

RELIGION  
AND HUMAN  
SECURITY

*A Global Perspective*



*Edited by*

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*For Annette, Constance, and Georgia: you bring grace and peace.*  
—James K. Wellman, Jr.

*For Greta, Chiara, and Cecilia: with gratitude and love.*  
—Clark B. Lombardi

23. Khaled Dawoud, "Islamism in Crisis." *Al-Ahram Weekly On-line*, December 31-January 6, 1998-1999, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/410/eg6.htm>.
24. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "In Defense of the Professional Syndicates" (news release), May 26, 1998. <http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/mena/cohr/synd.html>.
25. Tal describes Allam as believing "that all the Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist groups, were of one ilk, so that even the most extensive economic, political, or social reforms would have no effect in dissuading the Islamic groups to abandon their dream of replacing government. Faced with this reality the state had no choice but to deal decisively with them" (61).
26. Khalil al-Anani, "In Focus: Risks of Excluding the Brotherhood," *Daily News Egypt*, April 22, 2008, <http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/in-focus-risks-of-excluding-the-brotherhood.html>.
27. Sharon Otterman, "Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's Parliamentary Elections," Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/egypt/muslim-brotherhood-egypts-parliamentary-elections/p9319>.
28. Otterman, "Muslim Brotherhood."
29. Munson (2001: 487) notes that the Brotherhood "was an explicitly apolitical religious reform and mutual aid society" during its formative period in the early 1930s. It took a political turn in the late '30s in order to support the Arab general strike in Palestine and to combat "the quasi-British control" of Egypt.

## Popular Muslim Attitudes towards Violent Islamic Groups: The Case of Pakistan

C. Christine Fair and Clark B. Lombardi

### Introduction

This volume examines the contemporary relationship between religious actors and "human security," which the editors of this volume, following the United Nations Development Programme, have defined broadly as "the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable." Human security, as the editors of this volume see it in the introduction, contains at least three parts: (1) a physical aspect, involving protection from threats to basic human welfare; (2) a juridical piece, relating to protection from violations of human rights; and (3) a more elusive, culturally conditioned factor.

The book takes it as axiomatic that people lack human security, "if they are in danger of physical harm or material want; if they are suffering grave violations of human rights; or if they feel alienated, psychologically distressed, or sociologically oppressed—for example, during a period of dislocation as refugees." From the standpoint of human security, one of the most disturbing facets of the contemporary religious revival is the rise in many parts of the world of militant, ideologically religious political organizations. These groups are willing and able to use violence to undermine governments, which they perceive to be nonreligious or insufficiently religious. They generally try to replace these governments with ones that are explicitly religious. Although militant religious political groups are found in many parts of the world and are associated with different religions, the most visible and notorious are the shadowy families of Islamist militant groups that sometimes operate on their own and at other times operate in concert with

like-minded groups around the world. As popular religiosity has increased in the Muslim world, a number of militant religious political groups have emerged.

The threat that militant Islamist groups pose to human security is potentially twofold. First, the violence they employ to achieve their goals threatens the physical welfare of people and, thus, makes them insecure. Second, the states that militant religious groups seek to impose often turn out to be affirmatively repressive or, alternatively, can be ineffective at protecting their safety, health, or human rights. Notwithstanding the harm that seems to be caused by militant Islamist groups, militant Islamist groups seem to enjoy public support in some nations. This raises important questions. Does deep religiosity in certain countries lead the public blindly to support these groups on ideological grounds notwithstanding their impact on the physical or juridical aspects of human security? Or does popular support exist in part because significant portions of the public are simply unaware of the true impact that these groups have on the physical aspects of human security? Or do elements of populations support militant groups because they support their goals, means, or both?

In this chapter, we look at Pakistan to see what polling data tells us about the sources of support for Islamist militant groups in that country. We should be clear that Pakistan is home to numerous Islamist and even militant ("jihadi") organizations, all of which are active in various ways in Pakistani society. In this chapter, we focus on a subset of Islamist groups, known within Pakistan as *askari tanzims*. Pakistan has long been home to numerous militant groups, which have enjoyed, and indeed continue to enjoy, various degrees of state support. Since 1947, militant groups have engaged in violence in India and Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan. In recent years, these groups have also had an impact well beyond the South Asian theater. We will describe in the first part of this chapter the universe of groups that fit within the definition of "militant Islamist groups" and whose sources of support we are exploring. We make no claims about the nature of other groups, about the roles that they play in society, or about their sources of support within Pakistan.

The violence perpetrated by Pakistan-based militant Islamist groups has had grave consequences for the welfare of civilians in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and beyond.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, in areas where violent Islamist groups have been able to establish control in Afghanistan and Pakistan, human security has suffered.<sup>2</sup> In the summer of 2007, one of the authors of this chapter, C. Christine Fair, commissioned a study of Pakistani attitudes toward militant groups under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), in collaboration with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA).<sup>3</sup> This chapter draws on that study and depends as well on some largely urban data collected by the Pew Global Attitudes Project,<sup>4</sup> and on data collected by the International Republican Institute (IRI),

These studies confirm that important minority segments of the Pakistani public evince some level of support for Islamist militant groups operating from Pakistan, despite the damage that militant Islamist groups have done to human security within and outside Pakistan. The data that indicates popular support for militant Islamist groups must be read alongside other data that suggests that there is surprisingly widespread public ignorance about the activities in which these groups do and do not engage. Furthermore, in looking at the trends in Pakistani popular support for militant groups, there is also some evidence suggesting that the support may wax or wane depending on the degree to which these groups are perceived as indiscriminately violent. Other reasons for supporting these groups may have to do with the perceived efficacy of achieving their goals. In the following pages, we will discuss this data in detail and then consider its implications.

In order to approach this study, we organize the chapter as follows. First, we provide an overview of Islamist militant groups operating in and from Pakistan and catalogue the activities in which they engage.<sup>6</sup> These activities include limited welfare activities along with shocking acts of violence against civilians and security forces. Second, we discuss polling data that suggests important, if limited, public support for these groups and attempt to examine the roots of this support. In our analysis, we look at data addressing the degree to which Pakistanis are aware of any welfare activities carried out by Pakistani militant groups. Third, we turn to two crucial questions: (1) whether the Pakistani public supports, in the abstract, certain types of violence and (2) whether members of the Pakistani public are aware of the nature of the violence that Pakistani militant groups actually perpetrate.

Looking at the studies described above, it seems that Pakistanis are ambivalent about violence against civilians anywhere in the world and are hostile to violence against Pakistanis in particular. The data, however, also suggests a surprising lack of awareness, among Pakistanis, about the nature of the violence that is perpetrated by particular Pakistani militant groups.

