exercise power—and many analysts outside of India have expected it do so—“India continues to be ambivalent about power . . . [and has] failed to develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and military capabilities.”³⁸ Pant identifies a curious conundrum: India’s “political elites desperately want global recognition as a major power and all the prestige and authority associated with it. Yet, they continue to be reticent about the acquisition and use of power in foreign affairs.”³⁹ This discomfort with exercising power *outside of* India is doubly perplexing, Pant observes, because India’s political elites have never been reticent about maximizing domestic power even when doing so has “corrod [ed] the institutional fabric of liberal democracy in the country.”⁴⁰

8.3 Strategic thinking abounds: But a new grand strategy remains elusive

Despite Tanham's Orientalist assertion that India is inherently unable to engage in grand strategic thought, India has a surfeit of grand strategists: "grand strategy" is a cottage industry within India as many writers compete for dominance in a political space in which policymakers seem to evidence little will to embrace a new grand strategy and formally shrug off the vestiges of Nehruvianism, and their copious publications vie for purchases and downloads. Some of these contenders have even proffered up a new version of Nehruvianism (Nonalignment 2.0) that retains most of its lineaments pertaining to the use of power but embracing a capitalist economic strategy.⁴¹ India has also seen the arrival of think tanks that seek to influence the government. However, think tanks in India have struggled to be relevant sources of independent guidance to the government, which privileges inside thinking.

Kanti Bajpai does yeoman's service in summarizing the three leading schools of thought on Indian grand strategy: Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism. He argues that the Cold War's demise has brought these schools into sharp relief and their adherents can be found within the civil services, armed forces, political parties, academia, think tanks, and media alike even if the terms themselves are not necessarily in use and even if proponents of these schools would demure from describing themselves in such terms.⁴²

With respect to the international system, all three fundamentally accept the anarchic nature of international relations, and in this anarchic system, all states will seek to protect their territory and autonomy. They all recognize the staples of international relation—interests, power, and violence—and all concede that power is derived from both economic and military capabilities, at a minimum. However, beyond these core areas of agreement, these schools diverge. For example, proponents of Nehruvianism assert that states and their people can better understand one another and thus avoid conflict. For them, violence is a regrettable last resort. Nehruvians also believe that the inherent state of anarchy can be mitigated if not outright supervised by international laws and institutions, military restraint, compromise and negotiations, and so forth. For them, preparing for war and the balance of power create the conditions to sustained conflict and misdirect precious resources that should be used to mitigate poverty. Neoliberals accept the general state of the international system is a state of war, but they contend that pursuit of economic power is just as important as the pursuit of military power if for no other reason than the simple fact that economic might permits the accumulation of military power. They hold that economic power may be more

effective than military power and pursuing military power may result in a nonproductive diversion of finance and capital, which will further degrade India's domestic and global economic prowess. (Given India's inability to engage in strategic planning, translate strategic aims into military requirements and equally problematic procurement system, this concern merits significant reflection.) Neoliberals also believe that economic security is important for national security in a broader sense: economically dissatisfied citizens cannot be secure. Hyperrealists are the most pessimistic about the international system. Whereas both Nehruvians and neoliberals believe that international relations can be transformed in some measure, hyperrealists see only threat and counter-threat.⁴³

Bajpai explains that the three schools differ in their views about the use of force. Nehruvians believe that communication, contact, and interdependence are more useful in securing India's interests than is force. Moreover, the adversary will surely reciprocate forcefully, leaving the fundamental nature of the dispute unresolved. For neoliberals, force is simply a blunt, antiquated instrument that is not suitable for the modern world order. While states should be capable of defending themselves, it is "economic power and capacity to innovate in a global economy that eventually makes society secure."⁴⁴ For hyperrealists, force is the only means through which a state can secure its interests whether deployed defensively or offensively. In their view, no responsible leadership—whether civilian or military—can avoid planning to use coercive force. "Only 'idealists' of various stripes—Nehruvians or Neoliberals—could fool themselves into thinking that a more aggressive posture is always bad."⁴⁵

