

# Pakistan's Future: The Bellagio Papers

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The papers below are one component of a project conducted at the Brookings Institution in 2010.<sup>1</sup> They were written by the participants in a conference in Bellagio, Italy in May 2010 that examined the future of Pakistan.

This project was conceived shortly after the publication of the *Idea of Pakistan*, in which Chapter 8 looked at 'alternative' futures, speculating on the directions in which Pakistan might evolve.<sup>2</sup> These included the continuation of the "establishment" dominated Pakistan, a state in which democratic forms—if not democracy—were maintained. This is also a state with stable if not good relations with two of its neighbors, Afghanistan and India. Overt military rule was also discussed, as was the emergence of a truly "Islamic" state, or even a full-fledged democracy. The book also examined the possibility of a Pakistan in which the provinces of the Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh, Balochistan, or even the Mohajir dominated areas of urban Sind and Karachi broke away. Finally, the possibility that Punjab itself might split was briefly noted, as was the possibility of a new war with India. At the time, Pakistan's role in Afghanistan was not seen as a major problem, nor did that study examine the role of the press and other changes in culture and society.

By 2006 it was clear that Pakistan was, if not 'failing,' at least not fulfilling the hopes that many people had for the regime of General/President Pervez Musharraf. There was always room for skepticism regarding Musharraf's claims to be Pakistan's saviour, and the warning indicators that were described in 2004 were all blinking bright red by 2006.

In returning to the question of what makes Pakistan work and what might be its future, a three-fold strategy was pursued.<sup>3</sup> This collection of papers written by a group of Pakistan specialists comprises one prong of that strategy. The other two are a survey of recent predictions of Pakistan's future (attached below as an Appendix) and an extended essay, *Pakistan 2011-16*, which will be published on the Brookings website later this year.

The experts who wrote these papers, European, American, Pakistani, and one Indian, were asked to specify the underlying variables or factors that would shape Pakistan's future, and then set forth the most likely of these futures. They were also urged to be very brief. I chose this approach rather than sectoral analyses (the economy, the military, foreign influence) because I wanted to get the group to focus on the range and variety of likely futures. There are instructive

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<sup>1</sup> The project was partly supported by the US Institute of Peace and the Norwegian Peace Foundation (NOREF). Timely assistance was provided by research assistants Erum Haider and Azeema Cheema, and two interns from the University of Chicago, Rohan Sandhu and Jacob Friedman.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington: Brookings Press, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of prediction methodologies in the policy world, see Philip Tetlock, "Reading Tarot on K Street," September/October 2009, *National Interest Magazine Online*, (<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22040>); also see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington: Brookings Press, 2004), note 3, page 362.

differences in how they treated the same events or factors. Some contributors were however to also focus on a particular issue, problem, or factor. Thus the papers are not exactly comparable.<sup>4</sup>

The papers were edited and reformatted, but otherwise are reproduced as they were presented at Bellagio. The authors were subsequently given a chance to revise, but together they represent a snapshot as of May-June 2010 of what these experts thought were the key variables that would shape Pakistan in the long-term, and what kind of alternative futures it might see.

Two events occurred after the conference, one was the extension of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani for an additional three years' tenure, the second was the calamitous floods that struck Pakistan in July-August 2010, submerging about a quarter of the country under water at one time or another.<sup>5</sup> The floods could be seen as a classic Black Swan event,<sup>6</sup> with possible negative consequences for the people and state of Pakistan, but my view is that it is too early to judge one way or another: they could accelerate the negative trends that all of the paper writers comment on, but they could be the stimulus for fundamental rethinking on the part of Pakistan's leadership—especially the army—its friends, notably the United States, and its most important neighbor, India. These are trying times for Pakistan, but they are also a moment for reconfiguration and regeneration, we will see over the next year whether the floods usher in the destruction of Pakistan as we have known it, or whether something much better (or much worse) will emerge.

The group met for four days in the Rockefeller Foundation Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy from May 17-22. Some of the papers were discussed in detail, but generally we focused on the factors themselves, and plausible alternative futures. In the words of one conference participant, there may have been very few instances when such a grim subject was discussed in such a beautiful setting, for just about all the papers reflect varying degrees of concern (the word 'pessimism' comes to mind and I discuss hope-pessimism in my own paper). The papers show great concern about Pakistan's chances of emerging from its prolonged crisis and becoming a normal state, defined as anything resembling the moderate, progressive state envisaged by the man most responsible for its creation, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. However, very few saw the situation as beyond redemption, and my summary paper reflects the general belief (although there were exceptions) that if Pakistan got several things right, it would avoid slipping into extremism, chaos, or a nasty spell of authoritarianism or worse. That is a huge "if."

The group did not take a poll or try to form a consensus, the views of individual participants are expressed best in their own papers. There was, however, a learning process: the group was selected because they came from diverse backgrounds, and looked at Pakistan through different lenses. This was not just because of their national origin (there were seven Pakistanis,

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<sup>4</sup> The paper-writers and conference participants were originally termed a "Delphi" panel, after the methodology used by the Rand Corporation to predict events in the 1960s. However, as one participant wryly noted, the Oracle of Delphi was a woman, and her pronouncements were both cryptic and easily misunderstood, leading to tragic consequences for those who consulted her.

<sup>5</sup> For a recent Brookings discussion of the impact of the floods see Pakistan's Flood Catastrophe and International Response, [http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2010/0820\\_pakistan\\_ferris.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/multimedia/video/2010/0820_pakistan_ferris.aspx), and for my immediate response see: Lessons from Pakistan's Latest Catastrophe, weblog, [http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0817\\_pakistan\\_floods\\_cohen.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0817_pakistan_floods_cohen.aspx)

<sup>6</sup> See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable* (New York: Random House, 2010), Black Swan events are unpredicted, have great consequences, and can be either negative or positive.

five Americans, two Europeans, and one Indian), but there were three former ambassadors (Fatemi, Milam, Synnott), four students (Haider, Shah, White, Yusuf), three scholars with deep experience with Pakistani society and politics (Rizvi, Weinbaum, Weiss), three “think tank” scholars (Cohen, Fair, Guruswamy), and one retired Pakistani officer (Brig. Shaukat Qadir, who could not obtain a visa in time to participate at Bellagio; his revised paper is included in the collection).

The papers together represent a comprehensive attempt to look at Pakistan’s future.<sup>7</sup> Several paper writers were encouraged to range beyond a discussion of factors and a prediction of the future to discuss specific issues in depth. Laila Bokhari looked closely at radical groups and militants in Pakistan, especially the Punjab, while Josh White focused more on developments in the Frontier. Fatemi, Milam and Synnott, the three former diplomats, each looked at Pakistan’s strategic environment, but mostly focused on the influence of India and the United States. Mohan Guruswamy did not explore Pakistan in general, but did provide a fine-grained study of China’s role. Shaukat Qadir and Hasan Askari Rizvi were asked to pay special attention to the state’s dominant bureaucracy, the army, and Anita Weiss, one of the very few sociologists to work in Pakistan over the last few decades, shared her insights about social and gender issues in a rapidly changing state. Marvin Weinbaum and Chris Fair represent two generations of Americans with deep knowledge of Pakistan, and they focused on political and party developments and state coherence.

It is inappropriate to speak for the group, but there was consensus on the centrality of the army, on India’s role in shaping Pakistan’s identity and policy, and on the rapid deterioration of law and order in Pakistan. For the most part, participants were skeptical of the capability of outside powers, notably the United States, to transform Pakistan without a major effort by the state’s elite. Behind the issue of reforming the police, the parties, the governmental structure, and the economy, there lurks the near irreversible demographic trends that will shape Pakistani society in many ways over the long run. Together, the papers present a grim but realistic picture of a state whose importance has grown vastly over the last decade. As I have written earlier, Pakistan has not failed comprehensively, as have some African states and Afghanistan (although the latter is more properly described as having been murdered, rather than failed), but it has failed along almost every dimension. It is too important to let fail, but there are grave questions as to whether its elite has the will to make the structural and ideological changes that would allow it to become a state at peace with its neighbors and with itself. The answer to the larger question, “is it too late,” has to be nuanced; it may be too late in some sectors, but not in others. These papers, plus my own overview, provide a more detailed answer to this question.

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<sup>7</sup> See Stephen P. Cohen, *Pakistan, 2011-17* for a survey of recent attempts to evaluate Pakistan’s trajectory as a state and as an idea.

# Conference Papers

# Laila Bokhari: Radicalization, Political Violence and Militancy

## A myriad of competing groups

“May you live in interesting times,” goes an old saying often attributed to the Chinese. While many people use this phrase casually to describe events in many countries, for Pakistan it is almost a constant fact of life. Despite its brief history, Pakistan has seen many interesting times. With attention focused on militancy in the last few years, the country is increasingly viewed as the hub of both local and regional militant groups, and tags such as “the most dangerous place” and “the breeding ground par excellence for global jihadists” are increasingly attached to it. With various militant movements challenging both the state and the very idea of Pakistan—one of the struggles that has and will continue to characterize Pakistan is the fight for the very soul of the state. This trend will most likely continue as we look to the near future. In changing this trend, the first and foremost task facing Pakistan’s leaders is to deal with the underlying problems causing these tensions and increasing radicalization among its population. Thereafter, much will depend on the ability and willingness of the Pakistani people themselves.

Pakistan has experienced several waves of political violence, essentially related to various forms of sectarian, ethnic, tribal and more recently to so-called global *Jihadi* movements. The fight for different agendas ranging from local sectarianism in Pakistan itself, regional jihads notably in Afghanistan and in India, and a more global jihad and militant struggle aimed against the West and Western interests.

At the core of much of the tension and violence experienced by the country lies the key question about what is the very basis for Pakistan – the relationship between the state and religion, and the role and the place Islam assumes in Pakistan’s society. The creation of Pakistan as a Muslim country in contrast to India, its largely Hindu neighbor formed much of the initial thinking behind the idea of the state. The image of Hindu (or rather non-Muslim) India as the ‘enemy’ has been the rationale for the many Kashmiri groups, as well as for the Pakistani Army. *Jihad* became a fight against both the Indian army and the Hindu nation over the territory of Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave a whole different flavor and momentum to the many militant groups that were soon to operate in Pakistan: Mujahedeen from all over the world passed through Pakistan en route to Afghanistan, many of whom stayed behind in the region after their “glorious victory over the Communists.” Furthermore, the different schools of Islam present in South Asia, notably such Sunni groups as Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith, themselves grew in influence, and generated both support bases and rivals at the local and national levels. These groups remain influential, and are a force to be reckoned with. Constant rivalries, some resulting in violent clashes are a persistent characteristic of their role in Pakistan today.

The 1980s saw an underlying conflict between Shi’a and Sunni intensify—and groups defining their rational in forms of sectarian struggles took centre stage – the regional battle for

dominance in the Muslim world only strengthened these struggles. These are still the groups that have taken the biggest toll on the Pakistani people: sectarian groups of Sunnis targeting Shi'a, and vice versa. The *jihadi* landscape of Pakistan is more diverse than this however, in terms of its aims, methods and rationale. Recent clashes between the *Barelvis* and *Deobandis* in both Faisalabad and Karachi, or attacks on minorities, such as Christians (recently in Gujrat) or *Ahmediyyas* (recently in Lahore) show there is a broader problem: first a challenge of religious identity, intolerance and violence; second that of state effectiveness in providing security to the Pakistani people.

Thus, there are different types of militant groups with different agendas and motivations, operating in Pakistan today, including:

Sectarian groups, e.g. Shi'a and Sunni;

*Jihadi* groups inspired by al-Qaida, often with foreign connections;

Taliban-related groups;

Kashmir-oriented groups, often based in Punjab.

Each of these constitutes a challenge for the Pakistani state.

### **The crisis of the state**

Several observers point to a fundamental legitimization crisis of the state and its institutions, for being the very trigger to these continuous waves of tension.<sup>8</sup> It is, arguably, the very writ of the state that is at stake also in today's struggles in the border areas to Afghanistan. Questions regarding what structures, if any, fill the void that the state is unable to deal with are at the centre here. Why is the Pakistani state unable or unwilling to hold onto its authority? The answer here can explain much, but not all, of the success of militant groups in these areas over the last few years. Furthermore, the failure in fulfilling their developmental agendas has created a continuing existential crisis for successive regimes. With the energy and economic crises now evident, and with these severe consequences for 'Pakistan's society, the challenges are immense. A weak judicial system and a deteriorating law and order situation are only the results of the failure of the state to fulfill its responsibilities.

The Muslim state that the founding father Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah envisioned before partition in 1947 is arguably very different than the Pakistan we see today. The process of illumination of the state was most strongly apparent in the era of General Zia ul-Haq. The late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s saw the aggressive promotion of Islamists in the hitherto relatively secular Pakistani Army; this was a sign of times to come. The increasing Islamization of both state institutions and the general society, coupled with the Afghan war, were turning-points in the role of Islamic orthodoxy in Pakistan.

A more codified and strictly Wahhabi Islam was also imported into Pakistan by its close ally, Saudi Arabia, the guardian of the holy sites. The effect remains strong and visible in Pakistan today, and is arguably one reason why the militant infrastructure was embedded in the state. Furthermore, the 1990s was a decade in which sectarianism flourished, plus it also saw the

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<sup>8</sup> For further analyses of these issues see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington: 2004, and Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism. Allah, The Army, and America's War on Terror*, Pentagon Press, New Delhi: 2005.

growth of Kashmiri Jihadi groups and more globally defined groups, both in terms of membership and outlook. Underlying much of this is as mentioned above, was the country's security build up against India, its large neighbour to the east.

Support to a number of militant movements has been seen as part of a foreign policy tool which, arguably, has now come back to haunt the Pakistani state apparatus and society.

This question remains a key issue today and for the near future: To what extent, if at all, is the Pakistani establishment willing and able to let go of its old allies, the militant groups that served this purpose? The question touches upon a number of issues relevant to the very identity of the state of Pakistan.

### **The *Jihadi* infrastructure**

The state of militancy—both the local and international elements—as we see it today cannot be understood without taking a look at the link between the religious political frameworks that form the building blocks of Pakistan, and the links between religious identity and politics. Similarly, the build up of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be understood without keeping the Pakistani theatre in mind. Pakistani support to the Taliban movement and its seeds was formed both around the ideological wish for a true Sunni Islamic Shariah state and the national political aim of strategic depth into the hinterland of the Afghan territory, and so the roots of the Taliban were watered by the financial, ideological and logistical support of the Pakistani Sunni groups and political religious parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI).

The role and the platform of the religious political parties of particular Jamaat-e-Islami, but also the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islami are seen here as vital. While we today see the more moderate parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), in addition to the provincial, more nationalistic and secular Awami National Party (ANP) at the forefront, the more traditional religious parties do play a role in Pakistani politics. They have traditionally run a number of religious institutions and madaris, and are known to have educated people in ways which may have inspired a very few to go towards militancy.<sup>9</sup>

Recent years have seen the militant nexus focus on Pakistani territory: the Pakistani Taliban has emerged as a power in itself, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are seen as the base for much of the Taliban and al-Qaida leadership. Importantly the links are seen increasingly in the Pakistani “mainland,” possibly with more traditional Punjabi militant groups—exemplified through the recent attacks and operations in the cities of Punjab.

In the post September 11, 2001-era Pakistan has seen the banning of a number of militant groups, and the arrests and targeted killings of key al-Qaida and related militants. This has followed as a result of both pressures from the international community—most notably the United States, and also from a domestic realisation that the very survival of the Pakistani state itself was at risk. Several failed attempts on the lives of previous prime ministers and the country's president, led to increased efforts to clamp down on militant movements in the

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<sup>9</sup> Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge. Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, USIP Press Books, March 2008 and **International Crisis Group**, *Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and the Military*, **ICG Asia Report** No.36 Islamabad/Brussels (2002)

country. The banning of groups and arrests of key al-Qaida operatives, many of them local militants involved in international networks, has however not hindered new groups and factions from both appearing and re-appearing. Recent years have seen an intensified hunt, in public opinion seen as an American-driven massive military incursion into the tribal areas of Pakistan, the results of which often have—and continue to—backfired at the Pakistani Army both with colossal casualties in the Tribal Areas and direct attacks at regional and national security service and military headquarters.

As of late 2007 we saw the re-focusing of many militant movements towards the Pakistani homeland. A strengthened Taliban with a Pakistani flavor was also seen. While Afghanistan and the foreign forces operating there remain a key front line, a key enemy and *raison d'être* for the many groups, the aim and agenda of the most vocal and active actors in the Pakistani theatre has shifted also to include a focus on the Army, the so-called 'apostate' state and its institutions as the enemy. This provides the backdrop of the most recent development in which the foundations of the state are again challenged.

Over the last few years, groups and actors operating under the name of the Taliban—with more local Pakistani traits, have increasingly been seen developing relations with local tribes and gaining ground in new areas, such as the previously peaceful valley of Swat. This has led to a nuanced and more local focus. The question however remains as to whether this is a temporary arrangement, a result and backfire of recent events, or a more long-term shift. An analysis of the Deobandi umbrella movement the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and some of its actors may exemplify some of the issues at stake here. With the recent Nato-US surge in the region, one has however seen indications of a provoked, stronger and unified Taliban in Pakistan. This may however be too early to ascertain.

### **The absence of national debate**

The political setting in Pakistan is vital to understanding the rise of jihadi groups in the country. Historically, Pakistan served as the key channel for the transmission of resources to the *Mujahideen* resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Its *madaris* have nurtured the core of what was to become the Taliban, and from the mid-1990s until 2001 Pakistan supported the Taliban regime. Some claim this is an ongoing phenomenon. Pakistan also struggles with severe Shi'ite-Sunni sectarian conflicts, and is heavily affected by the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, especially the border regions where the popular sympathy for the Taliban is high. Finally, Pakistan has its conflict with India over the issue of Kashmir. Since its birth in 1947 Pakistan has had a constant struggle with itself about how being an Islamic state should influence its own identity as a state, and its policies. Today, Pakistan finds itself at the forefront in the US-led "Global War on Terror" as a close ally of America, which, in turn, has deepened the cleavages in the Pakistani political landscape, aggravated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in recent months.

Much of the academic work undertaken on radical Islamism and terrorism in Pakistan has focused on the historical and political context, the groups' infrastructures, ideologies and development and choice of targets. While much can be said about the political framework, a question which is often ignored is, what processes and dynamics make individuals join radical movements; what is their reasoning; what happens; how and why? These are questions of underlying motivations, but also about the landscape that encourages radicalization.



The processes of socialization and education have been seen by many as being crucial. Leaders, trainers and educators may have a certain amount of influence on the individual. Here there are both *leaders* who may see their roles as being to legitimize, convince and educate, and also *individual* men and women who have participated, in some way or another, in the struggle. They should both be part of a debate, importantly also to defame the *jihad*.

The lack of a national debate about these issues is a factor which gives any government a more or less '*carte blanche*' to act as it pleases. Historically, there has been a relatively high degree of social acceptance for "jihad" (as defined by the jihadi groups) in Pakistani society. Furthermore an unclear or unfinished debate on what Islam is to mean to the state is at the centre. The country's history with Afghanistan, the jihadist politics of President Zia ul-Haq and the centrality of Kashmir in its policies, may offer some explanation for this fact. The recent shift with the civilian government and the military taking on the militancy is arguably a step in the right direction. Yet much more needs to be done. Questions as to why the government and the military are now taking on the militants with a degree of force previously not seen, are raised by both critics and realists reminding the optimists that Pakistan is only taking on the militants it sees as challenging the state, not the ones it may need some time in the future. As such the game has not changed.

### **Government responses**

At the core of most counter-terrorism and de-radicalization work lies a need for an understanding of what is the infrastructure of militancy. However, just as important as analysing the past is the question of what makes people go into terrorism: what are the underlying factors for radicalization, political violence and militancy?

Two events arguably mark a turning point in the fight against militancy in Pakistan in the last few years: first, the events in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The event marking the change was the Lal-Masjid incident in summer 2007, wherein several hundred people were killed, and several more wounded, after the government gave a green light to remove the militants at the mosque and *madrassah*. This released a whole wave of suicide attacks across Pakistan targeting state institutions, military and police installations and the establishment. Similarly the attacks towards the military in the tribal areas were severe, and the military suffered great losses. As the conflict increased in Pakistan's western borders, the Mumbai attack reminded us that Pakistan fights many fronts at the same time. There are militant groups with various agendas, some with an aim to hit India. For Pakistan, the Mumbai attack reminded many that the state may also have to tackle those who sympathize with militancy within its own agencies. The banned terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) believed to be behind the Mumbai attack, was once a tool of the country's foreign policy—aided and built up by the Pakistani military to fight its Indian neighbor. The question on everyone's mind thus became to what extent the Pakistani establishment knew about the attack.

The government has vowed to "finish off" both the Pakistani Taliban and the terrorists creating havoc on foreign soil (read: LeT and others). As previous policies seem to have created a Frankenstein monster, the government has seen itself been put under increasing pressure both by its own population and the international community. In the tribal areas, the military is fighting an insurgency which is more diverse and stronger than previously thought. The strategy here has been two-pronged: military incursions and the negotiation of peace deals. Since 2004, successive local governments and military leaders have signed deals with both tribal leaders and militants,

most of these short lived and broken by either party. Arguably, the result of such deals has been the strengthening of the militants through their expansion of territory and resources. At the same time, the ongoing and more successful targeted drone attacks from across the border creates a dilemma for the Pakistani leadership. Civilian casualties from unsuccessful drone attacks are increasing anti-Americanism, and the Pakistan government is blamed for being too lenient towards the Americans.

### **The way forward**

Pakistan has a multitude of different political groups, each pursuing their own agenda. Some of these take on a militant shade and these are the ones increasingly challenging not only the state infrastructure and institutions, but also the very identity of the state. Through their successful attacks on both hard and soft targets, making life in Pakistan insecure for both its leaders and its citizens, the government is forced to show that it has the will and ability to cope with these threats.

A coordinated counter-terrorism strategy would be a good start. But more than that, this is about the very viability and stability of the state institutions. Among other things this will have to involve a serious national debate about (militant) Islam in Pakistan. It will also have to involve political, economic, developmental solutions not only for the tribal areas, but also for other remote areas and provinces, including quality education, health and employment opportunities. A serious discussion of what constitutes the basic security of Pakistan will also have to include a regional dimension—looking at the role of India in the region and Pakistan's obsession with its neighbors.

This is a struggle that Pakistan cannot fight alone, but a struggle that Pakistan needs to own and define itself. The future of militancy, sectarian violence and radical extremism will depend much on the government structures being able to define the problems it is up against, and the willingness to change these underlying problems.

# Hasan Askari Rizvi: At The Brink?

Pakistani's uncertain future is a widely shared cause of concern at the international level. Such a concern raises strong doubts about the long-term capacity of the Pakistani state to effectively fulfill its obligations of political coherence, internal peace and security, and an assured future to its citizenry. Internal failures would make it difficult for Pakistan to fulfill its responsibilities towards the international community, thereby further accentuating internal problems.

Pakistan's viability is not an entirely new concern. This issue was first raised prior to the establishment of Pakistan. When the All India Muslim League's demand for Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslims of British India gained popularity among the Muslims in mid-1940s, the issue of its long term survival began to be debated in British India's political circles. At the time of independence in August 1947, most leaders of the Indian National Congress, and a good number of British and other political analysts believed that the new state of Pakistan was not a viable one, and that it would soon collapse under the weight of its problems.

## Concerns About the Future of Pakistan

While accepting the partition plan on June 15, 1947, the Indian National Congress maintained that "when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all."<sup>10</sup> Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad maintained that Sardar Patel was convinced that "the new state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last.... Pakistan would collapse in a short time."<sup>11</sup> While commenting on the troubled political and administrative conditions in Pakistan, in the immediate aftermath of independence, Keith Callard wrote, "There were those in India (and elsewhere) who had disbelieved the possibility of the survival of Pakistan even under favorable conditions. And actual conditions were far from favorable."<sup>12</sup>

In December 1971, Pakistan faced an acute crisis of confidence when East Pakistan broke away from it, after Pakistan lost the war to India. There were doubts if West Pakistan (the present-day Pakistan) would overcome the shock of military defeat and loss of East Pakistan. Many analysts were not sure if the post-1971 Pakistan would survive as an effectively functioning state. In the midst of these concerns, the popular civilian leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto managed to surmount the crisis of confidence and put the country on a democratic and constitutional path. However, the question Pakistan's troubled and uncertain future continued to haunt Pakistani, and other political analysts and historians.

In 1970, Tariq Ali argued for a socialist revolution to salvage Pakistan. He wrote that "the choice will be between socialist revolution – that is, people's power – [and] complete and utter disintegration," and underlined the need for building "the revolutionary vanguard which will enable us to achieve a socialist workers' and peasants' republic in Pakistan."<sup>13</sup> Thirteen years later, he returned to the question of Pakistan's future in his book *Can Pakistan Survive?* He attributed Pakistan's chronic instability to its internal contradictions and regional geopolitical

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<sup>10</sup> *The Indian Annual Register, 1947*, Vol. 1, pp.122-123.

<sup>11</sup> Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959), p.207

<sup>12</sup> Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p.14.

<sup>13</sup> Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*, (New York: William Morrow & Co.), 1970, pp.243-244.

factors. He went on to suggest that “the question which now increasingly haunts the new generation in Pakistan is not simply whether the country can survive but whether its existence was necessary in the first place.”<sup>14</sup> The prescription offered by him was a modification of the earlier suggestion. He wrote: “[T]he survival of Pakistan as a state today does not depend on vested interests or the armed forces. Only a thoroughgoing social transformation and the institutionalization of democracy, together with the disbandment of the mercenary army, could offer Pakistan a future.”<sup>15</sup>

Interestingly enough, now, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Tariq Ali’s suggestion to reshape the Pakistani society from top to bottom is advocated by Islamic orthodox and neoconservatives, albeit, in an Islamic framework. They view militancy as an instrument for transforming the society, and warding-off the enemies of Islam and their local agents. They talk of the control of the state machinery to transform the state and the society on Islamic lines as articulated by them.

In the early 1990s, the notion of a failed state emerged in the global political discourse, against the backdrop of breakdown of state authority and internal strife in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Zaire and the Sudan. A failed state is often described as a state that is unable to perform its obligations as a sovereign entity both in the domestic and international context. The administrative and security structures, the economy and societal fabric are in complete disarray, making it impossible for the state to perform its basic functions towards its citizenry. It is confronted by multiple competing armed groups that exclude its control from major parts of its official territory. Such a state of affairs is seen as a threat to the international community. Robert D. Kaplan argued that “scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet,” and the traditional boundaries of the states are losing relevance with internal strife, refuges and inability of the states to perform their basic responsibilities. “Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map—in a sense, the “Last Map” – will be an ever mutating representation of chaos.”<sup>16</sup>

Kaplan articulated Pakistan’s problem as one that was “more basic still: like much of Africa, the country makes no geographic or demographic sense. ... Like Yugoslavia, Pakistan is a patchwork of ethnic groups, increasingly in violent conflict with one another. ... Pakistan is becoming a more and more desperate place. As irrigation in the Indus River basin intensifies to serve two growing populations, Muslim-Hindu strife over falling water tables may be unavoidable.”<sup>17</sup>

During the decade of the 1990s, Paul Kennedy and his research associates identified 9 developing countries that could be described as the Pivotal States, whose successes or failures would have implications for regional and global stability. These states could go either way—emerge as a successful states or decay and degenerate as state entities.<sup>18</sup> Pakistan is identified as one of the 9 Pivotal States that faces serious internal threats and external challenges. It could go

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<sup>14</sup> Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State*, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983), pp.9-10.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161.

<sup>16</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *The Atlantic Quarterly*, February 1994, pp.44-76.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds.), *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), pp.1-11 (Introduction).

either way – be successful in coping with the challenges or fail to address the issues. In either case the developments in Pakistan have implications beyond its territorial borders.

Some writers described Pakistan as a failed state. Others believed that Pakistan was a failing, rather than a failed, state. If we compare Pakistan with the states of Africa, that helped to coin the term the failed state in the early 1990s, Pakistan's state system, the economy and the society has not crumbled to the extent of Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and the Sudan. Pakistan's state institutions and societal operations cannot yet be described as close to some ruinous end.

But, if Pakistan cannot be described as a failed state it is not a success story either. It is a troubled state that faces the threat of going under due mainly to internal problems and external pressures. However, it has the potential to overcome these challenges and shape up as a reasonably functioning state. It can go either way: decline and fragment or emerge as a functioning democracy and a middle-level economy. However, Pakistan's turn-around is not possible without internal determination to address the issues that afflict its state and society, and international support to meet these challenges. Pakistan alone is not in a position to overcome its presently troubled situation.

### **Different Scenarios**

Writing in 1999, Hasan Askari Rizvi articulated four future scenarios of Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> The most optimistic scenario projects Pakistan as adopting a participatory political process, offering ample opportunities to diverse interest groups, to pursue an accommodating and cooperative interaction with each other. Pakistan is also seen as making significant strides in the economic domain by mobilizing domestic resources and international support. Further, participatory governance and an improved economy make it possible for the country to devote more resources to social sector development. The settlement of major India-Pakistan problems and improvement of their bilateral relations is also part of this vision of the future.

The second – a more pessimistic scenario – visualizes Pakistan becoming increasingly ungovernable with the effective writ of the state being limited to the capital city and other major cities. Socio-economic pressures and, ethnic and regional cleavages will fragment the political and social processes. As weapons are easily available in Pakistan, competing interests would settle their scores with each other and challenge the tottering government. These developments will further undermine the economy, causing alienation and frustration in a large populace. Pakistan, moreover, will face an anarchic situation in the domestic context which could trigger the rise of an authoritarian or dictatorial regime. The military is likely to establish such an authoritarian rule but it will find it increasingly difficult to keep the polity and the nation-state intact.

The third scenario visualizes internal strife in some parts of the country but life in other parts to be stable and secure. Confusion and chaos will provide a good opportunity to Islamic groups to win over the people in the name of an alternate Islamic ideology that would solve their problems. A host of Islamic groups rather than a unified Islamic movement will compete with each other and with “non-religious” parties and elements. This will add to Pakistan's internal confusion making it more vulnerable to both, external penetration and intervention.

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<sup>19</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan” in Robert Chase et. al., *ibid.*, pp.64-87.

The fourth scenario – described as the most likely – does not expect Pakistan to fully overcome its socio-economic, political and other problems, but enough to prevent the country from collapse. Pakistan will be able to manage the situation, sometimes satisfactorily but sometimes poorly. It will slowly move on the road to fuller democracy. However, this process may freeze or face reverses from time to time. Much depends how the problems are kept within manageable limit. It will be a constant struggle for survival, and uncertainty about the future would persist.

Writing in 2005, Stephen P. Cohen argued that “Pakistan will be a state-nation lodged between a weak democracy and a benevolent autocracy .... Barring a cataclysmic event or a conjunction of major crises such as military defeat, a serious economic crisis, and extended political turmoil, the failure of Pakistan as a state can be ruled out. However, failure can still take place slowly or in parts. Pakistan may be unable to maintain minimal standards of ‘stateness’.”<sup>20</sup> He suggested six possible visions of the future of Pakistan which include the continuation of establishment-dominated oligarchic system, liberal secular democracy, soft authoritarianism, Islamic state, divided Pakistan and postwar Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> Though describing the break-up of Pakistan as “unlikely”, Cohen suggests that it could take place in “at least four ways”<sup>22</sup> because of internal conflicts and regional developments.

An article by Khaled Ahmed published in 2008 argues that three broad narratives of the political and security developments in and around Pakistan influence the visions of the country’s future.<sup>23</sup> These narratives are overlapping and each can be sub-divided into more perspectives. These narratives show wide divergence in the interpretation of political and societal issues, thereby creating different visions of Pakistan’s future. However, the common denominator is the confusion and uncertainty, prevalent in Pakistan about the country’s future, and a confluence of internal and external factors influencing these narratives and visions of the future.

The first narrative, described as the external narrative by Khaled Ahmed, is shared by the world outside Pakistan, especially by the states that are affected by Pakistan-Afghanistan based militancy. This perspective views Pakistan as the center of militancy by the Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other groups that use violence to pursue their ideological agendas beyond Pakistan. Consequently, the views of these states about the present and the future of Pakistan, are shaped by their knowledge of and concerns about the militant groups and their activities.

The second narrative labeled as the civil society narrative, focuses on the perspectives of Pakistani society on militancy, the Al-Qaeda and the United States. It is based on their belief systems and ideologies rather than facts, and thus does not share the negative opinion of the non-Muslim world about Islamic militancy, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Most people identifying with this narrative are alienated from the state and identify with Islamic movements or the notion of Muslim “Ummah” (brotherhood or community). They think that the Muslim states and rulers serve the interests of the United States and the West that are adversaries of Islam. They see “America’s war against Al-Qaeda as a war against Muslims and [do not] take into account the global consensus behind this war.”

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<sup>20</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.296.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.297.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.291-292.

<sup>23</sup> Khaled Ahmed, “Three Terminal Narratives of Pakistan,” *The Friday Times* (Lahore), July16-24, 2008, p.8.

The third perspective, described as the nationalist narrative, is purely India driven; wherein India is viewed as a greater threat than the Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Some talk of two adversaries of Pakistan which are India and the United States. This perspective is widely shared by Islamic groups and the political right. It is also shared by the military circles in Pakistan.<sup>24</sup>

The first perspective projects Pakistan as an epicenter of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, and views Pakistan's future with a lot of concern. The concern outside Pakistan is that if Pakistan cannot cope with radicalism and militancy, the state and society may disintegrate with dangerous consequences for the rest of the world. Can the outside world salvage a country like Pakistan where a large number of people entertain the second narrative, which views all domestic and external developments with reference to religious orthodoxy that maintains that Islam and the Muslims are under threat from the non-Muslim world? To them fighting the West rather than the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is the need of the hour, and they cannot trust their state system and rulers that serve Western interests. When we add the third narrative that emphasizes a highly nationalist perspective, the dichotomy between this perspective and the rest of the world becomes alarmingly conspicuous. In addition to the West, India also emerges as a threat to Pakistan. In fact, India is seen as more immediate threat than the West because it shares a border with Pakistan. For these people, the state is relevant to the extent that it enabled them to achieve their objectives that are derived from religious and nationalistic perspectives. The rational and dispassionate approach based on the study of dynamics of international politics is missing in most societal level debates in Pakistan on Islamic militancy and the present state of affairs in Pakistan and its future.

### **Five Challenges**

Pakistan's future as a coherent and stable state is threatened by five major challenges: religious extremism and terrorism, appallingly poor governance, feeble economy, the misplaced priorities of the civilian political class, and the persistent efforts of the Supreme Court to expand its domain at the expense of the elected executive and legislature.

Religious extremism and militancy are the most formidable internal threats to political stability, societal harmony and socio-cultural pluralism. The growing Islamic orthodoxy and militancy have not only imposed pressures on religious minorities but have also accentuated inter-denominational conflicts among the Muslims. There is less patience for religious and cultural divergence, and self-styled Islamic vigilantes threaten those not sharing their religious perspectives.

Social, cultural and religious intolerance and violence has caused irreparable damage to Pakistan's social fabric. There have been many instances of violence against the Ahmadis and Christians in addition to conflict between the Shias and the Deoband Sunni. Pakistan is also witnessing intra-Sunni conflict wherein the followers of Deoband/Wahabi Islamic tradition and the champions of the Barelvi Islamic tradition conflict with each other, either for controlling mosques or for challenging each other's religious doctrine and rituals.

Since 2007, various militant Islamic groups, especially the Taliban, have been targeting major cities in mainland Pakistan by suicide and roadside bombings, with greater frequency. Pakistan experienced maximum suicide attacks during April 2009-January 2010. According to the data released by Pakistan's Ministry for Interior Affairs, there were 1,780 terrorist incidents

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

(including suicide attacks), killing 2,072 and injuring 6,253, including 1590 security personnel. This figure was higher the corresponding figure for 2008.<sup>25</sup> The city of Peshawar experienced more suicide and car bombs in October-December 2009 than any other Pakistani city.

The troubled internal security and stepped up violence have contributed to extremely poor governance on the part of the federal and provincial governments. These governments are finding it difficult to effectively address the socio-economic problems that afflict the state system and society. Corruption and mismanagement have greatly undermined governmental efficiency; and state patronage is being employed in a highly partisan manner, thereby giving greater premium to loyalty rather than professionalism and performance. The federal and provincial cabinets have been unduly expanded to accommodate parliamentarians, multiplying the cost of administration without any increase in efficiency and performance.

The major disappointment is the economic domain, which is performing poorly in both, micro and macroeconomic affairs. The economy is heavily dependent on two foreign sources: economic assistance from foreign countries and international financial institutions; and transfer of funds into Pakistan (remittances) from Pakistanis settled abroad. Pakistan's own economy is unable to generate enough resources to cover administrative, security and other expenditure. Major social development programs rely on external assistance.

The ordinary people are hit hard by price hike, shortages of essential food items, increased oil prices in the international market, and the continued neglect of their welfare, especially inadequate allocations to education, health care and civic facilities. The economy is especially hurt by acute electric-power and gas shortages, and the government does not have articulate plans of action to cope with these problems.

The political class and other politically active circles have misplaced priorities. They devote less attention to working together in order to address the aforementioned challenges, and pay more attention to advancing their partisan agendas. Even on issues of religious extremism and terrorism the opposition parties are not forthcoming in supporting the government. They may condemn terrorism in principle but avoid condemning specific militant Islamic groups for involvement in specific terrorist incidents. On the other hand, they criticize the government for being what they describe as subservient to the United States on terrorism issues in the region. Islamic parties openly sympathize with the Taliban/Al-Qaeda and oppose military action in tribal areas.

The statements of the political leaders on the current issues and problems reflect their narrow partisan efforts to delegitimize each other. They pursue highly partisan agendas. The key interests of the opposition parties, especially the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PMLN), include getting rid of President Asif Ali Zardari and increasing pressure on the federal government?<sup>26</sup>

Pakistan's democracy is threatened by the constant pressure generated by the Supreme Court on the elected executive. Since the restoration of the Chief Justice in March 2009 by the PPP government, after unnecessary delay and under pressure from the military and the political forces, the Supreme Court has attempted to free itself from the influence of the elected executive

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<sup>25</sup> *Daily Times* (Lahore), January 26, 2010.

<sup>26</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Political Class and Democracy," *ibid.*, December 1, 2009.



and the legislature, and stepped into the domain of the executive under the pretext of judicial activism.

Traditionally, the military has resisted the role of civilian government in its affairs and has expanded its domain in pursuance of its self ascribed task of saving the political system from major crises. Now, it seems that the superior judiciary – another non-elected institution – is endeavoring to free itself from the elected institutions and seems to have developed the military-like aura of self-righteousness to put every institution of the state on a self-articulated correct course. If this becomes an established trend the civilian political order, already under severe pressure, may become dysfunctional.

The opposition parties and a section of the lawyers support the Supreme Court's strident approach towards the PPP-led federal government with the hope that the Supreme Court would either disqualify President Zardari or build enough pressure to cause the collapse of the incumbent federal government.

In the past, a section of the political leaders supported the military's intervention in the political domain, including the dislodging of the government. Now the major opposition parties, especially the PMLN, are expected to support the Supreme Court if the latter decides to take a hard line towards Zardari or the federal government.<sup>27</sup> This will cause a serious blow to the current efforts to put Pakistan on the road to democracy and civilian rule.

### **Is Pakistani Society Cracking-up?**

If the Pakistani government and the state are finding it difficult to ensure good governance and function as a coherent and stable entity, the society is showing signs of cracking up, on multiple fault lines of ethnicity, region and religious-sectarianism. Islamic orthodoxy and militancy have seeped deep into Pakistan's state system and society. This has weakened the attachment of the people, especially the youth that constitute the majority of Pakistan's population, with Pakistan as a nation-state. The notions of citizenship, civic obligations and collective good have been replaced by the obligations of an individual, as a Muslim who functions as a part of a transnational Muslim community. The state is relevant to the extent that it helps to achieve the radical Islamic transnational religious-political agenda.

Going back to the early 1980s Pakistan's military government socialized the youth into Islamic orthodoxy and militancy through the state education system and the mass media. The state patronage was used to strengthen these trends which were reinforced by the traditional Islamic education through the *madrassas* that proliferated in the 1980s and the early 1990s, with the encouragement of Pakistan's state policy. The media was used for popular mobilization in favor of Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. These policies created a uni-dimensional and highly skewed Islamic worldview among the youth – one that viewed national and global affairs in purely religious terms and projected world affairs in terms of "We, the Muslims" versus "they," the non-Muslims – adversaries of Islam and the Muslims. Such a narrow religious mindset made them vulnerable to appeals of militant groups that advocated the pursuance of Islamic religious-political agenda through violence.

These trends are more pronounced among the people subscribing to the Deobandi, Wahabi/Salafi and Ahle-Hadith (Hadees) Islamic traditions. Others are critical of violent

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<sup>27</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Towards Instability?" *The Friday Times* (Lahore), April 23-29, 2010, p.2.

methods of the Taliban but they do share their dichotomized worldview of Islam versus the rest of the world and that Islam is under threat from non-Muslims and their agents amongst the Muslims.

By September 2001, at least one and a half generations had been socialized into religious orthodoxy and militancy as a favored mindset and basis for action. These people have reached the middle level positions in the government, the military and intelligence services and the private sector. While most of them are not expected to get directly involved in violence, they have an in-built sympathy for Islamic militancy and negative disposition, if not hostility, towards the West as the adversary of Islam and the Muslim.

A Pakistani commentator described this phenomenon in these words: “Pakistan, aided to no little extent by western funding, managed to arm an entire generation with not only guns but far worse, the ideological certainty of warriors of the faith, tireless defenders against the ungodly and evil. While the ungodly in those days [1980-1989] were Soviets, it is hardly surprising that the jihadi definition of the enemy expanded over [the] subsequent years and now appears to refer to practically everyone.”<sup>28</sup>

Pakistan faces two sets of threats to its society. First, the Pakistani Taliban and other militant Islamic groups based in the tribal areas, and several militant groups based in the Punjab pose a threat to societal peace and stability. These groups have established “*jihadi*” infrastructure in various cities of Pakistan where they recruit young people to militancy.<sup>29</sup> Various Islamic political parties and groups sympathize with them, giving them enough space to flourish and multiply.