We conclude that based on the data available, it is impossible to say whether Pakistanis would stop supporting militant groups if they were better informed about the nature of the militants' activities. Nevertheless, the polling data before us gives us no reason to believe that this is not true. Policymakers could explore this proposition by commissioning studies using larger sample sizes of Pakistani respondents and experimental surveying techniques (information cues) to discourage inaccurate responses to sensitive questions. And they should. For both theoretical and policy reasons, this hypothesis deserves further study. As a theoretical matter, this hypothesis, if proved, would challenge the assumption, prevalent among some theorists, that the religious revival threatens human security by

security and, as a result, are prone to accept violence. As a policy matter, it would indicate that education could be an effective, nonmilitary tool to limit the sources of support that militants enjoy.

### *Pakistan's Militant Landscape*

Pakistanis often refer to the myriad militant groups operating in their country as *askari tanzeems* (which literally means "militant organizations").<sup>7</sup> Prior to General Pervez Musharraf's acceptance of the US-given ultimatum to join the US-led global war on terrorism in September 2001, Pakistan's militant landscape could be differentiated by the group's sectarian orientation, its theater of operation, and its ethnic constitution. For example, there were askari tanzeems that traditionally focused on Kashmir, including the Deobandi groups of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in addition to Ahl-e-Hadith organizations such as Punjab-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).<sup>8</sup>

Other askari tanzeems have been traditionally sectarian in nature and include the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan.<sup>9</sup> Both these antisectarian groups are under the sway of the Deobandi organization Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI) and are funded by wealthy Arab individuals and organizations. Notably, many of these Deobandi tanzeems have overlapping memberships, and they also have strong connections to the JUI (Zahab and Roy 2004; Fair 2004). Though they have largely disappeared, Shia sectarian groups were lethally active in the past, often obtaining funding from Iran and targeting Sunni Muslims.<sup>10</sup>

Since 2004, when the Pakistani military went into South Waziristan, Pakistan has experienced the emergence of a distinctive cluster of militant groups whose activists all describe themselves as "Pakistani Taliban."<sup>11</sup> Some "Pakistani Taliban" commanders, including Baitullah Mehsood, Maulvi Nazir, Mullah Fazlulla, and Maulvi Faqir, have operated in specific agencies. In late 2007, many of these commanders coalesced under the banner of the "Pakistani Taliban" (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan) under the leadership of (now deceased) Baitullah Mehsood and based in South Waziristan in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas (FATA). Since then, they have successfully established an archipelago of micro-emirates of Sharia within large swaths of the Pashtun belt (in FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province [NWFP]).<sup>12</sup> (Note that the name of NWFP has changed since this survey was fielded. The territory is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, we have retained NWFP throughout this essay as this was the name used during the survey.) After the August 2009 slaying of Baitullah Mehsood, the coherence of the "Pakistani Taliban" was in doubt. However, after some delay and confusion, Hakimullah Mehsood emerged as the leader. Under

him, the "Pakistani Taliban" demonstrated growing competence and stronger ties to other organizations, especially anti-Shia groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan.

While the so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, the phenomenon quickly spread throughout the tribal areas and into settled areas of Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, supporters of the Pakistani Taliban established themselves in pockets in Pakistan's cities.<sup>14</sup> In April 2009, the problem of militant groups ensconced in Southern Punjab (with important ties to the Pakistani Taliban) has become apparent.<sup>15</sup> For example, Punjab-based groups such as the Deobandi Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad are allies of the Pakistani Taliban and both have conducted suicide attacks in Pakistan on behalf of the Pakistani Taliban.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, in addition to the above noted Pakistani groups, one finds in Pakistan several Islamist militant groups whose members are not, primarily, from Pakistan itself. Pakistan hosts groups of the Afghan Taliban, with leadership committees (shuras) in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi.<sup>17</sup> As is well known, Pakistani territory is also used by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda operatives are known to reside in North and South Waziristan and Bajaur among other areas in the Pashtun belt. Moreover, many al-Qaeda operatives (such as Abu Zubaidah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad among numerous others) have been arrested in Pakistani cities.<sup>18</sup>

Together, these different militant groups have long been involved in fomenting violence in Afghanistan and India, particularly Kashmir. Since late 2001 and 2002, they have increasingly been involved in violent activities within Pakistan itself. Many of Pakistan's militant groups, particularly those of Deobandi background, have splintered or reoriented in terms of their targets and tactics. Many of the Deobandi groups are tightly allied to the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban and are increasingly aiming their resources at the Pakistani state even though some elements within these same groups continue to enjoy various levels of formal and informal state support.<sup>19</sup> Since 2006, militants have launched bloody suicide attacks against Pakistan's national security establishment, including the Frontier Corps, intelligence services, and the army. The actual numbers of suicide attacks dramatically increased in 2007.<sup>20</sup> The Pakistani state has not relinquished its uncritical support for many of these groups even while it has suffered significant losses battling elements of militant groups that specifically target the Pakistani state.<sup>21</sup> Pakistani support for groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba remains intact, even for Jaish-e-Mohammad, even though parts of that group have joined ranks with the Pakistani Taliban.

Most Pakistani militant groups were established by the Pakistani intelligence agency to prosecute the state's foreign policy goals, and thus to increase its national security, rather than to advance the cause of human security. These groups primarily recruit individuals who are interested in addressing key Muslim

grievances. They are linked only indirectly to the provision of human security, and in limited ways. For example, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban both provide a modicum of public goods, such as physical security, conflict resolution, and diminished corruption, but they have done so at a very steep price. Other groups, such as anti-Shia militant groups and those that target India, do not purport to provide public service as a part of their violent campaign.

Some of these groups, however, do have a separate organizational branch for the provision of human services. Lashkar-e-Taiba's Jamaat ul Dawa is an example. Other militant groups, such as Hizbul Mujahideen, are tied to religious parties, and benefit from the social services provided by those religious parties.

### *Pakistani Beliefs about Welfare Activities of Islamist Extremist Groups*

As noted already, most Pakistani militant groups were organized by the Pakistani state to serve national security objectives, and they appear to be engaged in only limited and indirect attempts to provide human security. Nevertheless, it is commonplace to assume that some Pakistani militant groups enjoy popular support because they provide some benefit to Pakistani society, or at least to their supporters. For example, some posit that Pakistanis will support a specific militant group, or will at least decline to view that group as a threat, only if they perceive that group or its actions as beneficial to the Pakistani nation or to Pakistani citizens. Conversely, Pakistanis will be less likely to support groups if they perceive them to be harmful.