For reasons noted below, among others, India's leadership and the political parties they represent have not embraced any of these schools of thought as its grand strategy. Perhaps oddly, in differing measures, all three coexist or have shown the potential to emerge depending upon the prime minister in power and the circumstances that prevail. Thus, it is useful to find what Bajpai calls the "lowest common denominator" among them, which appears to be an embrace of "defensive realism." This seems to correspond with a greater affinity for Nehruvianism infused with neoliberal economic commitment, inclusive of expanding global economic engagement, even if specific prime ministers at specific points in time seem to evidence a greater personal predilection for alternative grand strategies. Why, despite decades of growth and expanding acceptance of India as a major regional and even global power by others and successful confrontation and ultimate defeat of the global nonproliferation regime in 1998, remain defensive in orientation and fundamentally uncomfortable with power projection? Given the centrality of the prime minister in Indian decision-making, what prevents any given prime minister with defensive predilections from effectuating his or her preferences? I explore these issues below.

8.4 Impediments to change?

India's strategic establishment remains, in the words of Mohan, "overly cautious and slow in responding to new geopolitical opportunities" as well as the wellspring of India's economic, political, diplomatic, and even military import.⁴⁶ What explains India's persistent gravitation to Nehruvianism infused with liberal economic policies? Why does India remain reactive instead of working proactively to shape its near and far neighborhood more consistently and aggressively, consonant with India's rising stature in the international system? Mohan describes this search for a new grand strategy as India's need to rediscover Lord Curzon, who described in his 1909 essay *The Place of India in the Empire* India's pivotal role:

On the West, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan; on the north, it can veto any rival in Tibet; on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and it is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam [Thailand]. ON the high seas it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas.⁴⁷

After the passage of well over one hundred years and after becoming one of the world's eight nuclear powers and having the world's fourth most powerful military,⁴⁸ and ranked fifth in military expenditure,⁴⁹ today's India's strategic elites have generally failed to embrace a less defensive posture commensurate with India's widely recognized potential for becoming a great power.⁵⁰ There are several potential explanations, many of which operate in an adverse synergy that ensures that India remains mired in some variant of Nehruvian discomfort with power despite having the trappings of actual power.

First, as described in the beginning of this chapter, India's military remains excluded from the apex of national decision-making. Instead, all significant defense matters reside in India's bureaucracy by design, subjugated to the Ministries of Defense and Finance. In India, the ministers rarely have the expertise of the ministries they lead because ministerial positions are usually awarded to stalwarts of the party in power and its coalition members. This state of affairs is exacerbated by the fact that India's administrative service deliberately precludes bureaucrats from developing any particular expertise. This has devastating impacts upon strategic planning, translating strategic goals into military capabilities, generating defense requirements and procuring the same.

By design, there is a serious imbalance among the services, with significant interservice rivalry, little strategic planning, let alone operational coordination. For example, India's notion of Cold Start is essentially an army-led strategy to punish Pakistan for using nonstate actors in India and to coerce Pakistan to cease and desist from using them in the future.⁵¹ Such a doctrine is predicated—or should be—upon a supporting role of India's Air Force;

however, India's Air Force refuses to see itself in such a role and instead envisions that it—not the army—will be the lead service in confronting Pakistan in the future. A former Indian naval chief summarized the services' predicament, "India has services' doctrines, but these lack credibility and weight because they do not represent a comprehensive view of national priority."⁵² Along the same lines, while India's security elites understand the need for greater interoperability *in principle*, "the Navy and the Army still want to be self-sufficient in light air power . . . [and] do not want to rely on the Air Force to provide support, and the Air Force does not to be an appendage to the Army and Navy."⁵³

As Perkovich and Dalton perspicaciously observe, none of these issues are likely to be resolved in the policy-relevant future in large measure due to the lack of civilian expertise in defense and security matters, despite emergence of various research centers purporting to focus upon defense and security affairs.⁵⁴ Worse yet, they correctly argue that addressing these critical shortcomings "require much greater expertise and attention on the part of top political leaders, and improved integration of military leaders into policy-making deliberations."⁵⁵ Even if the military *did* have greater input, it is uncertain how useful their inputs would be given their moorings in "mid-twentieth century industrial warfare."⁵⁶ In any event, this is a moot point because if there is little sustained civilian interest in forging a new grand strategy for a contemporary—much less future—India, there is even less interest in integrating the military into apex decision-making structures.