Second, the pro-*Jihad* mindset cracked Pakistani society sharply on Islamic-sectarian lines. It has caused two major problems for the youth who find it difficult to link themselves positively to the Pakistani society and the state. First, the concept of the nation-state and citizenship has been greatly undermined for them. Most of them are alienated from the Pakistani state and do not feel obligated to respect its primacy and obligations as citizens. Their affiliation ladder starts from a person being a Muslim with religious obligations. The next stage includes non-state national or transnational Islamic movements that uphold the primacy of Islam. The third stage is the notion of Islamic *Ummah* or a universal Muslim community. As already mentioned earlier, the nation-state, i.e. Pakistan, is relevant to the extent that it helps facilitate the goals of this affiliation ladder as against those who do not share Islamic orthodoxy and radicalized worldview. Second, the notion of collective good or social responsibility has been extremely weakened, except in purely Islamic terms. What matters most is a Muslim’s obligation to God and the Muslim community-represented by Islamic movements. A radicalized Muslim mindset may use violence without paying any attention to the consequence of his action for other human beings or Pakistan as a nation-state, and a member of the comity of nations.

This worldview thus questions the legitimacy of the nation-state and the socio-cultural and economic order. The rulers are viewed as corrupt, self serving, and agents of anti-Islam political and economic forces and countries. Consequently, there is growing alienation of the people, especially the youth, from the state and the society in Pakistan (and the Muslim world in general) where Islamic discourse emphasizes the need for total transformation of the latter.

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<sup>28</sup> Hajrah Mumtaz, “Reforming the Unrepentant,” *Dawn* (Karachi), January 10, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> See the editorial “Jehadi Infrastructure,” *Dawn*, May 12, 2010. See also Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The struggle with Militant Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp.89-101.

However, radical Islamists have not developed unanimity of views in terms of operational norms and strategies of the politico-social and economic order to replace the existing state and society; they speak in terms of broad generalizations and clichés.

This process of de-legitimization of the state and society in Pakistan is reinforced by the non-performance of the Pakistani state in social and economic sectors, which strengthens the perception that the ordinary people cannot look towards the state for addressing their problems.

This has given rise to a culture of defiance and anarchy. Sporadic street protests are quite common in urban centers by the political parties, societal groups or disorderly crowds that are upset by some event like a road accident. It has been observed for the last four-five years that the protesters are more interested in making life difficult for others, disrupting normal business and routine city life, causing traffic jams and ransacking property. There is an increased tendency to block highways to suspend inter-city traffic, disrupt railway train services and plan attacks on police stations and government offices. These mini insurgencies have become routine in urban life.

The political leaders often encourage defiance of the government in order to paralyze it, hoping it will cause its collapse. The PMLN leadership, the main opposition party, has on occasions called upon its supporters as well as government employees to defy government orders, or threatened to launch street agitation. There is a lesser tendency on the part of the political leaders to use the parliament for raising contentious issues. They appear to be more inclined towards generating extra-parliamentary pressure.

These trends are indicative of growing incoherence, divisiveness and fragmentation in the society which threatens the prospects of democracy and political stability. Several parts of Balochistan are experiencing insurgency-like situations by dissident Baloch groups. The target killing of people from other provinces in Balochistan has resulted in the loss of a large number of professionals, thereby further weakening the capacity of the provincial administration and the federal government to pursue development and modernization projects.

### **The Military and Pakistan's Future**

The attention is now focused on the military as Pakistan drifts towards the edge due to multiple crises of the state and society, especially the pressures generated by religious orthodoxy, extremism and terrorist infra-structure and the growing fissures in the society. The military's importance has also increased because the administrative apparatus and the paramilitary forces alone could not cope with the menace of terrorism. The perennial problem of the troubled relations with India also sustains the primacy of the military for external and internal security.

The top brass of the military, especially the Army, is focused on three major issues. First, they are attending to rehabilitation of the image of the military in Pakistan that had suffered a lot in the last two years of the Musharraf rule. The top brass of the Army faced virulent criticism at the societal level during these years. The Army top command is now working towards retrieving the reputation. Various efforts in public relations, including the 2010 army exercise, have helped to boost its image.<sup>30</sup>

Second, the military is paying full attention to deal with terrorist groups based primarily in the tribal areas. The present series of encounters between the military and the militant groups

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<sup>30</sup> See Umer Farooq, "Operation Image Restoration," *Herald* (Karachi), May 2010, pp.43-45.

began in the last week of April 2009, following which the Army, the Air Force and the paramilitary forces dislodged the Taliban from Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan. Currently, the security forces are taking tough action against various militant groups in other tribal areas, especially in Orakzai, Khyber, Bijaur and Kurram. These successes have improved the image of the Army by showing that the Army top command has the determination and capability to challenge the terrorist groups that had become the major threat to Pakistan's internal peace and stability, and the military's primacy in the country. These operations have also contributed to the military's image-building abroad as a task oriented force for counter-terrorism.

Third, the Army Chief has devoted much attention to improving service conditions and facilities for officers and other ranks. Greater attention is being given to improving the quality of life for the junior officers, JCOs, NCOs and other ranks that did not benefit from the Musharraf government's favors for the military.

The Army's highest priority is counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Therefore, its top brass is not expected to knock out the civilian rulers in the near future. They are cognizant of the problems of the state and society outlined in the earlier section of this article, forcing them to avoid direct assumption of power. Their preference is to improve their image inside and outside of Pakistan, and to protect and promote their professional and corporate interests from the sidelines.

The experience of last two years shows that the top brass gave enough space to the civilian leadership in governance and security policy management. They looked towards the post 2008-election civilian leadership to provide policy guidelines. The meetings between the President, Prime Minister and the Army Chief take place quite frequently. However, the civil government has found it difficult to provide leadership for two main reasons. First, the lack of confidence and professionalism are the major obstacles to the civilian government assuming a leadership role in the security and foreign policy domain. There are hardly any professionals in the government for security and terrorism related issues. Most of the time, the political leadership hardly comes out with a well-thought out discourse on internal and external security. Civilian leaders invariably engage in rhetoric on security issues and examine the issues, including terrorism, in highly partisan manner; they prefer to rely on the army for professional advice. There have been more security related briefings by the army and intelligence top brass to the federal government and the parliament than ever in the past.

Second, while the military expects the civilian leadership to provide policy guidelines, its (the military's) top brass is not giving the latter a free hand. There are certain policy areas where they accept no civilian interference and in the case of other issues the top brass favors shared decision making, albeit with the military having the stronger role.

The top brass of the military is opposed to civilian interference in its internal organizational matters, including appointment, promotions, transfers and postings and their commercial and business activities. They think civilian interference in these matters will undermine the military's discipline and professionalism. The policy areas where they prefer a shared civil-military decision making, rather than the civilians deciding the matters unilaterally include matters such as defense expenditure, service conditions, perks and privileges, and the key foreign policy and security areas such as India (including Kashmir), Afghanistan, military related affairs with the United States, weapons procurement and the nuclear policy. The civilians are not expected to engage in policy making in these areas to the exclusion of the top brass.

They also resist civilian efforts to weaken the Army Chief's role in managing the affairs of the Inter-Services intelligence (ISI), although its Director General is appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Army Chief. Another domain where the military has acquired reasonable autonomy is counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The key policy decisions are made jointly by the civilian and military leadership and the military wants the civilian political leaders to build political support for counterterrorism activities. However, actual security operations and the related activities are the exclusive concern of the military.<sup>31</sup>

The key concern is the disposition of the military towards civilian affairs and governance if the political and economic situation continues to deteriorate in the future. There can be several difficult situations that may arise: the current degeneration of the political process continues unabated and the state institutions are unable to perform their basic functions towards the citizenry; Pakistan's economy further stumbles in the absence of internal support or due to internal mismanagement; the society is fragmented by socio-cultural and political conflicts, and political revolts and insurgencies cause a total breakdown of the state system in large parts of the country.

There are two other negative scenarios for the future: an open conflict between the overactive Supreme Court and the federal government and the opposition parties launching street agitation against the government and in favor of the Supreme Court. Some opposition parties, including the PMLN, have hinted at supporting the Supreme Court in the situation of a government-Supreme Court conflict. This will be a highly destabilizing development.

Another issue of concern relates to political and administrative follow-up to military operations in Swat/Malakand, South Waziristan and other tribal areas, and rehabilitation of the internally displaced people. The civilian authorities have hitherto shown a limited capacity to undertake administrative, security, rehabilitation and reconstruction responsibilities, making it difficult for the army to withdraw its personnel from the areas cleared of the Taliban and other militants. If the capacity and performance of civilian authorities remains far below expectation, this can become an irritant in civil-military relations.

The strains and tensions caused by these situations will have far reaching implications for the future of democracy and the nature of civil-military relations.

The military can publicly support a weak and divided government and thus, enable it to gain confidence for retrieving to the political and administrative initiative and assert its authority. This will also be a message to the opposition groups that the military wants the government to stay on, at least for the time being. Another alternative for the military is to build pressure on the government, either to make its displeasure known on policy matters or to force it to change its policy. Still another option is displacement of the government by bringing in a new combination of political leaders.

The military will continue to function as an autonomous political player, building alignments with civilian leaders from time to time, but not seeking a permanent arrangement

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<sup>31</sup> Speaking in a public meeting in Swat, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said that the government would not "bow down to extremism and terrorism" and that it would launch military operation "anywhere that served as a safe haven for terrorists." He also declared that the Army Chief would decide about the military operation in North Waziristan. *Daily Times*, May 30, 2010

with a particular political leader or group. It makes and breaks partnerships with civilians keeping in view its professional and corporate interests.

It can pursue its political agenda through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI). For example, it viewed the direct references to the military and the intelligence agencies in the Kerry-Lugar bill (September-October 2009) as a deliberate attempt by the Pakistan government to interfere in its internal organizational and service matters. It invoked the ISI linkages with the political Right and the media to launch a massive campaign against the proposed law. The PMLN adopted a tough stand against the Kerry-Lugar bill after the Punjab Chief Minister and the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly met with the Army Chief in the last week of September 2009. The military thus demonstrated its capacity to build pressures on the civilian government through intelligence agencies.

The military's capacity to support some and build pressure on others is expected to become crucial if the confrontation between the executive and the Supreme Court reaches the breaking point. If the Supreme Court decides to reprimand the civilian government, the civilian leaders will not be able to resist the Supreme Court pressures without the backing of the military. If the top brass of the military decide to back the Supreme Court, the civilian government is likely to collapse.

The military can impose the government of its choice if internal chaos paralyzes the latter. The military may also decide to assume power directly only as a last resort for salvaging the collapsing state and society. This can happen if various crises threaten the state system, the society is highly factionalized on various counts, and internal violence intensifies while various terrorist outfits and armed groups attempt to overwhelm the state and society. The military's direct role in governance and politics will be facilitated if large sections of politically active circles in urban centers become indifferent to its (the military's) direct political role or support it against the backdrop of the decay of the civilian processes of governance and political management.

However, much will depend on the internal state of affairs in the army. How far will it continue to insulate itself from societal polarization and religious cleavages? There is some evidence available to suggest that subtle sympathy for Islamic militancy exists in the lower echelons of the Army and the intelligence agencies. If some of the divisive trends that characterize the society penetrate the military, its internal coherence may be adversely affected. This will compromise its ability to undertake a swift and peaceful take-over of the state apparatus. This is becoming increasingly important because the base of recruitment to the army is expanding in terms of area, ethnicity and orientations of the new entrants. Education and socialization within the army have thus gained greater importance for promoting internal coherence, discipline and professionalism. Further, the military's direct intervention is also discouraged by proliferation of societal formations, political activism and complexities of socioeconomic forces. For future coups – if any – the top brass will have to take into account more factors for ensuring a swift, orderly and gentle take over.

### **Concluding Observations**

Pakistan is slowly drifting towards greater political and social fragmentation. Most threats to its future are internal because of the sharpening multiple fault lines, a weak and dispirited civilian leadership, an overconfident superior judiciary bent on establishing its superiority over the elected executive and legislature, and the threat of religious extremism and

militancy. The society is more fragmented than ever before, and the economy is unable to internally develop enough resources to sustain the state system. If these trends continue, Pakistan may lose efficacy and become a non-performing state in most sectors of society.

If left alone by the international community the Pakistani state can go under whose negative ramifications will go beyond its territorial borders. However, if the international community can devote resources to human and social development, focusing mainly on education, health care and economic development that benefits the common person, there are chances of salvaging the situation. Unlike a number of African states, Pakistan has sufficient educated and highly trained human resources and its institutions such as the bureaucracy and the military continue to function effectively. Some sectors of the economy like communications and information technology and several scientific and technical fields, also continue to do well. Agriculture has much potential. If immediate attention is given to these areas, Pakistan can be pulled back from the brink.

This calls for a thorough review of Pakistan's current political and security profile. It needs to learn to live in peace with itself and improve its relations with neighboring states, especially India, to ensure peace and stability at its borders. It should also seek to relax relations with Afghanistan.

Pakistan needs to look inward, in order to promote internal political harmony and stability, strengthen the economy, and create a knowledge-based rather than a religious belief-based society. All is not lost in the case of Pakistan. There is some hope left. Can Pakistani leaders and the international community work together to pull back Pakistan from the brink?

# Shaukat Qadir: Still an Uncertain Future

Predicting the future is best left to soothsayers, palmists, and astrologists; so-called analysts, prefer to preclude any attempt at predictions, with sufficient clauses to safeguard their effort, if they are often found to be in error.

I would not like to attempt predicting the future of any peoples, but attempting to address a county like ours, beset with its myriad of problems and many intangibles, makes the challenge almost impossible. However, since that is the object of this conference and I have no alternative but to make an honest attempt, I intend to begin with the positives, negatives, and the intangibles and the unpredictable, as I see them today, before offering alternative scenarios for your consideration. In conclusion, I will write a few words on the military and the Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan.

## **Our Positives**

1. There is a democratically elected political government in place in Pakistan.
2. The senior leadership in the military is making every endeavor to steer clear of politics and the COAS seems determined to re-establish the principle of supremacy of the political government.
3. The military has swiftly recovered from the devastating effect of Musharraf's policies and has been again molded into an efficient fighting unit, under Kayani, the new COAS. It is also demonstrating its efficiency in dealing with insurgents in the recently renamed province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
4. Despite the frequent terrorist attacks, the people of Pakistan continue to support the military in its efforts to root out this evil. Without this national support, the military's efforts could never be successful.
5. Even the efficiency of the domestic intelligence, police, and security forces has improved; and the people are becoming increasingly appreciative.
6. The judiciary, having fought for its independence is reasserting itself (perhaps overly so, but time will permit it to find the right balance.
7. The recently approved Eighteenth Amendment to the constitution has restored the balance of powers, as envisaged in the original 1973 Constitution and has decided on greater political autonomy to the provinces. There are, however, a couple of clauses in this amendment that makes the chairperson of each political party more powerful than he/she should be.
8. The economy has begun to show signs of recovering and restored confidence of the people.

## **Our Negatives**

1. The political government may have been democratically elected, but it still fails to provide good governance to the people. There is increasing lack of confidence in the government and its representatives, visible in the increasing numbers and issues on which the people are taking to the streets to resort to violence in their demonstrations against the government.
2. The unrest in the Hazara (the non-Pashtun portion of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) could become increasingly difficult to handle and might snowball into a demand for a Saraiki province (also a simmering issue for many years) in Southern Punjab. Personally, I have



been in favor of increasing the number of provinces in Pakistan, however, that is another subject.

3. Despite the military's success in the tribal areas, in this kind of 'war', the military can only win battles; the war has to be won politically. There seems no recognition of this aspect, nor is there a comprehensive political strategy to deal with it. The political leadership seems content to cede its authority over all matters remotely related to 'security' to GHQ. As a consequence, the administrative vacuum left by the exit of the Taliban is not being filled. The provincial government refuses to take over the Taliban captured by the army in Swat and Waziristan (numbering over 2000), let alone initiate legal proceedings against them. The only plausible explanation of this fact is that the provincial political leadership is afraid of the Taliban revenge. As a consequence, these prisoners continue to languish in military custody; by all standards of 'human rights', in illegal custody; but the army has no options; it can hardly turn them loose again! What is more, the only effort(s) to reclaim the minds of those young children, corrupted by Taliban teachings and convinced of their 'Islamic' duty to kill people through suicide attacks, is also being made under the aegis of the army; which has hired the services of child psychologists, who have had a remarkable success.
4. However, it is a physical impossibility for the Pakistan military to maintain a credibly deterrent force on its eastern borders, fight the Taliban, maintain sufficient presence in the recaptured areas to prevent a return of the Taliban and, simultaneously, assume politico-administrative control of these recaptured areas. What is more, the mere fact that the political leadership has not assumed its rightful duties in these areas is tantamount to a voluntary ceding of political authority to the army. This is something that the army does not want.
5. Despite the COAS' efforts to remain apolitical, he has frequently been left with little option but to interfere, albeit from behind the scene. What is more, internationally, he has acquired a stature that forces him to frequently take the lead role, as was reported in most US dailies, during the recent visit of the Pakistani delegation, for a 'Strategic Dialogue', ostensibly under the leadership of the foreign minister.
6. Rampant corruption continues. Not just the people, even the military feel uncomfortable with Zardari and his cronies.
7. Another politico-judicial crisis appears to be in the offing on two major issues: the government's reluctance to obey the Supreme Court and re-open the Swiss cases against Zardari, and the appeal filed in the Apex Court to consider the constitutional validity of certain clauses in the Eighteenth Amendment.
8. The relations between the most important province, Punjab, governed by the majority party in Punjab, the PML(N), which is the opposition party in the central government, and the central government continue to be strained. The Punjab Governor is a staunch PPP member, who continues to create hurdles for the provincial government. Admittedly, the Punjab government is also not performing as well as it was expected to; which only aggravates the situation.
9. Spiraling prices, energy and water shortage, are all taking toll of the common man; who is increasingly disillusioned.
10. Balochistan is an increasing cause for concern. Indian involvement there, and in our tribal areas is now internationally accepted, at least by established (non-aligned) journalists, like Robert Fisk.

11. India's capability of exercising control over two of the western rivers of Punjab, which were supposed to be Pakistan's share under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty are assuming alarmingly dangerous proportions for our future relations. For those John Briscoe, an expert on the Indus Water system, provides considerable detail about this issue.
12. Terrorism, insecurity, and frequent deaths of the near and dear are taking their toll, even as the people so far remain determined. The question is, how long will it be before they take matters in their own hands and we find the military being forced to quell vigilantes.

#### **The intangibles and the unpredictable**

The intangibles and the unpredictable factors are innumerable; here are a few:

1. Will this political government complete its tenure? So far, it seems likely, but unrest in the populace is spreading and it is impossible to predict the outcome of even the mounting protests against electricity load shedding.
2. How long will people continue to suffer from the scourge of terrorism without losing patience?
3. Will the COAS accept the extension, that informed sources say, he has been offered? If he does, how long will he stay? Will his extension affect his personal performance or the army's in a beneficial manner or not? He has accepted his role as the real power behind the scenes, and continues to perform creditably, in all humility; will that last, if he stays on for an extended tenure? [Note: at the time of revision, General Kayani has received a three year extension in office, this is to be welcomed, but of course uncertainties remain]
4. Although it seems unlikely, and almost impossible, so long as Kayani remains COAS, but will the continuing failure of our political masters again create a situation where the military may be forced to intervene politically, albeit, only as an interim measure?
5. Is there still any link between the Pakistani intelligence Agencies and the Pakistani Taliban? I know of the connection(s) with certain Afghan chapters, but this question keeps being raised domestically and by certain elements abroad. I am fairly certain there is no longer any link, but I don't know for sure. If there is one, it will have its own unpredictable ramifications.
6. Will Pakistan's stuttering economy manage to stage some kind of a recovery, despite power shortages? Presently, even if we were given preferential treatment by the US for export of our largest and best industry; textile, I doubt if we could meet the export requirements with the prevailing energy shortage.
7. Will India place us under greater pressure through its control over the timing of the flow of water or not?
8. Will India continue its coercive diplomacy through creating unrest in our tribal areas and Balochistan, or not? Let me state unequivocally that if Indian friends choose to level counter allegations on Pakistan in this context, I have no intention of disputing these. We would both be better off by stopping this activity. The only reason why the issue raised here appears one-sided is because we are discussing Pakistan.
9. How will the increasing number of the religious right in Punjab, coupled with the growing unrest shape up in the immediate future; and will the government be able to prevent the increasing growth of religious intolerance in Punjab?

The list is endless, but I will leave it here and move on to discuss possible scenarios.

### **Possible Scenarios**

Premise: At least for the foreseeable future it seems that there is no likelihood of a military takeover, even though the COAS may continue to be the most influential actor from behind the scene.

### **Comments:**

While clauses of the Eighteenth Amendment have been referred to the Supreme Court to decide whether they are repugnant to the constitution, I (a layman, not a constitutional lawyer) do not find any of these clauses unreasonable. The issue being most talked about is the fresh procedure for appointing Judges to the High Courts and the Supreme Court. In this context, their approval by a Committee of Elected Members is not unreasonable. According to the theory of political science, 'sovereignty' rests with the people and, when they have elected their representatives; the elected representatives become 'sovereign' since, theoretically, they are representative of and, therefore, are (considered to be) the spokespersons of the people.

The actual clause(s) that gives rise to concern for me has not been referred to the SC yet. The first clause is the amendment to Article 63(A) of the constitution, according to which an elected member who opts to vote against the 'Party Policy', which means in effect, the wishes of the Chairperson of his/her party could be disqualified. In effect, Zardari could quit the office of the president today and yet no member of his party could remain an 'elected' member or hold any office intended for an 'elected' member, if he/she opposed the wishes of Zardari.

The other, related cause for concern is the removal of the clause in the constitution, necessitating periodical elections within each political party. In effect, therefore, an individual holding an office within the party could continue to do so for life! Coupled with the amendment to Clause 63(A) we are destined to have leaders of political parties as dictators; even if they are not elected as public representatives.

This is destruction of the very essence of any democratic system.

### **Scenario One (best outcome)**

That after the Eighteenth Amendment, the PM begins to assert himself, (with Zardari's blessings), attempts to grasp the complexity of the security situation we are faced with; formulates a comprehensive 'security policy' (one that not only deals with the conventional threat requiring the use of force, but includes food security, health security, education, job security, energy security, water security, and every conceivable aspect that affects the Pakistani citizen). Of necessity, such a policy will have to encompass a strategy of dealing with the growth of the religious right, particularly in Punjab.

While doing so, it might be in the national interest for Kayani, the COAS to be offered an extension which he (might) accept. However, if he does, the central and respective provincial governments ensure that there is no politico-administrative vacuum that the army has to fill. The government(s) must not cede political authority to the military; and must leave the military to deal with its assigned role.

After handing over the administration of areas re-captured from the Taliban to the provincial government, the military clears the remaining tribal area, where remnants of the Taliban still reign. The political leadership, not only takes over the administration, but also absorbs the tribal areas into the mainstream of the Pakistani political system.

While employing force judiciously, wherever necessary, the government also ensures that genuine grievances of deprived individuals and groups are addressed expeditiously. In this, Balochistan must have priority, second only to the tribal areas.

The governor of Punjab steps back to let the government function unhindered.

The economy begins to strengthen and unemployment decreases while inflation is reduced.

India and Pakistan cease fomenting unrest in each other's troubled regions; and India ensures the desired flow of water to Pakistan from Chenab and Jhelum Rivers. Meantime a mutually acceptable solution is found through a re-negotiation of the Indus Water Treaty for a long term assurance to Pakistan

In short, the central and political governments begin to perform the function(s) that they have been elected for and begin to deliver 'good governance'.

#### **Comment, preceding scenario two:**

Nawaz Sharif's party, the PML(N), has often been referred to as a 'friendly' opposition. This is because, despite the frequent refusal by Zardari to meet his verbal/written, publicly announced and unannounced agreements, the PML(N) has not sought his exit nor has it attempted to force the issue of early elections; something many an analyst expected. This is not out of any love for the PPP or Zardari. Prior to the infamous 'Swat Peace Deal', Nawaz Sharif was the strongest opponent to the use of force against the Taliban; insisting on finding a negotiated settlement as the only option. In fact he and his party have frequently been accused of soft pedaling towards the rightists and even of being rightists, in their own right.

When the Taliban demonstrated the kind of rule they would impose on Swat, extensively covered by the media, the Pakistani nation suddenly united against the Taliban and strongly supported the use of force. The PML(N) had no choice but to voice the people's demand as forcefully as it could. However, it is my considered opinion that the party in general and its leadership, in particular, is reluctant to come into power at a stage when it will have the responsibility of authorizing the use of force against the Taliban. It would far rather take over after the military success has been achieved and would prefer to deal with the aftermath.

This is substantiated by the PML(N) government's reluctance to face this issue in Punjab, the province it governs. It is primarily for this reason that the PML(N) does not want mid-term elections.

#### **Scenario Two (almost worst case)**

Whether the PPP led government in the center lasts its remaining three years or not, it continues on its present path, bungling everything, failing to address the concerns of the people. Zardari continues to create one crisis after another and the PM continues to try bailing him out.

Alternately, in the event of a mid-term election, or an election after the scheduled three years, the next government shows no radical improvement.

No comprehensive 'Security Policy' is created and the concerned political government continues not to fill the administrative vacuum left by the departure of the Taliban, leaving it up to the army to do what it can.

With the army spread thin on the ground, hamstrung by committing resources to administer areas reclaimed from the Taliban, the Taliban re-emerge in North Waziristan (as they already have; though these elements are carefully avoiding running afoul of the military so far and have announced their intent of opposing terrorist attacks on Pakistani territory), they also regroup in the Aurakzai, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies (the order in which these are named is deliberate, since the Aurakzai will be the heartland and the other two, rim-land, protecting the heartland).

The possibility of a clash between the judiciary and the executive might become a reality and further exacerbate the growing feeling of political insecurity.

In such an environment, if the military finds itself unable to deal with the spread of the Taliban from their multi-directional pincers, a number of (sub)-scenarios could emerge; all bad:

1. The army might find that it has no option left but to intervene politically; either because of the increasing public protests or, having foreseen this eventuality, to prevent them. However, judging from the current mood of the military, it is unlikely that it would like to take over the reins of government and far more likely that it removes the political set up to: a) hold another election immediately, if the PPP is still in power; or, if power has passed to another political party after elections, and that has also failed, b) instate an interim government of technocrats to run affairs for a year or two till elections can be held again. The latter course has been tried before and has not succeeded; in the event of the former course, the performance of the freshly elected government will decide the course of future scenario(s). There is one more complication; in the event of either course stated above; the SC will be asked to legitimize this action which, under the Eighteenth Amendment, it has been prevented from doing.
2. Before or after 1 above, people of the tribal areas could decide that enough is enough and take matters in their own hands. Anarchy will inevitably follow and vigilantes, in the form of tribal *Lashkars* are likely to mete out to the Taliban exactly what they have been receiving from them.
3. Under such an environment it is more than likely that the religious right will flourish. It is also likely that it will further stoke unrest among the people.

### **Scenario Three (most likely)**

The political government continues its current course of 'muddling through' with Zardari creating crises where none need exist and the PM keeps bailing him out. No comprehensive 'security strategy' is worked out and the provincial government continues to refuse to fill the administrative vacuum left in the areas re-claimed from the Taliban by the military. However, the central and provincial governments continue to 'firefight' issues that arise, but the military remains the dominant actor, domestically and internationally.

Kayani, the COAS, is offered an extension and accepts it. The army continues to influence policies, to the extent it can, from behind the scenes; while Kayani (and the army) continue to be increasingly accepted internationally as the most reliable representatives of Pakistan. All international assistance continues to be actually negotiated by the army.

US assistance in the form of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, assistance in resolving the energy crisis in the short term helps alleviate the immediate shortfall. IMF and the World Bank, along with 'The Friend of Pakistan' also help bail Pakistan out and the economic situation improves.

Military successes in the Tribal Areas continue but at a slower pace than in the last twelve months or so and, in two/three years, all the chapters of the TTP are demolished. The army continues to attempt to assist in administering areas re-captured from the Taliban. However, the inactivity of the political government(s) permits the Taliban to resurface again and again, though no longer as organized as before.

While the Balochistan situation has been addressed partially by the central government and the Eighteenth Amendment should also redress some of the Baloch grievances, no comprehensive policy is formulated. Indian interference continues, and the Baloch remain alienated.

Occasional instances of violence in Balochistan and, indeed throughout the country continue by in decreasing numbers and intensity.

The relationship in Punjab between the governor and the Chief Minister continue to be uncomfortable.

The religious right, particularly in the Punjab, continues to gain strength and, only half-hearted efforts are made to bring them under control. With the passage of time, the Punjabi religious extremists become formidable enough for the military to be forced to initiate action against them; the Punjab government reluctantly accepts.

Confrontation between the judiciary and the executive continues to erupt periodically and is also dealt with on a case-to-case basis.

Corruption continues, but at a reduced scale. Inflation stays in the double figures.

India does not reduce the flow of water in the Jhelum and Chenab rivers by much. Pakistan's agriculture is not affected adversely.

After the completion of its tenure, the PPP government holds elections in 2012/13 in which no political party obtains sufficient seats to be declared a majority. The army assists in brokering a political deal to form a 'National Government' with representation from all political parties; also unlikely to be able to do much.

### **Comment**

In between Scenario One and Three and between Three and Two, there can be numerous others; relatively better or relatively worse. I am certain that the other, far more learned participants of this conference will be able to spell these out and in far greater detail than my rather humble effort. I look forward to discussing these threadbare during the conference.

I would like to submit two conclusions that I have reached for the foreseeable future of Pakistan. In my humble opinion;

a) However far the situation might seem to deteriorate, Pakistan is not likely to implode. A view held by some of the doomsday specialists.

b) Nor is there any likelihood of a takeover of Pakistan by religious extremists. Pakistanis are a deeply religious people, but extremism is alien to their nature and, as they have proven, their tolerance for the Taliban form of government is very low, while their tolerance to suffering in the cause of ridding themselves of this scourge is very high. The huge mass of the religious middle-of-the-roaders in Pakistan will not let this happen; at least for the next five years or so.

However, if political leaders continue to fail the people with continuous regularity; the future beyond five to seven years may be totally unpredictable.

I have also been asked to write a few words on the role of the military and the Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Considering the well informed audience that I am addressing, I assume that no one is interested in a history lesson. I will confine myself, therefore, to the current Role of the Military and the current State of, what might more appropriately be termed Relations of the Military with a non-military (or political) Government, rather than Civil-Military Relations; since the latter term should really not be confined to the government but should encompass the Civil Population; the entire gamut of it.

### **The Role of the Military and its Relations with the Current Pakistan Government**

Since the conventional role of the military is well known, I again assume that the subject I have been asked to address is the current unusual role of the military. Much of it has already been covered in earlier paragraphs; however, some addition is essential to comprehend the current state of affairs. In 2007 we had an army that had reached its nadir; its name was mud with almost the entire Civil population, hundreds of soldiers were surrendering to a handful of Taliban; in one instance 208 soldiers, led by a Lt Col surrendered to two dozen Taliban without offering any resistance.

In an op-ed written immediately after that incident, I expressed the view that this was not an act of cowardice but one of extraordinary moral courage, since neither officers nor their soldiers were convinced that killing their own citizens in 'America's War' was in their interest. This incident was in the aftermath of the 'Lal Masjid' incident; in which Musharraf, under siege by a self-created judicial crisis, sought to divert the attention of people by deliberately permitting terrorists to occupy this mosque located in the Capitol and letting things get so far out of hand that no alternative was left but for the military to take the mosque by force; an assault that left a couple of hundred children dead or wounded. Musharraf succeeded in creating the impression internationally that He was the sole bulwark that stood between the extremists and the capture of Islamabad, but did (almost) irreparable damage to the army.

Mid level officers and soldiers alike lost confidence in his leadership and in the task(s) assigned by him.

I have known Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the current COAS, for a long time and held him in very high esteem since I first came to know his particular qualities of command, leadership, and intellect; but even I underestimated him. Within months of taking over as the COAS in November 2007, he switched a few of his Division commanders (those more familiar with the military structure would be aware of the fact that the Division commander is the highest level of direct command of troops), he went around each garrison talking to officers and troops, convincing them of the fact that Pakistan was actually fighting a war of survival against these terrorists and that far from fighting 'America's War', the army had to secure the future of the next generation.

Apparently he had also, through the mistakes of his predecessor, learnt two crucially important lessons: a) that the guerrilla warrior is far from a suicide bomber; the guerrilla believes that 'He who runs away today will live to fight another day'. Consequently, if conventional forces are to be pitched against the guerrilla warrior, they can only succeed if the guerrilla warrior is denied almost all avenues of escape: a strategy demonstrated with considerable

success in the capture of Swat. Secondly b) that to combat such an elusive force, initiative and the ability to survive without standard lines of communication, logistic support, and detailed orders at each stage will have to be inculcated down to platoon and section leaders.

The transformation was astounding. However, it would be unfair not to acknowledge the priceless contribution of the Swat Peace Deal; a deal I had opposed tooth and nail, but freely admit that, with the benefit of hindsight, without the disastrous consequences of this peace deal being visible to the entire nation, the military could never have succeeded.

The Taliban's form of justice and governance were visible to all on the media. This united the entire nation behind the military once again and, whatever vestige of doubt that might have lingered in the ranks of the military, were put to rest. They went in like committed soldiers, a well oiled fighting machine; the one that it used to be, before Musharraf's disastrous policies (almost) destroyed it.

I have met with young officers and soldiers, without identifying myself, as they were preparing to enter South Waziristan. Their confidence, commitment, and clarity of concepts was inspiring; these were battle hardened veterans who had seen the 'enemy within' and were determined to eradicate them; they included a large percentage of Pashtun.

I met with Mahsud Internally Displaced Personnel, IDP, before and after the operation commenced in their area. They were shamefaced at having things get this far, and immensely grateful to the military.

I spoke with ordinary people in Peshawar immediately after a suicide attack. Even those who were weeping at the loss of loved ones (a young man had lost his wife and only daughter). They, one and all, extolled the army and were determined to support it in its efforts to rid Pakistan of this scourge.

I have no intention of repeating what has been stated earlier and how Kayani has become (almost) the most powerful individual in Pakistan. However, it needs be pointed out that he is (was) the most determined democrat of all the army chiefs that I have known personally, or known of. It is, therefore, all the more astonishing that he should find himself saddled with this position. After assuming command of the army, he violated the established ritual of briefing the political leadership at GHQ and volunteered to deliver the briefing at the PM's office/residence. Unlike some of his predecessors, he made it a point to receive and see off the PM whenever he proceeded abroad and paid his respects, as he is supposed to

Many analysts have questioned the army's resistance to the ISI being placed under the Interior Minister. My view is that it was a hastily made decision; the ISI should be where it is, under the PM. I am fairly certain that in his own quiet way that is all that Kayani suggested. I believe the ISI should be renamed, since it is not an 'Inter Services' organization, and it should be 'civilianized', but that is another issue. The fact that in the post Mumbai attack period, the government made another hasty decision, agreeing to send the DG ISI to India and was again advised to re-think is not tantamount to interference in political matters. It is the COAS' duty to advise the PM.

When the historic 'Long March' to restore the independence of the judiciary was approaching the capitol, I am reliably informed that all Kayani did was to visit the President and inform him that if the Long March reached the Capitol and Zardari wanted to call out the army,



‘In Aid of Civil Power’, in accordance with the constitution, his orders might not be **obeyed by the rank and file**. Zardari caved in.

Zardari, however, continues to raise the possibility of a threat to democracy from the army and the judiciary (democracy being symbolized by the PPP!). His frequent references to the threat ‘from the pen and the sword’ are not oblique. While the judiciary might pose a threat to his person, the army has refused to dignify his utterances with any kind of a response.

Kayani’s first act that apparently violated his attempts to visibly demonstrate the principle of supremacy of the elected government was when the Inter Services Public Relations Department, ISPR, the military’s spokesman issued a statement criticizing the Kerry-Luger Bill.

I am convinced that Kayani must have made every effort to convey his reservations to the political leadership and had compelling reasons for going public. Nonetheless, that act took me by surprise (an op-ed written by me on the subject is also attached below, in case somebody is interested). As also did the fact that the day before Kayani left Pakistan for the ‘Strategic Dialogue’ in the US, five top bureaucrats, Federal Secretaries came to GHQ to brief him, bypassing the political leadership; their respective ministers. When this issue was raised in Parliament by the opposition, the government denied all knowledge of it.

However, perhaps by then, the government had acknowledged that Kayani would be the principal interlocutor for Pakistan as far as the US was concerned, and Kayani was conscious of the inevitability of this fact. The last op-ed attached below expresses my views on the subject.

The last surprise for me was when Kayani called the chief minister of Punjab to his office and took him to task for his public statement in which he had, more or less, begged the Taliban to spare Punjab from being subjected to more suicide attacks.

So what conclusions can we reach with regard to the relations between the military (primarily the army) and the current political government? I can list some below:

1. The government has voluntarily ceded all its responsibilities to any matter remotely related to ‘Security’ to the army.
2. The provincial government has also left the army with no option but to govern the tribal areas re-taken from the Taliban.
3. The central government has also ceded (or accepted) the military’s primacy in deciding issues on foreign policy, at least those relating to the US, India, and Afghanistan.
4. On the other hand, the government is fully conscious that it faces no threat of a military takeover.
5. The Chief’s relations with Zardari might not be the best, but he seems to have fairly comfortable relations with the PM.
6. However, Kayani has changed; from being the committed democrat, he has accepted the realities and has pragmatically adjusted to the responsibilities thrust upon him, including those that demand political interference from behind the scenes. It is also obvious from the ‘dressing down’ to the CM Punjab; that he is even handed and as now accepted the fact that he has to accept the assigned role.
7. Where necessary, the COAS will now increasingly play a role in political decision making. In the immediate future and the short term it might be for the best, in fact, it could even be considered imperative for Pakistan that he do so. However, in the long run, it inevitably weakens institutions.

In conclusion, the military, but specifically, the army, has always had an extraordinary political role in Pakistan. Kayani offered a golden opportunity for the reversal of this trend; but Zardari and his ilk squandered this opportunity. It is my considered view, despite opposing arguments from many quarters, that Kayani tried his best to 'return to barracks' but could not. This time the army has been forced back into accepting a principal political role that it did not seek. It appears that for the foreseeable future, the army will continue to remain politically active, though from behind the scenes.

### **Appendix: How Powerful is the Pakistan military?**

Since Musharraf's departure Pakistan has ostensibly returned to a democratically elected government. What is more, the country is fortunate enough to have the most determined democrat as the COAS. An individual who has determinedly, against all odds and despite numerous opportunities offered by the political leadership's continuous blunders, been trying to break away from previously established norms, to re-establish the principle of civilian supremacy. In this, undoubtedly, he enjoys the unquestioned support of the senior and mid level leadership of the armed forces.

Simultaneously, Kayani has infused new life in the demoralized, rudderless army that he inherited from Musharraf, he has turned it back into the efficient fighting machine it used to be and has demonstrated its effectiveness, not only domestically, but to the entire international community; while trying to remain apolitical.

It has also been obvious that the political government has, since it took over, handed over the responsibility of all decisions, even remotely related to 'security' to GHQ. While the duties of a COAS leading an army in constant battle would be sufficient to test the mettle of any individual; when it is combined with a constant stream of challenging situations requiring the 'bailing out' of the government and dealing even with all political aspects that are remotely security related; the pressure he faces can only be imagined.

However, it is said that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Kayani would have to be more than super-human to avoid all this affecting him in any way. While I have no misgivings about the possibility of another military intervention in Pakistan, is it possible that he is becoming increasingly comfortable with the authority wielded from behind the scene? What is more pertinent; is Kyani becoming convinced of his indispensability?

If so, it should not be surprising, since there are far too many people on the domestic and international scene who have been trying to convince him of this for the last year and a half; and the political leadership continues to voluntarily cede their authority to him. Why should it surprise anyone if he begins to assume that authority as his rightful role? Even in the strategic dialogue with the US, Kayani is considered the lynch pin in the Pakistan delegation. He will negotiate what Pakistan receives from the US and what Pakistan will offer in return.

Some indications of the possibility of such a change in Kayani's outlook have become visible in the last few months. When Mullah Baradar was captured in Karachi in February this year, the government announced that he was 'captured in a joint operation by US and Pakistani Intelligence Agencies' and that, 'after his debriefing by Pakistani agencies he would be made available to American agencies'. However, a week later, the Inter Services Public Relations, ISPR, Director General, the GHQ spokesman, contradicted that.

In a most unusual occurrence, before his departure to the US for the 'Strategic Dialogue', five federal secretaries came to GHQ to 'brief' the COAS! Now this occurred most likely on the instructions of the government; but when the opposition raised the issue in parliament, treasury benches denied all knowledge of it and sated that 'if this had happened, it was a private arrangement between individuals, not as representatives of government'!

During his stay in the US, Richard Holbrooke commented, 'How can you have a strategic dialogue (with Pakistan) without including the military?' The New York Times stated 'Army Chief driving Pakistan's agenda or talks'; and 'in a sign of the mounting power of the army over the civilian government in Pakistan, the head of the Pakistan military, Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, will be the dominant Pakistani participant in important meetings in Washington this week'. The Washington Post read, 'Gen Kayani is driving the nation's agenda'.

During his visit to the US, the general met not only military officials, but also the civilian decision makers in Washington. Obama's surprise visit to Afghanistan on March 28<sup>th</sup> is viewed by many as an outcome of the 'Strategic Dialogue' and input from Kayani with regard to the prospective 'End Game' scenario in Afghanistan.

Domestically, Kayani was already in effective control of 'domestic affairs' and now seems firmly in control of foreign relations with the US, the West, India, and Afghanistan. He persists in taking a back seat but without a shadow of doubt, he is the most powerful man in Pakistan.

In a country where the political leadership persists in proving itself inept and corrupt, this might be for the best in the immediate and short term future. In many ways an extension will be for the best General Kyani has indeed become indispensable and there does not seem to be a replacement for him available to fill the enormous shoes he wears.

However, this situation cannot but continues to weaken civilian institutions in the long run. More importantly, it can result in a desire for self perpetuation under the very real conviction of his own indispensability; as happened to many of his predecessors. Admittedly, Kayani is an individual of a far stronger character than any of the examples one can think of; but then, absolute power can become a powerfully addictive aphrodisiac.

# Shuja Nawaz: The Clash of Interests and Objectives

Pakistan's future appears to be a spaghetti bowl of different interests and objectives: depending on what assumptions you make, different future scenarios unfold. Adding to the confusion is the fact that politics in Pakistan tends to be entirely short-term, aimed at tactical advantage rather than strategic placement. As a result, Pakistan's economic future has become a matter of great concern—affected as much by what has happened in the past decade as by the emerging demographic shifts that pose a huge challenge to the country—while offering tentative hope at the same time.