To explore a variety of Pakistani attitudes about militant groups, the USIP-PIPA team asked respondents several questions about specific groups as well as the actions of these groups and their impact. While this survey's main objectives were not human-security related, some of the data elements can and do inform the project of this volume. For example, the survey seeks to understand why Pakistanis support "Kashmir" groups that engage in violence to "liberate" Kashmir from Indian rule. The USIP-PIPA team asked respondents to consider "Pakistani militant groups [askani tanzem] that operate in Occupied Kashmir" and to indicate whether they "think that, on balance, they help Pakistan's security, hurt Pakistan's security, or have no effect either way on Pakistan's security." While the largest group declined to provide an answer (39 percent), nearly one in five believed that they "help Pakistan's security," which was somewhat higher than the percentage who believed that they "hurt Pakistan's security" (17 percent). Somewhat more than one in four believed that they "have no effect either way." We also asked respondents whether "these groups help the security of peo-

percentage (37 percent) declined to provide an answer. However, the largest group (39 percent) believed that they "help Kashmiris' security." Only 9 percent believed they "hurt Kashmiris' security."

Turning attention away from "Kashmiri" groups and toward groups that are focused on affecting the social and political environment of Pakistan itself, the team asked respondents to think about "groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ul Dawa, Hizbul Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammad among other tanzems"; they were to say whether they thought these groups "provide social and community services, or are these not part of their activities?" While more than one in three refused to answer, the largest group (42 percent) did not believe that they offered such services. Nonetheless, nearly one in four *did* believe they offered social and community services. For the 23 percent of the sample who did think these militant groups offered such services, the team asked them to "mention a few services you are aware of." Open responses were permitted, and as the data in table 5.1 suggests, respondents identified madrasas and other schools along with medical care, humanitarian assistance, and financial help with marriages and burials as forms of assistance.

Despite frequent claims that militant groups are popular because they engage in widespread provision of human services, our urban survey results do not support this claim. However, it is possible that a sample that is more representative of Pakistan's population distribution, including rural respondents, would elicit different results. This does not mean, however, that militant groups are not *perceived*

**Table 5.1 Services Believed to Be Provided by  
Pakistani Militant Groups**

Service	Percentage
Deeni madrasas	22
Schools that are not deeni madrasas	15
Medical care or services	16
Humanitarian assistance during floods, earthquakes, famine	19
Financial help with marriage and burials	11
Refused/don't know	29

*Source:* WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy, and Relations with the US: Questionnaire," January 2008. [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan\\_Jan08\\_quaire.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_quaire.pdf)

by some elements of the public as groups that provide essential human services or other human security benefits even if they have no direct experience with such service provision themselves. For example, during the 2005 earthquake, militant groups were widely hailed as providing emergency assistance. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, under a new appellation, provided well-publicized relief to persons displaced by the 2009 military offensives in Swat to rouse militants from their strongholds. The media coverage of these limited, but high-profile, activities no doubt fostered a sense that these groups are stepping in to fill a void where the state had failed to do so.

### *Pakistani Perceptions of Violence by Militant Groups and Support for Islamist Militancy*

To see whether Pakistani support for militant groups is related in any way to a belief that they are benign from a human security standpoint, one might also approach the issue from the other side of the coin. Instead of asking respondents whether or not they believe that these groups provide benefits, one might ask what respondents believe about the harm they cause and the kinds of victims they target. For example, the operations of groups that target militaries may enjoy more support than those that target civilians.

Pew data casts some light on Pakistanis' support of violence in the service of Islam. The Pew Foundation has been surveying Pakistan since early 2002 as a part of the Global Attitudes Survey. For several years, Pew has asked the question given below in Pakistan and several other countries to measure support for suicide terrorism and other attacks against civilians to defend Islam:

Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

When Pew first fielded this question to a largely urban sample in 2002, one-third of the sample (33 percent) believed that such attacks were often or sometimes justified. In March 2004, this number increased to 41 percent. In 2005, the figure declined to 25 percent, and in 2006, it declined further to 14 percent. By 2007, only 9 percent believed that such attacks were always or sometimes justified, and by 2008, support had dropped even further. At the same time, the percentage that believed it was rarely or never justified climbed from 43 percent in 2002 to 91 percent in 2008 (see fig. 5.1). This sharp decline in support for suicide attacks is

likely due to the fact that, particularly since 2006, Pakistan has been the target of numerous suicide attacks, as shown in figure 5.1.

The USIP-PIPA team asked a question similar to that used by Pew and obtained similar results. When the USIP-PIPA team posed the below question, 15 percent indicated that such attacks are often or sometimes justified. Two-thirds (66 percent) said they were rarely or never justified. Twenty percent did not answer.

Some people think that bombing and other types of attacks intentionally aimed at civilians are sometimes justified while others think that this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that such attacks are often justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

While the question is similar, the USIP-PIPA question does not specifically mention suicide bombings. This, along with different sample structures and temporal effects, may explain the difference between the USIP-PIPA and Pew results.

While Pakistani views about suicide attacks and other forms of terrorism have shifted in recent years, even when such attacks were in the service of Islam, most Pakistanis sampled by Pew in urban areas are concerned about the rise of Islamist extremism. The Pew Global Attitudes project, in two years, queried a largely urban




FIGURE 5.1 Pakistani Support for Suicide Bombings and Annual Numbers of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan.

Source: Survey results for all years are available in Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Survey Project, "Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe," September 17, 2008, p.64.

Data on annual suicide attacks taken from South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Fridayen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan," updated March 2, 2009. Available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/Pakistan/database/Fridayenattack.htm>. Readers should be aware that different sources of counts vary.

registered in those who said they were "not at all concerned." We have too little information to see if these are statistically significant differences.

A somewhat different picture emerges looking at data collected at regular intervals by IRI between June 2007 and July 2009 (fig. 5.3). In IRI's nationally representative sample, which includes rural residents as a majority of respondents, a fluctuating majority agreed that religious extremism is a serious problem. Support slightly flagged, however, between June 2007 and October 2008. After March 2009, Pakistanis increasingly came to view religious extremism as a problem. This likely had much to do with the militant takeover of Swat in the wake of yet another failed peace deal and a continued suicide bombing campaign by the Pakistani Taliban. By July 2009, an unprecedented 90 percent of those polled held this view. Given the different samples, time periods, and questions, these two surveys cannot be directly compared. Nevertheless, both polls support the conclusion that solid majorities are concerned about religious extremism in their country in a general sense.