Not only are India's security elites generally unable to undertake strategic assessments of its future needs from which it generates joint defense requirements, the inadequacies of its defense procurement process are notorious within and without India.⁵⁷ Even though India is one of the world's largest arms importers, India's armed forces "lack the quantity and quality of weapons, supplies, and enabling technologies that they, in principle, are supposed to have acquired."⁵⁸ Part of the problem is India's fetishization of "indigenous production." In its origins, India did not want to be dependent upon outside suppliers and it also wanted to develop indigenous technologies. In effect, this policy has allowed India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to forge a monopoly on defense development even though it consistently fails to deliver while, at the same time, the Ministry of Defense often fails to make important acquisition deals in part because it lacks a specialized cadre of defense professionals. India generally persists upon this pathway, largely due to domestic political constraints, even though advanced militaries routinely rely upon proven defense producers which need not be entirely indigenous. Moreover, accustomed to the relationship that India enjoyed with the Soviet Union, India expects foreign defense suppliers to license and/or share technology

with India, which many are reluctant to do for a variety of reasons. This has resulted in a nonproductive tension between “aspirations for indigenous design and production” on the one hand and the clear “superiority of foreign-supplied capabilities” on the other, which is further exacerbated by the “inefficiencies of India’s procurement processes.”⁵⁹ India’s challenges can be summarized thusly: India must overhaul virtually every aspect of its civilian–military relations and higher defense organization, reconfigure its defense procurement process, vigorously pursue defense modernization and service-specific visions of the future battlefield, among other initiatives.⁶⁰ However, there is simply little political will to redress these sundry hindrances.

India’s political system mitigates the likelihood of India’s leaders anachronizing strategic commitments that are now ill-suited for an emerging great power and adopting new ones that are. Since the 1990s, India’s polity has experienced a steady federalization which has occurred along with the decline of the Congress Party system that more or less dominated Indian politics for the first thirty years after independence. Until recently, with the rise of the BJP, the decline of the Congress Party had not been replaced with a similar dominance of another party. However, even the BJP with current dominance at the center, state-based politics remain important. The BJP must not only maintain its base at the center, it must also continually aim for a seemingly endless lineup of state elections. While this this federalization of the Indian system and the collapse of the Congress Party, until the recent consolidation of the BJP, generally prevented the overconcentration of power in the hands of one person and required more consultation at federal and state levels in decision-making, the same developments have also imposed a “democratic constraint” on forging economic, foreign, and national-security policies.⁶¹

Examples of this dynamic abound. In 2008, the government of then Prime Minister Manmohan narrowly survived a no-confidence vote when his Marxist coalition partners withdrew over Singh’s pursuit of the so-called US–India Civilian Nuclear Deal. The deal and his government survived because Singh, in an uncharacteristically bold move, sought support from India’s smaller, regional parties as well as independent lawmakers. His government also encouraged abstentions in the vote and sought to secure defectors from other parties. In fact, the parties even arranged for the temporary release of jailed legislators such that they could vote. In some cases, parliamentarians were even pushed into the assembly in their wheelchairs, despite their hospital treatments and illnesses.⁶² In other cases, political leaders in India’s various states have influenced the country’s foreign policy by asserting their polity’s preferences in adjacent countries with ethnic ties or historical and cultural links. India’s Punjab has pressured the center to expand greater cross-border—especially commercial—contacts with Pakistan’s Punjab,⁶³ and Indian Sikhs,

concentrated in the Punjab, have also sought greater access to historical Sikh shrines in Pakistan.⁶⁴ Similarly, Bengal's powerful powerbroker, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, is able to exert enormous influence over the country's policies with respect to Bangladesh whether one focuses upon trade policies, water disputes, border concerns, or the ongoing Rohingya crisis.⁶⁵ During the 1980s, India's Congress Party even provided military and other assistance to Sri Lanka's ethnonationalist insurgency group the Tamil Tigers in effort to woo Tamils in Tamil Nadu as state politicians engaged in competitive outbidding over who could support the insurgents more. At the same time, the turnout of the same voters and politicians after a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber killed Rajiv Gandhi was equally critical in the government's ability to turn against the group.⁶⁶ Both the BJP and Congress, at various points in time, also shaped their party's policies towards the Sri Lankan civil war with the explicit aim of not alienating their coalition partners in Tamil Nadu.⁶⁷