Last year, the World Bank released its review of the development experience of the world over a thirty year span, focusing on the *World Development Report* of the Bank and the issues that it had covered since its inception in 1979.<sup>32</sup> The accompanying World Bank Indicators produced a remarkable result. Over the period 1980-2007 Pakistan exhibited one of the developing world's highest average growth rates of 5.8 per cent, second only to China's 9.9 per cent. Of course, with a shorter time horizon, India and other rapidly developing economies would have made the top five and Pakistan would have been relegated to lower rungs. But the important issue that emerges is how Pakistan, despite its record of poor governance, could produce such a growth performance. Clearly, there are sinews of strength in the country and economy that need to be identified and examined when making calculations of what is possible in the decades ahead. Pakistan has a middle class of some 30 million with an average per capita income of \$10,000 a year on a purchasing power parity basis. It has a huge and active diaspora that provides it large sums in remittances and has the potential brain power to jump-start Pakistan's economy and society.

But overlaying all the economic and social changes occurring in Pakistan is the regional political situation, which has a major effect on Pakistan's politics and economics. Pakistan is a prisoner of its geography. Sitting as it does on the cusp of South Asia and Central Asia, while overlooking the Gulf, it is subject to developments and influences from its neighborhood and beyond. For the second time since 1979, it is coping with the after effects of a major invasion of Afghanistan, first by the Soviet Union and now by the United States and coalition forces. Its role as a frontline state imposes a heavy burden on Pakistan, even while it has to deal with the presence of a rapidly rising superpower to the east: India, its main rival since independence in 1947.

## Basic challenges

Pakistan's response to several basic challenges will determine its future path. One of these challenges is its demographic situation and shifts. Today, with a population of some 180 million, Pakistan has a population with a median age of 18 years. Hence, it has some 90 million youth who need to be fed, educated, and given gainful employment lest it risks losing them to the lure of militancy that already exists in the country. Pakistan's population pyramid has a classic pyramid shape. For the next 15 years it will retain a bottom heavy shape. This poses a challenge in terms of providing opportunities for the youth cohort. But it also provides a great opportunity

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<sup>32</sup> *Development Economics Through the Decades* Shahid Yusuf et al. , World Bank, 2009

in terms of a productive base for the economy, with a youthful population that will continue to work and add value to the economy for the first half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Moreover, Pakistan is fast becoming an urban country, with mega-cities like Karachi and Lahore and other urban centers displacing the weight of the countryside in the national economy. Traditionally, Pakistan has been an agricultural economy. It cannot afford to be restricted to that sector alone and will need to move up the value chain toward agricultural-based industries and then into manufacturing. Worldwide, the trend since the 1970s has been for developing countries to shift away from agriculture to manufacturing and services. On average, today agriculture accounts for only 20 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product of developing countries.<sup>33</sup> Future growth will more likely be urban based. This will be a huge challenge for Pakistani agriculture. If and when the new census in Pakistan takes place in 2010 or soon thereafter, it will validate these trends and thereby shift dramatically the political map of Pakistan as election boundaries are redrawn, moving more seats in parliament to the cities. Pakistan's feudal politics will suffer a body blow when this happens. Feudal cliques will resist such changes and the result may be political turmoil.

The gradual emergence of provincial centers of power, supported by a rising civil society that has found voice through new mass media outlets had already led to shifting Pakistan's power balance. In 2010, after 17 years of debate, the National Finance Commission Award was ratified. This law gives greater say in the use of revenue and resources to the provinces. This realignment of power had long-term consequences. The new rules for revenue sharing under this award promise to give the federating units greater say over state resources and reverts the country to its original federal structure. This development alone may help in staving off the centrifugal forces that have been threatening the cohesion of the state. A much-discussed topic in Pakistan in recent years has been a June 2006 article by Ralph Peters in the American publication, *Armed Forces Journal* that raised the possibility of Pakistan being reduced to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh, with Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) breaking away. Peters suggested that Balochistan might become a free state including parts of Iran's own province of Baluchistan, while the NWFP/ KP would become a part of Afghanistan.

As Pakistan's provinces become stronger and as potentially more provinces are carved out of the current four, the possibility of countervailing forces emerging inside the country emerges. This may reduce the enormous power of the Punjab, for example, with its 60 per cent of the population and production of GDP, as well as a commensurate proportion of the armed forces.

The urban shift also has great meaning for the military. My own study of recruiting patterns in the Pakistan army between 1970 and 2005 indicate that there has been a major shift in recruitment from the countryside to the cities and within the Punjab from the north to south and central Punjab.<sup>34</sup> And in the decade ending 2005, more officers were recruited from Karachi than Jhelum. This trend also indicates that urbanization rates in the army are faster than the country as a whole. This will have far reaching effects on the nature of the officer class and its thinking, as it becomes dominated by city-dwellers. Moreover, the shift into south and central Punjab puts the military recruitment in the same area as the emerging Punjabi militant (predominantly Sunni)

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<sup>33</sup> Yusuf op cit. P. 47.

<sup>34</sup> See Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within* (London: Oxford 2008) Pp. 570-72.

groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammed. This will pose a huge challenge for provincial and central government leaders.

Pakistan also faces huge challenges in the energy and water sectors today. Continuing difficulties with neighboring India over the share of waters from rivers that have their source in Indian controlled Kashmir has led to disputes over the construction of the Kishenganga Dam and other dams. Pakistan's own water resources have been badly managed. It needs energy from hydroelectricity as well as other sources, but its corrupt energy distribution system has created a major obstacle for its economic output. No immediate solution is evident for its longer-term energy needs. Apart from finding new sources of energy, it will need to resolve issues with India or risk another conflict.

Externally, Pakistan now faces hostility on both its eastern and western borders. The aftermath of the Afghan war has made Pakistan a frontline state again. Meanwhile, its hostility vis-à-vis India continues to affect its military posture and economic development by drawing resources away from development to defense. Today some 150,000 of the 500,000-strong army are deployed on the western border. A raging insurgency in those border regions and even in the settled areas of Malakand and Swat has led to thousands of casualties and has created an insecurity that has an immediate effect on both domestic and external investment. Meanwhile, India is emerging as a regional and global power and its defense posture is mainly trained on Pakistan's eastern flank.

Tensions between the powerful and disciplined military establishment and the weak and disorganized civilian coalition government have added to political uncertainty and confusion. In the past, power centered on a Troika: the President, the Prime Minister, and the army chief. Today, the power has moved to the army chief, the President (despite his divestiture of power to the Prime Minister), and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who represents the emergence of civilian society. Catching up are the media, especially the broadcast media, who are increasingly playing a major role in shaping public opinion. But, the army, while still most powerful with its latent coercive power, no longer has an alternative party waiting in the wings. The major opposition party, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz or 'N' group) is not seen as pro-military and does not have the broad national base that the PPP has.

Pakistan suffers from a political system retarded by the belief among ruling elites that politics is family business. Strong feudal groups and economic cartels have led to opportunistic collations of like-minded individuals, creating a predatory political class. Historically, the armed forces have been the only group able to counter the power of these ruling elites. As a result, Pakistan has suffered military or quasi-military rule for more than half its life as an independent country. This prolonged military rule has left the nation's civil structure and political system stunted. Under the most recent long-term military ruler General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), the army penetrated deep into the civil system, posting army officers into key institutions and ministries. And it has entered into the economic field too, crowding out private sector enterprises with its aggressive access to state resources. The end result <sup>35</sup>has been a tentative return to democracy and a dysfunctional government that is largely bent on survival rather than on making the longer-term changes in the system that would allow democracy to survive.

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<sup>35</sup> "Urbanization Challenges in Pakistan" by Murtaza Haider, McGill University, 2006.

## **What does the future hold?**

The demographic time bomb is ticking in Pakistan today. Without a coherent and effective family planning system and urban planning, the rise of mega cities will pose huge challenges for Pakistani society. According to one project, another 80 million persons will be added to the urban rolls between 2005 and 2030, a 140 per cent increase over the 2005 baseline. Without proper devolution of fiscal and administrative authority to the cities, the ability of city managers to cope with urban poverty, unemployment and demand for services will be seriously hobbled. The current trend is to wrest power back from local governments. If this continues, Pakistan risks having large cities that become ungoverned spaces and a cockpit of violence between different ethnic, language, and sectarian groups.

If the current lack of urban planning and zoning policies continues, urban growth will be haphazard, driven by short-term monetary gains rather than economic considerations. The education system will be unable to cope with the demands for services, and the health services sector will collapse. So too will Pakistan's infrastructure, which is already stretched to its limits. Provisions for water supply, sanitation and sewerage services and transport systems will all be unable to meet demand, leading to chaotic and uneconomic growth of the cities. The central and provincial governments have failed to take advantage of community-based planning for urban development, which creates ownership among the users of services and could lay the basis for sound fiscal and financial policies. The political motive, gaining power over all levels of government, has short-circuited the little progress that was made under the Musharraf regime, where, despite shortcomings, some success was achieved in certain urban settings in providing services to city inhabitants. The current trends point to urban violence and missed opportunities for economic growth.

Pakistan has the potential to vastly increase its output and garner greater financial benefits from shifting to agri-businesses, moving up the value chain for its exports. As major shifts occur in India and China, Pakistan could easily move into the manufacturing sector, becoming, for example, the producer of spare parts for the growing automobile industry of Asia, as suggested by Shahid Javed Burki. Instead of relying on greater access to United States and European markets for low-end textile exports, it could move to higher end products and hence higher revenues. But this will be unlikely if the current political system continues to give undue voice to the cartels that run the textile industry. Moreover, the energy shortage is likely to persist, further creating obstacles to the full employment of textile workers in current factories.

Regional disparities inside Pakistan will likely increase if the National Finance Commission Award is not implemented carefully. The devolution of central government powers to the provinces, combined with the sudden abolition of the concurrent list of responsibilities has created a bottleneck, as provinces lack the revenues and the manpower to handle their new mandates. This may well exacerbate provincial rivalries, unless a national consensus can develop on the best way to manage this transition to provincial rule. Pakistan has a well-integrated economy. If that can be further buttressed with modern infrastructure, roads, railways and air links, it may be able to counter some of the tendencies towards separatism that have arisen over time. If the civilian government can produce consensus between provinces on the national need for new dams and energy sources, and shifting of nuclear efforts to power generation, Pakistan could easily meet its energy needs and provide for a reformation of its agriculture sector at the same time.

As an increasingly urban military officer corps emerges, the links between the military and business interests will deepen. It may be possible then to see more open discussion of the advantages of reducing hostility with India and to lessen the use of military power as a deciding factor in negotiations. Great potential exists for improvement of economies on both sides of the India-Pakistan border with the rise of trade to natural levels (i.e., 70 per cent at the time of partition between the areas that now form Pakistan and India). Research by Mohsin Khan of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and similar work by Adil Najam and Moeed Yusuf, and Mohan Guruswamy indicates that trade could well rise from its current \$2 billion to \$50 billion, generating revenues for economic development. Importantly, such a rise in Indo-Pakistan trade would create vested interest groups in both countries that might inoculate both against war. A major spin-off benefit would be the potential opening of transit trade with Afghanistan and links to Central Asia that would allow the both India and Pakistan to benefit from access to abundant energy needed for their growth.

Economic ties and opening of borders to traffic between India and Pakistan would also be a major factor in helping resolve water issues between the two countries. The economic incentives to conflict resolution would outweigh the need to resort to threatening military postures to resolve issues. I see a growing civil society pressure on governments in both countries to open up relations, building on the momentum of the "*Aman ki Asha*" (Quest for Peace) initiative launched by the Times of India and the Jang Group of newspapers of Pakistan.

A key factor in all this will be the relationship between the military and the civil establishments. The transition later in 2010 to new leadership in the Pakistan army will be a harbinger of future trends. A new military leadership that continues to eschew overt interference in civil matters should give the country's political system room to mature over time. For its part, the political parties will need to introduce greater democracy in their internal operations and broaden their base to move beyond family interests. The emergence of urban parties, building on the model of the Muttahida Quami Mahaz (MQM), without cultish or violent behavior, would be a major new development. The attempts by the MQM to build an urban coalition across the country appear to be a good sign. It is natural to expect that urban parties will emerge and coalesce to counter traditional feudal interests as the country becomes more urbanized.

Despite fears that the state of Pakistan will collapse, I do not see that occurring in the next five to seven years. Governments may come and go, but the institutions of the state are still able to function. The security establishment remains disciplined and ready to protect the country against internal and external threats. Civil society is coming into its own. The new media are adding transparency to governance. The general population supports the battle against extremism and militancy and is prepared to fight for political space and voice.

The different futures of Pakistan depend on how far and fast the country can imagine itself as a modern state, meeting the needs of all its people and escape from the thrall of religious conflicts. A Pakistan that wishes to provide an enabling environment for its young population and strengthen its economy so it can become impregnable militarily as well could have the confidence to settle differences with its neighbors, without feeling in any way paranoid about their aims. Pakistan needs to specifically restore financial stability with disciplined fiscal and monetary policies, shield the poorest by providing resources for them as it adjusts its economy, and raise revenues from its own economic activities through taxes that are well designed and collected honestly. Its current tax-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest in the world and far below



the revenue level needed to allow it to grow at more than 6 per cent, in order to stay ahead of the curve of the expansion of its population.

All this will require concentrated focus on economic and political policies that foster growth and create greater ownership of governance among the masses. In such an atmosphere, the population could be critical in helping fight militancy and end the insurgency that is threatening Pakistan today. A national debate on what kind of Pakistan its citizens imagine is needed. In other words, it is critical for Pakistan to set lofty targets for itself and to attempt to meet them with its own resources rather than be subservient to the interest of other states, near or far.

# William Milam: Factors Shaping the Future

The list of negatives that make Pakistan's future uncertain at best is long, complicated, interrelated, and depressing. A comprehensive list of these political, economic, and social problems is, indeed, very discouraging reading. Even worse, it is relieved by almost no potential strengths that seem realistic. And the positives are mostly double edged. For example, if the so-called "demographic dividend," (the increase in the working age population over the next generation) is not accompanied by large investment in public education and reform of the educational curriculum, as well as by a significant and sustained increase in the economic growth rate, the long term prospects for the economy will be far less sanguine and the prospect of social upheaval and Islamization is far more likely.

The point here is that the negatives and positives are interrelated, with and among each other and will affect each other in negative and/or positive ways. There are virtuous circles that one can imagine. However, they certainly do not come as easily to mind as the potential vicious circles that would drag the country a slow and inexorable downward trajectory toward some sort of failure.<sup>36</sup>

All the factors and variables that Jonathan Paris identifies in his study will, of course, affect the long term political, economic, and social trajectory of the country.<sup>37</sup> But, in my view, there are perhaps six major factors or variables by which we should be able to judge with some accuracy in the medium-term, i.e. the next five to six years, what that long-term future holds for the country and its people.

These major factors/variables are both cause and effect; they can influence the direction of the many other factors and variables and, in turn, are influenced by the direction of the others. Were these major factors/variables all moving in the right direction (which I will define in what follows) in 2015-16, which is as far as our medium-term analysis goes, I would not rule out a good-case scenario. However it will be a long, difficult slog of one or two generations before one could safely wager that Pakistan was going to join the rank of modern societies.

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<sup>36</sup> The word "failure" here is used for a wide range of possible outcomes some of which would obviously involve a "worst case" scenario, but some of which would also emanate from what would have to be regarded as a "bad case" scenario. The "worst case" scenario differs from the "bad case" one in that it involves apocalyptic outcomes, e.g. balkanization, economic collapse, Islamist takeover. The "bad case" scenario implies non-apocalyptic outcomes in which Pakistan slowly proves itself unable to deal with its structural deficiencies and the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and slides inexorably into some sort of dysfunctionality, possibly involving a loss of government writ over a sizeable chunk of the territory and/or economic stagnation accompanied by an increasingly intolerant and Islamist society. In the "good-case" scenario (but not the best), which is more of a long shot, Pakistan would, after 2 or 3 generations overcome most of its many structural deficiencies and join the ranks of modern states and societies. There is also a "business-as-usual-case" scenario (not good but better than the bad alternative) in which Pakistan overcomes some of the deficiencies, e.g. the stagnant economy, but not others, e.g. India Centricity, and stays in business pretty much as is. This has a higher probability. I hasten to add that I believe that there is a high probability that the endgame, whatever it is, will play out over many years. However there is a caveat on the timing—the occurrence of a "Black Swan" event, i.e. one of low probability but high impact on a complex but fragile system, e.g. a war with India, could accelerate the worst- and the bad-case scenarios and bring on an undesirable outcome much earlier. See, for example, Niall Ferguson "Complexity and Collapse," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2010, Vol. 89 Issue 2, p.18-32 or Nassim Nicolas Taleb, *The Black Swan*, (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks), 2010.

<sup>37</sup> Jonathan Paris, *Prospects for Pakistan* (London: Legatum Institute, 2010).

One caveat at the beginning: in what follows, readers will not see extensive discussion of the return of full parliamentary democracy through the passage of the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment. Whether Pakistani politicians can eschew the traditional poisonous political culture and make unfettered parliamentary democracy work efficiently to meet the multi-dimensional challenges the government faces is not just unclear, but unlikely in the 5-6 year period that we are examining.

Here, then, are a list of thesis most important factors that will shape Pakistan's future, and a brief discussion of where Pakistan might be heading.

### **The India-Centricity of the Pakistani Mindset and Policy Focus**

This is the most important factor/variable, and the bottom-line question is whether now, or six years from now, relations between the two countries are moving in the direction of a sustainable normalization. This is, perhaps, the most measurable of the major factors that will shape Pakistan's future. Specifically, the criteria on which to judge this is, I think, that a sustained dialogue is underway; one that has, depending on the time it has been in operation, resolved one or two of the easier issues that divide the two countries. One of the issues that has been teed up for resolution for some time is Sir Creek, which is essentially a technical issue that lends itself to quick resolution. Another possibility is Siachen, which most Pakistanis and Indians (except perhaps the military) believe is a piece of real estate that is not worth what it has already cost in lives and resources.

We should not expect the dialogue to solve more contentious issues in so short a time. There is too much baggage left over from previous conflicts to expect such a miraculous turnaround in mindset in both India and Pakistan. The Kargil conflict, the 1971 Indian intervention in then-East Pakistan (which many Pakistanis still believe is what separated West and East Pakistan), the 1965 war, and the ongoing conflict over Kashmir will remain neuralgic issues which we should realize may take a generation to detoxify.

The psychological resistance to a normal relationship between the two countries goes even deeper than those issues, however, and is an inhibiting factor in all. To read of the pain people who lived through the 1947 partition still feel is to understand the deep-seated enmity and mistrust that many Pakistanis and Indians feel towards each other.<sup>38</sup> Each move toward normalization meets with stubborn feelings of mistrust in the older generations of both countries. India and Pakistan may not be able to completely normalize their relationship for another 15 years—until most of the generation that experienced partition is gone.

But, five or six years out, the continued absence of a dialogue that looks like a permanent feature of the diplomatic landscape will imply to me that Pakistan's India-centric mindset—the most critical issue in my view—would negatively affect the other major factors. Without visible progress on normalization, it seems highly unlikely that the other major factors can be turned into a virtuous circle. Thus this is the critical factor; an attenuation of the India-centric mindset in Pakistan would have a strong positive knock-on effect on the other major factors/variables. Without that, it will be much more difficult for Pakistan to escape the slow downward spiral it has been in for most of the past 15 years.

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<sup>38</sup> Yasmin Khan's recent book, *The Great Partition* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007) and the first chapter of Alicia Albinia's book, *Empires of the Indus* (W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 2008) are worth reading in this respect.

## The Outcome in Afghanistan

There is increasingly credible discussion in the media of a “political” resolution to the Afghan conflict. Official spokesmen, sometimes speaking anonymously, sometimes not, have speculated that ultimately the US/NATO/Afghan military coalition will focus on establishing a semblance of military superiority in the urban areas and the economically and politically strategic rural areas of Afghanistan as a prelude to an attempt to lure some portion of the Taliban and the other opposition groups into a power sharing arrangement in Afghanistan. One also has to wonder if the former UN chief in Kabul could have been conducting preliminary talks with some Taliban leaders, as he had publicly claimed, without at least receiving the tacit green light from the major powers waging the war.

President Obama will clearly want to be able to claim that the US is winding down its involvement in Afghanistan (perhaps on a fuzzy time schedule) by the time his campaign for reelection gets into high gear in the spring of 2012. Other western governments pose even more immediate concerns. For example, a coalition government in the UK, our closest ally in Afghanistan, may limit their continued participation in the war. Increasing doubts in Germany and other western European contributors of troops may also play a role in future strategy.

President Karzai, probably for reasons of his own, has shown his interest in this approach by calling a “Peace Jirga.” He has also apparently authorized discussions with the Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an unlikely candidate, if there ever was one, with which to share power. Even the reclusive Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar, has made statements which seem to reinforce the view that this is the likely way, eventually, to the exit for the US/NATO forces whose governments are under increasing pressure from their citizens to wind down their involvement in the war.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, a so-called “political solution” to the Afghan conflict, whether a good idea or not, seems a reasonable bet given the political realities in the US and the western members of the NATO coalition, and the increasing doubts about coalition success. However, it will take prolonged negotiation in combination with effective military action by the coalition before such a hybrid approach can be judged feasible. Thus the denouement in Afghanistan is probably several years away. A key test, however, may well be whether the coalition views its already-announced offensive to wrest the Kandahar region away from the Taliban as successful. Both sides are now building up forces for that now delayed conflict whenever it takes place.

But there is one very serious question that I have seen no discussion of in the media, by official or unofficial, anonymous or named sources: why and how such a power-sharing hybrid political solution in Afghanistan should be structured to ensure that it is neutral in its effect on Pakistan’s political development? The first principle of such a solution should be that it promotes Indo-Pak cooperation, and does not exacerbate their rivalry. At a minimum, in the context of trying to bring about a reduction of Pakistan’s deeply embedded India-centric mindset, the

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<sup>39</sup> In a series of contradictory and confusing statements that began with his September Eid al Fitr pronouncement and included a number of subsequent blog reports, Mullah Omar seemed to be distancing the Taliban from Al Qaeda and limiting Afghan Taliban objectives to Afghanistan as opposed to the far broader objectives of Al Qaeda. Recent reports in the “Sunday Times” of April 18, quote him as indicating that the Taliban did not understand how difficult running a country is (implying that sharing power with more experienced parties at governance would be acceptable to them) and that The Taliban’s only objectives in Afghanistan are the implementation of Sharia Law, the expulsion of all foreigners, and the restoration of security in that country.

political solution in Afghanistan must avoid converting Afghanistan into another proxy battleground for India and Pakistan to continue their conflict.

This will be difficult in any case, and the less effective General Petraeus' counter-insurgency strategy turns out to be over the next one or two years, the more difficult it will be. The Pakistan army is likely to see it in its interest that to hold out for a power sharing solution that gives it the edge over other interests, and it will likely work toward that goal. To the extent it is successful, its own role in Pakistani politics is enhanced. As such, it will become even more able to portray itself as the sole guarantor of Pakistan security interests, necessary to ensure that its "strategic depth" against India in Afghanistan is maintained.

Moreover, its links with the Afghan Taliban will become stronger, not weaker. It will, in fact, continue to wage a proxy struggle against India. Perhaps it will be a political struggle, not a military one (at least initially), but one that still maintains the army as *primus inter pares* in Pakistan's domestic politics. Its ability to run the state from behind a gauzy democratic curtain will certainly be enhanced. In such a context, the army is unlikely to wish to break its now-attenuating links with those Punjabi jihadists that maintain their focus on India/Kashmir and are not yet at war with the state of Pakistan.

However, the primary objection to an Afghanistan political solution that fully meets Pakistan's perceived political requirements is quite simple. It would tend to strengthen, not diminish, the India-centricity that is the key variable that must change if Pakistan is to develop along more positive lines. This is not to argue that Indian interests in Afghanistan should prevail either. That would also increase, not decrease the India-centricity of the Pakistani army.

However, this will be a difficult solution to accomplish. The more complex the situation, and the more parties involved, the more difficult it is to find a solution that doesn't break down because one or more parties see an advantage in cheating. Finding a political solution in Afghanistan that will, *inter alia*, not provide an incentive for Pakistan to try to game the outcome and try to control it to its advantage, and the advantage of its proxy, could require a lot more time, determination, patience, and understanding than the US and NATO have shown so far.

Though it may seem like "pie in the sky" (but most of the positives in a better-case scenario have a high content of wishful thinking), an Afghan political solution more likely, at least, not to intensify Pakistan's India-centric mindset would need a structure that would offset Pakistan's influence by inclusion of all the regional stakeholders. By including India, Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan and by setting up a power sharing system in which their proxies—the various Northern Alliance groups, perhaps a Shia party, possibly a second Pashtun party and the Karzai government—have an equal share power of with the Taliban, this goal could be achieved.

Given the history of these groups actually being able to work together, a strong international overseer would be also be necessary. Whether this would include US/NATO peacekeeping forces is an interesting question given the Taliban's so far non-negotiable insistence that foreign troops would have to leave before they would engage. For this reason, it might be necessary to recruit a peacekeeping force of Muslim country troops (e.g. Turkey, etc.). In any case, the US, NATO, and China would have to stay politically, if not militarily, involved to ensure its success. The overseers would also want to ensure that Al Qaeda did not try to return and set up shop in some remote area of Afghanistan.

The idea is for Pakistan and India to, over time, become aware of their emerging web of mutual interests in a neutralized Afghanistan, one that is under neither country's domination, therefore not a threat to either. Would the two countries also discover a mutual interest in a more developed Afghanistan and cooperate in helping this process? In such a context, the interests of both countries would be congruent with US strategic interests in the region. India would come to recognize, I hope, that in the interests of its own economic and great power ambitions, to which the US could be of enormous help, it is necessary to accommodate the American priority of building a stable, modern Pakistan. For Pakistan, peace and normalization with India would become a necessity if it is to build itself into a modern society and state.

### **The Army's Evolution**

I suspect that there is a high probability that the civil-military balance in Pakistani politics will continue as is for the next 5-6 years. The army, at this point, is in the catbird seat; it calls the shots on most policy issues for the most part vis-à-vis a weak civilian government, and it is unlikely to want that dominance be weakened. However, it is also unlikely to be tempted into taking direct power, and there would be no reason to do so except in the case of a catastrophe such as war. It is looking these days to repair the image that Musharraf's last two years tarnished badly by refraining from getting out in front of that curtain behind which it now exercises power. Its power seems equally unlikely to erode as long as this government is in power.<sup>40</sup>

In the context of a continuation of the status quo in its relations with the elected civil governments, the primary question is how the army leadership, and officer corps more broadly writ, will react to other possible changes in the political environment. Would tangible progress in an Indo-Pak dialogue be accompanied, over time, by a less intense India-centric mindset; or would there be resistance to a change in outlook toward India engendered by the perceived threat that would be to the army's vested economic and political interests in retaining that focus? If there were such palpable progress in a dialogue, accompanied by concomitant change in the mindset of the political leaders of Pakistan and its political class, would the army resist the political change that could imply?

A follow-on question is whether the army's praetorian mindset and tendencies would harden if what appears to be a sustainable and substantive dialogue between India and Pakistan takes hold. Would the Corps Commanders and the general officer corps view a substantive Indo-Pak dialogue as the beginning of a slippery slope to gradual subordination of the military to elected civilian rule? If so, how would they react? One possibility would be to project the traditional military mantra that civilian political leaders can't be trusted to fully protect Pakistan national security interests more loudly in the public political dialogue. A rigid determination to continue to remain the prime political player in the political culture would certainly bring on the threat of direct intervention, though I believe that is not likely to happen in the time frame of our terms of reference.

The answers to these questions will be implicit in the army's behavior over the next 5-6 years. If the army continues to insist on calling the shots on issues labeled "national security,"

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<sup>40</sup> What happens if Nawaz Sharif gets elected is another question, but I think the Army would wait to see if he had learned anything in the past 10 years. Here is where it could be argued that the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment changes everything. As mentioned in the first full paragraph of page 2, an efficient and somewhat successful parliamentary government would give us reason to wonder if the role of the army would erode, perhaps had already done so. But only time will tell on this score; it would contravene all historical evidence to assume such success at this time.

and if it seems determined to keep the civilian government weak and a weak civilian government in office, the signs will not be good.

A possibly more important determinant of the army's attitudes and behavior over the next 5-6 years will be the changes, if any, in its demographic makeup. Traditionally the army has recruited primarily from the "martial" triangle in Punjab, a rural region demarcated on three corners by Rawalpindi, Attock, and Jhelum. At this point, even though the army has broadened its recruiting focus considerably over the past few years, a majority of its jawans still hail from this small part of Punjab. There is, among many families of that area, a strong tradition of army service—grandfather, father, and son going back generations. The second largest number of army recruits is of Pushtun ethnicity.

As the majority of jawans begins to reflect the attitudes of the changed recruiting patterns—much more urban in nature—there is an increasing probability that the army's jawans could have a more resistant attitude to the army's present policies of resisting militarily the predations of the extremist Islamist groups that challenge the writ of the state. The pool of young men the army recruits, Punjabi or Pushtun, may be changing slowly, but they are increasingly from the same socio/economic pool as the jihadi organizations recruit from. Jawans looking through their gun sights at their brothers or cousins may be more reluctant to shoot than at present.

Moreover, since 1980 there has been an increasingly deeper seepage of the Islamist narrative into Pakistani society's mindset without an alternative competing narrative as a contrast. (There is more on this in the following section.) This narrative has been fostered as a whole through the "soft power" activities of the large and active jihadi organizations operating in both in Punjab and in the Pushtun areas. In addition, the pervasive activities of "apolitical" organizations such as Tablighi Jamaat, which have spread a strong Deobandi Islamist message, have inculcated that narrative even more deeply and widely.

Thus, there is the possibility that the outlook of army's the half million jawans will change in ways that will make it more difficult for it to continue the long term conflict against Islamist extremists. But a change in the attitudes of the army's enlisted ranks could influence its behavior on other issues. These ranks could, for example, enter the army with a far more negative image of India, the result of what has come through the undiluted Islamist narrative learned in families or in school.

Thus, over the coming 5-6 years, the army's behavior will be affected primarily by the progress, or lack of it, on the Indo-Pak dialogue and by whether its recruits retain the same loyalties and attitudes as those over its previous 60 years. It is not clear whether progress on the dialogue will cause the army to become more rigid in its attitudes and behavior or less so. Nor is it clear whether new generations of enlisted troops will cause it to back away from this dialogue and/or a strong counter-insurgency policy.

### **The Lost Generation**

With a great push from Zia ul Haq, Islamism has seeped into pores of a generation of Pakistanis. Most of those born between 1980 and 2005 know of no alternative to the Islamist narrative. The elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did nothing to reverse the institutional and intellectual creep of Islamist thought into Pakistani society. General

Musharraf's promises on this score proved to be as hollow as his political vision. Pakistani scholars that I respect greatly have told me that "we have lost an entire generation."

To say that this generation is lost to Islamism is not necessarily to say it is lost to extremism, though certainly the extremist organizations draw on it extensively for recruits. Most Pakistanis still, however, reject violence (which is what defines an extremist) as a method of extending Islamist thought and practices. But full-throated acceptance of the Islamist narrative promotes many of the popular sentiments which inhibit progressive government policy in many areas, and could inhibit the army in vigorously pursuing its counter-insurgency strategy.

It is difficult to define the Islamist narrative without being accused of Islamophobia. What I mean in this context is the narrative of Pakistani political Islam, which the West must keep separate from a narrative stemming from mainstream, traditionally moderate Islamic thought. The Islamist narrative emphasizes hostility between the West and the Islamic world, primarily the US, and promotes the idea that the West in general, and the US in particular, is out to destroy or subjugate Islam to Western ideas and values. This narrative blames the US for most of the problems that beset Pakistan. It is, in my view, abetted by much of the curriculum of Pakistani public education as well as the education of most Madrassah students. This curriculum also tends to promote the ultra-nationalist sentiment that, inter alia, inhibits moderate leaders of Islamic thought in condemning the extremist tactics that Islamist extremist groups use with impunity.<sup>41</sup>

This Islamist narrative, broadly writ as I have defined it, has elicited in the public an abstract sympathy with Islamist objectives and, often, with the behavior of extremist organizations. The reasons for this sympathy are not well understood.<sup>42</sup> While few Pakistanis, if pressed, would voice general support of the extremists' use of violent methods to attain religious objectives, there is the ever present tendency to blur the ends and the means. In some cases, this sympathy extends to a passive support for Islamist extremist organizations, which in some areas of Punjab and the Frontier is clearly exacerbated by fear of the consequences if such support is not extended.

We must be careful not to exaggerate this problem. Given better security, firmer and fairer law and order, and an effective government that Pakistanis believed in, sympathy with the extremists might dissipate, and the credibility of the Islamist narrative would lose its force over time. Islamist organizations, however, will continue to promote their narrative.

What is really the answer to this Islamist intellectual creep is for the Pakistani political establishment, collectively, to promote an alternative narrative, one that starts with, and is based on, the essentially moderate message of mainstream Islam. This can be done by emphasizing

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<sup>41</sup> Witness the recent gathering of Deobandi leaders in Lahore, called together ostensibly to try to elicit a common message of condemnation of the tactics of Islamist militancy—suicide bombings and assassinations of innocent people—which produced instead only the usual, time-worn charges that militancy is caused by the US presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the lack of a true Islamist state in Pakistan, the Pakistani government's support of the US, the drone strikes in the tribal areas, etc. In other words, these leaders said nothing about the extremists who promote violent means and train young men and women to carry out suicide bombings and assassinations. And it was reported that the moderates who might have wished to condemn such tactics feared doing so.

<sup>42</sup> See for example, Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security*, Winter 2009/10, pp 79-118, an attempt, not all that satisfactory, at quantitative analysis of the question.



perhaps the peaceful Sufi tradition which characterized much of Pakistani Islam in former times, and still has a basis of appeal to many Pakistanis, particularly those in Punjab and Sindh. This narrative would stress values that would appeal to most Pakistanis, starting with economic stability and growth and the equitable distribution of the fruits thereof, universal public education that promotes tolerance, and the necessity of transforming Pakistani society to meet the demands of the modern world. Such a counter narrative would expose the core values espoused by the Islamism as retrogressive, and would over time be the most effective counter force to the negative Islamist narrative that now dominates the political dialogue.

In other words, the inroads made into the mindset of Pakistani society by the Islamist narrative can best be offset by effective governance and a state with a modern vision and a persuasive narrative of its own. Again we come to the question of whether the feckless political culture that has characterized Pakistan almost from its inception can be detoxified by the democratization that has lately been its hallmark. The proof will be in the pudding.

### **The Imperative of Economic Growth and Reform**

In Pakistan, the economic deficiencies are probably easiest to understand, yet hardest for a democratically elected parliamentary government to deal with. Put simply, Pakistan has, as a country, lived consistently beyond its means for much of the past 35 years. The enormous structural problems that plague the economy and constrain policy reflect this history of generally financing its excess of domestic consumption over domestic production by borrowing from abroad. Pakistani success at pulling this off for such a long time has led to an almost automatic reliance on foreign capital for its inherent fiscal and balance of payments deficiencies. This has created a built-in political/social resistance to the fiscal reform that is necessary if this pernicious cycle is to be broken.

Unfortunately, successive Pakistani governments, both military and civilian, have relied on its geo-strategic position to avoid reform and always expect that its strategic allies of the moment will come to its rescue when there is a periodic payments crisis, as there inevitably is. This is exactly the situation of the last two years, which required Pakistan to return to the IMF for a large standby program, bolstered by economic and military assistance and targeted budgetary support, from the US and other donors in the international community. This is, in great part, a result of the international economic meltdown of 2008/9, but Pakistan's dependence on foreign financing renders it particularly vulnerable to international downturns.<sup>43</sup>

Previous crisis periods were interspersed with periods of windfall capital inflows from remittances, or foreign assistance from these allies, or both. These windfall years enabled Pakistani governments to avoid the kind of structural reform necessary to reduce Pakistan's dependence on foreign aid. These measures would need to include raises in the tax/revenue to GDP ratio and in the domestic savings/investment rates to levels that reduce Pakistan's need for foreign financing and increase its ability to finance growth and development from domestic resources. These failings characterized the large part of both direct military governments; both

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<sup>43</sup> Pakistan is the outlier among the major South Asian economies in this respect. India, for example, has already begun to tighten monetary policy to restrain the possible inflationary effects of a resurgence of demand and economic growth; Bangladesh, which one would expect to have been equally, if not more, vulnerable than Pakistan, has maintained growth constant at about 6 %, and is now reflecting on what to do with a current account surplus that is about 3% of GDP (in other words, Bangladesh is exporting capital to the rest of the world!).

the Zia ul Haq and Musharraf governments benefited from such windfalls, but neither took advantage of them to initiate serious efforts at structural reform.

The eras of windfall inflows of remittances and foreign investment which helped cloak the structural weaknesses during those two regimes appear to be over. There will continue to be large amounts of official flows through the enlarged US assistance programs, the Friends of Democratic Pakistan consortium, and continued participation of the other International Financial Institutions (the IBRD and ABD), but over the next few years the ability of the government to spur growth will be very limited given the need to implement serious structural reforms. This is not a comfortable position for a democratically elected government, or any government for that matter. A sentence from the State Bank of Pakistan's most recent quarterly statement is perhaps the best summation of the dilemma that the government faces, "[T]here is little doubt that the government cannot successfully stabilize the economy and simultaneously provide stimulus for growth."<sup>44</sup>

This economic paradox is both a short-term and a long-term factor in Pakistan's uncertain future. In the short-term, there will be enormous pressure on the elected government to abandon stabilization for stimulus. That would be disaster in the long term as it would mean, inter alia, that Pakistan would not find the resources and the political will to provide increased educational infrastructure and jobs to accommodate the "demographic dividend." Thus the dividend would become a dangerous deficit with possibly revolutionary implications. This is one question on which US assistance, if targeted correctly, can make a difference.

### **The American Factor**

In the next 5 years, the United States can play a critically positive role if the changed nature and focus of their reinvigorated bilateral relationship can be maintained and sharpened. It was imperative to change the nature of this relationship, and it appears we have made a good start. Previously, there had been a constant mismatch of perceptions and misunderstood interests, which led unconsciously to conflicting policy goals.

While it is not yet as cozy a relationship as will be needed, strategy meetings in Washington and Islamabad appear to be bringing about a more productive and interactive relationship with higher levels of mutual trust than in the past. Over the next few years, our objective should be to convince the Pakistanis that we are a stable, reliable ally that understands where we differ on issues and wants to find ways to work out or around those differences, an ally that knows that its long term interests in South Asia are best served by a long-term, stable, and reliable relationship with Pakistan.

The difficulty is, indeed, formidable. The range of vested interests alone in Pakistan—the feudal and industrial elite, the military, and the Islamists—make this a long-shot. A long-term commitment of resources as well as a huge reservoir of patience, pragmatic flexibility, and willingness to experiment will be required. Unfortunately, the US has a very poor record of managing assistance efforts that require flexibility, pragmatism, and some semblance of timeliness.

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<sup>44</sup> The bank also notes that while growth in 2010 will be higher than in 2009 (when it was lower than the growth rate of population, implying a decrease in GDP per capita), it will still not be "adequate to generate the required employment opportunities." Thus the government will face a growing unemployment rate even with an improvement in the economy.

The new dimension to this policy objective of restoring trust to the bilateral relationship is closely related to all the above factors/variables that will determine over the next 5-6 years which way Pakistan is heading. That is because, in the end, it is the people of Pakistan that must be convinced that the US is a reliable ally that can be trusted. They must come to believe that the US shares their aspirations for a better life in Pakistan. The reform necessary to move these factors/variables in a positive direction must come from the bottom up. Segments, though not all, of the ruling elites—industrial and landed feudals, the military, the Islamists, politicians—will resist a change of direction as inimical to their vested interests.

We have a good vehicle with which to carry out this risky policy—the Kerry-Lugar Bill which provides for \$1.5 billion of economic assistance over a 5-year period—a window of opportunity to see if we can target assistance in the right direction, to the higher value economic and social targets, and if that promotes movement toward reforming Pakistani social, economic and political institutions.

The initial indication that Kerry-Lugar will emphasize supporting government efforts to increase, in the long-term, institutional and productive capacity (*viz.* the energy sector, and education) is exactly right. More importantly in the context of this analysis, whether Kerry-Lugar appears in 5-6 years to have tipped in the right direction the factors and variables that we think will determine Pakistan's future (as listed above) will be a definitive test of how to sustain the relationship we hope to have built. In a sense, this 5-year window for the Kerry-Lugar Bill can be viewed as the diplomatic equivalent of President Obama's deadline of July 2011 for the beginning of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

### **The Range of Possible Futures**

It is likely that, in 5-6 years' time, Pakistan will look on the surface pretty much like it does now. Its future character and orientation will remain uncertain, although perhaps with a bit more definition than at present. It will be necessary to look deeply below the surface, and to look carefully inside each of the determinants listed above, to estimate whether the country has moved closer to one of the three kinds of trajectories that I see as possible: a good-case trajectory; a business-as-usual- case trajectory; and a bad-case trajectory.

Evidence of its moving toward a good-case trajectory would be provided if all of the six determinants listed above were moving in what could be persuasively argued were positive directions. The tests for judging positive movement are set out in the sections above. A second possible trajectory leads to a prediction of a business-as-usual Pakistan for the foreseeable future. This trajectory suggests that some of the determinants listed above would be moving positively (e.g. a sustained and substantive Indo-Pak dialogue had begun) while others showed no positive movement (e.g. no perceivable decrease in the India-centric mindset of the army, the political leaders, and the public). A bad trajectory would probably mean that none of the six determinants show any discernible positive movement in 5-6 years.

The judgments that we will be able to make in this medium-term framework cannot be assumed to be definitive, but they will have a stronger predictive power than is possible today. On most of them, however, there is no simple criterion, and much will remain judgmental and subject to interpretation.

One thing that should be clear, however, is that these factors/variables feed on each other. Thus, the most critical factor—reducing India-centricity—will have a strong knock-on effect on

the other five variables. This is true of all six variables, but the knock-on effect diminishes as one goes down the list. Thus, the weakest will be an effective, intelligent U.S. strategy to establish a stable and mutually trusting relationship. This will be of little consequence if, for example, the army clings rigidly to its India-centric worldview and/or the Afghan war outcome increases the incentives for it to do so.