While such questions have a general usefulness, previous survey work by C. Christine Fair and PIPA in Iran found that it is most useful to query respondents about *particular* groups of actors and targets rather than general and broad statements about violence.<sup>24</sup> This is likely because the general questions used by Pew (among others) are devoid of the political contexts of the group in question or of the attacks they perpetrate. Therefore, the USIP-PIPA team asked respondents about a series of militant groups operating in and from Pakistan and whether these groups posed a threat to Pakistan. The survey team provided respondents with a list of groups in Pakistan that conduct various activities. For each one, the respondent indicated whether she or he sees "these activities as a threat OR NOT to the vital interests of Pakistan in the next ten years." Respondents were asked about the following: "Activities of Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan"; "Activities of Mohajir nationalists in Pakistan"; "Activities of Baluch nationalists in Pakistan"; "Activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA and settled areas"; "Activities of al-Qaeda"; and "Activities of 'Askari tanzeeems' in Pakistan."

As the data in table 5.2 demonstrates, Pakistanis distinguish between different groups. Ethnic nationalists (Sindhi, Mohajir, and Baluch) register far less concern than Islamist militants (e.g., local Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the "askari tanzeeems"). In fact, a plurality finds the Islamist militants to pose critical threats to the state's vital interests and solid majorities believe that they are either a critical or important threat. This certainly suggests that many urban Pakistanis are not insouciant about these groups or even supportive, as is sometimes suggested in the media. While this is certainly encouraging, there are important minorities (14–18 percent) who do not find these groups to be a threat at all.




FIGURE 5.2 Pakistani Concern about Islamist Extremism.

Source: Survey results for all years are available in Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Survey Project, "Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe," September 17, 2008, p.56




FIGURE 5.3 Agree or Disagree: Religious Extremism is a Serious Problem in Pakistan?

Source: Data for June–November 2007 is taken from IRI, "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," November 19–28, 2007; data for January and June 2008 is taken from IRI, "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," June 1–15, 2008; data for October 2008 is from "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," October 15–30, 2008. Data for 2009 is from IRI, "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," July 15–August 7, 2009.

sample of Pakistani respondents, "How concerned, if at all, are you about the rise of Islamic [sic] extremism in our country these days? Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned or not at all concerned?" As shown in figure 5.2, there were modest changes between 2006 and 2008, with more people indicating that they were "very concerned." At the same time, a slight increase was




**Table 5.2** Pakistani Threat Perceptions of a Range of Militant Groups (Percentages)

Group	Yes, Critical Threat	Yes, Important but Not a Critical Threat	Not a Threat	Refused/Don't Know
Activities of Sindhi nationalists in Pakistan	18	28	41	13
Activities of Mohajir nationalists in Pakistan	22	33	32	13
Activities of Baluch nationalists in Pakistan	17	26	41	17
Activities of Islamist militants and local Taliban in FATA and settled areas	34	26	18	22
Activities of al-Qaeda	41	21	14	24
Activities of "Askari tanzems" in Pakistan	38	23	17	22

Source: WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy, and Relations with the US: Questionnaire," January 2008. [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan\\_Jan08\\_quaire.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_quaire.pdf)


IRI also asked whether respondents agree or disagree that "the Taliban and al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan is a serious threat." In 2008, fewer persons believed that these groups are a threat than in 2007. Recall that this is a nationally representative sample and includes rural respondents as a majority in contrast to the urban sample of PIPA-USIP and Pew. While the overall trends in figure 5.4 may be less than encouraging through 2008, by early 2009 Pakistani respondents increasingly viewed these groups operating in Pakistan as a clear threat, likely for the same reasons noted above.

With respect to al-Qaeda, recent fieldwork by Fair has found that many Pakistanis may not really understand what al-Qaeda is and, in fact, respond more accurately if they are told that al-Qaeda is the group under Osama bin Laden (Osama bin Laden ki tanzeem). Similarly, the author found that many did not really know what the Taliban (either Afghan or Pakistan) are, either.<sup>33</sup> Pew asked respondents in numerous countries how much confidence they have in Osama bin Laden specifically "to do the right thing regarding world affairs—a lot of



**FIGURE 5.4** Agree or Disagree? The Taliban and al-Qaeda Operating in Pakistan Is a Serious Threat.

Source: Data for June–November 2007 is taken from IRI, "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," November 19–28, 2007; data for January and June 2008 is taken from IRI, "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," June 1–15, 2008; data for October 2008 is from "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," October 15–30, 2008.



**FIGURE 5.5** Pakistani Confidence in Bin Laden.

Source: Survey results for all years are available in Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes Survey Project, "Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe," September 17, 2008, p.58.

confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all." As figure 5.4 shows, while the percentage of respondents who expressed either "a lot" or "some" confidence in Bin Laden declined from 45 percent to 34 percent since 2003, those who have "not too much" or "no" confidence at all increased

only modestly. Most notably, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they did not know or who refused to answer increased substantially indicating genuine ambivalence, increased fear in answering the question, or both. This raises a number of questions about measurement error on such issues in Pakistan.

As noted above, many Pakistanis believe that askari tanzeems present critical threats to Pakistan's vital interests. However, other data collected by the USIP-PIPA team indicates that many Pakistanis also believe that they advance the security of Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir. Thus, while Islamist militant groups may threaten Pakistan, clearly they are seen to have some value when operating outside Pakistan. To probe further the kind of legitimacy that these groups' actions enjoy among Pakistanis in the context of Kashmir, we put forth the following question to respondents:

In the context of the conflict in occupied Kashmir, for each of the following types of people, please tell me if you think that attacks against them are often justified, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?

The USIP-PIPA survey list included Indian policemen, Indian intelligence agents, Indian military and paramilitary troops, Indian government officials, women and children of the military, and women and children more generally. As the data in table 5.3 indicates, nearly one in five respondents believed that attacks against Indian policemen, intelligence agents, and police and paramilitary troops are "often justified." When the "sometimes justified" categories are included, support for such targets is as high as 40 percent. Support for attacks against Indian government officials was somewhat lower, with only one in four believing they were often or sometimes justified. It is interesting that even when it came to attacks in India, Pakistanis overwhelmingly rejected wives and children as legitimate targets, even those associated with the military.

While the set of questions given above focuses on the context of Kashmir, the USIP-PIPA team also asked more general questions about the legitimacy of targets, including "government institutions (like the national Parliament in Delhi and state assemblies)"; "attacks conducted against Indian targets like subways, stock exchanges, and tourist sites"; "attacks in India on families of Indian military personnel"; "attacks in Pakistan on Shia"; and "attacks in Pakistan on Ahmediya."