Similar "democratic constraints" render further economic reforms extremely difficult in large measure because politicians are wary of generating resentment among India's voters should they do so. Politicians instead have focused upon relatively easier reforms that do not directly affect the general population or have pursued "reform by stealth...which has involved manipulating the presentation of economic reforms by suggesting that the reforms were not significant departures from the status quo, dress the reforms as pro-poor and shifting the responsibility for implementation of the reforms to other levels" such as the states.⁶⁸ A third approach has been to focus upon gradual moves rather than decisive shifts.⁶⁹

These same democratic constraints also preclude India from being able to reorient its civil-military balance, its bureaucratic inadequacies, inability to conduct strategic assessments and translate them into defense policies, and effective acquisition of requisite capabilities inclusive of a functional procurement system that produces value for the Indian taxpayer. These economic constraints also preclude India from making a decisive shift from its traditional defensive strategic culture and grand strategy which remains imbricated with Nehruvian commitments but updated with neoliberal economic policies. As a consequence, we should expect India to generally persist upon this path of incremental or even ad hoc innovation. An example of the former is afforded by India's acquisition of its first nuclear-armed submarine, the *INS Arihant*, which emerged from "an ad hoc and secret development process" that spanned decades but was never informed by an understanding of its role in India's overall maritime or other strategy. In fact, as the submarine neared completion and as more technical information came available about its capabilities, roles and missions were discussed *ex post facto*.⁷⁰

8.5 What future for India: Taking bold steps or inching forward?

India's various political leaders have evinced a distinct willingness and ability to make important changes in reaction to global, regional, and domestic events as exemplified by, *inter alia*, India's decision to test a nuclear device in 1974 and to conduct more comprehensive tests in 1998. Equally important, key leaders have been able to muster the requisite political will and necessary political capital to overcome resistance to new initiatives when they are convinced of the urgency to do so (e.g. Manmohan Singh and the US–India Nuclear Deal). The current government under Prime Minister Modi frequently speaks about taking a harder line towards Pakistan; progress has been less apparent with two exceptions: in 2016, it undertook shallow punitive cross-border raids in response to a terrorist attack at Uru (in Kashmir) and in 2019, when it attacked a terrorist training facility in Balakot (in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province) in relation to a sanguinary suicide bombing of a convoy of Central Reserve Police Forces. In both cases, the government likely exaggerated what it did with little accountability.⁷¹ However, one should not confuse these responses with more significant changes in Indian strategy absent more information. Modi's government has been more aggressive in pursuing defense ties with other countries and appears more interested in effectuating controversial policies such as India's Cold Start Doctrine⁷² and a more confrontational posture with respect to China.⁷³ Thus, one can never rule out the possibility of significant changes in response to new opportunity structures.

Notwithstanding these important instances of punctuated equilibrium, for the foreseeable future, India is mostly likely to follow the past approach of incremental and even ad hoc evolution which will inch it, over time, towards a newer grand strategy that looks increasingly less like its current updated version of Nehruvian orientation. Over time, it is reasonable to assume that India will become more assertive in shaping regional and extraregional events and ever more comfortable in the exercise of power, inclusive of military force if its extraregional interests are threatened. India's civilian and military security establishment will most likely be cajoled towards this direction owing to India's expanding commercial and energy interests far beyond South Asia. India's large bureaucracy, institutional commitments to civilian dominance over the military and resistance to modifying civil–military relations, domestic stakeholders who can slow reforms in the procurement process, and other democratic and political constraints will dampen the pace of this transformation.⁷⁴