A reformed economy that can, ultimately, produce steady sustained growth of 6-10 percent will be one of the bases for a strong alternative to the Islamist narrative, and will, over time reduce the pull of extremism. Sooner or later, this can reduce the India-centricity of society and political leaders, but the key in this respect is the army. The point here is that each of these variables has a differential effect on all the others. All working in tandem toward one trajectory would be a powerful prediction of Pakistan's future. The more likely scenario is that some will work positively and some negatively, and where that leaves us in 5-6 years is highly uncertain—just like Pakistan's future.

# Mohan Guruswamy: The China Factor

Of the factors shaping Pakistan's future, its relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the most enigmatic, but possibly one of the most important. This essay offers a brief overview of that relationship, whose importance is likely to increase in years to come as Pakistan's domestic order remains unstable and its relations with the West enter a new round of "ups and downs."

The Pakistan-China partnership is one of the most enigmatic yet enduring of international relationships in recent times. It was born at the height of the Cold War, when the two countries were in opposite camps. The political systems in the two countries, one an Islamic Republic and the other an avowedly Communist and hence atheist state, should have made the two countries implacably hostile to each other under normal circumstances. Pakistan and China are geographical neighbors, but are joined together by extremely rugged, remote, and physically hostile territories, sparsely populated by potentially hostile ethnic minorities. They are not like France and Germany, or even like China and Myanmar, with long and open borders and many cultural and historical ties. So, it's not geography that binds them together! Yet China has poured in military supplies, has been unrestrained in providing nuclear weapons and missile technologies, and economic assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan, in return, has been an ever-grateful ally and even (at times) China's client state. At one time, the only common factor between the two countries was a common bond with America battling the former Soviet Union. The United States and China are now increasingly seen as rivals. But the Pakistan-China relationship flourishes, as does the Pakistan-US relationship. Is the only thing that binds Pakistan and China together an undisguised and implacable hostility towards India? With all three parties now nuclear powers, and India rapidly rising as an economic and military power, will things change? In the recent years we have seen a significant thaw in India-China relations. Both countries have in a place a regular consultation process, with the heads of state and government exchanging annual visits. The two countries have acted in concert on many global issues. Their bilateral trade has been growing exponentially. The vexatious border dispute that was the cause of a war in 1962 and bitterness over the years is now on the backburner. Both countries have special representatives discussing solutions at regular intervals. Since 1967, not a shot has been fired across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). With India-China relations growing and taking a new color, will it have an effect on Pakistan-China relations?

## **"Higher than the Mountains and Deeper than the Oceans!"**

Pakistan was among the earliest countries and the first Muslim nation to break relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognize the Peoples Republic in 1950. It established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC on 21 May, 1951. But soon after this, Pakistan joined both of the major the American sponsored military pacts in the region, CENTO<sup>45</sup> and SEATO<sup>46</sup>,

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<sup>45</sup> The Central Treaty Organization (also referred to as CENTO, original name was Middle East Treaty Organization or METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) was adopted in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979. Modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CENTO committed the nations to mutual cooperation and protection, as well as non-intervention in each other's affairs. Its goal was to contain the USSR by having a line of strong states along the USSR's southwestern frontier. Similarly, it was known as the 'Northern Tier' to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. Unlike NATO, CENTO did not have a unified military command structure, nor were many U.S. or UK military bases established in

to contain the Communist threat posed by the Soviet Union and its then-principal ally, the PRC. However, it would seem that this did not inhibit Pakistan from maintaining a close and often co-operative relationship with the PRC. In an interview with a Pakistan journalist on 29 July 2009, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Lou Zhaohui said, "Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize New China. Ever since our diplomatic relations began in May 1951, we have enjoyed mutual understanding, respect, trust and support and our friendship and co-operation have flourished. We are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners and dear brothers. When China was in difficulty caused by the western blockades in the 1950's and 60's, it was Pakistan which opened an air corridor linking China with the outside world. In the 1970's it was Pakistan which served as a bridge for the normalization of China-US relations."<sup>47</sup> Pakistani diplomacy has always had a track record of deftness and alacrity in furthering its perceived national interests, and there is no reason to doubt the Ambassador's acknowledgment of Pakistan's assistance in overcoming the western blockade.

Even while the "western blockade" was on, China invaded the Chamdo region of Tibet<sup>48</sup>, which caused New Delhi to express its apprehensions. China curtly told India that the invasion was no concern of India's, and was only an internal matter of China. Pakistan surely took note of this. India's discovery of the Xinjiang-Tibet highway across the Aksai Chin in the early 1950's also wouldn't have gone unnoticed in Pakistan, considering that it also shared a border with China in the region. Besides, the matter had caused some acrimony in the Indian parliament, among the Indian people and in the Indian media. This could have provided Pakistan with just the motivation to seek a better understanding with Beijing, despite the military alliances it was a member of. Then as it is today, Pakistan's main foreign policy focus was India. That is what pushed it into the western alliances and this would have also induced it to seek rapport with China.

Even before India became independent and China became communist, there were visible tensions between the two countries. In March 1947, four months before independence, the Congress Party organized the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. The Chinese delegation expressed unhappiness that Tibet was invited separately. They then tried very hard to make the

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member countries, although the U.S. had communications and electronic intelligence facilities in Iran, and operated U-2 intelligence flights over the USSR from bases in Pakistan. The United Kingdom had access to facilities in Pakistan and Iraq at various times while the treaty was in effect. In addition, Turkey and the U.S. agreed to permit American access to Turkish bases, but this was done under the auspices of NATO.

<sup>46</sup> SEATO was planned to be a Southeast Asian version of the NATO, in which the military forces of each member would be coordinated to provide for the collective defense of the members' country. SEATO did use portions of the military forces of its members in annual joint training maneuvers. The membership of SEATO reflected a mid-1950s' combination of "out of area" powers and "in area" pro-Western nations. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States represented the strongest Western powers. Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, and New Zealand represented Europeanized or pro-Western nations in the Southeast Asian area. Pakistan was included not only because East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was geographically close to Southeast Asia, but possibly because Pakistan was a member of the pro-Western CENTO alliance. Thus the pro-Western, anti-communist military alliances of the Mid-east and Southeast Asia were linked by the membership of Pakistan in both.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.opfblog.com/8824/interview-with-honorable-luo-zhaohui-ambassador-of-china-in-pakistan>

<sup>48</sup> The People's Liberation Army first entered eastern Tibet on October 7, 1950. The highly mobile units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces and by 19 October 1950, 5,000 Tibetan soldiers had been killed and the small Tibetan army had surrendered. After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures on socialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes.

Tibetan delegation sit with them. Then, they protested to the map of Asia that formed the backdrop to the main dais, which showed Tibet as an independent country. They wanted the painting modified immediately. The Chinese anxiety that the conference was in part India's aim to implicitly acquire leadership in Asia came to the fore when the location of the secretariat of the proposed Asian Relations Organization, the apex body of the member nations, was being discussed. India has assumed that it would be in India. China objected to this. It was then decided to rotate it half yearly between New Delhi and Beijing. Nothing was heard of this organization after this episode and it died soon after.<sup>49</sup>

Whether this Pakistani opening with China was done with the tacit blessings of the USA is not known, but it is well known that the USA had established close ties with several top Chinese leaders including Mao Zedong during WWII. This included the establishment of a US military mission to provide requisite assistance to the Chinese Communists in the war with Japan.<sup>50</sup> Despite the Korean War, there were many in the USA who nursed a desire to establish ties with Beijing and to break its alliance with Moscow. This could have very well been possible, because by 1956 Chinese ties with the Soviet Union were souring because of Nikita Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalinist excesses and the personality cult he had formed. It wouldn't have also gone unnoticed in China that India had supported, and had even taken part, in the United Nations operations in Korea.

The 60<sup>th</sup> Parachute Field Ambulance Platoon was much more than the title "platoon" indicates. For all intents it was a mobile army surgical hospital (M.A.S.H.) Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Rangaraj, it joined UN forces at Pyongyang on December 4, 1950, just in time to take part in 8<sup>th</sup> Army's withdrawal out of North Korea. As a sidebar, some members of the 60<sup>th</sup> Indian Field Ambulance Platoon jumped with the U.S. 187<sup>th</sup> Regimental Combat Team at Munsan-ni on March 22, 1951.<sup>51</sup> This participation in the operation against China, however modest, wouldn't have gone unnoticed in China, the main adversary of UN forces after the North Korean army folded under after the UN's landings at Inchon.

The events of 1948, which saw the accession of the hitherto princely state of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union, would strongly shape Pakistani policy. After Pakistan's failed attempt to seize Jammu and Kashmir by force, Pakistan had only one enemy, and its energies were and are still fully focused on it. China, given its rivalry and tensions with India, was a natural ally for Pakistan. The 1962 India-China border war was the major turning point in Pakistan-China relations. In the immediate wake of the 1962 War, as India turned to the West for

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<sup>49</sup> "The lost heart of Asia" by LC Jain in *The Hindu*, Sunday February 7, 2010.

<sup>50</sup> However, a perception grew that Chiang's government was unable to effectively resist the Japanese, or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Communists. Americans debated policy. China hands such as Stilwell argued that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land based counter-offensive in invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, starting in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Others, such as Claire Chennault, argued for air power. After World War II ended in 1945, the hostility between the ROC and the CPC (Communist Party of China) exploded into open civil war. General Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general George C. Marshall tried to broker a truce between the ROC and the CPC in 1946, but it quickly lost momentum, and the Nationalist cause went steadily downhill until 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan and other islands.

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.korean-war.com/60thindian.html>

support, it soon found itself under severe pressure by the USA and UK to “settle” the J&K dispute with Pakistan, either by a partition of the state or by accepting a UN supervised compromise.<sup>52</sup> India balked at this move. Realizing that little would come out of it, Pakistan turned to China, no doubt deriving moral and intellectual sustenance from the old Arab proverb: “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”.<sup>53</sup> The Chinese have an even more apt proverb: “It is good to strike the serpent’s head with your enemy’s hand.” It made sense to befriend Pakistan because it gave it a suitable stick to belabor India. It is still open to debate whether China’s investment on a relationship with Pakistan is anything more than just this.

Faced with a common enemy, Sino-Pakistan relations flourished. In 1963 Pakistan and China reached their first formal trade pact. The same year they also reached a border agreement with Pakistan ceding the Shaksgam Valley in the disputed northern territories to China. In 1965, Pakistan and India went to war and China supported Pakistan diplomatically. It would seem that China was even readying to open a front with India when it served India with a three day ultimatum to dismantle certain posts on the contested Sino-Indian border. But before the Chinese could act, Pakistan accepted a UN call for a cease-fire. It is said that the Pakistanis told Mao Zedong that the cost of continued fighting was far too high, both diplomatically and economically. However Mao pressed the Pakistanis to fight on sending President Ayub Khan the message: “if there is a nuclear war, it is Beijing that will be a target and not Rawalpindi.” But the Pakistanis could not oblige.<sup>54</sup>

The biggest step forward in Pakistan-China relations came in 1970, when it helped to set up the contacts to facilitate the historic secret visit to China of US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger. The rest is history. Kissinger’s and President Nixon’s personal animosity for Indira Gandhi was well known.<sup>55</sup> Soon a US-China-Pakistan troika came into being. The highpoint of this alliance came when India and Pakistan went to war in 1971 over Bangladesh. Despite major joint efforts by the USA and China, India inflicted a huge military defeat on Pakistan and succeeded in liberating Bangladesh from West Pakistan. The war was prolonged in the East Pakistan because of the expectation that China would open a third front in the conflict.<sup>56</sup> There is

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<sup>52</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. XIX, South Asia: W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Duncan Sandys, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, led a small group of diplomatic and military experts to India on November 22. While the experts assessed India’s military needs, Harriman, Sandys, and Galbraith discussed the implications of the border war with Nehru. Harriman and Sandys made clear their governments’ willingness to provide military assistance to India but pointed out the related need for negotiations to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In a private meeting with Nehru, Harriman stated that unless tensions over Kashmir eased, the United States could not continue to provide military assistance to both parties to the conflict. Nehru reluctantly agreed to negotiations but warned that in the wake of the humiliation suffered by India at the hands of China, Indian public opinion would not stand for significant concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir.

<sup>53</sup> In Mathew, Chapter 22, the Pharisees and the Herodians united against Jesus. Even though they hated each other, they had a common enemy.

<sup>54</sup> Page 606 in “Mao: The Unknown Story” by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Vintage Books ISBN 978-0-099-50737-6

<sup>55</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/south\\_asia/4633263.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/south_asia/4633263.stm) “We really slobbered over the old witch,” says President Nixon. “The Indians are bastards anyway,” says Mr. Kissinger. “They are starting a war there.” He adds: “While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she’s got to go to war.”

<sup>56</sup> Office of the Historian at the US State Department released Volume XI of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* devoted to the ‘South Asia Crisis, 1971’: in other words, the Bangladesh War.: “On November 10, Nixon instructed Kissinger to ask the Chinese to move some troops toward the Indian frontier. ‘Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that’s what they must do now.’ This was conveyed to Huang Hua, China’s envoy to the United



little doubt that the Pakistanis were banking on some Chinese assurance to subject India to military pressure. In his December 5, 1971 message numbered G-235 to Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi, Commander of all Pakistan forces in the then East Pakistan, Gen. Yahya Khan, President of Pakistan assures him that there is “every hope of Chinese activities soon.” The following day, Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi while briefing the Governor breaks out into tears and tells him that the Indian onslaught is relentless and advancing on all fronts. Governor AH Malik then sends message A-6905 on December 6 to President Yahya Khan briefing him about the difficult position they are in, but also informs him “if help is coming we will fight on whatever the consequences may be.” By December 9 the authorities in East Pakistan were ready to throw the towel in and sought the assistance of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, Paul Mark Henry, to arrange a “peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives of East Pakistan” and “repatriation with honor of armed forces of Pakistan to West Pakistan.” But suddenly on December 11, President Yahya Khan sends message G-0002 ordering Governor Malik: “do NOT repeat NOT take any action on my last message to you. Very important diplomatic and military moves are taking place by our friends. Is essential that we hold on for another thirty six hours at all costs.”<sup>57</sup> Clearly China promised more than it could deliver. Both the Americans and Pakistanis seemed to have believed that China’s intervention was imminent and would save Pakistan from defeat.

However, the Chinese failure to intervene beyond making a few noises did not dampen Sino-Pakistan relations.

In 1974 India tested a nuclear device, which provided an even greater impetus to Sino-Pakistan relations. China now began actively assisting Pakistan’s nuclear program. Even though China and Pakistan reached a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement only in 1986, much was happening. “US officials have said on many occasions that since the early 1980’s that Pakistan received a proven weapon design from China. It has been reported that this design was that used in China’s fourth nuclear weapons test in 1966 at Lop Nor. This test involved the detonation of a warhead carried by a missile.”<sup>58</sup> These efforts fructified when in the mid 1980’s when Pakistan assembled and tested a Chinese designed nuclear bomb in the Lop Nor testing grounds in northern Tibet.<sup>59, 60, 61</sup> In 1998 India tested a series of nuclear weapons over a period

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Nations. Kissinger told Huang the US would be prepared for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacked China. On December 12, the White House received an urgent message. The Chinese wanted to meet in New York. General Alexander Haig, then Kissinger’s deputy, rushed to the venue, but were disappointed. Huang just wanted to convey his government’s stand in the UN, no words of an attack in Sikkim or in the then North East Frontier Agency (now, the northeastern states). The myth of the Chinese intervention is also visible in the secret Pakistani dispatches. Lieutenant General A A K Niazi, the Pakistani army commander in Dhaka, was informed: ‘NEFA front has been activated by Chinese although the Indians for obvious reasons have not announced it. ‘Until the last day of the war, Pakistan expected its Chinese savior to strike, but Beijing never did.

<sup>57</sup> From The Hamidur Rahman Commission of Inquiry appointed in December 1971 to inquire into the circumstances leading to the surrender of Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi. This largely squares up with the US State Departments history cited in footnote 12.

<sup>58</sup> From the bulletin.org of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “Pakistan’s bomb: Out of the Closet” by David Albright and Mark Hibbs July/August 1992 pp 38-43 (vol.48;no.06)

<sup>59</sup> *The Nuclear Express, A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation*. Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman. viii + 392 pp. Zenith Press, 2009. “They also believe that ties between China and Pakistan led to Pakistan’s confidence in its nuclear weapons. Specifically, they maintain that at the behest of Benazir Bhutto, China tested an atomic bomb for Pakistan on May 26, 1990, at the Lop Nor Nuclear Test Site. As supporting evidence, they note that after the Indian nuclear tests of 1998, “it took only two weeks and three days for the Pakistanis to field and fire a nuclear device of their own.”

of two days. Pakistan followed soon after by also testing five weapons. The weapons were now out in the open. There was little doubt that China and its North Korean ally had actively assisted Pakistan to help them develop not only nuclear weapons but also their missile delivery systems. This co-operation continues even now.

In 1999, India and Pakistan again went to war following the occupation of the Kargil heights by units of the Pakistani Army. The ferocity of the Indian counter attack, which also used its air force, and none too subtle diplomatic pressure from the US President Bill Clinton forced Pakistan to withdraw to pre-conflict positions and accept a cease-fire. But this time around China was much muted in its support.<sup>62</sup><sup>63</sup> Did this signal any change in attitude towards Pakistan? Or was it just another phase in Chinese policy?

But then what is the Chinese policy? Why is China investing so much, even at the cost of earning global opprobrium as an irresponsible proliferator, and even at the risk of poisoning its relations with India for all time to come? To put it very simply, China and Pakistan have traditionally valued one another as a strategic hedge against India. "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India," current Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani told CFR.org in 2006, when he was a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "For Pakistan," he said, "China is a high-value guarantor of security against India."

India has long been perturbed by China's military aid to Pakistan. K. Alan Kronstadt, a specialist in South Asian affairs at the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, writes that observers in India see Chinese support for Pakistan as "a key aspect of Beijing's perceived policy of 'encirclement' or constraint of India as a means of preventing or delaying New Delhi's ability to challenge Beijing's region-wide influence." China and India fought a border war in 1962, and both still claim the other is occupying large portions of their territory. "The 1962 Sino-

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<sup>60</sup> Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan 'detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.

<sup>61</sup> Periodic revelations confirming the successful advance of the Pakistani program were turning up with some regularity. Drawn to the limelight, the leader of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan held periodic interviews boasting about Pakistan's nuclear prowess. It was in such an interview in February 1984 that he first made the claim that Pakistan had achieved nuclear weapons capability. In July 1984 the *New York Times* reported that US intelligence had learned that the previous year that China had supplied Pakistan with the design of an actual tested nuclear device - the design of China's fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966 with a yield of 25 kt. This is said to be a low weight (200 kg class) solid-core bomb design. Reports have also surfaced that China also provided sufficient HEU to construct one or two weapons in 1983. In 1998 A. Q. Khan stated that Pakistan had acquired the capability to explode a nuclear device at the end of 1984.

<sup>62</sup> "ASEAN backs India's stand". The Tribune. 2006-07-24. Retrieved 2009-05-20. [G8](#) nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Experts say all countries in the region are reevaluating their traditional positions. "Everyone in the region has learned to [develop] a relatively non-ideological set of policies," says [Kenneth G. Lieberthal](#), a noted China expert and professor at the University of Michigan. As CSIS's Parker and Schaffer note, China has taken a more neutral position on India-Pakistan issues such as Kashmir in the past decade and a half, and has "begun to take the relationship with India more seriously." A case in point, they say, was China's dissatisfaction with Pakistani military action across the Line of Control, which separates India- and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, during the 1999 Kargil conflict.

Indian border conflict was a watershed moment for the region,” says John W. Garver, professor of international relations at the Georgia Institute of Technology. “Both China and India incurred heavy costs on their economic development, and both sides shifted their policy over time to become more accommodating to growth.”<sup>64</sup>

Since its economic reforms in 1976, China has shown great flexibility in conducting its international relations with all its neighbors, adversaries and rivals. Japan is its largest trading partner and is a major investor in China’s manufacturing sector. Taiwan, which China officially considers a renegade province, is its second largest overseas investor. The USA is China’s largest export market. China’s annual bilateral trade with India has been growing exponentially and has now crossed \$40 billion.<sup>65</sup> By 2012 this is slated to rise to \$60 billion. The ASEAN, which is extremely wary of China, is also a major investor in China. China’s cumulative FDI is now close to \$1 trillion. Up to 2007, it had received \$750 billion, and it has received an average of \$70 billion every year since then.<sup>66</sup> FDI investors now account for 57% of Chinese exports. Without exports China’s, GDP growth would splutter to a halt. Also, without FDI, its export sector would not be able to sustain the frenetic pace of growth it has set for the Chinese economy. It is a testimony to Chinese pragmatism that three of its top four FDI investors—namely Japan, Taiwan and the USA—are countries that it has troubled relations with. It is this pragmatism that leads China to believe that it can have a much greater economic engagement with India, and still hedge against its emergence as a strong rival in Asia and on the global stage.

Pakistan desisted from attacking India in 1962, when it was extremely vulnerable. Pressure from the West, particularly by the Kennedy Administration, was a major factor. Before the second phase of the 1962 conflict, military supplies from the USA and UK had started pouring in. The USA had even established a Military Aid Group in New Delhi to process India’s wish lists. In turn, the West began applying pressure on India to seek a speedy resolution of the J&K dispute. The Americans were particularly keen on settling the issue with a new line running

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<sup>64</sup> “China-Pakistan Relations” by Jamal Afridi, August 20, 2009 Council on Foreign Relations.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070>

<sup>65</sup> 14 Apr, 2010. Times of India. Bilateral trade with China has already exceeded \$40 billion, making Beijing New Delhi’s largest trading partner.

<sup>66</sup> Cumulative FDI in China exceeds \$750 billion, from Xinhua 28.08.2007, China’s actual use of foreign direct investment (FDI) had cumulatively exceeded 750 billion U.S. dollars by the end of June this year since the beginning of its opening-up policy in 1978, according to a senior commerce official. Vice Minister of Commerce Wei Jianguo said the country had approved the establishment of 610,000 foreign-funded enterprises by the end of June this year.

In the first half of 2007, exports of foreign-funded enterprises accounted for 57 percent of the nation’s total, said Wei at a forum on the social responsibility of foreign-funded enterprises.

18 “A Working Paper on Kashmir” by AG Noorani, *Frontline* Volume 23 - Issue 04 :: Feb. 25 - Mar. 10, 2006 “The Swaran Singh-Bhutto talks in 1962-63 centered on drawing an international boundary through Kashmir (vide Y.D. Gundevia’s *Outside the Archives*, page 248; he was Foreign Secretary. Brigadier D.K. Palit, Director, Military Operations, gives details in his memoirs *War in High Himalayas*, page 393). Swaran Singh asked Palit “if I could consider offering a little more of Kashmir Valley because Pakistan’s acceptance of partition would hinge on how much of the Valley we were willing to give up”. Palit demurred, but Swaran Singh was all for it. He went so far as to offer “the Handwara area” in the northwest of the Valley to Pakistan. Bhutto asked for the entire State bar Kathua.”

slightly east of the existing LOC.<sup>67</sup> That moment soon passed. Neither side was ready for any major compromise. After inflicting another defeat in the NEFA, China unilaterally withdrew to positions it held before the conflict. India was quick to wind up the US MAG after the conflict and revert back to its policy of non-alignment. By mid 1963, Pakistan-China relations were on an upswing, with the signing of an economic co-operation agreement.

Should this moment of vulnerability ever arise again, Indian strategists generally agree that Pakistan will not let it pass. Pakistan will find a seizure of Kashmir by force too tempting. Therefore, Indian military doctrines now emphasize the capability to fight a two front war.<sup>68</sup> Indian strategists also generally agree that because of the high costs involved, China will not seek to attack India in the event of a conflict with Pakistan. China has had the opportunity to do so three times since 1962, and it has not taken advantage of India's military preoccupations with Pakistan. On the other hand, during the Kargil conflict of 1999, China actually took the position that Pakistan must withdraw from the areas it had occupied.<sup>69</sup> Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation said in her testimony to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "China's interest in improving ties to India over the last decade has spurred Beijing to develop a more neutral position on the Kashmir issue, rather than reflexively taking Pakistan's side, which has traditionally meant supporting United Nations resolutions calling for a plebiscite or backing Pakistan's attempts to wrest the region by force, as with Pakistan's 1965 Operation Gibraltar. A turning point in China's position on Kashmir came during the 1999 Kargil crisis when Beijing helped convince Pakistan to withdraw forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control following its incursion into the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing made clear its

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<sup>67</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963*, Vol. XIX, South Asia: Much of the time and effort devoted to South Asia by the Kennedy administration during the following months was spent in a fruitless attempt to resolve the Kashmir dispute. With steady encouragement and prodding from Washington and London, Indian Minister for Railways Swaran Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met six times between December 26, 1962, and May 16, 1963, to explore the basis for a settlement. On February 21, with the talks apparently stalemated, Kennedy instructed his advisers, in Rusk's words, "to wade into the effort from their ankles up to their knees." (258) Rusk traveled to India and Pakistan in May to try to find an approach that might produce a solution. He and Sandys met with Nehru and Ayub and managed to convince them to explore the possibility of mediation rather than accept the failure of the ministerial negotiations. (286, 288) Again, however, the effort got nowhere.

<sup>68</sup> "India prepares for a two front war" by David Blumenthal in *The Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2010. "There is one country responding to China's military build-up and aggressiveness with some muscle of its own. No, it is not the United States, the superpower ostensibly responsible for maintaining peace and security in Asia. Rather, it is India, whose military is currently refining a "two-front war" doctrine to fend off Pakistan and China simultaneously. Delhi has begun planning to fight a "two-front war" in case China and Pakistan ally against India. Army Chief of Staff General Deepak Kapoor recently outlined the strategy: Both "fronts"—the northeastern one with China and northwestern one with Pakistan—would receive equal attention. If attacked by Pakistan and China, India will use its new integrated battle groups to deal quick decisive blows against both simultaneously. The two-front strategy's ambitions go even further: In the long term China is the real focus for Indian strategists. According to local newspapers, Gen. Kapoor told a defense seminar late last year that India's forces will "have to substantially enhance their strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India's geopolitical interests stretching from the [Persian] Gulf to Malacca Strait" and "to protect our island territories" and assist "the littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region."

<sup>69</sup> Experts say all countries in the region are reevaluating their traditional positions. "Everyone in the region has learned to [develop] a relatively non-ideological set of policies," says [Kenneth G. Lieberthal](#), a noted China expert and professor at the University of Michigan. As CSIS's Parker and Schaffer note, China has taken a more neutral position on India-Pakistan issues such as Kashmir in the past decade and a half, and has "begun to take the relationship with India more seriously." A case in point, they say, was China's dissatisfaction with Pakistani military action across the Line of Control, which separates India- and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, during the 1999 Kargil conflict.

position that the two sides should resolve the Kashmir conflict through bilateral negotiations, not military force. India was pleased with China's stance on the Kargil crisis, which allowed Beijing and New Delhi to overcome tensions in their relations that had developed over India's 1998 nuclear tests."

Commenting further on China's concerns about the current unstable situation in Pakistan, Curtis went on to testify, "One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that has surfaced has been the issue of Chinese Uighur separatists receiving sanctuary and training on Pakistani territory. The Chinese province of Xinjiang is home to 8 million Muslim Uighurs, many of whom resent the growing presence and economic grip on the region by the Han Chinese. Some have agitated for an independent "East Turkestan." In recent years, Pakistan has begun to clamp down on Uighur settlements and on religious schools used as training grounds for militants to mollify China's concerns. Media reports indicate that Pakistan may have extradited as many as nine Uighurs to China in April after accusing them of involvement in terrorist activities.

Tension has also surfaced over Islamist extremism in Pakistan. It came to a head in the summer of 2007, when vigilantes kidnapped several Chinese citizens whom they accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. China was incensed by this incident, and its complaints to Pakistani authorities likely contributed to Pakistan's decision to finally launch a military operation at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, where the militants had been holed up since January 2007. Around the same time as the Red Mosque episode, three Chinese officials were killed in Peshawar in July 2007. Several days later, a suicide bomber attacked a group of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan. Last August, Islamist extremists abducted Chinese engineer Long Zia Wei in Pakistan's Swat Valley. The Chinese protested vehemently to the Pakistani government and Zia Wei was released unharmed in February.

Pakistani security concerns could move the Chinese in the direction of working more closely with the international community to help stabilize the country. During President Zardari's visit to Beijing in October 2008, Beijing resisted providing Pakistan a large-scale bailout from its economic crisis, thus forcing Islamabad to accept an International Monetary Fund aid program with stringent conditions for economic reform. Beijing did come through with a soft loan of about \$500 million, though.<sup>70</sup>

The Chinese find the current situation in Pakistan uncomfortable, to say the least. They have time and again expressed concern over the domestic situation within Pakistan. In several recent Track II dialogues with Chinese think tanks in which this writer has participated, Chinese scholars and officials have expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Pakistan. They were even in full agreement with the Indian discussants that several militant groups now seemed to be acting independently even of the ISI and Pakistan military. The repeated attacks on Chinese nationals by jihadists in Pakistan were enough proof of this. "The Chinese have also expressed concern and Chinese investment projects in the region are now important not simply in scale but in their strategic nature. The Gwadar port and the linked prospect of an energy corridor to China's northwest, for example, are valuable well beyond their economic worth. Yet all of these projects — including the much-touted Aynak mine — are on go-slow until Chinese confidence

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<sup>70</sup> Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2009 by Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation, Washington DC. Research/Testimony/Chinas-Military-and-Security-Relationship-with-Pakistan

about stability has returned. The Pakistani military is no longer able to ensure that Chinese interests are given a privileged and protected status. Whether it comes to attacks on Chinese assets or the kidnappings and killings of Chinese workers, the threats have been growing as the situation in Pakistan has deteriorated. China has become a target for groups well beyond ETIM and Baluchi nationalists ever since its involvement in the Red Mosque incident. Political tensions with the Pakistani government over these issues have grown markedly in the past year.”<sup>71</sup>

Like many US and western scholars and writers, Chinese thinkers also privately express concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and fear the takeover of Pakistan by fundamentalist elements. Much has been said about this subject and the Chinese authorities, who are as influenced by western views on the subject as their other international counterparts would certainly be concerned about “loose nukes” in Pakistan.<sup>72</sup>

Nevertheless, economic and military cooperation between the two countries proceeds unabated. China has been a steady source of military equipment to the Pakistan Army, has helped Pakistan to set-up mass weapons production factories, and also has given technology assistance and modernized facilities.

In the last 20 years, the countries have been involved in several joint-venture projects to enhance military and weaponry systems. These include projects like the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, missile technology, Al-Khalid Main Battle Tanks, Babur Cruise Missiles. The armies have a regular schedule for organizing joint military exercises. China is the largest investor in the Gwadar Deep Sea Port, which is strategically located at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Time for a Presidential Decision on Afghanistan: Afghanistan-Pakistan: Bringing China (back) in. German Marshall Fund video. <http://blog.gmfus.org/2009/10/23/afghanistan-pakistan-bringing-back-china-in>

<sup>72</sup> “Choosing among Bad Options: The Pakistani “Loose Nukes” *Conundrum* By Thomas Donnelly

**“The prospect that a nuclear-capable state may lose control of some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the United States and its allies face,” warns the Quadrennial Defense Review report. The report states that at its core, the problem is one of “internal instability.” While this sort of language might seem vague and euphemistic, Pentagon planners have a very specific place in mind: Pakistan. Our most strategically immediate proliferation problems are posed by North Korea and Iran, two states that are obviously hostile to the United States. But a more important problem may be that of Pakistan, a crucial ally in the global war on terror and the broader war for the future of the Islamic world. The situation in Pakistan makes any possible military action to deal with future problems associated with its nuclear weapons extremely difficult. It would be hard to know in advance whether American intervention in a Pakistani crisis--whether related to nuclear weapons, materials, or facilities--would make things better or make them worse.** <http://www.aei.org/outlook/24416>

<sup>73</sup> Lisa Curtis **Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission May 20, 2009.**

“China is Pakistan’s largest defense supplier. China transferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan’s strength in the South Asian strategic balance. The most significant development in China-Pakistan military cooperation occurred in 1992 when China supplied Pakistan with 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles.<sup>[4]</sup> Recent sales of conventional weapons to Pakistan include JF-17 aircraft, JF-17 production facilities, and F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition.<sup>[5]</sup> Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic-missile manufacturing facility near the city of Rawalpindi and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.<sup>[6]</sup> While the U.S. has sanctioned Pakistan in the past--in 1965 and again in 1990--China has consistently supported Pakistan’s military modernization effort. China has helped Pakistan build two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province and continues to support Pakistan’s nuclear program, although it has been sensitive to international condemnation of the A. Q. Khan affair and has calibrated its nuclear assistance to Pakistan accordingly. During Pakistani President Zardari’s visit to

China has become one of Pakistan's top five import sources of Pakistan. Major imports from China are machinery, chemicals, garments and other textile products, stationery, construction materials like tiles, sanitary wares, and crockery. Machinery and electrical appliances form the major part of overall exports. Bilateral trade had reached around \$7 billion in 2008. The balance, however, is tipped in favor of China due to far fewer Chinese imports.

Under the five year program launched in 2006 to strengthen economic relations, existing trade is to be enhanced to \$15 billion by 2012. Besides, the program has identified new projects for co-operation and investment in various economic fields. Permanent and enduring factors that may prove effective and successful in the demand and supply dynamics need to be enforced through mutual co-operation. Some restrictions on free movement of goods and services are occasionally reported, and are often discussed for removal to further enhance the volume of trade and significant increase in investment. Both countries can benefit greatly from further expansion in economic and trade relations under this five year programme.

China has also been generous to Pakistan with financial assistance at crucial times. Recently, China agreed to extend \$500 million in financial aid to Pakistan, according to a senior Pakistani official. This represented a breakthrough for the South Asian nation and a rare move by China to take a leadership role in an international crisis. Shaukat Train, economic adviser to Pakistan's prime minister and the nation's de facto finance minister, had said that China agreed to provide the assistance following the recent visit to Beijing of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari.<sup>74</sup>

The Pakistan-China relationship has been one of the world's most enduring relationships of the last five decades. It has stood the test of time and some very difficult circumstances. The Chinese vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun described it best: "We have friendly relationship with Pakistan that we call all-weather friendship and we cooperate in all areas including energy," he asserted. Zhijun was responding to a question by correspondent of The Pakistan Observer, who led a group of 26 South Asian and South East Asian journalists invited for a meeting with him at Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>75</sup> The Pakistan President, Asif Ali Zardari, echoed a similar perception when he told a group of Chinese journalists: "In spite of changes that occurred in the regional and international environment, the friendship between Pakistan and China is time-tested and has turned increasingly firmer and much more solid as time goes by and is deep-rooted in the hearts and ethos of people of the two nations."<sup>76</sup> But most eloquent of them all was the Chinese President Hu Jintao when he said the relations between the two nations were "higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans".<sup>77/78/79</sup> And indeed they are.

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Beijing in mid-October 2008, Beijing pledged to help Pakistan construct two new nuclear power plants at Chasma, but did not propose or agree to a major China-Pakistan nuclear deal akin to the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement."

<sup>74</sup> <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122660181953225067>

<sup>75</sup> <http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=28360>

<sup>76</sup> <http://english.peopledaily.com/90001/90780/91342/6514759.html>

<sup>77</sup>"Pakistan and China have immense reservoir of goodwill and soft power. The legendary friendship between Pakistan and China is palpable in the Pakistani and Chinese street and in the majestic halls of government. Usually Pakistani and Chinese leaders and people use six expressions to describe this unique relationship. It is higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, stronger than steel, all-weather and time-tested. Recently, I heard yet another expression: it is dearer and nearer than the eyes." From speech by Ambassador Masood Khan at Tsinghua University, Beijing, September 8, 2009

## The view from China?

Having scaled the highest mountains and plumbed the deepest depths together, and after so many times expressed their feelings for each other with such mawkish sentimentality, where do Pakistan and China go next? The relationship between the Pakistan Army's Inter Service Intelligence agency (ISI) and several militant jihadist organizations is now well established. Internally, Pakistan has been wracked by sectarian strife, regional disputes, secessionist civil wars, a general breakdown of law and order, drug cartels, a struggling economy, and a severe water and environmental crisis. Its problems seem insurmountable and unending. Many western scholars and policy makers have now increasingly taken to referring to it a failing state.<sup>80</sup> There is a growing fear that its nuclear arms might be seized by ultra radical elements, either because of the collapse of the state or by an engineered takeover with the help of radical military officers.<sup>81</sup> In the past Pakistan has showed little compunction in selling and transferring nuclear technology to countries near and far. Its nuclear clients included nations like Libya in North Africa, North Korea in the far-east, and even Iran in the immediate neighborhood, an anathema to Pakistan's Arab friends such as Saudi Arabia. Its geography puts it in the fulcrum of the world's great struggle against radical Islamic fundamentalism and the terror it has fanned. So how do policy makers sitting in China see Pakistan?

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<sup>78</sup> [http://www.littleabout.com/news/58891\\_pakistan-china-enhance-military-cooperation.html](http://www.littleabout.com/news/58891_pakistan-china-enhance-military-cooperation.html)

<sup>79</sup> From "Endlessly" a love ballad by American country music singer and songwriter Sonny James – "higher than the highest mountain deeper than the deepest sea that's how i will love you oh darlin endlessly softer than the gentle breezes stronger than the wild oak tree that's how i will hold you oh darlin endlessly oh my love you are my heaven you a...

<sup>80</sup> Pakistan 'is a top failed state': BBC News, 2 May 2006, Pakistan and Afghanistan are among the world's top 10 most vulnerable states, according to a new study. The report - compiled by the US Foreign Policy magazine and the US-based Fund for Peace think-tank - ranked 146 nations according to their viability. Judged according to 12 criteria, including human flight and economic decline, states range from the most failed, Sudan, to the least, Norway. Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are rated 19th, 20th and 25th respectively. The top 60 positions in the list were occupied almost exclusively by African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. India was ranked 93rd, Bhutan came 39th and the Maldives were not mentioned. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4964934.stm>

<sup>81</sup> President Obama sees the possibility of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists as the "number one security threat" in the world, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said Monday, at the start of the nuclear security summit in Washington. ... India and Pakistan -- countries whose competition for nuclear material could develop into a Cold War-style weapons buildup -- are not expected to get heavy scrutiny. Pakistan is of particular concern, given its volatile location and the thriving presence of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban within its borders. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/12/obama-appeals-world-powers-nukes-terrorist-hands/>



They will have a few sleepless nights for sure.<sup>82</sup> The Chinese treasure tranquility and order (Indians, who are probably more adept at finding order amidst chaos, probably have far fewer sleepless nights than the Chinese). One can be sure that the Chinese will constantly be fretting about how to pick up the pieces if the Pakistani cookie crumbles. The jihadists, after all, give no special dispensations to anyone. Jihad is all out war against all those seen oppressing the Ummah, wherever in the world they may be. If Russia, with its Chechen problem, is considered a major enemy, then China, which has had possession of Xinjiang since 1949, and which is trying to swamp much larger numbers of Muslim Uighurs with unabated Han migration, should be an ever bigger enemy. Seminaries and jihadist training camps in Pakistan are reported to have trained several thousand Uighur militants.<sup>83</sup> Many are still in Pakistan and many more lie in wait in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

That still leaves us with the question as to why is China continuing to invest financially, politically, and militarily in a Pakistan whose future direction is uncertain?

There is one ready answer. After investing so heavily in Pakistan since 1963, China is not ready to cut its losses and run. Then, of course, there is the real possibility that Chinese leaders do not share the pessimism of the Americans and the understandable optimism of many Indian analysts that Pakistan is ready to crumble into several new nation states. All indications are that the Chinese recognize that Pakistan is in trouble. However, it seems that they believe that Pakistan is not a case like Somalia or even the former Yugoslavia, where age-old regional animosities released long-pent-up centrifugal forces. This is a fair assessment.

As long as the Pakistan military remains as a reasonably professional and strong institution, Pakistan will continue to exist. Incidentally, this Chinese assessment is shared by most analysts in India. And as long as this institution is there, Pakistan is a relatively low cost hedge for China against a rising India.

Finally, there is the simple fact of life that China is awash with foreign cash. It needs to put this cash to work and project finance is its best option. It creates Chinese jobs and a market

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<sup>82</sup> [Afghanistan-Pakistan: Bringing China \(back\) in](#) : part of entry posted by Andrew Small of German Marshall Fund US, on Friday, October 23rd, 2009 at 4:56 am and is filed under [Afghanistan](#), [Asia](#), [China](#), [Energy](#), [European Union](#), [NATO](#), [Transatlantic Relations](#), [Transatlantic Take](#), [United States](#). “Chinese investment projects in the region are now important not simply in scale but in their strategic nature. The Gwadar port and the linked prospect of an energy corridor to China’s northwest, for example, are valuable well beyond their economic worth. Yet all of these projects — including the much-touted Aynak mine — are go-slow until Chinese confidence about stability has returned. The Pakistani military is no longer able to ensure that Chinese interests are given a privileged and protected status. Whether it comes to attacks on Chinese assets or the kidnappings and killings of Chinese workers, the threats have been growing as the situation in Pakistan has deteriorated. China has become a target for groups well beyond ETIM and Baluchi nationalists ever since its involvement in the Red Mosque incident. Political tensions with the Pakistani government over these issues have grown markedly in the past year. China is also profoundly worried about Pakistan’s long-term security situation. It has become one of the only countries where Beijing has undertaken crisis contingency planning for scenarios ranging from state collapse to loose nukes. And all of their planning makes one thing clear: China needs to coordinate effectively with other major powers if its interests are to be protected. It is no longer clear that pursuit of a narrow set of bilateral objectives is the best Chinese strategy. <http://blog.gmfus.org/2009/10/23/afghanistan-pakistan-bringing-china-back-in/>

<sup>83</sup> “Effects of Uighur unrest” by Huma Yusuf Monday, 13 Jul, 2009 in “The Dawn”. “The extremism that has been witnessed among Uighurs since the 1980s — when Chinese borders opened and Uighurs went on Haj or began travelling to places like Pakistan and Afghanistan — is opportunistic rather than ideological. Uighurs who have gravitated towards militancy have done so in the hope that they could count on the Muslim world for political support and funding to continue the struggle against Han Chinese domination.”

for Chinese capital industry. With project margins being what they are, and taking a long term view (all project finance is long term), even if the initial principal is only partly recovered, it's still a worthwhile investment. It is much better than dumping the money in an American bank, where it would earn next to nothing. This is the Chinese way of making a virtue out of a necessity.<sup>84</sup> And in some cases, like in Gwadar in Baluchistan on the Makran coast, it has other advantages as well.