Among the Indian targets, levels of support are somewhat consistent, albeit lower, than the Kashmir-specific targets (table 5.4). Support for attacks against government institutions, civilian infrastructure, and Indian military personnel within India are deemed "sometimes justified" by 15 percent, 12 percent,

**Table 5.3** Pakistani Support for Militant Targets (in the Context of Kashmir) (Percentages)

Target	Often Justified	Sometimes Justified	Rarely Justified	Never Justified	Refused/Don't Know
Indian policemen	18	20	14	35	13
Indian intelligence agents	19	17	16	34	14
Indian military and paramilitary troops	19	20	15	33	13
Indian government officials	11	14	19	41	16
Wives and children of the military	1	2	8	75	15
Women and children	1	1	7	76	15

Source: WorldPublicOpinion.org. "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy, and Relations with the US: Questionnaire," January 2008. [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan\\_Jan08\\_quaire.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_quaire.pdf)

**Table 5.4** Pakistani Support for Militant Targets (Percentages)

Target	Sometimes Justified	Never Justified	Refused/Don't Know
Attacks conducted against government institutions (like the national Parliament in Delhi and state assemblies)	15	64	21
Attacks conducted against Indian targets like subways, stock exchanges, and tourist sites	12	68	20
Attacks in India on families of Indian military personnel	13	67	19
Attacks in Pakistan on Shia	5	78	17
Attacks in Pakistan on Ahmediya	6	75	19

Source: WorldPublicOpinion.org. "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy, and Relations with the US: Questionnaire," January 2008. [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan\\_Jan08\\_quaire.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_quaire.pdf)

and 13 percent of respondents, respectively. Support for harming Pakistani targets (Shia and Ahmadiyya, which have been subject to decades of vilification in Pakistan) is much lower at 5 and 6 percent. Pakistani respondents appear to differentiate among these targets with substantially more support when groups target persons and institutions in India. This support also seems to increase when the violence is in the context of the Kashmir dispute.

It is widely believed outside Pakistan that some of the askari tanzems do target civilians, even if their preferred target is military, police, or intelligence personnel. We asked Pakistani respondents to consider whether Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujahideen, and Lashkar-e-Taiba deliberately target civilians. Majorities simply refused to answer the question or claimed to have no opinion. However, across the three tanzems, only 6 percent said that the group in question "has intentionally targeted citizens." Given the number of media accounts about such attacks on civilians, this low number is rather surprising. Indeed, the notorious attack on Indian Army wives and children at Kaluchak in May 2002 was widely attributed to Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The team also asked a number of questions about the Taliban. The responses suggest that Pakistanis are far more likely to condone Taliban activities when they target Western forces and much more apprehensive to do so when the victims are Afghan forces.<sup>14</sup>

### *Pakistani Support for the Government's Handling of Militancy*

With respect to Pakistan's domestic security, the data in table 5.2 and elsewhere demonstrate that many Pakistanis *do* perceive these groups to imperil Pakistan. However, there is considerable discord among Pakistanis about the way in which the government has handled issues germane to these groups. To probe support for the government's various public policies, the survey team asked respondents to indicate whether they "approve strongly, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat, or disapprove strongly of the way Pakistan's government is handling the following issues." The team probed beliefs about the situations in Indian-administered Kashmir, FATA, and the Lal Masjid.

As the data in table 5.5 demonstrates, with respect to the government's handling of Indian-administered Kashmir, solid majorities approve of the government's approach and nearly one in three approve strongly. With respect to FATA, there is considerable ambivalence with 48 percent either approving strongly or somewhat and 34 percent disapproving somewhat or strongly. Support for the government's handling of the Lal Masjid is even lower, with 31 percent lending some degree of support while a majority disapproves.

**Table 5.5 Pakistani Support for Government Policies (Percentages)**

Policy	Approve Strongly	Approve Somewhat	Disapprove Some	Disapprove Strongly	Refused/Don't Know
The situation in Indian-administered Kashmir	32	36	13	9	9
The situation in the FATA	14	34	22	12	18
Religious extremism such as the Lal Masjid	12	19	27	29	13

*Source:* WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy, and Relations with the US: Questionnaire," January 2008. [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan\\_Jan08\\_quaire.pdf](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_quaire.pdf)

The international community has become acutely concerned about developments in FATA both because of the import for the international efforts to rehabilitate Afghanistan and because major terror conspiracies in Europe and the United States have important linkages to militant groups ensconced in FATA. As noted above, the data suggests considerable ambivalence about Pakistan's approach in FATA. To obtain a more granular understanding of public preferences for FATA, the USIP-PIPA team offered respondents three statements about FATA and asked which "comes closer to your view?" The statements are given below:

*Statement A:* Pakistan's government should exert control over FATA, even if it means using military force to do so.

*Statement B:* The government should not try to exert control over FATA but should try to keep the peace through negotiating deals with local Taliban.

*Statement C:* The government should withdraw its forces from FATA and leave the people alone.

The plurality (46 percent) believed that B, "keep peace through negotiating," best represented their view. Nearly one in four believed that A, "military force if needed to control FATA," best accorded with their preference, and a small minority (12 percent) identified C, "withdraw forces and leave the people alone." Only 18 percent declined to provide an answer. This seems to suggest that the

least objectionable aspect of Pakistan's approach to FATA has been negotiating deals brokered with the militants. The USIP-PIPA team found that Pakistanis are somewhat more accepting of Pakistani military action when the target is al-Qaeda. Respondents were asked whether or not they favor or oppose the Pakistani Army entering FATA to pursue and capture al-Qaeda fighters. While 44 percent said they favored the policy, 36 percent said they oppose it.

Similar results were obtained when the USIP-PIPA team asked about hot pursuit of Taliban insurgents who have crossed over from Afghanistan. Nearly half (48 percent) favored allowing the Pakistani Army to pursue and capture Taliban insurgents who have crossed into Pakistan. However, more than one in three (34 percent) opposed it.

IRI, using a different series of questions and a nationally representative sample, uncovered similar ambivalence about the best course of action to deal with a variety of threats based in and from Pakistan, even if respondents generally agreed that they posed a threat. IRI asked respondents whether or not they agree with the statements

- "I support the army fighting terrorists in NWFP and FATA."
- "I support the army fighting al-Qaeda."
- "I support the army fighting the Taliban."
- "I support the army peace deal with the militants."