■ NOTES

1. Thomas R. Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).
2. Cited in C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2003), 204.
3. Ashley J. Tellis, *Nonalignment Redux: The Perils of Old Wine in New Skins* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/10/nonalignment-redux-perils-of-old-wine-in-new-skins-pub-48675>
4. George K. Tanham, *Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretative Essay*, R-4207-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 1992), v, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4207.html>
5. Tanham, *Indian Strategic Thought*, 17.
6. Cited in Tellis, *Nonalignment Redux*, 3.
7. *Ibid.*, 3.
8. *Ibid.*, 3.
9. K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Grand Strategy," *Indian Express*, February 3, 2012, <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indias-grand-strategy/>
10. Sumit Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 24, no. 1–2 (1991): 11–26.
11. Tellis, *Nonalignment Redux*; and K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Grand Strategy."
12. Tellis, *Nonalignment Redux*, 5; and K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Grand Strategy."
13. Tellis, *Nonalignment Redux*, 5; and K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Grand Strategy."
14. K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Grand Strategy"; George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Ashley J. Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Itty Ibrahim, *South Asian Cultures of the Bomb: Atomic Publics and the State in India and Pakistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2009).
15. Sumit Ganguly, "The Crisis of Indian Secularism," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 4 (October 2003), 11–25.
16. Ganguly, "From the Defense of The Nation To Aid To The Civil."
17. Steven I. Wilkinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 21.
18. *Ibid.*, 21.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, 22.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2010).
23. Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); Wilkinson, *Army and Nation*.
24. Wilkinson, *Army and Nation*; Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil."

25. Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil."
26. Srinath Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India* (Bangalore: Orient Black Swan, 2010), 18.
27. See *inter alia*, C. Christine Fair, "Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India's Nuclear Test," *India Review* 4, no. 1 (2005): 23–58; Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999): 148–77; Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture*.
28. C. Christine Fair, "Lessons from India's Experience in the Punjab, 1978–1993," in *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned*, eds. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (London: Routledge, 2009); Ian Talbott, "Pakistan and Sikh Nationalism: State Policy and Private Perceptions," *Sikh Formations* 6, no. 1 (2010): 63–76.
29. Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming*; C. Christine Fair, "US-Indian Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition Operations?," *Asian Security* 1, no. 2 (2005): 157–73.
30. For a more careful exposition of Nehru's reading of Chinese intent and the role of Russian influence upon China, see Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*.
31. See for example, Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil."
32. Srinath Raghavan, "Civil–Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 149–75.
33. C. Christine Fair, "Indo-Iranian Relations-What Prospects for Transformation?" in *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 132–54.
34. C. Raja Mohan, "Poised for Power: The domestic roots of India's slow rise," in *Strategic Asia 2007–08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Research, 2007), 177–207.
35. Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming*; George Perkovich and Toby Dalton, *Not War. Not Peace?* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016).
36. See *inter alia*, Fair, "Learning to Think"; Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II."
37. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, led this engagement from the American side. He authored his account of being persuaded by Indian arguments; Strobe Talbot, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2010). Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs, led the Indian side. He has written several accounts, one of which is Jaswant Singh, *In Service of Emergent India: A Call to Honor* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). Also see Ashley J. Tellis, *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis.India.Global.Power.FINAL.pdf>; Ashley J. Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2008): 21–42.
38. Harsh V. Pant, "A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy," *Orbis* 53, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 255.
39. *Ibid.*, 255.
40. *Ibid.*, 256.