China's military partnership<sup>85</sup>, much like the US's military relationship with Saudi Arabia, helps to defray the high cost of developing and manufacturing high cost military equipment. The US made F-16 Block 52IN fighter, which the manufacturer is now trying very hard to sell to India, was developed with a \$3 billion investment by the UAE. If the Indian Air Force were to buy this aircraft, then it becomes that much cheaper for the US Air Force, as the costs will be distributed over a larger manufacturing run. With the USA prone to imposing embargoes, Pakistan also wanted to have a reliable supplier of weapons and munitions. China fit the bill, and often foots the bill as well.

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<sup>84</sup> "China-Pakistan Relations" by Jamal Afridi, Council for Foreign Relations, updated on August 20, 2009. "The two countries have cooperated on a variety of large-scale infrastructure projects in Pakistan, including highways, gold and copper mines, major electricity complexes and power plants, and numerous nuclear power projects. With roughly ten thousand Chinese workers engaged in 120 projects in Pakistan, total Chinese investment--which includes heavy engineering, power generation, mining, and telecommunications--was valued at \$4 billion in 2007 and is expected to rise to \$15 billion by 2010. One of the most significant joint development projects of recent years is the major port complex at the naval base of Gwadar, located in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. The complex, inaugurated in December 2008 and now fully operational, provides a deep-sea port, warehouses, and industrial facilities for more than twenty countries. China provided much of the technical assistance and 80 percent of the funds for the construction of the port. In return for providing most of the labor and capital for the project, China gains strategic access to the Persian Gulf: the port is just 180 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of all globally traded oil is shipped." <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070/>

<sup>85</sup> "China-Pakistan Relations" by Jamal Afridi, Council for Foreign Relations. "After the 1990 imposition of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, China became the country's leading arms supplier. Collaboration now includes personnel training, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism efforts. While the relationship is not quite balanced, it has been critically important to Pakistan. "Pakistan needs China more than China needs Pakistan," says Huang Jing, a China expert at the National University of Singapore. Pakistan has benefited from China's assistance with the following defense capabilities:

**Missile:** Pakistan's army has both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shaheen missile series, that experts say are modifications of Chinese imports.

**Aircraft:** The current fleet of the Pakistani Air Force includes Chinese interceptor and advanced trainer aircraft, as well as an Airborne Early Warning and Control radar system used to detect aircraft. Pakistan is producing the JF-17 Thunder multi-role combat aircraft jointly with China. The K-8 Karakorum light attack aircraft was also coproduced.

**Nuclear Program:** China supplies Pakistan with nuclear technology and assistance, including what many experts suspect was the blueprint for Pakistan's nuclear bomb. Some news reports suggest Chinese security agencies knew about Pakistani transfers of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. China was also accused of having long-standing ties with Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), known as the father of the Pakistani nuclear program and head of an international black market nuclear network." <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10070/#p3>

# Tariq Fatemi: Looking Ahead

Pakistan should be confident of its own abilities and optimistic about its future, given its size, location, and the qualities of its people, which now number over 170 million. So should the rest of the world, given that Pakistanis have been successful wherever they have gone, and in whatever endeavors they have undertaken.

Yet, it is not only scholars and political analysts who are convinced that Pakistan faces an uncertain future; many Pakistanis too, are worried about the destiny of their country. What explains this phenomenon, when much smaller and weaker countries appear far more confident about their future and do not arouse similar worries and fears? The factors are many and go as far back as the unusual circumstances surrounding its birth, which cast a deep shadow on the state's future conduct and behavior.

Upon emerging from colonial rule, Pakistan's political leadership and its elite lacked adequate resources for spending in important social sectors, such as health and education. Instead, priority had to be given to ensuring the country's safety and security, in view of the deep hostility it faced from its much stronger and far-bigger neighbor, India. Even if some of Pakistan's concerns may have been exaggerated, India's leaders left no stone unturned to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan. India even went as far to assuage the hurt pride of their citizens at the sub-continent's partition, by assuring them that the newly-established Pakistan would be a short-term experiment and sooner rather than later, its people would seek to rejoin the "motherland".

Thereafter, a host of problems cropped up between the two neighbors, including the issue of Kashmir, which was primarily responsible for three wars and numerous confrontations between them. In fact, this issue should not be seen merely as one relating to disputed territory, for it has impacted on the hearts and minds of Pakistanis who could not visualize their country without this strategically important Muslim majority area in it, as it had always figured in demands for a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. Not surprisingly, this lingering dispute continues to cast an ominous shadow on relations between the two South Asian neighbors, while impacting Pakistan's domestic policies as well.

In this context, one may refer to the well-known French scholar, Dominique Moisi's book, "The Geopolitics of Emotion". In it, he asserts that contrary to common perception, emotions and symbols play an important role in international relations and that this is much more applicable in the case of India and Pakistan. For example, even when discussing complex legal matters, both sides give primacy to historical and cultural aspects, rather than to strategic ones. The skill and resourcefulness of South Asians is evident in their success in foreign countries, which only proves how memories and emotions have impeded their political development. In Moisi's words, the policymakers of the region need to seek the right balance between good and bad emotions, while recommending that the two countries need to resolve those issues that are easily amenable to solution, while leaving the intractable ones on the back burner.

There is no doubt that the two nations' inability to resolve their differences gave primacy to Pakistan's military, intelligence and security organizations. Over a period of time, they came to assume the mantle of the nation's protector and guardian of its geographical borders and its ideological frontiers. This became more pronounced during the rule of Gen. Zia ul Haq, but had been in evidence ever since the country's early days. Consequently, in external relations,

Pakistan's major motivation became the search for external "props", both in terms of economic assistance and military arms, to help deter the designs of its much larger and inimical neighbor. This led Pakistan to the US, which was already looking for friends and allies in what it rightly anticipated would be a global confrontation with a militarily powerful and ideologically formidable foe—the Soviet Union.

There was another feature about Pakistan's political development which was not only unusual, but also harmful to the growth of national politics. This arose from the fact that the most vigorous and sustained campaign for Pakistan was carried out in the Muslim minority provinces of undivided India. As a result, the Muslim League was far better organized in those areas. Consequently, it was from these provinces that the first lot of Pakistan's political leaders and senior civil servants came to government and manned its various departments and agencies. Even the business class consisted primarily of migrants from the state of Gujarat and the cities of Bombay and Calcutta. But the domination of the migrants, or Muhajirs as they were referred to in popular parlance, coupled with their inability to relate to local sentiments and needs soon began to be resented by the locals. An unfortunate chasm was therefore inevitable between the rulers and the ruled. The only institution that remained predominantly "local" was the Armed Forces and in particular, the Army. This made the latter not only conscious of its responsibility in the national security set-up, but also aware that it better represented the ethos of the people. This motivated it to seek a stronger voice in national affairs and eventually to carve out a special role for itself as the guardians of the national good, not only as regards the protection of the country's sovereignty and independence but as custodians of its ideological moorings as well. This came about gradually at first and then much more forcefully during the Zia regime, which shamelessly exploited the faith of the majority to lay claim to a virtual "divine" right to maintain its stranglehold on power.

In such an arrangement, it was inevitable that the authoritarian regimes would prefer to deal with people who were neither genuinely popular, nor principled. In fact, barring brief interludes of civilian governments, Pakistan has been ruled for more than half of its history by military dictators, who had little interest in promoting democracy or the rule of law, and even less interest in formulating policies that would cater to the needs of the common people. These long spells of authoritarian rule destroyed the institutions of state, promoted sectarian and ethnic organizations and encouraged fissiparous tendencies. More importantly, they ignored the interests of smaller and less influential communities and classes, which led to a sense of deep cynicism and foreboding among millions of common citizens and eventually to the country's break-up in 1971.

The country's strong alliance with the United States has also had an enduring influence on the country and its political evolution. But this relationship has never enjoyed popular support, viewed as it has been as another effort by the country's elite to protect its entrenched interests. This view seemed especially realistic as close cooperation with the U.S. and promotion of the latter's interests appeared to coincide with the advent of military regimes in Pakistan. Lacking legality at home, these authoritarian regimes sought to establish their credibility and legitimacy by seeking sustenance and support from foreign powers, even if it meant becoming their willing tool in ventures that were neither in the interest of, nor sometimes even in the knowledge of their own people. Over a period of time, this led to a disconnect between the rulers and the ruled, giving rise to the belief that the common man mattered little to the rulers, which in turn led the poor and disenfranchised to believe that they had no stake in the country's future.

There has however been a welcome change in recent U.S. attitude, as evident from the decision by the Obama Administration to engage in a strategic dialogue with Pakistan. The U.S. is now proposing cooperation in many diverse fields, rather than focusing on the single item agenda that had been the feature of US policy during the Bush Administration. There is also a distinct change in the American attitude towards Pakistan's nuclear program, confirmed in President Obama's remarks at the Press Conference on April 13, 2010 at the conclusion of the nuclear security summit, when he rejected a journalist's insinuation that "it appears that Pakistan is playing by a different set of rules". Instead, Obama categorically stated: "I have actually seen progress over the last several years with respect to Pakistan's nuclear security issues. I feel confident about Pakistan's security around its nuclear weapons program." Then, in a rare show of humility, Obama concluded by observing that "it is important to note that every nuclear power, every country that has a civilian nuclear energy program, has to take better steps to secure these materials. We are not, either". There are also reports to the effect that President Obama assured Prime Minister Gilani: "I will take it (bilateral relations) to the heights where it has never been taken before". Whether the US succeeds in this goal is difficult to predict, but even the articulation of this commendable objective, has helped to inject greater cordiality and trust in their ties. However, for the relationship to become truly meaningful, the US will have to focus on building broad ties to the people of Pakistan, rather than merely confining this relationship to a few individuals and focusing on a couple of agenda items.

Many reasons can be ascribed for this positive development. These include the regular and continuous cross-sector dialogue and engagement between the political leadership and the civil and military bureaucracies of the two countries, which have gradually reduced the trust deficit between them. Moreover, the numerous legal and administrative steps taken on nuclear material and technology appear to have finally convinced key members of the international community that the country's nuclear program is secure. The most critical, however, has been better appreciation in Washington of Pakistan's legitimate security requirements, which includes its nuclear program. Linked to it is grudging acknowledgement in Washington that the US cannot remain totally indifferent to the failure of India and Pakistan to engage productively in the normalization process. There is also the realization, especially in the Pentagon, that Pakistan's total and unambiguous cooperation in the war against the militants is essential for success of American strategy in Afghanistan. This and other factors appear to have had a profound impact on how the Obama Administration currently sees Pakistan. Far from viewing Pakistan as a failed state, the Obama Administration favors a comprehensive, productive and meaningful relationship with this important South Asian country.

In the meanwhile, the abysmally inadequate allocation of resources over the years to the country's social sectors has resulted in Pakistan being pushed to the very bottom of various UNDP Developmental Reports. Whether it is health, education, housing, drinking water or women's empowerment, the country has been sliding down, even in comparison to countries far poorer and less endowed than Pakistan. Sadly, there appear to be only two things that are prospering in Pakistan. One is the high rate of population growth, with even official sites reporting an estimated 1.8 to 2.0% annual increase, which means a rough increase annually of about 3.3 million people. Given that about 40% of the population is already living under the poverty line and 5.6 % of the population is unemployed, the ever increasing population of Pakistan is adding to the country's existing problems, steadily increasing the pressure in an already under-pressure nation. This alarming situation has been confirmed in the World Bank's Global Monitoring Report for 2010, which warns that political uncertainty and domestic turmoil,

arising out of militancy, are likely to disrupt economic activity in Pakistan much more than in other South Asian countries.

The other worrying aspect is the alarming levels of corruption, both of individuals and institutions. Bad governance, and more often, no governance, have contributed to religious, ethnic and sectarian extremism and militancy. At the same time, the country's involvement in promoting the goals and objectives of foreign powers, occasionally at its cost, has also played an important role in furthering these tendencies. A third worry is that the nation is fully armed, with one of the highest per capita gun ownership rates in the world. The government, which should be a source of security for its people, has instead become one of insecurity. In many places, especially in rural Pakistan, the police, the courts and the educational and health systems are either non-existent or overwhelmingly inefficient and unreliable. The war on terror \ has also increased insecurity, rather than making people feel safe. Resultantly, instead of being able to depend on their government, the poor and uneducated have come to depend on tribal leaders, feudal lords, religious and political leaders, and increasingly, on extremists and militants.

Pakistan's successful tests of its nuclear explosive devices in May 1998, in response to those of India, deeply angered and upset many countries, especially those in the West. Led by the U.S., many of them imposed sanctions on Pakistan, while demanding that Pakistan satisfy their concerns. As if this was not enough, the reckless adventure of the then Army Chief in the summer of 1999, in what came to be known as the Kargil episode, unleashed serious alarm in world capitals at what was perceived to be a dangerous and reckless military campaign. This was followed soon thereafter by reports of a dubious role played by some of the country's nuclear scientists in proliferation of nuclear technology and equipment, which deepened concern in many countries. This provided some of these countries with a reason to accuse Pakistan's official agencies of involvement in this transgression, which kept the country under pressure.

Since the 9/11 tragedy, Pakistan has found itself on the front-line of the so-called "War on Terror". Over the past few years, the country has been rocked by a wave of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings that have induced the expatriate community to flee the country, while discouraging foreign investment. Thousands of schools and other educational institutions have been destroyed by the militants and millions have been forced to abandon their homes. These attacks have crippled the economy and brought development work to a halt. The government appears weak, confused and ineffective, while neighboring India has tried to take advantage of this situation to disparage Pakistan, accusing the nation of involvement in acts of terror.

While General Musharraf's military regime had little interest in meeting the aspirations of the country's rapidly growing population, the restoration of democratic institutions in February 2008 raised huge expectations. Many Pakistanis felt a sense of joy and pride in the manner in which popular sentiment played a critical role in the ouster of the military strongman. Some believed that the nearly decade-long military rule had made the politicians wiser and more mature, while convincing them that only a responsible and responsive government would be able to confront the massive challenges confronting the country.

Sadly, the past two years have intensified the doubts and misgivings in large sections of the population, especially in the middle class and the poorer sections of society. These groups, in particular, have seen a dismal deterioration of governance, amidst confused and directionless leadership. The current government, though elected, remains oblivious to the needs of the country and unaware of the sentiments of the common man. It has continued to lurch from one

crisis to another. This has caused disappointment and dismay amongst the citizens, which is likely to weaken their belief in democracy and the rule of law. They have seen the essential commodities of daily use disappear from the market or available only at extremely exorbitant costs. They have also witnessed the virtual break-down of the rule of law, with regular and sickening violence directed at schools, colleges and even mosques, forcing millions to flee their homes. High food and fuel prices have increased poverty to unprecedented levels, while a weak economy means there is little hope of improvement in their lives.

However, this is the age of globalization. Growing linkages amongst nations and regions mean that Pakistan's future cannot be determined in isolation. Many of the challenges that young Pakistanis will face in coming decades will be similar to those faced by youth in other regions, because the world's population is increasing at a phenomenal pace. For example, in 1960, the population of Earth was just three billion people. Since then, the global population has more than doubled and will have tripled by 2050. At the same time, there is an ineluctable power shift from the developed to the developing world, with Europe and North America's share of global population shrinking and their citizens aging rapidly. Half of these citizens are over the age of 40, with recent migrants making up the growing share of their labor force. On the other hand, citizens in the developing world are much younger, with an average age of less than 27 years old. Urban centers are growing rapidly and by 2030, there will be around one and a half billion more urban dwellers in developing countries, with experts predicting that half a dozen more "mega cities", with ten million or more people, will have emerged.

But this rapidly increasing population in developing countries is likely to face enormous challenges, even in merely ensuring survival. In addition to religious, ethnic, sectarian and tribal conflicts in many of these nations, these countries also face environmental degradation on a scale that is beyond their comprehension. By 2030, the global demand for food is expected to grow by 50% and the demand for energy by 45%, which would necessitate massive investment and innovation to keep pace with needs.

Climate change is also having an adverse effect on the entire globe and Pakistan's resources have also been impacted by this phenomenon. It is likely to threaten the country's water resources, which will disrupt agriculture and increase the number and severity of natural disasters. Pakistan will also come under pressure to conform to higher standards of environmental needs, affecting its industries and economic activities. Since the richest 10 percent of the world's population own 85 percent of its wealth, this means that even if the developing countries expand at unprecedented rates, it will take decades, possibly even centuries, for them to come close to the standards enjoyed in the developed countries. But if their economies were to stagnate, the situation would be much worse, particularly in countries in the midst of domestic violence and conflict.

Presently, the portrait of Pakistan is that of a young and increasingly urban society, with half of its citizens under the age of twenty and two-thirds of that number yet to reach the age of thirteen. But its most worrying aspect is that the country's population has tripled in less than fifty years and is likely to grow by another eighty five million in the next twenty years. This is primarily because birth rates remain high, even by regional standards, especially in rural areas. This requires that the economy grows by 6 percent a year to meet the needs of its growing population. The country will also have to provide 36 million new jobs in the next 10 years, which explains why Pakistan ranks 101 out of 133 countries on the Global Competitiveness Index. The current energy crisis has also exposed the failure of the military regime to focus on

this critical sector. This has led to power shortages for hours, with little prospect of any meaningful improvement in the coming years. In fact, by 2030, Pakistan will be more urban than rural, creating huge demand for infrastructure. Energy requirements are likely to quadruple. This could result in the shutting down of industries and factories, throwing millions out of their jobs, which would cause severe unrest and even social upheaval.

The challenges that Pakistan faces are not dissimilar to those faced by other countries in the developing world. Though the current situation makes its predicament appear more serious and worrisome, like other developing countries, it too will be deeply influenced by global social, economic, security, and environmental factors. As Pakistan's Finance Ministry noted last year in its assessment of future prospects, "Pakistan's economy still faces pressures from an uncertain security environment, higher inflation, driven by a spike in food prices, acute power shortages, bewildering stock market, perceptible contraction in large scale manufacturing and a slow-down in the services sector, lower than anticipated inflows and growing absolute financing requirements".

Even though growth is expected to pick up in the next 6 to 12 months, it will be at a rate that is barely above the population growth. Pakistan will remain heavily dependent on external assistance and remittances of its workers abroad. The energy crisis is destined to get worse with the result that the industry will be further crippled and ordinary people's lives adversely impacted. Even though Pakistanis consume less than a quarter of the energy used by the average global citizen, by 2030, with annual economic growth above 6 percent, energy demands will be 4 times current levels.

Water problems are also assuming alarming proportions, as Pakistan is now one of the world's most water-stressed countries. The sources of water resources are becoming depleted and available water is deteriorating in quality as well, with the World Bank warning of Pakistan facing "outright water scarcity" in the coming years. This is on top of the increasing impact being felt by changing climate conditions. This has been made evident by the fact that the period from 1995-2006 saw 11 of the 12 warmest years since 1850, leading to severe droughts. The glaciers on the Himalayas are retreating at between 10 to 15 meters a year and could disappear in about 40 years.

Not surprisingly, these challenges have had a profound impact not only on the standard of living of the people, but on the national morale as well. According to a recent survey, only one in ten expects the situation to get better in the near future, with most statistics indicating that the challenges faced by the country's coming generations would be far greater.

This has led some political observers to claim that while Pakistan is definitely a state, it is not yet a nation. They believe that strong common identity, mental makeup, shared sense of history and common goals are missing from the equation. While Pakistan's genesis explains some of the current problems, that is only part of the story. After the early death of the founder of the state, the feudal classes, in league with the country's civil and military bureaucracy, seized power. Resultantly, the failure to effectively overcome inequalities of wealth and opportunities, and the inability to introduce effective democracy and ensure a functional legal system combined to cripple the country in its very infancy. Pakistan was established in

the name of Islam, but ensured the protection of the religious, economic and cultural rights of not only the Muslims, but of all other communities as well. However, Islam quickly became an instrument in the hands of feudal "lords" and the clergy to deprive the provinces and



communities of their right to pursue legitimate demands and to express their own individual beliefs and views. The break-up of the country in 1971 should have ended the illusion that common religious belief could hold people together in the face of oppression and injustice. Instead, this remains the strongest bonding factor in the country. A recent survey of 2,000 young Pakistanis in the 18-27 age group found that three-quarters identified themselves first as Muslims and only secondly, as Pakistanis. Dejected and adrift, most see religion as their anchor.

Pakistanis continue to hope that they can become a nation one day. How long will this process likely take? In Pakistan's case, this does not have to be centuries. Its people are diverse but almost all understand Urdu. They watch the same television programmes, read the same newspapers, deal with the same inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy, and go through the same hurdles and handicaps. They also have a strong and visible commitment to the country. However, if Pakistan is to chart a path to viable nationhood, a national dialogue on its most pressing problems is essential. While the country faces major external challenges, its most serious ones are those at home. Therefore, Pakistan has to devote its energies and resources to ending its raging internal wars. The long conflict with India has achieved nothing beyond creating a militarized security state which uses force as its first resort. Attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute militarily have bled the country and left it dependent on foreign aid. The nation must begin to redefine the Army's role so that it is limited to defending the country's frontiers.

Second, Pakistan needs economic justice. This demands a social infrastructure that ensures decent employment, minimum income and benefits based on ability and hard work. In rural areas, where old structures of land ownership remain intact, sweeping land reforms are desperately needed. Incidentally, India abolished feudalism upon attaining independence, but the enormous pre-partition land holdings of Pakistan's feudal lords were protected by authority of the state.

Third, Pakistan must shed its colonial structure of governance. A huge, inefficient and unconcerned centralized government sitting in Islamabad cannot effectively manage such a big and diverse country. Pakistan has to be reorganized as a genuine federation, where provinces and local governments hold the critical economic and social powers, while only a few critical subjects, such as defense, foreign affairs, communication and currency held by the Federal government. A welcome step in this direction was taken in April this year, when Parliament approved an amendment to the Constitution that greatly expands the powers of the Provinces, granting them authority over areas that had been denied to them in the past.

Fourth, Pakistan needs a social contract. This is a commitment that all citizens, irrespective of their religious, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, shall be treated fairly and equally by the state and, in turn, shall willingly fulfill basic civic responsibilities.

Fifth, Pakistan's education system needs a drastic overhaul in the means of delivery and content. The syllabi and the curricula have to be uniform in both private and public institutions.

The challenges listed above are so huge and formidable that it would not be surprising if the reader was to reach the conclusion that the prospect of Pakistan emerging successfully out of its current difficulties and becoming a modern, moderate and progressive Islamic state is bleak. Nevertheless, recent developments give ground for considerable hope. For one, the manner in which the people of Pakistan were able to rally round the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after he was summarily dismissed by General Musharraf represented a welcome development in the growth of people's political awareness. In fact, Chief Justice Chaudhry's refusal to accede to

the military dictator's demand that he submit his resignation was so unexpected and dramatic that it not only stunned the military ruler, but also struck a chord of strong admiration among the people of Pakistan. It also triggered a massive protest movement amongst lawyers that extended to the entire country and brought thousands of young and old urban professionals within its fold. What was even more remarkable was the peaceful manner in which the protest movement reacted to the military regime's heavy-handed attempts to suppress it. In the process, the movement became nation-wide, embracing all communities and all political parties. This, more than anything else, was instrumental in exposing that military ruler's isolation at home and his alienation from his people.

In the process, Pakistan saw, for the first time, a seemingly innocuous issue captivating the imagination of the people and galvanizing them in an unprecedented manner. No one expected the poor, hungry and uneducated people to care about an issue of seemingly little interest to them. Instead, it gave birth to the nucleus of a civil society that had been non-existent in the past.

This mass awakening had a profound impact on the general elections held soon thereafter. For one, they took place with hardly any disturbance or violence, with the people rejecting the candidatures of many of Musharraf's cronies, while giving a severe drubbing to the religious figures, even in their traditional strongholds. The victory of mainstream political parties and the humiliation of the religious groups was a welcome confirmation of the inherent unpopularity of those who wished to use religion as a political tool. Admittedly, the elected government has performed poorly. Politicians continue to show little commitment to good governance, while remaining addicted to corrupt practices; these actions have not won them any praise. But this is not surprising given the fact that Pakistan has had long interludes of military rule and even when the elections have been held they have been deeply influenced by the authoritarian regimes' ethos.

A major positive development was the government's initiative, with the main opposition party's support, of bringing the political parties on board with a national policy aimed at confronting extremism and militancy. Reinforced by this national consensus, the Army was able to undertake massive operations against well-entrenched terrorists in some of the most inaccessible areas of Pakistan. In fact, the resolve and commitment with which the Army conducted its operations and the skill and courage it demonstrated earned it well-deserved praise at home and from senior U.S. military commanders. It helped to lay at rest the fears expressed in the West that the militants were about to over-run the state and possibly even capture Pakistan's non-conventional weapons. This success has given the country fresh hope and confidence and greatly strengthened its image and standing abroad.

It is also a matter of deep gratification that the Parliament has been successful, notwithstanding many doubts and misgivings, in doing away with many of the undemocratic measures and changes introduced into the Constitution by the military regimes of General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. That the political parties were able to overcome their differences and resolve dozens of contentious issues is welcome evidence of the maturity and wisdom of Pakistan's mainstream politicians.

Another encouraging development has been the growing involvement of thousands of Pakistanis, both in the urban and rural areas, who have pooled their resources and set up schools, colleges, clinics, hospitals and similar facilities that are engaged in philanthropic and social

work. This spirit of sacrifice and sharing in social uplift programs is not only commendable, but also compelling evidence that the people remain not only committed to the state, but have both the will and the capacity to engage in nation-building tasks.

While there is no shortage of those who claim that an uncertain future is inevitable for Pakistan, its people have shown tremendous faith in their ability to overcome the many challenges confronting it. They have demonstrated an uncanny ability to surprise not only their enemies, but their well-wishers as well, by overcoming seemingly insurmountable hurdles and impediments, thus giving convincing evidence of their inherent resilience and inner strength. This was most dramatically revealed on two important occasions in the country's history. The first was in the aftermath of the country's break up in 1971. While the Pakistani political elite was primarily responsible for the anger and alienation that swept across what was then East Pakistan, there is no doubt that India contributed, in no small measure, to aiding and abetting in the break-up of the country. Recent revelations by prominent Indians have confirmed the widespread suspicion that had India not been instrumental in first nurturing and then militarily invading East Pakistan, the Bengali leadership may not have been averse to holding dialogue with their West Pakistani counter-parts, as many friendly countries, including the U.S., strongly suggested.

When East Pakistan succeeded in declaring itself an independent state, there was a deep sense of anger and anguish in Pakistan, with many convinced that this represented the death of the idea of Pakistan. Many scholars predicted that the other federating units would also seek to walk away, leaving the state subject to the ambitions of its larger neighbors. It was at this point that the people of Pakistan demonstrated tremendous strength and resilience in overcoming the trauma of the break-up and in the words of Mr. Bhutto, were able "to pick up the pieces" and rebuild the country, with renewed vigor and resolve.

The next challenge confronting Pakistan was India's nuclear weapon test in May 1974. Even though New Delhi claimed that it was a "peaceful nuclear explosion", christening it the "Smiling Buddha", the Pakistani nation recognized that India's possession of this awesome weapon would have a critical bearing on the region and add greatly to India's ability to pressurize Pakistan. Though a poor, under-developed country with limited resources and under various sanctions, Pakistan was nevertheless able to initiate a comprehensive plan for the development of its indigenous nuclear program. And, much to the surprise of the international community, it was able to regain strategic equilibrium by becoming a nuclear state.

Recent events in Pakistan have renewed the people's faith in themselves. Admittedly, the government has performed poorly, but the manner in which a military dictator was ousted, peaceful elections held and an elected government assumed power and is being supported on critical national issues by a mature and responsible opposition, is evidence of the ability of the Pakistani nation to confront the challenges. Even the near-unanimity with which the political elite of the country has been pushing for "normalization" with India, is a welcome departure from the sterile, non-productive confrontational policies of the past. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that in another 10 years time the Parliamentary system will not become stronger and more durable, ensuring a stable and prosperous Pakistan.

Those eager to write Pakistan's obituary, given that this strategically important country had become synonymous with terrorism and nuclear proliferation, are being much too hasty and presumptuous. It would be wrong to believe that everything about Pakistan is negative. After all,

the country has weathered a savage civil war, resisted crude American pressure and Indian blackmail and ousted a vicious military dictator. In fact, militancy and the horror that it created amongst the people has helped to bring an unexpected degree of unanimity and understanding amongst the people of Pakistan. Even the manner in which the common people of the country rallied around the victims of terror and helped look after millions of refugees is a glorious testimony to their inner strength and to their profound love and commitment to the country.

## C. Christine Fair: Addressing Fundamental Challenges

Pakistan's problems are as well-known as they are numerous. Pakistan is both the source of terrorists operating throughout the region and beyond (some of which enjoy explicit state sanction) while also increasingly being the victim of terrorist groups that have emerged from its erstwhile proxies. Despite a parliamentary democratic mooring, the state has been dominated by the army, which has governed Pakistan directly or indirectly for most of the state's existence. While democracy has never fully taken root, authoritarianism has never garnered widespread legitimacy. Thus the army *always* comes to power through the connivance and acquiescence of a broad array of civilian institutions and personalities necessary to provide a patina of legitimacy to the seizure of power. The army enjoys a generally accepted "right to intervene" due in part to the Pakistan's origins as an insecure state and the intractable security competition with India that at first centered around the disputed disposition of Kashmir but which now derives from India's ascent as an emerging global power. The army believes—and is believed by many Pakistanis—to be the only institution capable of protecting Pakistan. As the army sets external policies, including the use of Islamist militants, normalized civil-military relations is likely a necessary (if insufficient) condition for Pakistan to resolve its security concerns vis-à-vis India. However, because such normalization would vitiate the Pakistani Army's arrogated right to manage Pakistan's affairs, the army itself poses important institutional stakeholder that may resist such normalization.

Pakistan is also riven with ethnic discord, often stemming from strained center-provincial tensions which include the center's refusal to devolve power and control over resources to the provinces' consonant with the 1973 constitution. Pakistan faces numerous governance challenges throughout the country but these challenges are most acute in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The state has made successive policy decisions to keep FATA beyond the remit of the law by maintaining a draconian, colonial era legal instrument (The Frontier Crimes Regulation), which facilitates the control of the area but not its incorporation into Pakistan's legal structures. To manage both internal and external concerns, the state under military and civilian leadership has instrumentalized Islam in various ways, to varying degrees, and with a variety of outcomes. In short, Pakistanis continue to wrestle with foundational issues such as the role of Islam in the state, who is a Pakistani and who is not, what relationship should exist between the center and the provinces, where should the balance of power lie, and what kind of Islam should Pakistan embrace as a state?

While these myriad challenges are often evaluated as distinct issues in isolation of the others, I argue here and elsewhere that their origins are fundamentally similar: the failure of constitutionalism to fructify in Pakistan, despite having forged and subsequently abandoned numerous constitutions. Unfortunately, the weaknesses of Pakistan's political and civil society institutions, the groundswell of emergent domestic threats, and failed institutions of governance and internal security will likely prevent Pakistan's varied polities from forging a consensus on these foundational issues.<sup>86</sup> I further argue that these foundational issues squarely impact domestic and international security. Most critically for U.S. interests, Pakistan will not be able to

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<sup>86</sup> C. Christine Fair et al. *Pakistan: Helping to Secure an Insecure State* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010).

decisively turn against militants targeting the state and those operating in India and Afghanistan *until* it can resolve these fundamental questions. This suggests that there are no elegant or easy—much less expedient—solutions to the challenges confronting Pakistan and those states seeking to manage the implications of these challenges near and far.

After briefly providing an empirical basis for the above description of the various fault lines that exist in Pakistan, I will address structural features and shaping events. I will focus first upon domestic institutions and development and next upon regional and geostrategic factors. I conclude that in the near term (1-3 years) and in the mid-term (3-10 years), Pakistan's institutions will be unlikely to resolve these foundational issues. While Pakistan will be unable to forge a coherent constitutional rule of law, it will not succumb to its various internal pressures. Wild cards in this trajectory include Pakistan's media, conclusions that the army may have learned from its recent internal security operations, and the decisions that international actors such as the United States, India and China take that influence the Pakistani cost-benefit calculus.

### **Fault Lines of State and Nation**

Recent polling, using a 6,000 person sample drawn from all four of Pakistan's provinces, attests to the pervasiveness if not durability of several fault lines.<sup>87</sup>

#### **Fault Lines**

- The role of Islam is contested:
  - While fewer than one in three believe that Pakistan is governed “completely” or “a lot” according to Islamic principles, nearly 70 percent believe that Sharia should play a larger role in Pakistani law compared to one in five who prefer the status quo, and only one in ten that want it to play a smaller role. Since most Pakistanis in our poll believed that Sharia overwhelmingly meant aspects of good governance, large majorities believed that more Sharia would translate into better governance (e.g. access to justice, reduction of corruption, etc.).
  - Pakistanis remain torn about the best way to deal with the Pakistani Taliban. Large swathes of Pakistan support peace deals with them, and the Pakistani public is deeply torn on the issue of military force to defeat them.
- The kind of government is contested:
  - While most Pakistanis highly value living in a government governed by elected representatives (78 percent), only one in two believe it is so governed “completely” or “a lot.” Similarly high expectations are held for courts independent of political and military authorities, and Pakistanis are similarly disappointed about the courts' actual independence..
  - Yet, Pakistanis are fundamentally divided about the nature of governance in Pakistan.

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<sup>87</sup> This section draws from C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, Jacob N. Shapiro, “Islam, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, forthcoming 2010; C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, Jacob N. Shapiro, “The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan,” March 10, 2010. Working paper available at <http://www.princeton.edu/~ins/papers.html>; C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009).

- 55 percent believe that the civilian government should exert “complete” or “a lot” of control over the military. However, 41 percent believe that civilians should exert “a moderate amount,” or “little,” or even “no control” over the army at all.
- 14 percent believe that the president should control the army and another 24 percent believe this is the prime minister’s job. The largest portion (60 percent) believe that is the job of the Chief of Army Staff alone.
- Only one in five believe that the military should never be able to take control over the state.
- While Pakistanis believe that Pakistan’s interests would be undermined if FATA remains autonomous, opinion diverges about what to do about FATA. A majority favors negotiating with the Taliban in one way or another. While support for military operations in FATA is generally low, support for political reform in FATA is high.
- Finally, while Pakistanis overall do not support the numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan, important minorities do. This support does not appear to be driven by education, poverty, hate for the United States, or lack of support for democracy.
- Constitutions and Constitutionalism?

The current constitution from 1973 remains the lodestone of legitimacy, but it has been mangled by civilian and military regimes alike. The country has tended to be governed by a strong president, with a pliable parliament and prime minister, with interludes of parliamentary democracy as called for in the 1973 constitution. Until Pakistan can resolve these varied foundational issues through a process of constitutionalism, Pakistan will likely continue to lurch from one crisis to another. Arguably, many of the internal security issues that Pakistan confronts stem from a failed process of constitutionalism. Pakistan’s contentious center-province relations, which have often spawned ethnic-based rebellions; the country’s failure (or unwillingness) to extend the writ of the law to all of Pakistan’s territories such as FATA, the failure of civilian institutions to exert control over the military, the argument over what kind of government that Pakistan should have, and the role that Islam should play in that state as well as within Pakistan’s social and cultural fabric all exemplify this. As noted above, Pakistanis themselves are deeply divided over these key issues.

What then are the prospects for resolving these issues, which I contend are key to stabilizing Pakistan? Arguably, several institutions are necessary to resolve these concerns, each of which will be addressed briefly below: the capacities of political parties; domestic security institutions; civil society organizations; and the role of the state governance apparatus. This list is not comprehensive, but it illustrates key institutions and their limits.

### **Political Parties**

A comprehensive assessment of Pakistan’s political parties is beyond the scope of this short paper. However, Cohen among others has documented their organizational strengths and shortcomings.<sup>88</sup> Most of the parties are vertically-integrated personality cults that aggregate highly localized interests. This is true of the regional and religious parties discussed below, as

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<sup>88</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2005).

well as the so called “mainstream” parties: the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP), of which only the PPP has any modicum of national standing. While the PPP may have more expansive presence across the country, the PPP’s core remains in rural Sindh. Similarly, the PML-N has its strongest hold on Punjab’s urban centers.

In addition to these purportedly main-stream parties, Pakistan has numerous parties that are based upon ethnic and/or provincial ties, such as the Awami National Party, which represents a slice of Pashtun interests in Khyber Pakhtunwa (KP) and, in recent years, in Karachi. Balochistan also hosts a number of Baloch ethnic parties with little reach beyond Balochistan. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) represents what is perhaps the closest thing to a secular movement in Pakistan, but the party represents the interests of Pakistan’s Mohajir community, and is essentially a political movement formed from the backbone of an organized criminal organization. In addition to these parties, Pakistan has several Islamist parties, which garner few votes in free and fair elections but have power and influence in the army and in the street disproportionate to their showing at the ballot box. Curiously, one of these parties—the Jamaat Islami—is the only party to elect its leaders democratically and is the only party to operate a think tank (IPS in Islamabad) to generate policy options.

The fundamental problem with Pakistan’s political parties is that they fail to aggregate national interest (with a few notable exceptions) and pursue deeply personal, rather than collective, agendas. Parties tend not to develop robust party platforms, and are indeed more interested in developing and servicing patronage networks than promulgating and shepherding effective policies. The failure to pass sensible tax reform policies remains one of the most illustrative examples of the negative role in state building that Pakistan’s patronage-driven politics plays. The state’s ability to raise revenue through taxation and redistribute these resources as services is a fundamental democratic transaction that binds the governed to the government. Yet, the self-serving political class will never enact such legislation as it would be tantamount to taxing their own interests, literally. Similarly, any meaningful efforts to establish more normalized civil-military relations are undermined by the simple fact that many politicians benefit from the status quo, whereby they can use the army to undermine political opponents.

Any renewed process towards establishing constitutionalism, forging a new contract between the government and the governed, and addressing the above-noted foundational issues (including the role of Islam in the state) requires party leadership and effective interest aggregation. Unfortunately, this appears beyond the capacities of the political parties for any foreseeable future due to the parties’ deeply non-democratic nature, the limits of civil society to pressure parties to act discussed below, among other shortcomings.

### **Civil-Society Institutions**

Given the pervasive structural problems with Pakistan’s political parties and inadequate demands for reform from within, what then are the prospects for pressure for reform from without? Pakistan’s civil-society institutions have historically been weak in contrast to neighboring India, and even Bangladesh. In recent years, civil society organizations have evolved, but not all will be forces for liberalism, or even forces for resolution of founding questions about the state and its polity. Arguably, the ways in which civil society organizations are evolving augur more—not less—division across Pakistan.

On the one hand are human rights organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the nascent lawyers’ movement, which have pressed for greater adherence to democratic



practices, but which enjoy a very limited support base across Pakistan. After all, CSOs by their nature attend to deeply localized issues and their constituents. (While it may at first blush appear attractive to the United States to invest in these institutions, studies of CSOs find that they become less effective when they receive international aid in part because they cease being answerable to their members, and increasingly orient towards the demands of their funders<sup>89</sup>) On the other hand are those civil society organizations that are anti-liberal and which pursue an explicitly Islamist agenda that, at best, seeks to use democratic processes to undermine democracy. Others do not even entertain the rhetoric of democracy and explicitly state their goal of Islamizing Pakistan (as a variously construed Sunni entity). These civil society forces take the guise of Islamist parties such as Jamaat Islami and evangelical revival movements such as Tanzeem-e-Islami and Tablighi-Jamaat. Others include women-targeted movements such as al Huda, which couch adherence to orthodox Islam in the language of feminist and liberationist terms.<sup>90</sup> The future of Pakistan that both of these forces are fighting for are orthogonal to each other.

The wild card in mobilizing Pakistanis is the press. Pakistan's private media, at first blush, appears vibrant and diverse, and in many measures this characterization is accurate. However, on issues of national security and contentious domestic affairs, Pakistan's media heavily self-censors and is deeply influenced by establishment commentators with deep ties to the military and intelligence agencies. Thus, they may be very limited by design to resolve some of these issues. However, it is likely inevitable that new media, such as social media and new and novel uses of cell phones to disseminate information quickly, may help transform, and even mobilize civil society beyond the grasp of the state. As noted above, this mobilization need not be for greater liberalism in Pakistan; rather, this mobilization is equally likely to be geared towards greater Islamism of state or society. Whether or not such a mobilization (be it liberal or its obverse) can effectively pressure Pakistan's political and other governance institutions remains an important empirical question for the near, mid and even long term time horizons.

### **The Army as a Guarantor of an Insecure State**

The army believes that it is—and is believed by many Pakistanis to be—the only institution capable of protecting Pakistan. The army is able to sustain this claim both by ensuring the continued external threat posed by India and due to long-standing and emerging internal threats. The Pakistan armed forces (as well as civilian leaders) have relied upon instrumentalizing Islam to manage Pakistan's security, and to protect what has been called the “ideology” of Pakistan.<sup>91</sup> These realities have resulted in a complex and dangerous relationship between the state and Islam that is not easily disentangled. Pakistan, conceived as a home to South Asia's Muslims, has yet to resolve the role of Islam within the state; what is not at question is that there *is* and *will be* a role of Islam in the state (few people are demanding a secular Pakistan). Pakistan couches its “natural power projection” throughout Central and South West Asia in terms of its Muslim-ness, and claims to have some responsibility to protect India's Muslims for the same reasons. For a number of well documented reasons, Pakistan has come to

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<sup>89</sup> Masooda Bano, —Dangerous Correlations: Aid's Impact on NGO's Performance and Ability to Mobilize Members in Pakistan, || *World Development*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2008, pp. 2297-2313.

<sup>90</sup> Sadaf Ahmad, *Transforming Faith: The Story of al-Huda and Islamic Revivalism Among Urban Pakistani Women* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2009).

<sup>91</sup> Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*; Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C.: CEIP, 2005).

rely upon Islamist proxies to prosecute its interests in the region, beginning in 1947 in Kashmir and in the 1960s in Afghanistan.<sup>92</sup>

In recognition of these realities, some interlocutors have argued that Pakistan will not be able to give up its militant proxies as long as security competition exists with India. Indeed, Pakistanis say that their concerns in Afghanistan stem from their fear of India and that if Pakistan's issues with India (read "Kashmir") could be resolved, their need for the Afghan Taliban would abate. However, a counter-argument can also be made: until Pakistan is ready to give up its commitment to instrumentalizing Islam for domestic and external purposes, Pakistan will never be able to resolve its existential and neuralgic issues with India. As neither any durable resolution with India is on the horizon, nor is a preparedness to abandon Islam as an instrument of policy, Pakistan is likely to continue using militant and Islamist groups to manage an array of domestic and external challenges.