The results of these queries are detailed in figure 5.6. Most Pakistanis do not support the army fighting in NWFP and FATA; however, this opposition has declined since September 2007 and a fluctuating minority supports such fighting. A similar majority opposes fighting al-Qaeda, while a minority supports it. Results were similar for the Pakistani Army fighting the Taliban. In July 2009, IRI asked a slightly different question than in past surveys. Rather than asking about support for the army fighting extremists in the NWFP and FATA, it asked whether respondents support such action in the "Malakand Division," which focused the attention of Pakistanis upon Swat. When this particular area is the focus of operations, a full 60 percent supported such action compared to 28 percent who opposed the army's fight. Three percent declined to answer.

At the same time, IRI found that a declining majority supported the army's peace deal with the militants, and this support declined precipitously, particularly in 2009, in the wake of the Swat debate.<sup>14</sup> The nationally representative IRI data reveals considerably more opposition to fighting an array of militant groups and substantially less support for doing so than does the largely urban USIP-PIPA sample. At the same time, it finds more but declining support for peace deals.




FIGURE 5.6 Pakistani Views toward Various Military Approaches toward Different Militant Groups.

Source: International Republican Institute. "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," July 15–August 7, 2009. "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," March 7–30, 2009. "IRI Index: Pakistan Public Opinion Survey," October 15–30, 2008. Available at [http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news-iri/show\\_for\\_country/1113](http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news-iri/show_for_country/1113)

While the military component of Pakistan's policy may be unpopular, another USIP-PIPA survey item found that Pakistanis do support *political reform* for FATA. When asked whether they supported leaving the colonial-era and draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) unchanged, modifying it "slowly over time such that the people there should have the same rights and responsibilities as all other Pakistanis," or "abolishing it such that the people there should have the same rights and responsibilities as all other Pakistanis," only a slim minority (8 percent) favored leaving the FCR intact. The largest percentage (46 percent) favored modification and more than one in four favored abolishing it altogether.

Thus, while there may be ambivalence about the government's policy of military action, appeasement of the militants and political reform seems quite palatable. Unfortunately, while Pakistan's political leaders have episodically made public proclamations about political reform, they have not actually initiated any such reforms of the FCR in FATA.

### *Conclusions and Implications*

There have been a large number of polls conducted in Pakistan designed to shed light on Pakistani attitudes toward Islamist militant groups. None have been specifically designed to illuminate the relationship, if any, between support for such groups and perceptions about their impact on human security. Perhaps the time has come to do such a study. Lurking in the polling data that has been gathered to date are intriguing suggestions that such a link may exist. If that is true, scholars of the global religious revival should reflect upon this. Policymakers should also be aware of the link and should exploit it.

Two recent, large-scale studies of Pakistani support toward militant groups have confirmed that there is indeed support for such groups. However, what drives this support is not entirely clear. Most important, it is not clear whether the current level of support is rooted in religiosity and whether or not it is insensitive to concerns about the human security consequences of militant activity.

There are indications that Pakistanis are sensitive to human security issues. For example, they distinguish between different types of violence and, thus, are more likely to accept as legitimate attacks that do not target women and children. They are also more likely to support attacks in Kashmir and India and attacks in Afghanistan targeting Western forces than they are to support attacks in Pakistan itself. To understand how this data can be squared with Pakistani support for militant groups that have targeted civilians, including women and children, both abroad and in Pakistan, it is important to note that there is evidence that many Pakistanis do not appreciate the extent to which these militant groups are implicated in this type of violence.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, as noted above, there is some evidence that a small but significant minority of Pakistanis believe that "Kashmiri" militant groups provide essential welfare-enhancing services in Kashmir, and that Pakistan-focused militant groups provide some essential services in Pakistan.

The notion that Pakistani views about militant groups are shaped by their (mis)perceptions about the human security consequences seems to be consistent with data concerning Pakistani views about government responses to militancy. The Pakistani people are ambivalent about forceful governmental action against the Taliban and toward such violent events as the 2007 Lal Masjid operation, possibly because Pakistanis believe that these actions harm the human security of civilians. Policies of negotiating with the militants in the FATA and political reform remained popular until 2009, while policies of military confrontation received less support. Even in March 2009, only a slim majority supported the military engagement. Forceful action appears to be more popular when it is directed against groups that have been identified in the public mind with violence

against Pakistani civilians. Thus, when restricted to the Malakand Division, a solid majority supports such military action. Military confrontation with foreign elements, such as al-Qaeda and Taliban fugitives in Pakistan who come across from Afghanistan, is also more popular, although important and sizeable minorities still oppose military operations against these foreign, infiltrating targets.<sup>47</sup>

All of this data suggests that when Pakistanis take sides in the contest between Pakistani militant groups and the various governments against whom these groups violently struggle, they do not do so solely on the basis of piety. Rather, Pakistanis' allegiances may be driven, at least in part, by the way in which respondents understand the nature of the struggle and the role of these groups in those struggles. Pakistanis presumably believe that the residents of Indian-controlled Kashmir are deeply oppressed, and they themselves live in a state that has failed to provide essential services in an effective manner. As we have shown, Pakistani support for militant groups exists alongside ignorance about the nature of the activities that militant groups engage in. Some Pakistanis mistakenly believe that certain militant groups advance the human security of Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir. A minority of Pakistanis believe that militant groups provide some services that the Pakistani government does not. Conversely, the Pakistani public seems to underestimate the harm caused by militant groups. Significant numbers of Pakistanis seem generally disinclined to express support for violence of any sort, either by militant groups or by the Pakistani or US military forces opposed to those groups. They also seem to have a remarkably poor appreciation of the violence with which militant groups are associated.

All of this suggests that religious revival in Muslim countries like Pakistan may not have changed the political calculus in such countries as much as some theorists have suggested. In Pakistan, the polling data does not support the claim that religious sentiment and piety are sufficient to drive support for militant groups that target civilians. In fact, it contains data that seems inconsistent with such a claim. The international community and its allies among the antimilitant/anti-extremist elements within the Pakistani government and civil society may not be grappling, as some have feared, with a populace that is coming overwhelmingly to believe that religious ends will justify actions that cause widespread harm (particularly within Pakistan). Further study is needed to confirm whether this hypothesis is correct.

If Pakistani support for militant groups today rests, even in part, upon a lack of public knowledge about the net costs of these groups' activities in human security terms, then policymakers should take note. One policy question is whether the international community and antimilitant elements within the Pakistani government can change people's perceptions about the relative value of militant groups in human security terms with regard to their foes in the state and civil society. If so,

the loss of public support for militant groups should either weaken militant groups or cause them to change their tactics. Some benefit could presumably be gained by well-planned operations to educate the Pakistani public about the actual harm that militant groups cause as well as the benefits that the state provides. This is a job for Pakistani institutions and leaders, and it will require legitimate voices and media outlets lest such efforts be understood as Washington-inspired conspiracy.