190 COMPARATIVE GRAND STRATEGY

41. Sunil Khilnani et al., “Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century,” *Centre for Policy Research*, February 29, 2012, <http://www.cprindia.org/research/reports/nonalignment-20-foreign-and-strategic-policy-india-twenty-first-century>
42. He also suggests that one could conceive of three minor schools of grand strategy based upon Marxism, Hindutva (political Hinduism), and Gandhianism. However, because—as he concedes—“none of the three has been articulated very clearly and in any great depth or specificity in relations to what we are calling grand strategy,” I omit them from further consideration. Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Grand Strategy: Six Schools of Thought,” in *India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases*, eds. Kanti Bajpai, Saira Basit, and V. Krishnappa (London: Routledge, 2014), 114.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, 124.
45. *Ibid.*, 124–5.
46. Mohan, “Poised for Power,” 195.
47. Cited in Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, 205.
48. Global Fire Power, “2017 Military Strength Ranking,” 2017, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>
49. In 2016, India outlaid the fifth largest military expenditures globally with nearly \$56 billion, which was on par with France and higher than of the UK. In contrast China spent \$215 billion (est) and the United States \$611 billion. SIPRI, “Trends in World Military Expenditures 2016,” April 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf>
50. Mohan, “Poised for Power,” 195.
51. Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2008): 158–90.
52. Perkovich and Dalton, *Not War. Not Peace?*, 31.
53. *Ibid.*, 54.
54. Quoted in *ibid.*, 53.
55. *Ibid.*, 31.
56. *Ibid.*, 31.
57. Cohen and Gupta, *Arming without Aiming*.
58. Perkovich and Dalton, *Not War. Not Peace?*, 57. See also Cohen and Gupta, *Arming without Aiming*.
59. Perkovich and Dalton, *Not War. Not Peace?*, 59. See also the discussion in C. Christine Fair and Dan Shalmon, “India’s Strategic Win: The Upsides of the Lockheed Martin Deal to Produce F-16s In Indian,” *Foreign Affairs* (Online), November 3, 2016, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2016-11-01/in-dias-strategic-win>
60. Cohen and Gupta, *Arming without Aiming*; and Perkovich and Dalton, *Not War. Not Peace?*
61. Mohan, “Poised for Power.”
62. Rama Lakshmi and Emily Wax, “India’s Government Wins Parliament Confidence Vote,” *The Washington Post*, July 23, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/22/AR2008072200161.html>

63. Tridivesh Singh Maini, "India-Pakistan Tensions: Why Indian Punjab Is Watching," *The Diplomat*, August 24, 2016, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/india-pakistan-tensions-why-indian-punjab-is-watching/>
64. G. S. Paul, "Centre lets pilgrims visit Pak Sikh shrines," *The Tribune*, October 28, 2017, <http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/centre-lets-pilgrims-visit-pak-sikh-shrines/488393.html>
65. Madhuparna Das, "Central agencies accuse Bengal of rule breach in Rohingya shelter," *Economic Times*, January 16, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/central-agencies-accuse-bengal-of-rule-breach-in-rohingya-shelter/articleshow/62520123.cms>; Shikha Mukerjee, "Is Mamata Banerjee Willing to Do What It Takes to Keep BJP Out of Bengal?," *The Wire*, January 27, 2018, <https://thewire.in/218146/mamata-banerjee-tmc-west-bengal-bjp-cpim/>; Arkamoy Dutta Majumdar, "Why Mamata Banerjee is opposed to sharing Teesta waters," *Live Mint*, April 11, 2017, <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/dtIGtxiSUVdJgo7eoBxxDL/Why-Mamata-Banerjee-is-opposed-to-sharing-Teesta-waters.html>
66. See discussion in Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (April 1991): 351–63.
67. Sandra Destradi, "India and Sri Lanka's civil war: The failure of regional conflict management in South Asia," *Asian Survey* 52, no. 3 (2012): 595–616.
68. Mohan, "Poised for Power," 190.
69. Mohan, "Poised for Power."
70. Frank O'Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, "Lost at Sea: The Arihant in India's Quest for a Grand Strategy," *Comparative Strategy* 33, no. 5 (2014): 466.
71. Shashan Josh, "Everything that we know about India's cross-LoC strikes before Uri," *Scroll.in*, October 5, 2016, <https://scroll.in/article/818324/everything-that-we-know-about-indias-cross-loc-strikes-before-uri> and Nathan Ruser, "Did Balakot Airstrikes Hit Their Target? Satellite Imagery Raises Doubts," *The Wire*, March 1, 2019, <https://thewire.in/security/balakot-airstrikes-india-pakistan-satellite-images>.
72. Ankit Panda, "A Slip of the Tongue on India's Once-Hyped 'Cold Start' Doctrine?" *The Diplomat*, January 07, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/a-slip-of-the-tongue-on-indias-once-hyped-cold-start-doctrine/>; Walter C. Ladwig III, "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 5 (2015): 729–72.
73. Rajeev Chandrasekhar, "Doklam Heralds the Arrival of a Confident and Assertive India," *The Diplomat*, August 30, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/doklam-heralds-the-arrival-of-a-confident-and-assertive-india/>
74. The author acknowledges, in alphabetical order, Chris Clary, Sumit Ganguly, and Walter Ladwig III for perusing earlier drafts of this chapter. All errors of fact and interpretation are mine alone.