India, for its part, is appallingly short sighted. India demurs from making any policies towards Pakistan that may be conciliatory, including striking a comprehensive settlement between Delhi and Srinagar. India clings to the notion that its varied elections demonstrate that the Kashmir issue *is* resolved. However, as any visitor to Kashmir can attest, elections have not ameliorated the pervasive discontent and dissatisfaction with Delhi, much less provided a path towards comprehensive reconciliation. India's strategy appears to be 'wait it out' while India's ascends and Pakistan weakens. Unfortunately, in the meantime, India foregoes important opportunities to contend with this important domestic issue among its own Kashmiri populations. In the meantime, the "Kashmir issue" increasingly has merged with larger Hindu-Muslim discord throughout India. Pakistan-backed militant groups have leveraged this discord to develop Indian assets to conduct operations with Indian personnel to increase the plausible deniability of Pakistan's involvement. The Kashmir issue, which has largely centered on both countries' national narratives, has now become a strategic issue centered on regional water supplies. Arguably, if India could resolve its issues with its own Kashmiri citizens, it would diminish any space that Pakistan and its militant proxies have to maneuver on this issue. However, India's inability to decide what kind of neighbor it wants to have, and to effect policies that make one outcome more likely than the other, has only exacerbated Pakistan's existential crises and concomitant security challenges.

### **Who Adheres to Constitutionalism?**

While the Pakistan army generally takes the lion share of opprobrium for its intervention in the managing of state, the army *always* comes to power with the assistance of virtually every civilian and political institution.<sup>93</sup> The process is predictable. The army chief steps in, suspends the constitution, disbands the parliament, promulgates various legal framework orders and requires the Supreme Court justices to not only validate the move, but also to take an oath to the

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<sup>92</sup> Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad* (London: Routledge, 2007); Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005); Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan," in Christophe Jaffrelot Ed. *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* (London: Zed, 2002), pp.115-128; International Crisis Group. *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Asia Report N°49 (Islamabad: Crisis Group, March 2003); S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 139-180 (2000).  
<sup>93</sup> See the divergent accounts in Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007) and Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: OUP, 2008).

new government. Most justices, in the principle of self-interest, choose to do so, violating the very constitution that they previously took a vow to protect. Those that demur are simply replaced. Thus, the military regime is able to construct a compliant judiciary. Since the judiciary feeds the independent election commission, they also play a critical role in the inevitably problematic elections that ensue. As authoritarianism enjoys little outright support in Pakistan, the army chief cum president has a limited time to cobble together a democratic face for his regime. Using the intelligence agencies, the regime is able to forge a “king’s party” through a combination of coercion of members of extant parties and allurements. Once the party is assembled, invariably flawed elections are held, in which the king’s party comes into power at the center and provinces, perhaps in coalition with opposition parties of choice. The opposition party of choice is usually a coalition of Islamist parties, which the army chief uses to offset any challenges to his regime from Islamist quarters. The parliament that emerges rubber stamps the various orders of the regime.

This arrangement sustains itself until the Pakistani public grows exhausted with army rule and increasingly vexed with the army itself. At this juncture, the army moves against the president in effort to protect its own standing among the people. The army then returns to watchful role as an invariably problematic and ineffective democracy emerges until once again, the public turns against the political class and again welcomes the army into power. Needless to say, with each round of military interventions, the political and bureaucratic institutions become ever more ineffective and consensus around the modalities of government (prime minister versus president, presidential versus parliamentary) become ever more tendentious.

This process has played out more or less consistently four times under Generals Ayoob Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and finally Pervez Musharraf. *None* of the civilian entities or persons that aided and abetted the regime have ever been punished. Until 2008, no army chief was even threatened with punishment even though the coups are, according to Pakistani law, a capital offense (In 2008 Musharraf resigned under threat of impeachment, which was utterly unprecedented). Until the judiciary and the political parties punish members for defecting, what can put an end to this predictable cycle? Judicial reform and accountability is clearly needed to intervene at several nodes in this process. However, as the last several years have shown, the judiciary seeks to secure its own independence of action and the political parties themselves seek to politicize the judiciary for their own purposes. Thus the likelihood of developing institutions of rule of law nears zero in any meaningful time frame.

### **Internal Security**

Pakistan has long contended with ethnic challenges in the Pashtun areas of the frontier, in Balochistan and at times among Muhajirs and Sindhis in Sindh. It also managed complex urban low intensity conflict in Karachi. In recent years, it has confronted a complex insurgency that has organized under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). While the TTP is based in Pashtun areas of the FATA and parts of KP, the TTP is comprised of several Deobandi-affiliated organizations that draw their personnel from a raft of other Deobandi militant groups such as the Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami (HUJI), among others. Almost all of these groups are based in the Punjab, and none are new, with LeJ and SSP forming in the Punjab in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Equally important are the ties that bind these Deobandi militant organizations to the Deobandi Islamist political parties. The parties are comprised of the various factions of the

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), organized around specific individuals such as JUI-F of Fazl-ur-Rehman and JUI-S of Sami ul Haq.

Pakistan acknowledges that part of the TTP is an enemy of the state and has engaged in military operations to target TTP bases in much of FATA and KP. However, Pakistan's ability to decisively eliminate these groups is limited by the fact that Pakistan still seeks to project groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Pakistani security managers believe that the group will re-orient against India and again become an ally one day, rather than remaining a potential foe of the state. Indeed, JeM's leader, Masood Azhar, freely roams around Bahawalpur, where an entire Army Corps is stationed.

The implications are clear: If Pakistan cannot abandon Islamist militancy as a tool of external power projection, its ability to eliminate its internal threat will be very, very limited. Since the TTP shares overlapping networks with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, Pakistan will come under increasing pressure to act against the TTP while preserving its interests in JeM.

While it is popular to argue that only the military has espoused this policy of reliance upon militant proxies, the reality is quite different. Both the PPP and the PML-N have supported the jihadi groups operating in a variety of theatres. The purportedly secularly-inclined PPP has even allied with groups such as LeJ and SSP. Thus, a return of civilian-run government is not necessarily tantamount to a reversal of these dangerous policies.

So far, the United States has done little to push Pakistan on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, now under the name of Jammāt ul Dawa or JUD) out of fear that Pakistan may diminish US cooperation in Afghanistan. From Pakistan's point of view, LeT/JuD does not threaten the state, as it has never acted against targets within Pakistan. Indeed, western and Indian intelligence officials note that Pakistani state support to LeT has increased, not decreased, since the LeT attack in Mumbai in 2008. LeT also has operated against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan with increasing frequency. Fortunately for US-Pakistan relations, the failed New York Times Square bomber was trained by the TTP, Pakistan and the US see as an enemy, rather than the LeT.

While Pakistan's commitment to its external Islamist proxies diminishes Pakistan's ability to act against its internal Islamist foes, Pakistan's inability to promulgate effective governance and rule of law institutions further hinders its ability to manage its internal security issues. For a host of institutional reasons, Pakistan has not invested in its police. First, the army seeks to be the primary guarantor of Pakistan's security and is loathe to delegate this authority and responsibility to civilian entities, including the police. Recent army involvement in low-intensity conflict throughout Pakistan appears to have convinced some military personnel of the need for more effective police agencies. However, it is far from obvious that this view has greater currency across the army. Second, the intelligence agencies undermine local police. For example, in Bahawalpur, the police would like to act against Jaish-e-Mohammad's leadership but are prevented from doing so by the ISI. It is even routine for the police to pick up militants only for the ISI to arrange their release. Third, the political class has also been an enormous obstacle to police reform. To date, politicians have used the police as their own private thugs and, as such, the politicians have posed the greatest challenge to legal reform for policing.

Fourth, given the pay structure of the police, corruption is institutionalized. When police are given real wages and rigorous accountability as evidenced by the Motorway Police, they actually perform their job admirably. Similar efforts have been made with the Islamabad and

Lahore Traffic police with surprising success. Unfortunately, such programs are inherently not scalable. They “cream” the best police from the various police structures. Without system-wide pay reform and accountability measures, effective policing will remain elusive in Pakistan.

Similarly, judicial reform currently has few takers. There are too few justices and even fewer good justices. In real terms, their salaries are lower than they were under the British. However, the justices can augment their salaries with bribes to hear cases with inordinate expedience, providing justice for those who can pay. There are no quick fixes here either, as justice reform will likely have to be a part of a larger and more difficult challenge of civil service reform for which there are few constituents.

Arguably, the failure to provide good governance, to diminish corruption, to provide easy access to justice and to provide security is at the core of the security challenges in FATA and Swat. Why would anyone oppose the TTP when they offer access to services purportedly without corruption, access to some form of justice, provide services and can threaten violence when the state is not there to protect them from the same?

### **Regional and Geopolitical Factors**

Pakistan’s domestic and external challenges do not exist in isolation. Several trends beyond the capacity of the Pakistani state will likely have import for Pakistan’s precarious path, including US relations and engagement in the region, India’s rise, and the eventual position that China takes towards Pakistan.

The first of these is the way in which the United States has chosen to interact with the region. The United States, under President Bush, pursued a policy of dehyphenation first articulated by Ashley Tellis in 2000.<sup>94</sup> Tellis argued that the United States should pursue policies with India and Pakistan consonant with merits of each country, irrespective of US relations with the other or the continuing security competition between the two. Tellis argued that India, as a rising power, deserves an increasingly strategic relationship with the United States to help manage China’s rise, to contend with terrorism and to provide energy security, among other regional and international security affairs. In contrast, Pakistan should be prepared for a soft landing.<sup>95</sup> After the events of 9/11 and the centrality of Pakistan, the soft landing was deferred. However, Washington transformed its relations with India under the umbrella of de-hyphenation. The centerpiece of this has been the US-Indian civilian nuclear deal.

Pakistan has viewed Washington’s commitment to help India become a global power with unease. This discomfiture has been alleviated by the massive infusion of military assistance and lucrative reimbursements that Pakistan has received since 9/11. (It should be noted that Pakistanis believe that Pakistan has suffered a net loss because the reimbursements and other forms of assistance are inadequate to cover Pakistan’s losses due to economic volatility, domestic terrorism in response to the U.S.-led war on terror, political instability, etc..) The United States has sought to induce Pakistan into greater cooperation by offering Pakistan a “strategic dialogue.” However, the relationship that the United States has tried to offer has few

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<sup>94</sup> See Ashley J. Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan.” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 21-42, 2008.

<sup>95</sup> See Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia: U.S. Policy Choices,” in *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security—Discussion Papers*, ed. Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p. 88, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1306.1/MR1306.1.sec3.pdf](https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1306.1/MR1306.1.sec3.pdf).

takers in Islamabad. The United States has generally maintained that the Indo-US relationship should have no bearing upon Pakistan's standing. However, this is a view that is incomprehensible in Pakistan. The United States has been unwilling to creatively forge a "new big idea" for Pakistan as it did for India. This is unfortunate: until Washington can put forward meaningful and new (likely political) carrots and effective sticks, and develop the political will to do both, the United States will likely be unable to positively influence the arc of Pakistan's development.

Not only are US relations with India and Pakistan a factor that will influence Pakistan's domestic and external affairs, so too is the US relationship with Afghanistan. While Pakistanis opine that they distrust the United States and must prepare for any eventuality, they are fundamentally bothered by the fact that the Americans cannot articulate a desired end state for Afghanistan, much less a strategy to achieve that state. (Pakistanis are not alone in this frustration.) However, Pakistan's interests remain stable, and thus policy continuity will persist under civilian or military leadership. Pakistan will continue to work towards diminishing India's influence in Afghanistan and securing a regime that is minimally hostile to Pakistan if a friendly regime cannot be secured. Above all, however, Pakistan wishes to retain primacy in the region as a security manager. (In this capacity, Pakistan may also receive payments from Washington and others as a positive externality.)

Second, and related to the first, is the rise of India. India seeks to be an extra-regional power, according to some, a global power. Right-wing Indians associated with the BJP, for example, believe that India already *is* a global power. As such, India continues to develop relations in Pakistan's near and far neighborhood. These relationships serve both to deny Pakistan access to the same and to develop commercial and other economic interests throughout the region, including hydrocarbon resources. As India continues its ascent with U.S. assistance, and continues to develop ties to its neighbors, such as Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan will likely turn evermore towards Islamism and militancy and redouble its efforts to regain control over these assets.

It is also possible—albeit less likely—that the Pakistan military will eventually conclude that Islamist proxies are dangerous to Pakistan. If so, they will see these proxies to be unmanageable as a tool to contain India over the long term. This would suggest a Pakistan that over time acquiesces to the ascent of its larger neighbor and seeks some accommodation with it. In some sense, this would be rational, as Pakistan would be better off seeking a resolution today before India grows stronger and Pakistan grows weaker. However, it is doubtful that the army would buy into such an approach, as doing so would be concede its' massive powers of influence across the state.

A third issue is China. In recent years, China has grown ever more wary of the management of Pakistan's internal security crises. As China is presently the largest foreign direct investor (Aynak Copper Mine in Logar) in Afghanistan, and has made significant investments in Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia, it is rightly worried about Pakistan's use of Islamist proxies. Moreover, China's own restive Uighurs have received training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While China increasingly views India with concern, it is also aware that India offers more opportunities than Pakistan. Any reorienting of China away from Pakistan—be it political, diplomatic or economic—may be an important wake up call. However, China is unlikely to abandon its military ties with Pakistan because China sees balancing Pakistan's capabilities vis-à-vis to India to service its objectives with respect to containing India as a South

Asian power. Unfortunately, the United States has not made significant outreach to China as a regional partner.

Similar other wildcards are Saudi Arabia and the other Arab Gulf states, as well as Iran. While the Sunni Arab Gulf States are in a strategic competition with the Shia Iranian regime, these states all share on thing in common: a fear of Pakistan's expanding Sunni militancy affecting them at home. Pakistan and Iran have had a low-profile rapprochement. Iran has accused Pakistan and the United States of supporting Jundullah, a Sunni terrorist organization targeting the Iranian state despite the fact that Pakistan was recently involved in the capture of Jundullah's leader, Abdolmalek Riga. Pakistani intelligence officials have told this author in June 2010 that Iran has also been helpful in limiting the movement of Indian assistance to Pakistan's Baluchistan province. The Sunni Gulf states have sought to influence Pakistan's domestic forces by funding Islamic institutions such as mosques and madrassahs and by providing various forms of economic support. A comprehensive disaggregation of these varied states' interests and options is beyond the capacity of this author to assess.

### Conclusions

In brief, Pakistan's political and civil society organizations are too weak and/or self-interested to forge a new consensus about the nature of the state of Pakistan and its relations to Islam, among other issues. Political and bureaucratic institutions are too weak to address both the causes and the manifestations of Pakistan's decrepit internal security situation and inadequate rule of law institutions. Without resolving foundational issues about the state and its citizenry, the army will likely continue to dominate state decision-making with no diminution of reliance upon Islam and Islamism as tools of policy. Therefore Pakistan's domestic Islamist threat will be difficult to contain as Pakistan continues to nurture their co-sectarian members who purport to operate within India and Afghanistan. Over time, these groups will continue to develop greater autonomy, bringing South Asian stability to a serious dilemma. Will India hold Pakistan accountable in the future as these groups develop independence? How will India develop new military postures and doctrine, and invest in further force modernization to tackle this threat?

At the same time, as Pakistan's varied civil societies struggle over the Pakistan that will emerge, the attempts to find consensus about who is a Pakistani and on what basis the state exists will become more, not less, contested. It is entirely possible that two Pakistans will exist in an uneasy and unstable equilibrium with each other. On one hand is the Pakistan of forward-looking, modernizing Pakistanis, who want to free the state of its reliance upon dangerous proxies. On the other hand is the Pakistan of those who view Islam and Islamism as the only meaningful antidote to the various pressures bearing upon the state and its polities.

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# Aqil Shah: Security, Soldiers and the State

Social scientists consider themselves lucky when they can adequately explain an important social phenomenon ex post facto.. Crystal-balling the future, however, is a perilous undertaking not in the least because it involves somewhat static extrapolations from a highly dynamic social world that often unfolds contingently, and without much forewarning. Any forecasting of the future(s) can at best be a cautiously probabilistic estimate, subject to history's many twists and turns.

The motivating question for this project calls for such peeping into the future: what will Pakistan look like in five to seven years? It is safe to argue that it will probably neither become Sweden nor Somalia. But given history's sticky footprints, and barring any tectonic economic or political shocks, it is unlikely to extricate itself from the 'path dependent' pattern of a military-dominated state with an essentially revisionist foreign policy formed in the foundational first decade after independence. The historical sources of this "garrison state," including the perceived threat from India and the powerful (praetorian) military spawned by that threat, will continue to make exits to alternative futures less likely.

## Contemporary Pakistan

At present, Pakistan's domestic (economic, developmental and political) problems are undoubtedly many and enormous. An economy trapped in a cycle of debt and deficits, a rapidly growing population, low literacy rates, chronic energy shortages, and pernicious levels of poverty, to name a few of its economic-developmental woes, are interwoven with and complicated by a fragile state afflicted by internal challenges to its monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion. Its transnational interactions (Af-Pak, India-Pak, U.S.-Pak) are complex and fraught with consequences for its domestic stability and international security.

But running through both the domestic and foreign dimensions of Pakistan's past, present and future is one connecting factor: an out of (civilian) control army. Civil-military relations are not just one of many "structural problems" faced by Pakistan.<sup>96</sup> In fact, civil-military relations are central to and inseparable from center-province relations, internal political stability, Islamist influence in the polity, the prospects of warfare with India, nuclear security and proliferation, and regional and global terrorism.

It would be an understatement to say that Pakistan's present predicament and its future options cannot be adequately understood without recognizing the influence, motivations, and norms of the army, an institution which has directly ruled the country for thirty three years, and unrightfully exercised behind-the-scenes influence and vetoes over key national security and foreign policy areas in most of the remaining years. The military also consumes a lion's share of unaccountable expenditures, which are not only wasteful but divert precious resources from socio-economic development. Space constraints prevent any lengthy treatment of the military institution. Suffice it to pose a counterfactual: had the Pakistan army been under democratic-civilian control, might Pakistan and its neighborhood have been a different place? Given that civilian control over the military is a necessary condition for democratic rule, and because

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<sup>96</sup> Jonathan Paris, *Prospects for Pakistan*, Legatum Institute (London: 2010), p. 6.



democratic dyads rarely fight each other, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the answer to the counterfactual is in the affirmative.

Will the military continue to behave badly? The military staged a voluntary extrication from power in 2008, and subsequently, the generals took a number of steps to signal their intent to stay out of civilian politics. Under Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, who replaced Musharraf in that post in November 2007, the military remained more or less politically neutral during and after the 2008 elections. The army high command reportedly closed down the notorious “internal security” wing of the ISI tasked with ‘political management.’ General Kayani also ordered the withdrawal of hundreds of active-duty army officers whom Musharraf had placed in the civilian bureaucracy.

But appearances can be deceptive. If the past is any guide, the Pakistani military’s exit from power does not necessarily mean exit from politics. The military’s behavior is more likely to mimic the “garbage can” model of bureaucratic behavior, which posits that hierarchical organizations tend to respond to changed conditions or the need for adjustments to their policies with a set of learned and routinized responses rather than looking for alternatives.<sup>97</sup>

Yet Pakistan’s long term stability rests in good measure on a democratic pattern of civil-military relations, one that is premised on a military that is subordinate to civilian politicians and politically neutral. So, what might the future of civil-military relations look like? There are at least three possible future outcomes.<sup>98</sup>

### **At least three futures**

*The first future for Pakistan would be a ‘freezing’ of the political system in the intermediate, gray zone between full-fledged democracy and military autocracy.* While exerting sustained civilian control over the military poses a formidable challenge for any transitional democracy, the PPP-led coalition government faces the additional burden of resolving a complex array of economic, political, and security crises, all of which are immediate legacies of Musharraf’s military authoritarian rule. In this scenario, where the civilian government is responsible for and under pressure to squarely tackle broad governance issues, especially the potentially destabilizing economic and energy crises, the military will continue to operate in the shadows and rattle its sabers at will to prevent undesirable outcomes in domestic politics and foreign policy.

It is this latent military power which will likely act as an additional source of political instability and civilian institutional erosion in the next decade. New, emerging centers of power, such as an independent higher judiciary, could potentially exert countervailing democratic effects and help ensure the rule of law. However, in the absence of agreed rules of the game for resolving political and constitutional conflicts, an activist court is likely to act as a source of instability in the system. The ongoing executive-judiciary entanglement over such issues as the NRO (indemnity law) could open the door for yet another military mediation of civilian crises, which will reproduce the depressingly familiar (and democratically corrosive) pattern of civil-military relations under formal elected rule.

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<sup>97</sup> See Michael Cohen et al., “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* (1972): 1-25.

<sup>98</sup> This following discussion draws on, but contests and extends Jonathan Paris’ discussion of civil-military issues.

*A second possible future is the slow and steady stabilization of democracy.* Consolidating democratic procedures and practices is at best an uncertain process, which might degenerate especially if an anti-system group or institution mobilizes sufficient resources against it.<sup>99</sup> In the medium term, one of its necessary, if not sufficient, conditions will be at least a few peaceful turnovers of power as a result of relatively free and fair elections.<sup>100</sup> Democratic stability will also require political parties to perform the intermediary role of aggregating interests and linking the state with society. Pakistan's two main parties, the ruling PPP and the PML-N, are under-institutionalized, and may even be akin to unreconstructed "family fiefdoms."<sup>101</sup> But party system weaknesses are not so much the cause of weak democratic institutions, as they are a symptom of the military's sustained and systematic short-circuiting of the process of competitive politics. If Pakistan is to eventually become democratic, we cannot disregard the agency of these two polity-wide parties in the process.

Their recent bipartisan effort to consolidate parliamentary democracy by reversing authoritarian prerogatives in the constitution [such as the infamous Article 58 (2) B which empowered the president to arbitrarily dismiss an elected government] and conceding substantive provincial autonomy augur well for democratization. The two parties have so far resisted openly "knocking on the garrisons' doors" as they did in the 1990s. Recent reports of an escalating war of words between the two sides that concerns, amongst other issues, differences over dealing with militancy and terrorism in the PML-controlled Punjab province may yet erode the uneasy peace. But on the whole, they appear to have learned from experience that it is better to play by the rules of the game and continue to tolerate each other rather than risk destabilizing the system, and losing power to the military for another decade.

If civilians continue to play by the rules of the game, democracy will have a higher likelihood of survival. A continued competitive electoral process may also blunt the potential role of the Islamist parties as democratic "spoilers," the oft-expressed concern of democratic skeptics especially outside Pakistan. It may be true that the much dreaded "one man, one vote, once" sequence is unlikely to materialize in Pakistan. But compared to other Muslim majority countries, Islamist parties perform better in elections on average.<sup>102</sup> However, the degree of political power and space enjoyed by Islamists is more often a correlate of their mutually beneficial ties with the military, rather than their mass following.<sup>103</sup> For instance, their more recent electoral success in the 2002 elections was a direct result of military electoral manipulations and repression of non-Islamist political forces, not a resounding public rejection of moderate, mainstream political parties.<sup>104</sup> When the two main parties can contest elections without authoritarian restrictions, the Islamists are more likely to be sidelined. Twice, once in 1970, and again in 1997, moderate mainstream parties have electorally stalled the Islamists. And

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<sup>99</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, 7.2 (1996): 34-51.

<sup>100</sup> At its minimal, democratic consolidation requires that a country passes the "two-turnover test," which indicates the political leaders and parties are sufficiently committed to democracy to surrender office peacefully. See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization the Late Twentieth Century* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 267.

<sup>101</sup> Paris, "Prospects for Pakistan," 6.

<sup>102</sup> Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi, "Do Muslims Vote Islamic," *Journal of Democracy* (April 2010): 50-63.

<sup>103</sup> See Hussein Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Carnegie Endowment, 2005). See also e Vali Nasr, "Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy," *Middle East Journal* (Spring 2004): 195-209.

<sup>104</sup> See Aqil Shah, "Pakistan's 'Armored' Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* (October 2003).

while the JI boycotted the most recent ballot in 2008, even the relatively more successful JUI-F won only 6 of the 108 of the national assembly seats it contested.

What about their “illiberal” influence as pressure groups within a democratic framework? The hold of Pakistan’s two main parties in the key province of Punjab (and the PPP in Sindh) and the vote banks of non-denominational and nationalist parties in other provinces (the MQM, the ANP, etc.) is barrier enough to insulate democratic politics from any disproportionate Islamist influence in terms of minorities, women’s rights, etc. But it is also important to remember that “Islamization,” or the more heinous laws on the statute, are not the expression of the popular will but the outcome of autocratic fiat underwritten by a pact between the military and the mullahs in the 1980s.

Democratic institutionalization requires more than balancing just the civilian side of the equation. It also needs a military committed both “behaviorally” and “attitudinally” to a subordinate role in a democratic framework.<sup>105</sup> The military’s behavior appears to have changed since it withdrew from government, but it is important to recall it did not withdraw to the barracks because of a shift in its core praetorian ethos. Neither Kayani’s “professionalism” nor Musharraf’s lack of professional restraint can explain the military’s recent political behavior. In fact, the Pakistani army’s problem has never been “professionalism” per se. Rather, it is a particular brand of tutelary professionalism which gives it a sense of entitlement over the polity, and structures its responses to changes in the surrounding political environment.<sup>106</sup>

More specifically, democracy is unlikely to become “the only game in town” if the military withdraws from power contingently, considers itself above the rule of law and believes in the right to take actions autonomous of the wishes of the duly constituted civilian government. All three (contingent exit, supra-legality and absolute autonomy) continue to shape military behavior: consider the army chief of staff’s open ‘politicking’ and interference in civilian ‘crises,’ the army’s not so covert attempts to protect its own from scrutiny in the Benazir Bhutto murder case, and its ‘democratically’ objectionable public reaction to the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill.

What about the role of social classes? Will the urban middle class act as the agent of democratization? The logic behind the middle class as democracy’s cheer leader is that it stands to benefit from trade with India which would entail greater civilian control over bilateral relations and domestic resources.<sup>107</sup> For one, this assertion is rooted in the Euro-centric and historically inaccurate view of “no bourgeoisie, no democracy.”<sup>108</sup> There is no inherent connection between an urban middle class and pressure for democracy. Rarely unified or motivated by collective group interests, the middle classes across Asia (e.g., Indonesia under Suharto and present day Thailand) and Latin America, have shown themselves to be quite

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<sup>105</sup> On the “attitudinal” and “behavioral” dimensions of democratic consolidation, see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

<sup>106</sup> This observation is based on the author’s dissertation research, which included interviews with several dozen (mostly former) senior and mid-level military officers in 2006-2009, analysis of military writings and archival research in and outside Pakistan.

<sup>107</sup> Paris, *Prospects for Pakistan*, p. 25.

<sup>108</sup> Barrington Moore, Jr. *Lord and the Peasant: Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 418. While the phrase is Moore’s, his own analysis is much more complex than it suggests. In general, however, the bourgeoisie-liberalism-democracy teleology has trouble accounting for the role of authoritarian state actors in fragmenting and depoliticizing the bourgeoisie.

capable of backing illegitimate autocratic governments for their narrow economic and material interests. Pakistan, where the middle classes appear to have a historically low threshold of tolerance for “corrupt” politicians and a preference for order rather than democracy per se, has been no exception. And any prospective material benefits of trade with India will not necessarily accrue to a particular class, and could easily be counteracted by the anti-India psychosis that permeates popular media and the public education system where the middle class tends to be schooled.

At the societal level, the real issue is not merely this or that class championing democracy, but broad based public support and attachment to the practice and institutions of democratic rule. But democracy does not necessarily need natural-born democrats, and the casual chain can also run in the opposite direction. What it minimally needs is an elite consensus on procedural conditions, including free and fair elections, and a civilian government free of unconstitutional and unaccountable veto powers over its authority. Can civilian politicians extend and maintain civilian supremacy in the near future?

The scholarly literature on civil-military relations identifies at least three ways of achieving civilian control of the military: institutions, interests and ideas.<sup>109</sup> First, strong institutional rules and channels (legislative oversight, civilian-controlled ministry of defense and the like) can induce military subordination by enforcing sanctions for irregular behavior. Second, satisfying military corporate interests, through the adequate provision of resources and allowance of legitimate professional autonomy, may dissuade the military from meddling in politics. Third, the military may feel obligated to comply with civilian authority because it believes in the norm of civilian supremacy.

How do these mechanisms fare in Pakistan? At the risk of stating the obvious institutions need time and space to develop. Existing channels of civilian oversight are frail because of military intervention and influence which help the soldiers place themselves above any kind of meaningful reproach and accountability. Given military threat perceptions, military interests have rarely gone unmet in Pakistan. Similarly, civilians have rarely interfered with military autonomy in its internal affairs, except in rightful (if not always deft) control of top-level promotions and appointments. If neither of the two mechanisms works, voluntary military subordination to civil power may be a viable option, one that is typically ignored in the policy and scholarly literature on Pakistan. Military subversion of democratic procedures is much less likely when the military accepts that it is an instrument of the state subject to the authority of democratically elected representatives. Changes in the military belief system may require either internally-led reform or a sustained process of democratization that facilitates positive unlearning in the military. Neither are likely in the short to medium term.

There is truth to the claim made by some observers of Pakistan<sup>110</sup> that the military’s undue political influence is linked to the acquiescence, or worse, collaboration of civilian groups.

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<sup>109</sup> For a concise discussion of these three approaches, see David Pion-Berlin’s “Introduction,” in his edited volume, *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 1-35. The seminal work focusing on distinct institutions to enforce civilian control of the military is Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Belknap Press of Harvard, 1957), pp. 80-87. See also Samuel E. Finer’s *Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall, 1962), which emphasizes the military’s internalization of the norm of civilian control as a check on its intervention in politics.

<sup>110</sup> See, for instance, Christine Fair’s paper in this collection.

But it misses an important point. Militaries may rely on, and benefit, from the cooperation of sections of civilian society to enhance their domestic power and/or legitimacy. But military power is not the product of that consent. Historically, civilian governments have failed to extend their authority over the soldiers in any sustained manner not because they accept or prefer the military's supra-political role. However, many civilian politicians have self-interestedly come to expect a narrow realm of permissible behavior, and "anticipate that deviations from such expectations are likely to be counterproductive."<sup>111</sup> Some civilian leaders have vigorously contested military prerogatives (e.g., Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s, Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s) when they had the opportunity. But decisively swift military retaliations against them cast heavy shadows on civilian expectations of military institutional behavior.

If it cannot be eroded in the short to medium term, can that influence be more positively channeled? One solution favored and peddled, amongst others, by the generals is "bring the army in to keep it out" through such arrangements as the National Security Council (NSC). The logic is that civil-military integration would induce a partnership on all important national issues and prevent the military from going it alone. Besides being patently anti-democratic, conceding the military an institutionalized role in politics has not been a source of stability anywhere, not even in the archetype Turkey.

Permanently inducing the military to stay away from politics is complicated by the country's complex geopolitical environment and threat perceptions, which historically fomented the military's political role, and continue to provide the basis for its monopolistic influence over national security policy.

Comparatively speaking, one of the most potent mechanisms for eroding the domestic political power of the army is a defeat in war, as evidenced in the case of Greece in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, or Argentina in 1982 after the Malvinas/Falklands War. In Pakistan, however, the military's humiliating defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh war was not sufficient in bringing about a lasting institutional retrenchment from interference in politics and civilian affairs. This was in good measure because defeat (and dismemberment) at the hands of India exacerbated Pakistan's security dilemma, and made jingoistic nationalism more not less appealing in politics. Whether or not another defeat in a war (regardless of the nature or extent of such a defeat) with India will re-orient civil-military relations (and with it, military autonomy and expenditures) is therefore an unknown, and the potentially devastating presence of nuclear weapons, makes the war option too catastrophic to contemplate. Not war per se, but civil-military conflict over "who governs" war and peace may prompt military intervention (e.g., Kargil in 1999). And defeat on the battlefield could still have the opposite effect of increasing military insecurity and mobilizing nationalist demagoguery than pacifying and reorienting the Pakistani state in a civilianized direction.

A negotiated settlement of the conflict with India which has eluded the two sides for over sixty years may remove the territorial/nationalist drivers of military leverage over civilians. But vested interests on both sides would rather continue than upset the status quo, and the international community appears unwilling or unable to break the enduring impasse. There are some indications that the U.S. sees stabilizing the "Indo-Pak" relationship as a way to redirect

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<sup>111</sup> Guillermo O' Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Working Paper #172, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University (March 1992), 7. .

Pakistan's military machine to the "Af-Pak" front. But any serious or sustained effort to engage the two sides appears unlikely in the medium term.

And with internal security challenges emanating from militancy, Pakistan's threat environment is likely to become more and not less dangerous. In regions like South America, the ouster of the military from power and crucially, a lasting reduction of military autonomy, were linked to the cessation of the internal threats (from insurrectionary communism) which had originally induced the military to turn inwards and take over the control of politics. Hence, depending on how the overlapping external and internal threat environments evolve, the military may have less or more incentive to cede ground to civilians.

*The third and most drastic outcome is, of course, a military coup d'etat followed by military-led authoritarian rule.* There are both domestic and international factors which may counteract, if not eliminate, this option. It is probably too soon for the 'military-as-institution' to step in partly because negative memories of the 'military-as-government' are still fresh in the public mind. And if the past is any indication, the military usually waits at least half a decade or so for the next intervention. Pakistan's "resurrected civil society" (lawyers' associations, human rights groups, and sections of the media) and apparently more democratically-oriented parties will likely ensure that the military has no real occasion to openly undermine or overthrow an elected government.

The external costs of military rule may act as another inhibitor. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill which ties the continuation of U.S. aid to military non-interference in domestic politics could have a potentially restraining effect on the army's praetorian proclivities. But the threat of external sanctions and/or international opprobrium have not dissuaded the army from taking autonomous decisions in the past (e.g., nuclear proliferation, the 1999 military coup). And despite its pro-democracy rhetoric, Washington has typically preferred 'order' to 'liberty.' Its long history of 'getting things done through the generals' means that it is likely to continue to treat the military as a separate entity within the Pakistani state. This geopolitical support reinforces the military's distorted self image as a globally indispensable force in possession of a strategic piece of territory that it can leverage for gaining domestic and external influence. In fact, the U.S. continues to funnel untraceable monies through 'under the table' deals to the ISI, a process that undercuts the state and erodes the rule of law, both of which are crucial to fighting terrorism and militancy in the medium to long run.<sup>112</sup>

While a blunt military coup may not be a feasible option at the moment, given the military's entrenched praetorian norms, some form of authoritarian backsliding with at least a hidden hand from the military cannot be ruled out especially if civilian institutions (like the judiciary and the executive) were to openly clash or if economic conditions were to reach crisis proportions.

## Conclusion

Pakistan is not condemned to repeat its past. But the most likely medium term course is more of the same, not internal fracturing or spectacular stability. In the likely absence of a sustainable solution to the decades-long Indo-Pak territorial rivalry, Pakistan's India-focused

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<sup>112</sup>The CIA has reportedly doled out to the ISI funds that equal up to one third of the agency's budget, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in "bounty" money for the capture of wanted al-Qaeda militants. See Greg Miller, "CIA Pays for Support in Pakistan," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 November 2009.

security concerns will continue to provide powerful motivational drivers for its geopolitical behavior, including its not so deniable support to domestic and regional radical Islamist groups. Internal threats add another layer of complexity to the garrison state's sustenance.

At the domestic-political level, Pakistan is likely to remain a formally civilian-led regime governing under the watchful eye (and elbow) of a politically influential and autonomous military. Crucial to the country's longer term political and economic stability will be evolving a commitment to the "rules of the game" by both civilian and military actors. While civilians need to keep their own house in order, the persistent trend of recurring military authoritarianism has habituated the military into professional norms and prerogatives that are ill-suited to democratic-political consolidation. Democratic institutions are likely to remain stillborn until these norms undergo sustained erosion and the military is brought under firm democratic-civilian control.

In addition to facilitating factors like favorable geopolitical/threat conditions, a sustained process of democratization might be able to induce the military to stay away from politics. But democratization itself is an uncertain process fraught with the threat of erosion and reversals. And even if its procedures and conventions consolidate, and the military threat to civil supremacy is thwarted, democracy is not the panacea for the economic and governance problems which afflict Pakistan. However, it is a first and necessary step in the right direction without which Pakistan is more likely to lurch from one crisis to another.

# Sir Hilary Synnott: Looking at the Crystal Ball

*'It is a mistake to look too far ahead. The chain of destiny can only be grasped one link at a time'*  
(Winston Churchill)

## **The Past as a guide to the future**

It is a truism that there can be no adequate understanding of Pakistan without a knowledge of its past. If that is true of the present, it must also be true of any attempt to look into the future. But where in Pakistan's complex historical narrative should one make a start?

Perhaps in the period of the great movement towards politicised religion led by Zia ul Haq, so effectively supported by the CIA, in the 1980's? This would encompass two out of Pakistan's four experiences of military rule, the to-ing and fro-ing of elected but scarcely democratic governments, the development and proliferation of nuclear weaponry, and a couple of tumultuous bouts of activity in Kashmir. But that would be to omit the three wars with India and what many in Pakistan regard as the first two American betrayals, in 1962 and 1971, as well as the loss of Pakistan's East Wing to Bangladesh.

So maybe it would be more useful to start with the birth of the country itself, in 1947? That would take in the specter of Pushtun separatism, the brutal suppression of dissent in Baluchistan by the first of the Bhutto dynasty, and the collapse of the Constitution. But even beginning at the beginning of the nation would not allow adequate consideration of the well-springs of Pakistan's putative identity and the reasons for its separation from the larger part of the former Raj. To take due account of the arcane qualities of the Durand Line and the influences of differing religious narratives, we would have to start the clock even earlier.

All these momentous circumstances before and after the dawn of Pakistan had profound, and to a great extent debilitating, effects on the country's progress, in itself and in its relationships with the wider world. And most if not all of these effects may be relevant to the state of the nation today as well as to that in the future. They must therefore be borne in mind. Among specialists (there can be no true 'experts'), it perhaps goes without saying that they will be. But it is a tedious idiosyncrasy of the South Asian region that the recounting of the supposed lessons of history tends to supplant consideration of a way forward. It is easier to dwell on past grievances than to devise, still less to implement, action to improve prospects for the future. It will be best not to fall into that trap.

So why not consider the past within a timescale similar to that of the future and broadly confine the period from which we seek to extrapolate to, say, seven years also? This has an advantage of falling within the direct experience of current actors and analysts; and it has witnessed more than enough challenges that echo the characteristics of earlier periods. In the years after 2003, a military autocrat, losing his bluster and with much external encouragement, sought to cut a deal with a detested political foe and was ultimately tripped up by his own expedient gymnastics. In contrast to the blatant military interference in the 2002 electoral process, the outcome of the elections in 2008 - perceived as adequately free and fair despite routine shortcomings over electoral rolls and the like - dashed the hopes of Panglossian ideologues and confirmed the fears of the weary Pakistan-watching realists: the two all-too-



familiar national parties prevailed yet again, despite the appalling records of their previous two terms in office. An apparently flawless indirect electoral process produced a president of world-class notoriety who persisted for nearly two years in renegeing on solemn pre-electoral pledges for which his assassinated wife had vigorously campaigned. And, again confounding the over-optimists, the apparent trouncing of the religious parties' coalition in the north-west by a more secular ethnic-based party did nothing to prevent the eruption of violent tension in the region.

If the elections and unpopularity caused the army to beat a tactical withdrawal to barracks, the fecklessness of the political leadership re-endowed them, by default, with authority to conduct politico-military operations as they saw fit against an insurgency which was belatedly recognised as a threat to the nation, having been home-grown from nearly nothing in 2005

But if internal statecraft during this period was stagnant, contaminated by political rivalries, self-seeking and crass incompetence, the external situation assumed increasing importance and relevance. Having ignored Musharraf's repeated warnings in 2002 and onwards not to lose sight of the challenges in Afghanistan, contrary to its hopes and what passed for its plans, the US-led coalition was sucked into a politico-military quagmire in Iraq, which had ancillary costs in terms of popular revulsion on the part of Pakistanis. As the 'surge' in Iraq began to take effect in 2007, US attention belatedly reverted to Afghanistan and, all too much later, towards Pakistan. But it was only after Obama's election, first in March 2009 and then in a more refined form in December, that the elements of a US policy started to emerge. This, at last, appeared to recognise the intrinsic significance of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country with a population some six times that of its western neighbour and a highly politicised army whose interests were very different from those of the US.

By 2010 it had become clear that the US efforts since October 2001 to forge a transactional partnership with Pakistan had failed: Pakistan's army had suffered more losses than the whole of ISAF; it felt no gratitude for US attempted inducements; it declined to do US bidding over the Afghan Taliban, still less in relation to 'freedom fighters' such as the *Lashkar-e-Taiba* which was implicated in the outrages in Mumbai; and the opening of US military markets allowed the army to purchase big ticket weaponry to feed its fixation with India, at the expense of the nation's social welfare. The Pakistani population had further reasons to resent the US: for what they saw as attempted bribery; for diminishing their security and well-being; for increased violations of the sovereignty of a declared ally; and, in anticipation, for the 'fourth betrayal' when, as they fully expected, the US started to pull out of Afghanistan in 2011.

The above pictures are perhaps drawn somewhat starkly. But perceptions about such matters, both in the region and among many western commentators, are also stark. And when elections approach perceptions are often what count. Just as the last seven years have seen two elections in the US and two, very different, sets of government in Pakistan, so the next seven years will see another two US presidential elections, and who knows what political shifts in Pakistan. More to the point, the two processes are likely to impinge greatly upon each other. The significance of the Afghanistan campaign, and hence of Pakistan's role in that connection, upon US mid-term and presidential elections in 2010 and 2012 is inescapable. And the success or failure of US efforts in relation to Pakistan will have a profound effect upon that country. If things go badly, there may be knock-on effects within the region.

So, the last seven years encapsulates much of the nature of Pakistan and many of the realities within and around it: the strength, power and cunning of the army; the irresponsibility of

the non-military body politic; the limitations and ineffectualness of the institutions; the absence of hope for the future on the part of Pakistan's swelling population; the interplay of interest between Pakistan and Afghanistan; and the constant concerns of and about India.