Obviously, to maximize the effectiveness of such a message, the international community and nonextremist elements within the Pakistani state civil society would also be well advised to improve their performance in providing human security to the Pakistani people. This would include providing services that militants gain support from providing and learning to battle militant groups in a manner that minimizes the suffering of the Pakistani people. It will likely mean in some measure addressing the politics of militancy and resolving those political concerns and objectives that resonate with their supporters.

### Notes

C. Christine Fair is assistant professor at Georgetown University. Clark Lombardi is associate professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law and adjunct associate professor of international relations at the Jackson School of International Studies. The views expressed herein are attributable solely to the authors and not to their employers or the funders of their research.

This chapter draws on data presented in a paper by C. Christine Fair presented at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi in February 2008 and published as "Pakistani Attitudes towards Militancy in and Beyond Pakistan," in V. Krishnappa, Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, and Priyanka Singh, eds., *Saving Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009), pp. 93–112.

1. As many of the European terror plots have had connections to Pakistan, the insecurity generated by these groups extends well beyond the Southern Asian region. See Agence France-Presse, "Number of Militant Recruits on the Rise: Report," October 19, 2009, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hk4vEsPivpw-ckQBWz39wuGvuDeKq>; Craig Whitlock, "Washington Post: Europe Not Alone in Seeing Citizens Lured to Warzone for Paramilitary Training: Americans Head There Too," *Washington Post*, October 19, 2009. Archive copy available at [http://www.scrib.com/nationworld/ci\\_13594235](http://www.scrib.com/nationworld/ci_13594235).
2. Even if it were true that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban provide security in the areas under their control, undercut government corruption, provide basic dispute resolution of family and land-related issues, and address some popular grievances, a claim regularly made by their supporters, they do so at a high price. They have imposed rules that severely infringe on citizens' rights under domestic law and

under international humanitarian law. Women have been especially victimized. These groups fail to provide essential state services such as education, clinics, and sanitation among other public goods typically provided by the government.

3. One of the authors, C. Christine Fair, working under the auspices of USIP, in collaboration with research staff from PIPA, developed a comprehensive questionnaire to probe Pakistani public opinion on a wide array of domestic and foreign policy concerns. These questions pertain to public attitudes to numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, various "askari *tanzeems*" engaged in Kashmir, sectarian militant groups, and ethnic militant movements such as the insurgency in Baluchistan and previous conflicts in Sindh. Questions to ascertain views about policy issues covered the government's handling of the crisis in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and at the Red Mosque, among other public policies. The instrument also queried respondents' opinions about several kinds of militant targets, e.g., Indian police, women and children of armed forces personnel, civilian targets such as parliaments and national assemblies. The survey was conducted from September 12 to 18, 2007, just before President Pervez Musharraf declared a six-week state of emergency and before the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The sample included 907 Pakistani urban adults, selected using multistage probability sampling, who were interviewed at home in nineteen cities across all of Pakistan's provinces. The margin of error is  $\pm 3.3$  percent. The bulk of this chapter derives from analyses of these data. See Fair, Kull, and Ramsay (2008).
4. See the website for the Pew Global Attitudes Project available at <http://pewglobal.org/>.
5. See the home page for the work done by IRI on Pakistani public opinions, available at <http://www.iri.org/countries-and-programs/middle-east-and-north-africa/Pakistan>.
6. This study does not include militant groups that are organized along ethnic lines such as the Baloch or Mohajir militant groups.
7. This section draws from Fair (2008, 2004).
8. While these groups are often referred to as "Kashmiri groups," this is a misnomer as they have few ethnic Kashmiris among their ranks, and most of these groups do not operate exclusively in Kashmir. Indeed, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad have long operated throughout India, and Deobandi groups have, in recent years, begun operating in Pakistan. Both LeT and Deobandi so-called Kashmiri groups have also been operating in Afghanistan against US, NATO, and Afghan forces. See Fair (2009a). There are, one should note, other "Kashmiri groups" operating under the influence of the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami such as al-Badr and Hizbul Mujahideen, which tend to comprise ethnic Kashmiris and have retained their operational focus on Kashmir.
9. Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times, only to reemerge. Many now operate under new names. This chapter uses the names most likely to be familiar to readers.

10. Since the onset of sanguinary sectarian violence in Iraq and Iran's 2006 victory in Lebanon, some have suspected that Iran may once again be involved in inciting anti-Sunni violence in Pakistan. However, allegations of Iran's involvement are not, at this point, supported empirically.
11. The rise of this movement seems to have coincided with or was precipitated by the Pakistani military operations in FATA as well as US strikes in FATA by unmanned aerial vehicles. See "Many Killed in 'US Drone Attack,'" *BBC News*, April 1, 2009. The 2006 US drone strikes at Damadola (Bajaur) in an effort to eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri and the October 2006 drone strike against an al-Qaeda affiliated madrassa in Chingai village (Bajaur) are widely seen as the catalyst for the suicide attacks against security forces in FATA and NWFP. For more facts about this attack and its consequences, see Fair (2009b).
12. Baitullah Mehsud claimed many allies, all of whom seek to establish in various degrees Sharia (Islamic governance) across the Pashtun belt in Pakistan including the FATA and settled areas such as Swat, where the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi or Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (TNSM) has been active and successful in coercing the state to accede to granting sovereignty. In late February 2008, two dissident commanders, Mullah Nazir of South Waziristan and Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan, set aside their differences with Baitullah Mehsud and forged the Shura Irtihad-ul-Mujahidien. See Abbas (2007a, 2008) and Syed Shoaib Hasan, "Profile: Baitullah Mehsud," *BBC News*, December 28, 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/7163626.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7163626.stm). Pakistan has considered Maulvi Nazir an ally because he helped oust or kill numerous Uzbeks in South Waziristan. He is considered to be a dedicated foe of US and NATO forces as he dispatches fighters to Afghanistan. Gul Bahadar has had a number of differences with Baitullah Mehsud.
13. Talibanization next spread to Bajaur after Waziristan. Most recently, the Pakistan Taliban has emerged in areas that had previously been peaceful, such as Mohmand Agency, Orakzai, and Kurram. It has also emerged in the frontier areas of Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwar, Dera Ismil Khan, and Swat. Throughout the summer of 2007, Pakistan's Frontier Corps along with the Frontier Constabulary battled the Pakistani militants associated with the TNSM, which seized the Swat Valley in late October. See Fair (2007).
- The valley was wrestled from the militants when elements from the Eleventh Corps entered the fray, and Pakistan's armed forces remained engaged in Swat until the early 2009 peace deal was forged. This deal ceded sovereignty to the TNSM in the guise of government-sanctioned imposition of Sharia (Nizam-e-Adil) in Swat and Malakand. There is very little scholarly literature on this phenomenon, with most coverage taking place in the popular press or security publications. See, *inter alia*, Yusufzai (2007). See also Fair (2007: n. 8); Abbas (2007a, b); Idrees Bakhtiar, "Between the Lines," *The Herald*, July 2007; Ghafar Ali Khan, "The Lost Frontier," *The Herald*, July 2007; Owais Tohid, "The New Frontier," *Newsline*, April 2004,