At the same time, these very evident shortcomings and challenges have become so serious that they are now widely acknowledged, and this arouses the hope that change, being so desperately needed, might at last prove possible to achieve. What follows therefore explores such possibilities. Of course change could go either way. But, since there is almost no limit to a possible descent, even if the road is, as at present, paved with good intentions, let us focus particularly on the more difficult of the two directions, and consider the feasibility of positive change and how this might be brought about. This is therefore not a prediction. Nor is it simply an expression of hope. It is a recognition that progress will require both enlightenment and effort; and that without such effort the direction of movement will be backwards.

### **Extrapolation into the future**

The following list of 'variables', which are more susceptible to change, and 'constants', which are more enduring factors, is a provocation to discussion. Each component could, to varying degrees, profoundly affect Pakistan's future, in terms of itself and its relationship with others. Some discussion follows the list, leading on to consideration of courses of action which could be conducive to securing desired outcomes. The variables include Pakistan's body-politic, the economy, the role of the state, the judiciary and the police, the status of the insurgents, Afghanistan and America, potential 'friends of Pakistan, and the degree of optimism in and about Pakistan. The constants include the role of the army, India, China, Kashmir, the lingering question of the Durand Line, nuclear issues, corruption, sectarianism and the degree to which pessimism about the future overwhelms Pakistan.

### **Variable factors**

#### **The Body Politic**

Zardari's Presidency will not continue throughout the next seven years, even as the Presidency's role becomes titular, although it is fruitless to speculate whether he will survive his present term of office or depart sooner. Prime Minister Gilani should last until elections due in 2013, although these could be brought forward. But the PPP will most likely suffer electorally from the departure of the last of the Bhuttos (assuming that the next generation is too young to assume power) and the nasty aftertaste caused by Zardari and his coterie. The PML(N) will gain national ascendancy but this will not be tidy and its influence will not apply equally around the country. If Nawaz Sharif becomes prime minister, he will assuage the religious factions. This will cause annoyance in the US and Nawaz will capitalize upon this domestically. His propensity to centralisation around himself, together with patronage, will not allow much room for strategic thought, planning or execution. Governance will therefore be characterised by inefficiency, unpredictability and pork barrel opportunism. The Army could intervene. An alternative political leader might be more effective, but would be politically weak. And there is no sign of a plausible alternative, just as, contrary to all hopes and efforts, no contender has emerged in the past. If Nawaz were to fall under the proverbial bus, his brother Shabbaz Sharif might take the reins. In any event, provincial governance in Punjab and the north-west will gain importance. Tensions will rise between the centre, and Sindh and Baluchistan. Local governance is unlikely to prosper. But the political role of women might well do so.

## **The Economy**

This will depend crucially on political as well as economic leadership, and the extent to which necessary medium to long term economic considerations are allowed to prevail over shorter term political desiderata. The IMF will not be able to cope with outright irresponsibility, and if this occurs the poor will become poorer, and the gap between rich and poor will widen. External development assistance, from the US and those donors who subscribed to the Tokyo Conference, will no doubt fall short of their impressive pledges, as they have so far. Much will be in the form of budget support and thus lack transparency. But outside assistance will be an essential part of social welfare funding which will otherwise continue to be neglected. Foreign direct investment will depend upon assessments of political risk. To the extent that this diminishes, the country's natural resources, especially gas, coal and other minerals, might become better exploited and the energy deficit might be tackled. The availability of water will depend mainly upon the management of thorny domestic controversies, including water storage, inter-provincial disputes and the renovation and maintenance of neglected distribution networks. Disputes over water with India will however assume disproportionate importance as blame for the consequences of internal mismanagement will increasingly be lumped in with grievances about external water diversion. The durability of the Indus Water Treaty, under threat in 2001-02, cannot be taken for granted.

## **The Role of the State**

The relationships between the centre, the provinces and district governance will remain fraught because they are affected by the allocation of financial resources and hence by patronage and corruption. Although the National Finance Commission has introduced positive changes recently, and despite the preponderance of Punjab in parliament, the allocation system may be made still more equitable, so as to take better account of relative disadvantage. The centre will however continue to be beholden to or promote local power brokers which will lead to unhealthy compromises. Crucially, the relative roles of the army and any elected government will remain grossly unbalanced, with the army playing a dominant role in strategic and foreign policy issues. This will only change if there are first significant improvements in the effectiveness of the political class, which is unlikely to become apparent in the timescale under consideration. Nonetheless there may be scope at the edges to reduce some of the army's grosser privileges and incursions into the civilian domain.

## **The Judiciary and the Police**

Each of these important institutions is in a state of flux, which risks arousing over-optimism (see below). Judicial independence is a great prize, as would be a truly independent and effective Electoral Commission. But there are signs of an unhealthy over-concentration on settling old scores rather than implementing much needed reform and enhancing public respect. Increasing pay and conditions of the police, including correcting disparities between, for example, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are necessary but not sufficient for reducing corruption which may be so engrained as to take decades to control.

## **Insurgency**

Efforts to eradicate home-grown 'Pakistani Taliban' insurgency are likely to be broadly successful as a result of attrition and the elimination of militant leadership. But there will be a trail of resentment in their wake, arising from the concomitant injustices, damage to property and

displacement. The major potential variables concern the army's attitudes towards the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks and 'freedom fighters such as *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, which at present remain largely unchanged.

### **Afghanistan**

The management of this thorny relationship could be put on a sounder footing by the establishment of an Afghanistan-Pakistan 'Composite Dialogue', which Pakistan currently eschews. Karzai's presidency is an obstacle, for familiar reasons, as is the low representation of pro-Pakistani Pushtuns in the Afghan army and police. Similarly, suspicions surrounding India's role in Afghanistan (and Baluchistan) will continue to infect Afghan-Pakistan relations unless and until they are addressed head-on (see also below).

### **The United States**

The role of the US will be crucial, if not determinant. The tension between a US domestic political imperative to begin to draw down military forces in Afghanistan in mid-2011 and the perception of 'cutting and running' is the most significant political challenge. Because of the many uncertainties, at present Pakistan insists on the necessity of 'waiting and seeing,' which amounts to political paralysis. The deeply negative attitude towards the US is a major impediment to positive action. Successful administration of non-military aid will take time to become apparent, but it is not to be excluded that attitudes in Pakistan could become more favourable in advance of significant actual progress on the ground, if a view develops that the US is sincere in its beneficial intentions and is prepared, unprecedentedly, to become an all-weather friend. This will depend as much upon the reactions of Congress to inevitable failures and backsliding as on actual progress in Pakistan. The US will also need to address the issue of greater access by Pakistan to US markets, especially in the textiles and garments sector, and consider whether it should continue to facilitate big-ticket arms purchases unrelated to counter-insurgency. The issue of drone attacks also merits careful and constant assessment as there is an increasing risk that they are making more enemies than they destroy.

### **Potential 'Friends of Pakistan'**

The Tokyo Conference in 2009 provided a vehicle for pledges of help while the Friends of Democratic Pakistan aims to supply a policy framework for external help. There is a possibility that such instruments might assuage Pakistani confusion, and justifiable irritation, over dealing with a multiplicity of donors who understand little about the country, demand a lot, and relish proffering unsolicited advice. The challenges will be to ensure that actions speak louder than the words; to bring pledges closer to Pakistan's needs and to donors' self-interests in securing a stable Pakistan; to turn the pledges into actual disbursement (seldom achieved in the past); and to guard against Pakistan using foreign aid to free up its own resources to fund the army and India-related arms procurement.

### **Optimism**

This is a major variable which will colour or, when it proves unfounded, darken relationships. It is not to be confused with the frequently-expressed but seldom justifiable Pakistani plea to 'Trust Us'. It will have little basis if it is not accompanied by a determination to bring about change and to ensure that mutual trust is underpinned by evidence to justify it.

## **Some Constants**

### **The Army**

Rich in resources and confidence, despite the temporary humiliations at the tail-end of the Musharraf era, Pakistan's army will continue to see itself as the guardian of its idea of the Nation. It therefore stands ready to intervene in political life again should it regard that as necessary, but will be reluctant to do so without strong cause. Continuing US assistance, including reimbursement of declared costs of operations in the west and the supply of modern equipment such as helicopters, will add to its strength and capabilities. This will further distance it from an under-resourced and incompetent civilian regime. Continued access to US arms sales which are not relevant to counter-insurgency will help maintain its fixation with India. There is some scope for change at the margins, for instance by reintroducing and enhancing study periods abroad for promising officers, although these may include some future autocrat. An area to watch is the recruiting pattern and the possibility of greater religious conservatism within the army. The greater readiness of senior army and ISI officers to meet and interact with representatives of the US and certain other countries, which has only emerged in the last few years, is an opportunity which should be built upon.

### **India and Kashmir**

Policy on this will continue to be dictated by the army. It will take strong political leadership, and resolutely independently-minded foreign ministers (hitherto conspicuously absent) to secure any significant shift of approach. A true 'solution' to the Kashmir issue is nowhere in sight (the so-called progress of the Track II process between Tariq Aziz and S.K. Lamba has been exaggerated). But a reasonable aspiration is to manage the issue at a level of *modus vivendi* no worse than the last few years. If Indian political sentiment were to allow it, there is scope for rapid adoption of some Kashmir-related CBMs. But a real and permanent change of Pakistani attitude will require a radical reduction of the role of the army and possibly generational shifts of sentiment. The effects of further terrorist incidents like Mumbai are unpredictable but severe heightening of tension and even conflict (with all the accompanying dangers of escalation) cannot be excluded. In this respect the broad relationship is likely to remain constant.

### **The Nuclear Dimension**

Pakistan will continue vigorously to enhance its nuclear capabilities, in terms of warheads and delivery systems. It will maintain a high level of security, no doubt with some external assistance. The risk of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists is remote but, as always, cannot be totally excluded. It emphatically cannot be assumed that the absence of major conflict with India during recent periods of high tension proves that nuclear weaponry will never be used in South Asia.

### **China**

China will remain an all-weather ally and continue, not least in its own strategic and commercial interests, to contribute to the development of Gwadar and transport networks. This is of concern to India. But China's support will not be without limit: it will not condone violence or conflict with India; it will vigorously protect the interests of its citizenry in Pakistan; it is concerned about the proliferation of militant groups and their association with Uighur militants; and it will encourage moderation in Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan.

### **The Durand Line**

This issue will not be 'resolved' in the foreseeable future. Nor would agreement about the Durand Line unlock the range of other Afghan-Pakistan differences and tensions. Like Kashmir, an agreed and durable resolution will require a sustained period of stability and the consolidation of mutual confidence such as does not exist at present. External efforts to facilitate or impose a resolution will accentuate other difficulties. For the time being, the complexities of the Durand Line will have to be worked around.

### **Corruption**

This will be always with us. A good example set at the highest level, hitherto elusive, would be helpful, though even unfounded rumors would be undermining. A higher degree of transparency over military expenditure and the use of external development funding, however, will be essential if external support is to be maintained.

### **Sectarian Violence**

This too is likely to remain a common feature and may deteriorate further as other domestic tensions increase. It will affect governability, especially in Karachi and the Northern Areas. Improvement in relations with Iran is unlikely to have much effect.

### **Pessimism**

The factors described above and the absence for so long of any positive trend nourishes and enhances pessimistic and fatalistic sentiment. Well-educated youth and the scions of feudal and entrepreneurial families will continue to emigrate. Inward migration of talent and expertise, such as appears to be happening in India, will first require significant improvements in security, opportunity, and general welfare.

### **What Next?**

The foregoing analysis might encourage a conclusion that Pakistan is well on the way to failing as a state, and that there are few if any reasons to expect that it will pick itself up, turn the corner, and cease to be a source of major international concern. That is as may be. But, just as the future is unforeseeable, so such a conclusion is not inevitable. And assumptions to this effect by other countries are most likely to become self-fulfilling. As always, the condition of Pakistan is affected not only by its own actions and nature but also by external actors, for better or, perhaps more often, for worse.

A crucially important challenge for external actors, therefore, is assiduously to avoid actions which are likely to aggravate an already fragile situation. While that may seem obvious, the repetition of strategic errors committed in the interests of short-lived tactical advantage suggests that over-arching control of policy towards Pakistan has been seriously deficient and has too often taken second place to operational expediency.

Thereafter, the imperative is successfully to take actions which enhance the effectiveness and sense of responsibility of elected governments; to help such governments bring about visible improvements to the welfare of ordinary Pakistanis; and to improve the perception of the US and of democratic values in Pakistan (without being too prescriptive about the nature of democracy).

Securing the most appropriate mix of action will require considerable subtlety, patience, persistence and forbearance. There can be a tension between the objective of strengthening elected governments, for example, and that of improving the image of the US: it will do no

Pakistani government any good to be seen to be over-dependent on a foreign power; but it could be salutary to take actions which bring benefits for which Pakistani leaders can take the credit. An over-concentration on the military, although desirable for operational reasons, will further undermine democratic process and risks exacerbating regional tensions. But if Pakistan is ever to flourish in the longer term, the relative strengths and resources of the army and the civilian body politic must be rebalanced.

# Marvin G. Weinbaum: Regime and System Change

When a country is continually in crisis, as often seems the case with Pakistan, its direction is exceedingly difficult to chart. Threats regularly felt to Pakistan's economy, constitutional order, political integration, and national security leave open a wide range of potential outcomes. Indeed, Pakistan regularly exhibits change as crises ebb and flow, as threats heighten and dissipate. The country has undergone traumas during its 63-year history brought on by the impact of its wars, territorial dismemberment, the loss of its top leaders, economic shocks, and more. Yet, as the saying goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. The political, economic and social establishment that became ensconced decades ago is still largely intact. Whatever the regime, military authority continues to eclipse civilian rule in critical policy, and Pakistan's regional and international allies and adversaries remain mostly unchanged. The public's disappointments and frustrations with governance under successive leaders as well as its hopes and aspirations also are basically unaltered.

Even with this seeming resistance to basic changes, there exists the potential for both gradual and abrupt transformations of its political system. This essay will identify six scenarios of varying probability for the country's political future over the next five years. These scenarios reflect changes in distribution of power, class relationships and supporting ideologies. None of the scenarios is entirely exclusive of the others, and there are alternative forms within the same scenario.

A number of factors – many domestic, others regional and global – may determine which scenario Pakistan follows. Many that can trigger transformation or limit change arise from the country's political and economic landscape, and its social fabric. Others are regional or global. Whether internal or external, the precipitating factors are often familiar ones but also include those whose impact could not have been anticipated. While policy makers can mitigate the effects of some factors, others seem beyond their ability to influence. Most factors are interactive and can be cumulative, and mutually reinforcing in promoting change. But other factors, either for lack of sufficient intensity or a needed catalyst, help perpetuate a status quo. Three of the factors identified below, all involving the outcome of the Afghan and Pakistani insurgencies, and bilateral relations between the U.S. and Pakistan, have what is probably the highest potential for bringing far-reaching changes in Pakistan's medium term future; they are the subject here of more extended discussion.

## Leading Domestic Factors

### The public's verdict on democratic government

An elected government that falls far short of popular expectations, in its inability to address the country's pressing economic and social issues, creates disillusionment and mistrust in democracy and a readiness for fundamental change. Rampant corruption, political victimization, and a failed judicial system could in time lead to a greater willingness of the society for authoritarian government and even readiness to coalesce with the extremists.<sup>113</sup> Four

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<sup>113</sup> The largest percentage of Pakistan's population i.e. the youth is confused about democracy being a viable system for the country. According to a survey of Pakistani youth conducted by British Council in 2009, one third believe



out of five coups against elected governments took place in order to bring an end to political chaos, domestic disorder and unrest that were caused by previous political governments.

### **The military's restraint**

At issue is the willingness of the military to resist direct intervention in democratic politics and to curb ambitions to assume the reins of the government. Most regime changes have come about as a result of the army's direct or indirect intervention in politics, usually to protect its prerogatives. Politicians are ordinarily viewed as corrupt, unprofessional, and lacking the capability to deal with the country's problems. Finding a sustainable balance between civilian and military institutions is critical to a democratic outcome for Pakistan. While for the time being, the Pakistan army has shown no interest in an early return to the formal exercise of power, there is ample evidence that the weakness of the current government has elevated the military leadership, and especially its army chief, to an increasingly visible and assertive role in both domestic and foreign policy making.

### **The direction of the economy**

Popular pressures for regime and system change are most frequently a reflection of prevailing economic conditions. These can find expression in elections but may also lead to an organized or amorphous collective action. Sharply rising inflation is probably the single most important cause of the anti-incumbency sentiment. Energy deficits impact not only the country's industry but make a deep impression on the public's overall satisfaction with their government. Endemic joblessness and rising economic disparity more subtly undercut a regime's acceptance.

### **Addressing social welfare needs**

Basic government services including health and education that in Pakistan are either rudimentary or badly degraded undermine support not only for governments in power but for the political system as well. Unemployment is endemic and also critical in determining the tolerance people have for elected officials and their policies. It was not until the 1970 election that the Pakistani people were mobilized around the prospect of acquiring a social safety net, a political movement that capitalizes on the country's growing social and economic grievances awaits its leadership.

### **Resolution of provincial political and economic differences**

Pakistan has a troubled history of ethnic feuds, sectarian bloodshed, and linguistic politics. There are layers of confused identities that have kept 170 million individuals from becoming one nation. Decades of deprivation and dominance of Punjab's ruling elite has alienated all the smaller provinces and ethnicities. More than a generation of Sindhis, Baloch, and Pashtuns who grew up in insecure, deprived environments, have now turned against the very idea that had made Pakistan possible. Whether it is the complaints of economic exploitation or political discrimination, the possibility of the country breaking up, most likely along provincial lines, cannot be entirely dismissed.

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democracy is the best system of governance, one-third support Shariah law, while 7% think dictatorship is a good idea. With about two-third of the population under 30 years of age, young generation in Pakistan is the weakest link and will play an important role in determining country's future.

## **The outcome of Pakistan's struggle with its militants**

The commitment of the military and civilian policy makers to expand and sustain efforts to curb militant and extremist groups can have a profound effect on the survivability of a democratic government and the constitutional complexion of the state. The recently found resolve to move aggressively against the Pakistani Taliban requires the continued popular support for the army's actions in the tribal areas. Failure to confront fully the existential threat presented by insurgent forces, as well as long favored jihadi organizations, may in time force Pakistan's military and civilian establishments to share power with extremist groups. The more religiously doctrinaire and aggressively nationalistic state then likely to emerge is bound to increase tensions with India and increase the likelihood of an armed conflict.

## **Leading External Factors**

### **Relations with India**

Every sign of improvement or serious strain in relations with India carries unsettling political consequences. Even while the idea of reconciliation with India draws popular approval, indications of progress in negotiations with New Delhi over Kashmir and other issues have repeatedly triggered terrorism or military adventurism. Periods of crisis strengthen not only nationalist sentiments in Pakistan but also heighten the credibility of the country's jihadi and other extremists groups. The management of Pakistan's relations with India has proven to be a source of discord between the country's civilian and military leaderships, and a leading source of regime change. Pakistan's ethnic cohesion is strained by differences among the provinces in the priority given to Kashmir and other issues with India. A humiliating military defeat of the Pakistan army, as with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, and an accompanying economic and humanitarian crisis, could test the very integrity of the Pakistani state.

### **The outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan**

Pakistan has for some time pursued a dual set of policies toward Afghanistan. On the one hand, many Pakistani government officials acknowledge that a stable, peaceful Afghanistan, as long as it is not strategically aligned with India, can serve Pakistan's national interests. A secure, self-absorbed Afghanistan under the current Kabul regime, can possibly defuse sources of Pashtun nationalism and reduce radical influences in Pakistan's tribal belt. It can also benefit Pakistan in its quest for trade opportunities and energy transfers with Central Asia. On the other hand, Pakistan has another line of policy that provides sanctuary to Afghan insurgent groups dedicated to overthrowing the Kabul government ousting international forces from the country. Plainly then, Pakistan has a considerable stake in the outcome of the current counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and the staying power of the international community. Success can contribute to stabilizing not only Pakistan's neighbor but also the entire region. In a failed counter insurgency and weakened international commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan looks to play its Pashtun card with a friendly Taliban providing a sphere of influence for Pakistan in a fracturing Afghanistan. But an outcome that leads to the re-Talibanization of all or parts of Afghanistan could also have an unsettling political impact on Pakistan. The success of Islamic forces in Afghanistan will offer Pakistan's own Taliban its own strategic depth and energize its fight against the Islamabad government and the country's constitutional system.

## The course of relations with the United States

Pakistan can ill afford to be without its partnership with the U.S. There is no ready substitute for the advanced weapons and training the U.S. provides the Pakistani military, and the U.S.'s budgetary assistance and development aid for the country's economy. American assistance is also instrumental in unlocking the support from other sources. A more liberal U.S. trade policy in coming years could have an enormous effect on private direct investment and job creation and serve to strengthen democratic government in Islamabad. Pakistan also looks to the U.S. to apply pressure on India to come to the negotiating table on Kashmir and other issues, and has relied on U.S. diplomacy in times of crisis with India. Although the U.S. has few policy instruments with which to influence the course of Pakistan's domestic politics, their bilateral relations are regularly the subject of domestic debate that can strengthen or weaken a regime.

A severe trust deficit has for some time defined the U.S. relationship with the elites and public of Pakistan, and can ultimately determine the future of the strategic partnership. Fueled by media commentary, conspiracy theories alleging U.S. collusion with India and Israel to weaken Pakistan and seize its nuclear weapons are widely shared even at the highest echelons of the Pakistan military. Despite the recognition of the threat posed by the country's militants, most Pakistanis believe that the radicalization of the frontier comes as a direct result of U.S. counterterrorism policies and military operations in Afghanistan. Less than a tenth of the public holds a favorable view of the U.S., and almost twice as many Pakistanis see the U.S. as a greater threat to Pakistan's security than they do India.<sup>114</sup> Changing these views is a long term project that probably has to begin with the U.S. being willing to offer agreements on trade and nuclear issues, neither of which is in sight over the next several years.

## Developments within the global economy

The severe economic downturn of 2009 and 2010 has placed great strain on Pakistan and questioned the government's ability to manage the economy. Stabilization required returning to the IMF for budgetary support. The IMF has played a critical role in rescuing Pakistan's hard-pressed economy. Continued international backing strengthens the ruling coalition and staves off an economic crisis that could force those in power to implement unpopular fiscal and budgetary policies. But externally imposed conditionality can also invite conspiratorial explanations of foreign motives and reduce the confidence of Pakistanis in their own government.

## Six Scenarios

The following six scenarios differ on how power is exercised as well as in their supporting ideologies. Because outcomes vary considerably in their likelihoods over the next five years, each has been assigned an independent probability.

1. **Fragile Democratic:** This particular outcome is distinguished by its continuity with the present political dispensation. In this scenario Pakistan experiences only incremental changes to its politics and its economy. Although faced with periodic constitutional and economic crises, the country manages to muddle through. The country's ruling elites and relationship among its leading institutions would remain mostly unchanged. Civil society may experience growth and judicial activism may continue to play a larger role, but there will be no new balance among the pillars of the state. Most of the same cast of civilian leaders will still hold power or be

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<sup>114</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/160410bbcwspoll.pdf>

- contenders for power. Corruption will continue to be the centerpiece of political debate and any reforms will have marginal effect. Although the military avoids taking the reigns of power, it is not constrained from intervening to protect its prerogatives and interests in foreign and domestic policy areas. (60 percent)
2. **Authoritarian: Such a regime is** likely to be a consequence of a disappointing, dysfunctional civilian rule, and a public that is ready to accept more decisive leadership. Domestic issues most often drive public discontent, above all resentment against regime corruption and ineptitude. Under military rule, civilian institutions are suspended or strongly subordinated, and military personnel assume key positions in both the government and private sector. A Civilian-led authoritarian regime exercising arbitrary rule would come about because an elected executive was able to centralize and personalize power at the expense of other institutions, including the military.<sup>115</sup> This scenario would leave intact the country's civilian and military establishments, and not disrupt economic and social class relations. (40 percent).
  3. **Jihadist:** This describes the ascendance of extremist religious organizations, probably in coalition with other parties and possibly the military, enabling it to set the national policy agenda. It is most likely to have features associated with authoritarian rule but be distinctively ideological and normative. It may be infused with strong nationalism, and could conceivably seek to alter social class relations. Pakistan's fractured society, disgruntled provinces, uneducated and unemployed youth, failed system of education, and shattered economy set down the conditions for a jihadi scenario.<sup>116</sup> This outcome is most likely with a combination of regional and international developments such as a Taliban ascendance in Afghanistan and a sharp deterioration in relations with India. (20 percent)
  4. **Democratically Progressive:** Such an outcome is marked by a more responsive and responsible democratic government; elected regimes complete their constitutional terms of office, transfers of power occur regularly and peacefully, and there is a substantial growth of civil society. Such a progressive scenario will also be characterized by an appreciable gain in respect for individual rights and would most likely be accompanied by policies directed at the improvement in social welfare across the population. Much of this would be made possible by an economy that has stabilized, and with relations with Afghanistan and possibly India improved. (15 percent)
  5. **Radically redistributive:** Such an outcome is made possible by a catastrophic implosion of the economic system and a dramatic discrediting of the country's establishment. While democratic in character, such a scenario is more likely to tend toward authoritarian rule – whether secular or Islamic. It would be likely to address issues like economic inequality and poverty alleviation. This scenario would

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<sup>115</sup> Z.A. Bhutto might have moved in this direction had he survived politically into a second term of office. Nawaz Sharif in his second round as prime minister sought to centralize power in the executive that sought to cripple the country's democratic institutions.

<sup>116</sup> According to Pew Global Attitudes survey "Pakistani Public Opinion" which claimed to cover 90% of Pakistan's adult population released in August 2009, 83% supported stoning people who commit adultery; 80% favored punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery; and 78% supported death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion. These numbers were never this high even after Zia ul Haq's decade long Islamization movement.

- probably require the emergence of leadership and secular organization(s) able to mobilize a large-scale popular movement. (10 percent)
6. **Fragmented:** This outcome may arise as the result of a major trauma to the federal system, causing nationalist forces in the smaller provinces to form either substantially autonomous relationships with the federal government or to become independent national entities. It carries elements of a more serious national disintegration along multiple ethnic, sectarian and cultural lines. Like the previous scenario, it assumes that the military and federal civilian establishments are deeply discredited, most probably in the event of a disastrous economic and/or military failure. The danger of fragmentation within the army invites elements in the army to align with radical forces. As such it places the control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at risk. (10 percent).

### **Two Insurgencies and Pakistan's Future**

Pakistan's military and political classes have been strongly critical of the counterinsurgency strategy announced by the Obama Administration. Pakistan makes the claim that the military surge will push militants from Afghanistan across the border. But many of the hard-core insurgents who might be forced back into Pakistan are, after all, the same people to whom the Pakistan government has for years provided a safe haven. Against the argument that returning militants would join domestic insurgents in fighting the Pakistani state is the greater likelihood that the Afghan Taliban may turn against Pakistan in the event that they prevail against the Kabul government and international forces.

Though the Afghan Taliban poses no threat to the Pakistani state at present, this can be expected to change once they and their allies have consolidated their position inside Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban who were once very much beholden to Pakistan's security forces had begun to defy their sponsors in the late 1990s as they fell more and more under the sway of the al-Qaeda. Despite the Afghan Taliban's continuing dependence, resentment toward the ISI and Pakistan already exists within the Afghan Taliban.

There is good reason to believe that were the Afghan Taliban to assume power militarily or politically, they and their former mujahideen allies, notably in the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e-Islami, will be ever more beholden to radical Islamic interests outside the region. Their links to al-Qaeda and *jihadi* organizations in Pakistan remain strong. Together these groups form a network that aims at the removal of Western influences and the creation of a Shariah state in Afghanistan. And there is good reason to believe that the Taliban would as they did a decade ago help launch Islamic militants into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Most important, a successful Afghan Taliban insurgency is almost certain to energize Taliban forces in Pakistan seeking to achieve a similar Shariah state.

A failure of U.S. counter-insurgency strategy over the next several years is almost certain to promote civil conflict in Afghanistan and set the stage for a regional proxy war. Ethnic minority Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks in Afghanistan can be expected to resist any outcome that restores the Taliban to power. They learned a decade ago that the Taliban will not be satisfied with control of just Pashtun majority areas but will want to extend their authority over the entire country. With Pakistan as the Taliban's patron, Iran, Russia and the Central Asia republics will similarly seek spheres of influence in Afghanistan. And for all of Pakistan's concerns about Indian influence, a civil war in Afghanistan is likely to increase Indian activity. Furthermore, the

possibility of Indian military advisors and arms transfer cannot be ruled out, especially since India can now move them through air bases in Tajikistan. Saudi Arabia will also exert influence through client groups, mostly in order to minimize Iranian gains.

Predictably, with civil war in Afghanistan, millions of refugees will flee into Pakistan and a humanitarian crisis of major proportions will emerge. These Afghan refugees will put a severe financial burden on Pakistan. In the face of inflation and unemployment, and a weak, corrupt government, civil unrest in Pakistan provoked by extremist groups cannot be ruled out. The most likely outcome would be a full-fledged return to power for the Pakistan military. But instability could also create conditions for a radical transformation in which the country's civilian and military leaders are forced to accommodate radical Islamic elements in the government, with all the implications that carries for the control over nuclear weapons and the possibility of a major, possibly nuclear war with India.

A negotiated settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Karzai government is seen as the best way for Pakistan to ensure an India-free Afghanistan and also to avoid a civil war. Pakistan's motives closely resemble its efforts in the late 1980s to promote a post-Soviet coalition government in order to avoid a power vacuum. The case for negotiations with the Afghan Taliban is also an old one. Pakistani officials regularly argued while the Taliban was in power in Afghanistan that the leadership under Mullah Omar was capable of acting independently and not necessarily beholden to terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. Allowed to consolidate their power and given international recognition, the Taliban would be anxious to moderate their policies. Then, as now, Pakistan insisted that their influence with Afghan insurgents put them in a unique position to broker an agreement.

Yet recent public comments by army chief General Ashfaq Kayani offer some indication that Pakistan's strategies for a future Afghanistan may also be evolving and becoming more nuanced. In saying that "we can't have Talibanization . . . if we want to remain modern and progressive," the General has in fact suggested that Pakistan is better served if the Taliban does not prevail in Afghanistan.<sup>117</sup> The application of his remarks was even clearer with his words that "we cannot wish for Afghanistan what we don't wish for Pakistan." Kayani was willing to acknowledge Pakistan's logistical support for the U.S. on the Pakistani side of the border.

Despite these remarks, Kayani does not envision his army taking the field against the Afghan insurgents on Pakistan's soil. Rather, he would chart a course that would induce them to reach a settlement also acceptable to the Kabul government and international community. While promoting a grand bargain involving power sharing with the Quetta Shura, Kayani can also foresee a gradual weaning away and reintegration of Taliban fighters with the Afghan government. What has not changed is Pakistan's determination that any talks or accommodation with the Taliban should not ignore Pakistan's interests, principally its concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan. Kayani has brought back the term "strategic depth" but not as a shorthand for Pakistan's exploitation of Afghanistan territory as in the past. Rather it is to suggest that Pakistan could gain strategic depth and realize its security objectives "automatically" through "a peaceful, stable and friendly" neighbor.

It remains to be seen how Kayani's views actually affect Pakistan's policy. Unless his term of office is extended, the army chief will retire in fall 2010. Meanwhile, Pakistan is caught

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<sup>117</sup> Pamela Constable, *Washington Post*, February 1, 2010.

in several contradictions. Except on its own terms, it is unwilling to go all out to help the U.S. succeed militarily against the Taliban. But Pakistan also accepts that military pressure on the Taliban is probably necessary to reach a political settlement that would avoid the civil war that Pakistan dreads. And while Pakistan neither expects nor desires a long-term military presence by the U.S and its coalition partners in Afghanistan, it is certainly not anxious to see the U.S. lose interest in Pakistan as it did 20 years ago.

### **Concluding Thoughts on Leadership**

Fragile democracy and a largely benign military form of authoritarianism have alternated as the predominant forms of government in the recent past and are likely to continue to define Pakistan over the next five years. Notwithstanding widespread disillusionment with the democratic government elected in February 2008, for the time being at least most Pakistanis are opposed to a return to military rule. For its part, the Pakistan army appears content not to be seen having its hands on the levers of government. The army's traditionally low estimate of elected politicians has not changed, but it would rather let the civilian government exercise the formal responsibilities of power, especially given the country's many intractable problems. Though ostensibly subordinate to those democratically elected, the military has never ceded its control over those areas of foreign and domestic policy-making that directly impinge on its institutional interests. If the military does seek full power over the next five years, it will probably be in response to domestic instability so palpable that military rule would be welcomed by most of the public.

Even while the past cycle of military and civilian governments remains the most predictable course of events, a transformation of Pakistan's political system cannot be entirely ruled out. It is often observed that class disparities and inequities in the absence of a social safety net leave Pakistan with the basic ingredients for political and social upheaval. Pakistanis have reason to doubt that either the current civilian regime or a successor military-led government is interested in addressing their discontent. Yet the kind of transformations depicted by Pakistan's alternative scenarios face long odds. The best explanation lies in the continued absence of leadership and political outlets provided by programmatic parties, and an energized civil society that could produce popular mobilization.

Periodically, political figures have emerged who have been able to inspire and arouse the public in pursuit of a progressive scenario for Pakistan; but all have eventually forfeited the public's confidence. For a time in the early 1970s, Z.A. Bhutto transformed the country's political discourse and reconfigured politics; but he soon jettisoned his progressive agenda to rule in the fashion of a parochial, self-aggrandizing feudal politician. After 1998, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif serially acquired popular electoral mandates that might have broken the familiar mold of democratic politics. Instead, they succumbed to establishment politics, tolerating corruption and incompetence or, as in the case of Sharif, became addicted to enhancing personal power. General Musharraf was initially widely welcomed in the expectation that he would use his presidency to create a fresh political ethos and attract a new breed of politicians. That he placed greater value on the protection of the army's and his own prerogatives soon became evident.

The mass support received in 2007 and 2008 by a lawyer's movement that championed an independent judiciary and democratic government does however suggest that a normally politically passive population can be activated with an impelling cause. The judiciary's recent

assertiveness together with newly enacted constitutional changes restoring a parliamentary system will conceivably lead to strengthening a system of institutional checks and balances. Some observers see in these developments an important step toward the realization of a progressive democratic scenario. Others worry that an arrogant, arbitrary judiciary in league with the military or an autocratic party leader can become a powerful instrument of repression.

More radical scenarios seem to await the galvanizing effects of leaders able to evoke wide popular sentiment and display organization skills. They can tap into the frustrations growing out of severe energy and water shortages and high food prices. High unemployment among the country's youthful population creates a potentially volatile body of followers. Demagogic leaders could mount emotional appeals to nationalism, class exploitation, and religious values. The advent of liberalized print and electronic media able to fan strong opinion can potentially rally large numbers of people. For the time being, however, ethnic differences, still powerful patron-client relations, and vigilant security forces handicap nascent national movements. Pakistan's political complexion could change profoundly were an outcome of rising extremist forces the military to be compromised or the middle class to lose its confidence in the system. At least for the next five years, neither seems very probable.



# Anita M. Weiss: Population Growth, Urbanization and Female Literacy<sup>118</sup>

The first glimmer of light appears, seeping through the darkness. Dawn is finally breaking after what has felt like a very long, dark night. The warmth of a new day engulfs those who awake early. As the lilting a capella voice, gently yet firmly, gradually eases into one's sensibilities, it ephemerally intones the sanctity of the day declaring the greatness of God. Hope soars. Gradually, that voice is joined by others, from other mosques, calling the faithful to pray. But that lone voice gets drowned out by others using loudspeakers, a cacophony of now indistinct sounds whose timings are just off from one another. The intensity increases, and a listener now only hears yelling and shrieking, too much competition between each other, and now no clarity.

No, that's just not the way the story should go. Pakistan has been through this so many times before. How many times will there be a new beginning just to be overcome by the unrelenting jockeying for power and position that has come to characterize life in Pakistan? A general at the helm of the government is gone, the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment has been enacted, and it seems the army won't be able to take over easily again, at least within the bounds of the prevailing Constitution. However, in the shadow of nearly daily bomb blasts and suicide attacks throughout Pakistan, major cities are subject to 12-15 hours of daily load shedding while rural areas must endure living with even less electricity. Energy consumption is at an all time high, and there is not enough to go around. It is, therefore, not just contestations between communities for power and influence but contestations for diminishing resources too. The promises of economic growth, of external investment, of the commitment of major companies to Pakistan's future are mitigated by the recognition of the need for internal calm. There is still little said about social investment aside from base numbers of literates, and no interrogation of the contours of the necessary components of what it means here to be literate. There is no national consensus in Pakistan today on such things as how to share water, the rights women inherently have, what comprises a 'good education' aside from having served time as a student, what kind of political system is most desirable, or even a vision of civil-military relations. What indeed does the future hold for Pakistan when its demographic profile tells us that its population growth rate remains among the world's highest<sup>119</sup> but without the requisite development of natural resources, the economy and human potential that must accompany such growth to have the state remain viable and robust?

What transpires domestically is now intrinsically related to myriad global concerns in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. However, in this paper, I am not considering how external factors will impact Pakistan's future. Rather, my focus is solely to interrogate domestic factors with an eye towards understanding how Pakistan's changing demographic profile may affect its future options. Towards this end, I focus on three critical areas: first, the rise in

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<sup>118</sup> I am deeply indebted to the many people who have kindly met with me in Pakistan in the past many years and have shared their views and insights about the challenges confronting Pakistan, to Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb and Saba Gul Khattak for their helpful comments, and to Aruna Magier and Patrick Jones for their assistance with data research.

<sup>119</sup> UNDP *Human Development Report 2009, Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*, (Table L, Demographic Trends, UNDP:2009), p. 193. If taken as a whole from 1947-2010, Pakistan's total population growth rate has been 2.74 percent.

population growth and heightened demand for resources (e.g., education, healthcare, energy, employment); second, the effects of urbanization and related environmental challenges brought about by this demographic shift; and finally, what will it mean for Pakistan's future to have a significantly greater number of educated women than ever before?

It is sobering to reflect on how Pakistan has transformed since 1947 when British India was partitioned and an independent homeland for Muslims was carved out of its northern corners. Questions, debates and mistrust of a shared vision by its leaders arose from the outset. Mohammad Ali Jinnah – a British-trained lawyer who rose to be the founding father of the country, the *Quaid-e-Azam* – and other western-oriented professionals envisioned a multiethnic, pluralistic, democratic state free from the hegemony of any one group. The hope for this is evident in Jinnah's inaugural presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan three days prior to Independence, when he declared that "if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor."<sup>120</sup> Jinnah encouraged the rise of a vigorous civil society, one in which ethnic and religious divides would be set aside so as to promote the overall well-being of the new country.<sup>121</sup> He regarded Pakistan as the culmination of what had finally become a mass-based grassroots movement, extending out to consist of partisans from a range of ethnic, class, regional, and religious backgrounds – a profusion of groups working together for the overall well-being of the state regardless of these divisions. Differences between leaders and groups were to be resolved within a constitutional context, as Jinnah and other leaders of the new state shared the conviction that a popular consensus existed on its necessity, viability and structure. Most citizens of the new state, whether from areas deemed in the 1947 partition to become part of Pakistan or the hordes of migrants (*muhajirs*) who left everything behind in those areas ceded to India as they boarded trains for Pakistan, shared a conviction that they had achieved something pivotal for the Muslims of South Asia. The havoc and social chaos which became the legacy of partition kindled a unifying spirit among much of the citizenry of the new state. Pakistan's future held great promise according to the mainstream, populist narrative. While substantive political and economic challenges confronted the new state, most shared the conviction that these would be surmounted over time.

That promise remains unfulfilled even today. Importantly, Pakistan has failed to invest in its people, and notably in its women. Too often people use the trope that tradition is largely responsible for Pakistan's challenges in lowering its population growth rates. This is fallacious as the lack of prioritizing female education combined with a lack of prioritizing developing sectors in the economy to support the economic empowerment of women, is fundamentally responsible for Pakistan *not* lowering its population growth rates significantly – especially between the 1970s-1990s, which saw Pakistan's population double.<sup>122</sup> Experiences worldwide attest that educated women have smaller, healthier families and that only when women come to enjoy economic security and a sense of economic justice that they may turn their focus to becoming involved in civil society and political groups.

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<sup>120</sup> Reprinted in C.M. Naim (ed.) *Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: the Vision and the Reality* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, South Asian series #5, 1979), 212.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 212-213.

<sup>122</sup> Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan "Draft National Population Policy 2010" 18 January 2010, p. 1.

## Situating Pakistan's Population Growth and Urban Expansion

Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world – soon to become the fifth most populous – with a mid-2009 population estimated at 175 million.<sup>123</sup> Its land area, however, is only thirty-second in size in the world. Since Independence, Pakistan's population increased five-fold from the 34 million counted in the first census in 1951<sup>124</sup>; its projected population in 2030 is estimated to be between 243.6 to 255.3 million.<sup>125</sup> The United Nations estimates that Pakistan's population will nearly double by 2050 and it will become the world's 4<sup>th</sup> largest country with 335 million persons.<sup>126</sup>

Pakistan's population is not evenly distributed throughout the country, ranging dramatically from a sparsely populated Baluchistan to some of the highest densities in the world in parts of Karachi and the old city of Lahore. As shown in Table I below, two-thirds of all Pakistanis, on average, still live in rural areas; this is higher in Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa<sup>127</sup> (KBK, formerly the Northwest Frontier Province) where over three-quarters of the population resides in rural areas, but is changing in other parts of the country. In particular,

**Table I** Population by Province and Urban-Rural Residence (in millions)

	<u>Total pop.</u>	<u>Urban pop.</u>	<u>% urban</u>	<u>Rural pop.</u>	<u>% rural</u>
National	147.1	51.9	35.3%	95.2	64.7%
Baluchistan	8.5	2.0	23.5%	6.5	76.5%
KBK	20.9	3.4	16.3%	17.5	83.7%
Punjab	84.8	31.1	36.7%	53.7	63.3%
Sindh	32.9	15.4	46.8%	17.5	53.2%

*Source:* Federal Bureau of Statistics *Pakistan Demographic Survey 2006*, Table-1, pp. 39-43.

the urban population in Sindh has nearly surpassed the province's rural population, due in large part to migration to the city of Karachi where the population surpassed 13 million in 2007 (See Table II). Pakistan's urban annual growth rate has averaged 3.82 percent since 1950, with slower growth experienced only in the first half of this decade.<sup>128</sup> Pakistan's cities continue to experience

**Table II** Population of Major Pakistani Cities (thousands)

<sup>123</sup> This is the estimate of the CIA *World Factbook*, accessed at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>. However, figures in the Ministry of Population Welfare's "Draft National Population Policy 2010" estimate Pakistan's population at the same time as 171 million.