- <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2004/04/the-new-frontier>; Tohid, "The Warrior Tribes," *Newsline*, April 2004, <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2004/04/the-warrior-tribes>; Zahid Hussain, "Al-Qaeda's New Face," *Newsline*, August 2004, <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2004/08/al-qaedas-new-face>. For a recent article, see Anand Gopal, "Pakistani Taliban in Swat Refuse to Give Up Arms: The Militants Had Struck a Deal to Relinquish Their Weapons in Return for Islamic Law in the Region," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 16, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2009/0416/p99s01-dtcs.html>, accessed January 15, 2012.
14. Pakistani Taliban supporters were ensconced in the Lal Masjid until the Pakistani security forces launched Operation Silence in July 2007 to oust them. See Zahid Hussain, "The Battle for the Soul of Pakistan," *Newsline*, July 2007, [www.newslinemagazine.com/pk/News/July2007/coverjuly2007.html](http://www.newslinemagazine.com/pk/News/July2007/coverjuly2007.html). See also Fair (2009b).
15. See Sabrina Tavernise, Richard A. O'Connell Jr., and Eric Schmitt, "United Militants Threaten Pakistan's Populous Heart," *New York Times*, April 13, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/asia/14punjab.html>.
16. The Jaish-e-Mohammad leader, Masood Azhar, was close to the Taliban. In fact, Jaish-e-Mohammad, which shares considerable membership and infrastructure with LeJ, was the first South Asian Islamist group to use suicide attacks in the region. In that 2000 attack, Mohammad Bilal, a British Pakistani, attacked the Indian Army headquarters in Srinagar. Information from author interviews with Pakistani journalists and a terrorism analyst in February 2009. Also see Emma Brockes, "British Man Named as Bomber Who Killed 10," *The Guardian*, December 28, 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/dec/28/india.kashmir>.

While it is tempting to view this as a "new theater" or even as a future site of a redux of the Talibanization of Swat in the heartland of Punjab, these sites of militancy are interrelated.

17. The Afghan Taliban remains focused on ousting foreign forces in Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring a role in governing Afghanistan. See, *inter alia*, Senator Carl Levin, "Opening Statement of Senator Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Afghanistan and Pakistan," February 26, 2009, <http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=308740>; Barnett R. Rubin, "Saving Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62270/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan>.
18. See comments made by National Intelligence Director John Negroponte cited in "Al-Qaeda 'Rebuilding' in Pakistan," *BBC News Online*, January 12, 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6254375.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6254375.stm); Kronstadt (2008).

19. While their targets have included President Musharraf, they have also included other high-value military and civilian leaders. Al-Qaeda leaders continue to operate and plan attacks from the tribal areas, including, until his death, Osama bin Laden, as well as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, and Abu al-Yazid. Recent attacks and plots—such as the successful July 2005 attack in London, a transatlantic

tic plot foiled in 2006, and a plot to attack US and German targets in 2007—have connections back to Pakistan's Pashruu belt.

20. That said, the afore-noted innovation in targeting seems to have occurred in 2006 in response to US attacks on sites in Bajour. For example, on November 5, 2007, a suicide attacker assaulted army recruits doing exercises in northwest Pakistan, killing at least forty-one soldiers and wounding dozens. This attack was reportedly in retaliation for the US strike on a purported madrasa on October 30, 2007, which killed eighty-two persons. See Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, "Suicide Bombing Kills 41 Troops at Pakistani Army Base: Attack Called Reprisal for Strike on School," *Washington Post*, November 9, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/08/AR2006110800397.html>.
21. While Pakistan considers some of the militant groups to be allies, e.g., the Afghan Taliban and the so-called Kashmir groups, it has acted against some other groups, such as the TNSM and elements of the Pakistani Taliban, suffering serious losses in the process. For details of the actions and the consequences, including the possible creation of a broad Pashruu insurgency framed in Islamist terms and what seems to be the "Pakistanization of al-Qaeda," see generally Fair (2009b).
22. See USIP, "USIP and PIPA Give Advance Briefing on Unprecedented In-Depth Poll of Iranians," January 16, 2007, <http://www.usip.org/programs/projects/iran-working-group/>.
23. During recent enumerator training in April 2009, the author and her collaborator, Jacob Shapiro, found that few enumerators really knew what al-Qaeda was. Given low familiarity among enumerators, it seemed doubtful that they could adequately explain it to a respondent. This may explain why the nonresponse rate for al-Qaeda-related questions is higher in Pakistan than it is elsewhere.
24. As is well known, one of Washington's concerns about Pakistan is the sanctuary that the Taliban forces enjoy in Pakistan. As the Taliban were the clients of the Pakistani state for several years and given that the reversal of the official policy of support encountered some resistance, the team wanted to explore Pakistani beliefs about the Taliban and its activities. The team first queried respondent beliefs about Taliban activities by asking respondents to think about "attacks by the Taliban against NATO [Western] troops in Afghanistan" and indicate whether they "approve of them, disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them? Do you feel that way somewhat or strongly?" Thirty percent strongly or somewhat approved. Only 15 percent disapproved and another 18 percent had "mixed feelings." The remaining 37 percent were refusals or "do not know" responses. Next they were asked about "attacks by the Taliban against Afghan troops and police in Afghanistan." Only 5 percent strongly approved and another 13 percent approved somewhat. In contrast, 29 percent disapproved somewhat or strongly while 14 percent had "mixed feelings." The remaining 38 percent did not provide a response.

25. IRI found stronger support for this option than did USIP-PIPA, although the two results cannot strictly speaking be compared, due to different samples, time frames, and questions.
26. Pakistanis also fail to recognize the role of Pakistani state institutions in supporting these groups and their violent operations.
27. US and other foreign military operations are deeply opposed even when the targets are foreign and seeking refuge in Pakistan from Afghanistan.