<sup>124</sup> Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan "Draft National Population Policy 2010" 18 January 2010, p. 1.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>126</sup> This estimate by the UN Population Division was reported in *Dawn* 28 July 2009.

<sup>127</sup> NWFP was officially renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, or KBK, in March 2010.

<sup>128</sup> Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision* and *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unup>. The urban growth rate was highest in the country's first decade as *muhajirs*, migrants from India, relocated in the country's cities. It again averaged over 4 percent growth between 1975-1990, presumably due to the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan's cities.

	<u>2000</u>	<u>2005</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2015</u>
Faisalabad	2,140	2,482	2,833	3,260
Gujranwala	1,224	1,433	1,643	1,898
Hyderabad	1,221	1,386	1,581	1,827
Karachi	10,019	11,553	13,052	14,855
Lahore	5,448	6,259	7,092	8,107
Multan	1,263	1,445	1,650	1,906
Peshawar	1,066	1,235	1,415	1,636
Quetta	614	725	836	971
Rawalpindi	1,519	1,762	2,015	2,324

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2007<sup>129</sup>

significant growth; seven other cities (Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Hyderabad, Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi) have populations of over a million; Lahore's population is well over 5 million. The international think tank City Mayors now projects Karachi, in 2010, to have become the largest city in the world with a population of 15.5 million (although its total metropolitan area of 18 million puts it smaller than a number of others in this comparison).<sup>130</sup> Roughly a third of all urban dwellers live either in Karachi or Lahore.

City size is but one factor to consider when envisioning how to create livable cities in Pakistan. At least one-third of urban residents live in *katchi abadis* and other slums, lacking basic services.<sup>131</sup> Megacities today have tremendous infrastructural problems. In Lahore, for example, the city has expanded so far — Defense, Iqbal Town, and Township now being commonplace residential locales — that it has lost its sense of a center. The deterioration of public transit networks and the proliferation of automobiles and private minibuses have caused unprecedented traffic congestion, bottlenecks and pollution. The Ravi River receives so much hazardous and untreated waste on a daily basis that the city of Lahore is essentially encircled now by poison.<sup>132</sup>

Politics and ethnicity are uniquely intertwined in Pakistan. The family as a primary social concern in Pakistan extends out to ethnic identity, and ethnicity is a key influence in political attitudes. Ethnic identity is the primary foundation of provincial divisions in Pakistan, albeit residence in a province is by no means an exclusive domain of only one distinct ethnic group. Indeed, some of the greatest initial political divisiveness occurred over the question of which province distinct districts should join. For example, many Baluchis had championed having Dera Ghazi Khan be a part of Baluchistan, although it ended up being in Punjab. Numerous Pukhtuns live in villages abutting G.T. (Grand Trunk) Road between Rawalpindi and Attock, but one does

<sup>129</sup> Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, *World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision*, <http://esa.un.org/unup>.

<sup>130</sup> City Mayors statistics "The largest cities in the world and their mayors" accessed at: <http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-mayors-1.html>.

<sup>131</sup> Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission. 2001. *Ten Year Perspective Development Plan 2001-11 and Three Year Development Programme 2001-04* Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, September, pp. 249

<sup>132</sup> Ali Raza "Ravi receives 1,307 tonne toxic waste daily" *The News* 20 April 2010, accessible at: [http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily\\_detail.asp?id=235023](http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=235023).

not enter Khyber-Paktunkhawana until the bridge is crossed. One of the key reasons for the delay in enumerating the 1991 Census (it was finally held in 1998, 7 years later) is that popular knowledge held that the influx of millions of Afghan Pakhtun refugees into Baluchistan had caused the majority ethnic group in the province to change; stating definitively that Baluchis no longer comprised the majority ethnic group in Baluchistan would open provide further fuel for open provocation between groups in the province. In addition, clearly articulating that the city of Karachi had indeed experienced a very high growth rate would have brought demands for commensurate representation in the national parliament and higher quotas for government jobs, university admissions, etc., further aggravating hostility between the MQM and other groups. Punjab, the most populous province, would have seen its share of federal jobs and funding affected – whether its count was too high *or* too low – further antagonizing groups in other provinces and fueling anti-Punjabi sentiment (either from others, or from Punjabis who considered they were undercounted). An associated outcome would be that rural landholding elites would lose seats in the national assembly if the census proved that there had been significant population growth in urban areas. Furthermore, it was feared that sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shia groups would escalate further (they did, regardless) as each group would certainly decry the over-counting of the other, thereby fueling the ravaging, widespread and random acts of terrorism that these disputes have wrought. Finally, showing population growth rates hovering about three percent would have undermined economic growth in the country as well as serve to underscore the state’s failure to raise the status of women. This, in turn, would have further antagonized the brewing ‘culture war’ between western-oriented groups demanding the state actively pursue the empowerment of women versus Islamist groups demanding the state suppress those forces which seek to exploit women and lead them away from their prescribed roles as commonly perceived within the tradition.<sup>133</sup>

These are not symbolically imagined communities either. Ethnic orientations toward social hierarchies, toward the state, even toward Islam differ markedly between some groups. Being cognizant of the most salient ways that ethnicity influences political and economic stances enables us to gain a fuller view of how the different segments that comprise Pakistan interact. There are also significant cultural differences between major ethnic groups in Pakistan that contribute to interprovincial misunderstandings and very real tensions.

Separatist movements and ethnic crises have plagued Pakistan since its inception, though the nature and composition of such conflict has changed over time. At Independence, there was a definable fear that Pakistan might cease to exist; East Pakistan’s secession in 1971 further aggravated that anxiety. More recently, separatist movements in what was then the Northwest Frontier Province (now KBK), Baluchistan and Sindh have given way to demands for greater power and autonomy. Perhaps one of Pakistan’s greatest challenges today lies in how to create a sense of citizenry amongst communities which have not historically regarded each other as ‘a people’ aside from most being adherents of the same major religion. Of course, this is interwoven with the myriad economic difficulties and development concerns that Pakistan is facing.

Pakistan’s four major provinces were initially created to reflect how language is divided up in the country: Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province, the Punjab, and Sindh. In early

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<sup>133</sup> For further discussion of the various factors which constrained the Pakistan government from holding a census, refer to Anita M. Weiss “Much Ado about Counting: the Conflict over Holding a Census in Pakistan” *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 679-693.

2010, the Northern Areas became a fifth province, Gilgit-Baltistan; in March 2010 NWFP was officially renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Provincial residence no longer denotes either ethnicity or language, particularly as Punjabis and Pukhtuns have settled outside of the respective provinces associated with their language. For example, nearly half of all Pakistanis (48 percent) speak the provincial language Punjabi while over two-thirds identify as being ethnically Punjabi. Therefore, a sizeable number of ethnic Punjabis do not speak the Punjabi language. We must presume that, in this case, many who identify as being ethnically Punjabi and who don't speak the Punjabi language may be Saraiki speakers (who comprise 10 percent of the population). In response to the creation of a new province, Gilgit-Baltistan, from the former Northern Areas, there have been demands not only for renaming other provinces – resulting in NWFP being renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa – but for carving out new ones. The Punjabi language distribution is important here. The population of the province of Punjab (84.8 million) would make it the 15<sup>th</sup> largest country in the world if it were a separate national entity.<sup>134</sup> There is a political movement in southern Punjab gaining strength to separate that area from Punjab as a Saraiki-speaking province. Riots have also broken out in Abbotabad and other non-Pakhtun Hindko-speaking areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as Hindko speakers feel divested of their provincial citizenship under the new name, and are agitating to carve out a separate province of their own.

Political dissent and control is a key factor in demands for restructuring FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies. This legacy of British colonialism which can be traced to the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of 1901 is comprised of seven tribal agencies and six frontier regions. While administered directly by the federal government, it enjoys a great deal of local autonomy. Here, tribal leaders' power holds sway over their members' lives to a considerable extent, and federal institutions and constitutional laws are essentially irrelevant. Political agents, representatives of the federal government, rarely wield even limited influence; they are essentially couriers. A common sentiment in FATA is the disdain with which most residents regard the federal government. Development projects which have sought to build modern roads, schools, and new kinds of economic enterprises are often viewed locally as insidious efforts to dominate the tribal areas. It is erroneous to assume that the federal government of Pakistan maintains effective power and influence in FATA.

Where will this sense of provincial citizenship lead as Pakistan's population numbers rise? Will it strengthen Pakistan to have smaller provinces or will that further dilute a sense of national identity, displacing loyalties to the provinces away from the center?

### **Situating the Position of Women in Pakistan**

Two perceptions characterize the basic understanding of traditional gender relations in Pakistan: women are subordinate to men, and a man's honor resides in the actions of the women of his family. Throughout the country, gender relations differ more by degree than by type. Space is allocated to and used differently by men and women. Traditionally, a woman was seen as needing protection from the outside world where her respectability – and therefore that of her family – is at risk. Women in many parts of the country live under traditional constraints associated with the *purdah*, which necessitate the separation of women from the activities of men both, physically and symbolically, thereby creating very differentiated male and female spheres.

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<sup>134</sup> CIA *World Factbook*. This would place Punjab between number 14<sup>th</sup> ranked Ethiopia (85.2 million) and 15<sup>th</sup> ranked Germany (82.3 million).

In the past, most women spent the bulk of their lives physically within their homes, venturing outside only when there was a substantive purpose. While greater numbers of women venture into public spaces in Pakistan today than in the past, in most parts of the country – perhaps Islamabad, Karachi, and wealthier parts of a few other cities to the exception – people still consider a woman (and by extension, her family) to be shameless when there are no restrictions placed on her mobility.

Two important factors have been responsible for differentiating the degree to which women's mobility is restricted: class and rural/urban residence. Poor rural women in Punjab and Sindh have traditionally enjoyed a great degree of mobility than women in the western parts of the country if for no other reason than sheer necessity. These women characteristically are responsible for transplanting seedlings and weeding crops, and are often involved in activities such as raising chickens (and selling eggs) and stuffing wool or cotton into local blankets (*razais*). When a family's level of prosperity rises and it begins to aspire for a higher status, often the first social change that occurs is putting a veil on its women and placing them into some form of *purdah*.

Marriage serves as a means of cementing alliances between extended families. There remains a preference for marriage to one's patrilineal cousin, otherwise to kin from within the *biradari* (clan). The pattern of continued intermarriage coupled with the occasional marriage of nonrelatives creates a convoluted web of interlocking ties of descent and marriage, resulting in the perception by many non-Pakistanis that everyone who they know is related to one another.

Social ties are defined in terms of giving away daughters in marriage and receiving daughters-in-law. To participate fully in social life, a person must be married and have children, preferably sons. Women overwhelmingly get married and have children in Pakistan: 98 percent of all women aged 35-49 had ever been married in 2002. Fertility rates are finally declining: merely two generations ago, an average family consisted of 8-10 children; a generation ago (in the early 1990s), it was 6 children; and today the norm is 4, even among many rural families.<sup>135</sup>

Overall literacy rates in Pakistan have been steadily rising. The last census in 1998 reported that 43.9 percent of Pakistanis (over age 10) were literate: 54.8 percent of males while only 32.0 percent of females.<sup>136</sup> This has occurred even though there has never been a systematic, nationally coordinated effort to improve female primary education in the country. One cannot decry cultural reasons for the low female literacy rates, as the South Asian regional norm is over two-thirds.<sup>137</sup> Research conducted by the Ministry for Women's Development and a range of international donor agencies twenty years ago revealed that *access* was the most crucial concern parents had. Indeed, reluctance turned to enthusiasm when parents in rural Punjab and rural Baluchistan could be guaranteed their daughters' safety and, hence, their honor.

This scenario, today, is changing remarkably. UNICEF reports an overall literacy rate of youth aged 15-24, at 80 percent; the corresponding figure for females in the same age group is 60

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<sup>135</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2002*, pp. x, and UNDP *op. cit.*

<sup>136</sup> Statistics Division, Population Census Organization, Government of Pakistan *1998 Census Demographic Indicators*, accessible at: [http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/demographic\\_indicators98/demographic\\_indicators.html](http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/demographic_indicators98/demographic_indicators.html).

<sup>137</sup> UNDP "Country Brief, South Asia Region, Pakistan" 2003, compares Pakistan's female literacy rate with that of other countries in the region with similar per capita income levels.

percent.<sup>138</sup> This bodes well for the emergent generation of Pakistan’s workforce as both males and females will have unprecedentedly high education levels.

While overall literacy rates are rising, the state has established distinct quotas to promote women’s greater participation in public arenas of society: 5 percent for women in government service (now 10 percent); 17 percent for women in the national and provincial parliaments; and 33 percent for women in most tiers of local government. However, it has been less successful in forging economic opportunities for women outside of government service. Of a total labor force of 51.78 million in 2007-08, only 10.96 million were women.<sup>139</sup> Even those sectors commonly associated with women such as teaching – women as nurturers—have been dominated by men as shown in Table III below. Here we find just under half of all primary school teachers are women. This climbs to nearly two-thirds in middle school, but then decreases to just under one-quarter in universities. Issues of mobility, economic self-sufficiency, the view that fulfilling domestic obligations is paramount, and the question of ‘male honor’ when a family lives off the labor of their women, serve to prevent women from entering the most nurturing professions which they dominate elsewhere in the world – just not in Pakistan.

Table III      Average percentage of women teachers, 1997-98 – 2007-08

Primary schools	44.3
Middle schools	61.9
High schools	49.3
Universities	24.3

Source: “Data Sheet Showing Number, Enrollment Teaching Staff and Student Teachers Ratio” at [www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/social.../education.pdf](http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/social.../education.pdf)

### **Implications**

Pakistan’s economy has grown much more than that of many other low-income countries, but has failed to achieve social progress commensurate with its economic growth. The educated and well-off urban population lives not so differently from their counterparts in other countries of similar income range. However, the poor and rural inhabitants of Pakistan have been left with limited resources, clamoring for jobs, decent schools for their many children, plagued by inflation, and living – quite literally – in the dark. Pakistan’s ranking in the UNDP’s Human Development Index slipped from 120 in 1991, to 138 in 2002, and to 141 in 2009 – worse than the Congo (136) and Myanmar (138), and only just above Swaziland (142) and Angola (143), all countries with *far* weaker economies.<sup>140</sup>

With greater numbers of people demanding goods and services in the country and most of them living in densely populated cities difficult to navigate (physically as well as politically), the Government of Pakistan must prioritize creating economic space for the masses in the country and prioritize both economic and political justice. As greater percentages of citizens are cognizant of what transpires elsewhere in the world due to higher levels of education and the expansion of media coverage, they will naturally expect – and demand – more. We have already

<sup>138</sup> UNICEF “Basic Indicators: Pakistan” accessible at: [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan/pakistan\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan/pakistan_statistics.html).

<sup>139</sup> Finance Division, Government of Pakistan “Population, Labour Force and Employment” *Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09*, p. 183.

<sup>140</sup> UNDP op. cit.



seen the violence that emerges from narrow views of community, a divisive cleavage that ostensibly pits western-oriented, wealthy groups against the poor, the disempowered, those who cannot afford a government education and who know that receiving one won't alleviate their poverty and disenfranchisement. These are the people who identify with their groups wholly, whether due to tribal identity, sectarian identity, kinship, locale, or other ascribed factors.

An important change that results from urbanization is the nuclearization of the family, and we can see this occurring in Pakistan's cities today in large numbers. The old *havelis* have given way to self-contained flats and it is now common not to know one's neighbors. This is substantively affecting the country's social character as values today are imparted in schools, through the media, and on the streets. Younger generations of Pakistanis, especially children of the elite, are now questioning the priorities of their elders in wholly unprecedented ways. Yet the failure of government schools to provide viable education has unduly harmed that very group – children of the poor – which it claims to be dedicated to serving. The forthcoming 5-Year Plan has the goal of achieving universal primary education and 75 percent enrollment in secondary education, although the overall development budget is facing a 40 percent cut. How can this be achieved? Pakistan's future will continue to be precarious if it is not.

Pakistan's high population growth rate, combined with current fertility levels, certainly constrains Pakistan's economic prospects. As high population growth rates and rampant urbanization provide greater challenges than opportunities for Pakistan's future, the opposite must be said for increases in absolute numbers of literate women. In research I have conducted in a wide variety of areas in Pakistan – from the Old City of Lahore to metropolitan Islamabad and Peshawar, to small towns in Swat earlier this year – I have found educated women as being the most secure about their future. As one impoverished widow in the Old City of Lahore, who saved every rupee she earned from sewing *panchas* at the bottom of shalwars so she could educate her daughters, told me over twenty years ago, “Land and gold can always be taken away, but no one can steal a good education.”<sup>141</sup> The draft National Population Policy recognizes that a huge societal shift is now underway,

Societal changes such as rapid urbanization, increased female achievements in education and employment market, related expansion of opportunities for women, proliferation of information through electronic and other media, and improvements in economic situation have set in a process of changes in social values. Demographic surveys show that fertility level has declined but has slowed during the last few years.<sup>142</sup>

Pakistan will be confronting different kinds of challenges emerging an increase in the absolute number of educated females. Gender and development literature contains numerous examples of such women demanding cleaner neighborhoods, better schools, legal reforms to support their economic participation (such reforms are already underway in Pakistan)<sup>143</sup> and, importantly for Pakistan, enjoying lower population growth rates. Might we see more political accommodation as women become more active in political office as I saw in the NWFP provincial government earlier this decade, when it was women from the MMA, PPPP and ANP who crossed party lines

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<sup>141</sup> For more information on women's survival strategies in the Old City of Lahore, see Anita M. Weiss *Walls within Walls: Life Histories of Working Women in the Old City of Lahore* 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Oxford University Press, 2002.

<sup>142</sup> Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan “Draft National Population Policy 2010” 18 January 2010, p. 7.

<sup>143</sup> For further discussion of these ongoing legal reforms, see Anita M. Weiss “Moving Forward with the Legal Empowerment of Women in Pakistan?” draft paper (unpublished).

to find solutions to problems plaguing their schools and children's healthcare options? They considered it their *amanat* (a kind of sacred obligation) to fulfill their duties as parliamentarians despite having been elected on reserved seats. From interviews I conducted recently with women in Swat, I saw a self-confidence among educated women; in larger numbers, they will certainly stand up to obstructivist forces seeking to keep them down. The late US Congresswoman and founder of WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organization) once said,

It's not that I believe that women are superior to men, it's just that we've had so little opportunity to be corrupted by power . . . I'm one of those who has always believed that women will change the nature of power, rather than power changing the nature of women.<sup>144</sup>

If there ever was an ideal ground on which that will occur, it is Pakistan.

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<sup>144</sup> As quoted in <http://guerillawomentn.blogspot.com/2009/07/bella-abzug-women-will-change-nature-of.html>

# The Perils of Prediction

Joshua T. White

Predicting Pakistan's future is risky business. Just a few years ago, no one would have expected the emergence of a robust Lawyer's Movement, challenging the Musharraf government and agitating for judicial independence. Few would have predicted the rise of a bafflingly multifaceted Taliban movement in Pakistan's frontier that brought together a wide array of Pashtuns and Punjabi militants. And who could possibly have predicted an outbreak of deadly rioting in the historically peaceful Hazara division in the newly-named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province? Clearly one should have humility when gazing into the future, particularly with respect to a country about which there is relatively little reliable data.

## Key Factors

What are the key factors that are likely to determine Pakistan's future course? There are many that deserve attention: demographics, energy demand, state spending on social welfare, state patronage of militant Islamist groups, and foreign policy toward neighboring countries, to name just a few. Here, with no pretense of being comprehensive, I have chosen to focus on three particular factors.

### Islamism

The trajectory of Islamism in Pakistan is a critical determinant of the future. Political Islam is often framed as a competition between radicalism and liberalism. One common formulation pits dangerous Deobandism against benign Barelvism, each group challenging the other ideologically for the soul of the state. An even more hyperbolic formulation sees a battle between a secularist vision that seeks to roll back the institutional expressions of Pakistan's state Islamism — the *Shariah* courts, Hudood ordinances, Council on Islamic Ideology, etc. — and Ahl-e-Hadith/Wahhabist ideologies of a Saudi-like *Shariah* state.

Although political and military elites have long supported the Islamization discourse in Pakistan — so much so that only a handful of politicians and public intellectuals will question the need for an “Islamic state” — there is little to suggest that they have an interest in promoting a wholesale alternative narrative. That is to say, the future of Islamism is not likely to be contested at the extremes. The Pakistani people, by most measures, support a relatively benign *Shariah*, and are unlikely to countenance either the establishment of a robust Islamist state, or the dismantlement of existing Islamic state institutions.

The real debates over Islamism are likely to be more subtle, and focus on differentiation among Islamist groups. What kind of distinctions will the public make between Taliban “over there” (Afghanistan, Kashmir, India) and Taliban “over here” (Pakistan) or between groups that participate in elections and those that reject the democratic process? What distinctions will be made between groups that engage in relatively popular *jihads* (Kashmir) and relatively unpopular ones (sectarian violence) or between those that support the Pakistani army and those that target it?

These distinctions are in part ideological, and may be shaped in the coming years by media debates, academic conferences, clerical *fatwa*, etc. But such debates do not occur in a

vacuum; they are driven by interests and incentives, and in Pakistan, those interests and incentives are largely those of the state. It is the state, its institutions and its leadership that will most significantly shape the debate about Islamism. Recent research (by Chris Fair and others) shows that the public already differentiates among Islamist organizations, and does so in ways that appear to mirror state “messaging” about those organizations. Even so, they often fail to understand the linkages and common operations of groups that, at first blush, appear to be distinct.

A focal question then, is what incentives will the state continue to provide to Islamists? Will the military continue to feed the narrative that links Pakistan’s strategic situation — its disadvantages vis-à-vis India and the United States — to a larger story about the disadvantages of the Muslim *Ummah*? Will it continue to provide succor to militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir, who in turn pressure mainstream political parties and religious movements to condone militancy? Will it continue to invest little in protecting political and religious leaders who speak out against violence? Will political elites continue to find it useful to ally with religious parties that are opposed to any retrenchment of state *Shariah* laws and institutions? And will they continue to make concessions to extremists?

Unfortunately, political incentives for both military and political leadership are mixed. Both find advantage in encouraging public support for militant Islamists “over there.” Both find it useful to portray the Islamist narrative as a response to American hegemony. And both are inclined to accommodate groups that claim an Islamic mantle in the form of peace deals (e.g., the army), *Shariah* concessions (e.g., the liberal ANP), and even preemptive strategies (e.g., Shahbaz Sharif’s suggestion that the Taliban find another, less sympathetic target).

The future of Islamism in Pakistan, at least in the near- and mid-term, is likely to depend in large part on which groups the state chooses to support, and how it differentiates (to itself and to the public) between those that are legitimate and those that are not. These decisions, by and large, will be shaped by the extent to which Islamist groups threaten the military and political elites.

### **Fragmentation**

A second factor in determining Pakistan’s course is the likelihood of sub-national fragmentation. As an ethnically and linguistically diverse state, Pakistan has long been concerned about its cohesiveness and integrity. In the 1950s and 1960s it dealt with agitation by the Afghan government and Pashtuns within the NWFP for a greater “Pashtunistan” that would reach from eastern Afghanistan to the Indus river. In the 1960s it faced an uprising of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan — a consequence of near-sighted linguistic and political dominance by West Pakistan. It has dealt with ethnic Baluch nationalism for decades, and more recently, there have been calls for a “Seraikistan” to be carved out of Punjab and Sindh, and a Hazara province out of Paktunkhawana Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Can the state contain these fissiparous forces? With the exception of 1971, when West Pakistani elites disastrously calculated that they could crush an uprising by half the country, Pakistan’s leaders have been able to contain nationalist movements, albeit harshly at times. Pashtun nationalism, though troubling, never represented a pressing strategic threat to the state. Baluch movements were a thorn in the side of the military, but have been diminished with a combination of bribery and brutality. The demand for a Saraiki province has gained little

momentum. And the Hazarawals demanding a province, allied as they are with the weak PML-Q, hold little political leverage.

While these examples of ethno-linguistic nationalism seem unlikely to flare up in ways that would seriously endanger the state, they could nonetheless undermine the legitimacy of the government and the army. Somewhat more likely is the possibility that Pashtun nationalism would be revived — not from the left, in the tradition of the secular Awami National Party, but from the right, using the rhetoric and organization of new Pakistani Taliban groups. The Pakistani Taliban have emerged as a new vehicle for the expression of Pashtun grievance, but have been careful to portray themselves solely in religious rather than ethnic terms. This is perhaps because they consider religious mobilization to be more effective than ethnic mobilization; or perhaps because their ranks are increasingly supplemented by Punjabis from Kashmir- and sectarian-oriented organizations.

If the Pakistani or American militaries expand their operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the FATA over the coming years, Taliban groups could leverage local discontent to promote a hybrid religious-ethnic narrative of resistance against the Pakistani government. This would not necessarily “splinter” the Pakistani state, but could result in deep antagonism toward the government, and the loss of peripheral areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and Baluchistan to Taliban control.

### **Blowback from Attacks**

The third factor is the likelihood of another major attack on the United States or India by organizations linked to Pakistan. This may not fit the typical definition of a “core variable” underlying Pakistan’s future development, but it is arguably a fundamental one. No other factor could so dramatically shake up Pakistan’s relationship with its key interlocutors — the United States and India — and spark internal instability.

A Pakistan-linked attack on the United States admittedly has a ripped-from-the-headlines quality, but it is one of the few events that could precipitate a major restructuring of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Nothing else is likely to be a game-changer in the bilateral relationship since America is wary of participating in negotiations over Kashmir, a nuclear deal for Pakistan is improbable (or would be heavily diluted), and American efforts to extract concessions from India on issues of its military posture or activities in Afghanistan would almost certainly fall flat.

By contrast, a high-casualty attack on the United States could spark any number of responses: ultimatums to the Pakistani military about dealing decisively with militant networks, unilateral drone strikes across Pakistan, overt American troop movements into the tribal areas, or threats to withhold military supplies and economic aid. Such actions could spur new avenues of cooperation, particularly if militant groups had also increased their targeting of the Pakistani state; however, they could also push Pakistan in dangerous new directions, encouraging both elected and military elites to cast about for alternatives to an American partnership. (While in today’s geopolitical environment they may find few takers, in ten to twenty years China or Russia may be willing to forge new relationships.)

We have already seen, on multiple occasions, what can come of Pakistan-linked attacks within India. The 2001 attack on the Indian parliament brought India and Pakistan close to war. Following the 2008 Lashkar-e-Toiba attack in Mumbai, India demonstrated remarkable restraint, leaving the United States to lean on Pakistan (which it did, rather unsuccessfully). Future attacks

— when, not if, they happen — could easily bring both countries to war. With a more open and aggressive media than at any previous time in Pakistan’s history, a major war could serve as a referendum on the Pakistani military.— either buttressing its legitimacy as the *de facto* guarantor of the state or exposing its recklessness in engaging in asymmetric warfare against India.

### **Futures**

There are good reasons to reject the most dire predictions of Pakistan’s future. It may be a dysfunctional state, but it is not a failed one. The bureaucracy, for all its problems, retains not inconsiderable capacity and expertise. The army, as guarantor of the state, is relatively professional and disciplined. The political class, venal as it may be, generally holds to basic democratic principles (though not with respect to internal party workings). The media, though often shrill, is increasingly influential and confrontational. And the public at large, while quick to embrace an abstract Islamist narrative, has shown little appetite for strict *Shariah* or violence within Pakistan in the name of religion.

These are positive factors, and ones which should temper any assessment of Pakistan that is uniformly gloomy. Keeping these and other relatively stabilizing factors in mind, however, there seem to be three scenarios that could play out in the next five to seven years; each, while somewhat pessimistic, falls within the realm of the possible, and points to the prospect of new dynamics in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.

#### **A Center-Right Government**

One relatively likely scenario would be the emergence of a center-right government, such as one led by the PML-Nawaz, that constrained but did not reject cooperation with the United States. The contours of such a government are not difficult to imagine. It would run on a mildly Islamist platform— promising Islamic values, protection of Pakistani sovereignty, and less deference to the West. It would ally in coalition with Islamist parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, and garner informal electoral support by Sipah-e-Sahaba and other militant groups in Punjab. It would, along with the religious parties, adopt mild but troubling *Shariah* measures at the provincial level, enabled by the devolution reforms of the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment. Moreover, it would seek to limit the scope of U.S. operations in Pakistan and publicly challenge American drone strikes.

Behind the scenes, Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States would not change dramatically, but the presence of a center-right government would give the army an excuse for acting haltingly on American demands, and deflecting decisions into the parliamentary process. Compared with its center-left predecessors, such a government would be considerably more resistant to military or paramilitary operations against militant groups within Pakistan, and would have a particularly hard time taking action against popular social welfare organizations that are linked to, or serve as a front for, extremist groups.

#### **Overreach**

A second potential future emerges in the wake of a major attack on the United States, for which there was clear evidence of complicity by organizations in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan, facing another “Armitage moment” of decision, weighs its options and realizes it would face severe military and economic losses if it were to break off its strategic relationship with the United States. Neither China nor Saudi Arabia could provide an adequate substitute for

U.S. largesse. Then, as after 9/11, it chooses to cooperate with a new wave of American demands to crack down on militant groups.

The American demands are sweeping, and include insistence on actions against popular social welfare groups affiliated with militant organizations—groups known for their *jihadi* activities in Kashmir, as well as large scale military operations in the tribal areas. The Americans also take the prerogative to expand the area of operations of their drone strikes and begin using them on a near-daily basis against training camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, southern Punjab and the Pashtun slums in Karachi.

The combination of the Pakistani army's reluctant actions against militant groups, and the unilateral American response, provokes an intense reaction in the country. The elected government, unable to construct a narrative to explain its actions to the public, and unwilling to take the blame for unpopular army activities, is consumed by a wave of resignations. There are days of violent street protests, led by a broad-based political coalition opposed to "violations of Pakistani sovereignty." The bar associations openly question the decision of the government to cooperate with the American requests, and the Supreme Court, using its sweeping *suo moto* powers, calls serving army officers from GHQ to justify the arrest of Jamaat-ud-Dawa activists, and explain the Americans' use of drones in Karachi and Bahawalpur.

Sensing an opportunity amidst the chaos, Pakistani Taliban groups led by the Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan begin a coordinated campaign against the government in Islamabad, which the Taliban accuses of being subservient to the Americans. In an attempt to take the Pakistani military off guard, teams of Taliban soldiers advance simultaneously into a number of settled districts in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab, setting up "shadow nazims" and driving out civil servants and police forces. They declare that areas under the control of the Pakistani government are *dar-ul harb*, and promise to expand the *Shariah* in accordance with the wishes of the people.

By the time that the Americans realize they may have over-played their hand — demanding too much, too quickly — the government's credibility has been severely diminished, with anti-Americanism raised to a fevered pitch, and the Taliban have made limited but significant territorial gains across the frontier.

### **A More Political Taliban**

After several years of ineffective counterinsurgency operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the U.S. eventually drew down its military presence significantly in 2012, and found a face-saving solution whereby a Taliban-affiliated political party entered into a power-sharing agreement in Kabul. It was an unpleasant situation, but some measure of calm had returned to the country, and Pakistan was relatively pleased that pro-Islamabad Pashtuns were again at the helm in Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, even the half-hearted political victory by the Taliban in Afghanistan encouraged Pakistani Taliban groups to press for concessions within Pakistan. Some Taliban factions, particularly in Waziristan, kept up their violent confrontation with the Pakistani army. But others, emboldened by their brothers in Afghanistan, began a political shrewd strategy of declaring *Shariah* in pockets of Pakistan, making a show of force, and then extracting political concessions from the government, leaving them in control of those regions.

The Pakistani Taliban also learned, again from their brothers in Afghanistan, that "kindler, gentler" Taliban rule — less exploitative and more focused on providing quick justice

— was more likely to take root in local communities, and less likely to provoke the Pakistani army. They began partnering with social welfare organizations (linked, naturally, with militant outfits and religious parties) to deliver basic social services in areas under their control.

The army, for its part, felt relatively secure about the evolving situation in Afghanistan, and saw little reason to act decisively against these Taliban groups that were increasingly providing a wide range of services to disenfranchised communities. But as the Taliban became more sophisticated, they gradually but consistently encroached on the influence of the government — first only in the border areas, but eventually in pockets across the country. The slow, seemingly-benign expansion of these Taliban groups had happened without much fanfare, but before long had resulted in the weakening of the state, and the creation of pockets of militant safe-haven in virtually every region of the country.



# Moeed Yusuf: Youth and the Future

Hardly anyone can question the importance Pakistan holds for the future of global security. Pakistan's tremendous importance has spurred voluminous research. However, a majority of the writings are narrowly focused on immediate concerns regarding Pakistan's role in the War on Terror. This microscopic focus holds little value in understanding Pakistan's potential trajectory beyond 3-5 years. Virtually no one has attempted to understand the perceptions and outlook of the real custodians of Pakistan's future; i.e. its young generation. This is an obvious void, as it will be the orientation of Pakistani youth, not present-day leaders, which will determine what kind of state Pakistan transforms into over the next decade or two.

This paper focuses on Pakistani youth's perceptions and preferences, and attempts to analyze them in light of the socio-economic realities their country is likely to be faced with over the projected period. The premise is that youth preferences will be tempered by the surrounding socio-economic realities, and the manner in which this dynamic plays out will ultimately determine what Pakistan looks like more than a decade from now. Much of the following discussion benefits from fresh data obtained from three recent high profile surveys which seek to capture opinions of the youth on various personal, community, national, and international issues. We begin by analyzing selective aspects these data sets and conjecture where the current mood of Pakistani youth will lead their country. Next, we look at the projections for Pakistan's performance across certain key socio-economic variables. Third, we posit just how the identified socio-economic trends and youth preferences are likely to impact each other and where this dynamic is likely to lead Pakistan. Finally, nodes for policy intervention are identified for Pakistan to progress towards becoming a stable, prosperous state.

## Why Bother About the Youth?

A focus on the youth bears special significance in Pakistan's case given that the country possesses one of the largest youth populations in the world. Pakistan is a country of 180 million, 101.95 million (59 percent) of which are young men and women below the age of 24. In proportional terms, this is second only to Yemen. Another 13.95 million fall within the 25-29 year bracket. This brings the under-30 tally to 67.1 percent of the total population. What is more, Pakistan is only half way through its democratic transition (see figure 1) and the current rate of 3.8 births per female is set to carry Pakistan's youth bulge well beyond 2025.<sup>145</sup> By 2030, Pakistan's under-24 population is still projected to be 51.4 percent of the total.<sup>146</sup> The sheer numerical strength of the Pakistan's upcoming generation then implies that the direction in which the critical mass of this segment chooses to direct their country will inevitably become the destiny of one of the world's most populated states.


Figure 1: Pakistan's Democratic Transition

Figure 2: Pakistan's Youth Population


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<sup>145</sup> Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2006-07* (Islamabad, 2007), p.190.

<sup>146</sup> United Nations, "World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision," Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, <<http://esa.un.org/unpp>>; United Nations, "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision," Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, <<http://esa.un.org/unpp>>.



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision



Source: The Population Council (based on official population data) Population Database, <http://esa.un.org/unpp/>

### The minds of young Pakistanis

This section summarizes youth opinions as identified by three recent national surveys: the British Council’s “Pakistan: The Next Generation”, the Herald’s “Youth Speak”, and the Center for Civic Education’s “Civic Health of Pakistani Youth”.<sup>147</sup> Table 1 provides a summary of select questions from the three surveys. Rather than presenting data from each survey separately, we have created seven broad functional categories, each creating information from one or more surveys. The discussion that follows, largely based on the results depicted in Table 1., analyzes each functional category and posits what kind of Pakistan these youth perceptions and preferences may bring about.

Table 1: Youth Preferences in Pakistan (based on select data from the three quoted surveys)

Sr. #	Issue	Yes (%)	No (%)	Other observations
1	What do you see yourself as**			
	A Muslim	75		
	Citizen of Pakistan	14		
2	Proud to be Pakistani*	79	12	Figures from Balochistan are the bleakest  Weak positive correlation between religiosity and pride
3	Would you leave Pakistan if you had a chance*	75	23	
4	Will next five years be better*	79	n/a	
5	Optimistic about finding employment*	57	16	Education positively correlated with optimism about finding job
6	Pakistan as an Islamic state*	64	22 (secular)	Level of religiosity and type of education correlated with this desire

<sup>147</sup> The British Council, “Pakistan: The Next Generation,” November 2009; Herald, “Youth Speak,” Vol.41, No.1, January 2010, pp.52-105; Center for Civic Education, “Civic Health of Pakistani Youth,” 2009. All three surveys were conducted at the national level. The British Council survey drew a sample of 1226 for young men and women between ages 18-29. The Herald’s sample was 845 and the target age was 15-25 years. The Center for Civic Education decided on a scope which was narrower than that of the other two exercises; the survey focused mainly on questions relating to civic education. Its sample size was 1855 and the targeted age bracket was high-teens-30.

	Issue	Yes (%)	No (%)	Other observations
7	Harsh punishments like flogging, cutting of limbs, etc*	33	47	Even some who are not strictly observant support these
8	Level of religiosity*	81 (very or moderately)	15 (rarely)	
9	Importance of religious sect*	86 (very or moderately)	11 (unimportant)	
10	Importance of ethnic identity*	86 (important /somewhat important)	9 (unimportant)	
<b>Pakistan's major problems*</b>				
11	Inflation	40		
	Unemployment	20		
	Terrorism	14		
12	Blame for Pakistan's political problems*			
	Politicians	37		
	US	25		
	Military	19		Baloch tend to blame military much more than other provinces do
13	Blame for Pakistan's economic problems*			
	Politicians	41		
	US	23		
	Military	13		
<b>Popularity of political parties*</b>				
14	PPP	28		No party's voter bank associated clearly with the secular segment of society 59% of PPP voters want Pakistan to be an Islamic state
	PMLN	13		
	MQM	8		
15	Preference for democracy over military rule*	76	21	Type of preferred information source correlated with preference
16	Confidence in institutions**			
	Military	60+		
	Religious institutions	40+		
	National government	<10		
17	Do you vote***	52.8		
18	Confidence in power of vote***	61.8		
19	Participation in political activities***	21.9	78.1	
<b>Most popular activities*</b>				
20	TV	51		Top three choices may vary in relative importance but they are the same across the socioeconomic spectrum On TV, political news is most watched by 24-30 year olds
	Reading	45		
	Going out with friends	33		
21	Most popular hang out place*			
	Home	66		
22	Who are you closest to*			
	Parents	52		The richest cohort closer to friends
23	Is it ok to be friends with members of the opposite sex*	31	47	Females less likely to approve More religiously oriented less likely to approve
24	Should women work*	61	23	Inversely correlated with number of children desired
25	Arranged marriage*	52	31	

	Issue	Yes (%) (yes/may be)	No (%)	Other observations
26	Philanthropy***			
	Religious organizations	21		
	Social organizations	14.8		
	Political organizations	7.2		
27	Freedom to express views freely***			
	Friends	70		
	Internet	30		
	Educational Institute	34		
	Religious institute	5		
28	Is extremism rising***	69.6		
29	Can youth help counter terrorism***	85.4		
30	Should Pakistan Army be fighting in FATA*	42	33	The rich are far more likely to support the action
31	Whose war is the War on Terror in FATA*			
	US	51		The more educated Pakistanis are more likely to blame the United States
	Both	26		
	Pakistan	18		
32	Should Pakistan negotiate with the Taliban*	47	29	
33	What should US do in Afghanistan*			
	Pullout immediately	34		
	Pullout with financial and political assistance	16		
34	Are madrassas radicalizing youth*	44	25	Level of religiosity inversely correlated with choice
35	Reasons for violence and terror in Pakistan**			
	Injustice	28		
	Poor economic conditions	27		
	Lack of education and awareness	20		
Reading of National History vis-à-vis India				
36	Who started the 1965 War*			
	India	75		
	Pakistan	13		
37	How did West Pakistan treat East Pakistanis*			
	Don't know	40		
	Unfairly	38		
	Fairly	19		
38	Who is responsible for the Kargil conflict*			
	India	38		
	Pakistan	22		
	US	25		
39	Do you think Kashmir should be*.....			
	Part of Pakistan	50		
	Part of India	2		
	Independent	40		
40	Closer economic ties between Pakistan and India*	60	18	
41	Should there be an open visa regime between Pakistan and India*	45	37	

Key: \* Questions from Herald's survey; \*\* Questions from British Council's survey; \*\*\* Questions from Center for Civic Education's survey.

## What Does the Data Show?

### Viewing Pakistan

Pakistani youth remain patriotic at the core but their religious identity supersedes their affinity with the country. In terms of their trust in Pakistan to provide for them, the youth display a rather schizophrenic mindset whereby they realize that desire for upward economic mobility may best be served by emigrating (75 percent would prefer to), yet they retain a sense of optimism about their future in Pakistan that defies most projections. Seventy-five percent believe that the next five years will be better and majority expects to find a job; the more educated are more hopeful about this. This schizophrenic mindset may perhaps be explained as a coping mechanism for those who may like to leave Pakistan but do not have the ability to do so.

This implies a future Pakistan where:

- Religious and national identities remain intrinsically linked
- Difficulties and challenges are psychologically (not operationally) neutralized by a coping mechanism that provides hope and resilience even when it defies reality

### Role of Religion

Data reinforces the fact that separation of church and state is a misnomer for Pakistani youth. Religion remains central in the lives of Pakistanis, with 81 percent of the youth being strictly or moderately observant. Sixty-four percent seek an Islamic state; the support for this wanes only among a minority of youth educated in elite schools. Strong support for Islam's role notwithstanding, unpacking this notion is not easy. Existing literature on the subject shows that there is no agreement on just what kind of Islamic state Pakistan should be. In fact, the surveys quoted here hint at the failure of the Pakistani state to impose Islam – the same Islam for everyone – as a unifying bond. The youth seem to lend tremendous importance to their religious sects, an awareness that has led to more discord than agreement in Pakistan in the past. Moreover, ethnic identities continue to be extremely important – 86 percent say it is 'important' or 'somewhat important' – despite the state's efforts to subdue these divisions by imposing Islam as the overarching identity.

Next, so acute has been the deterioration in the country's service delivery, dispensation of justice, and law and order that the youth are losing trust in the efficacy of the current system altogether. Although a minority, a substantial 33 percent supports harsh punishments that are derived from the traditional Islamic narrative but are antithetical to the modern human rights discourse. Important to note is the fact that this preference transcends levels of individual religiosity. As the Herald survey remarks in its comments, "for a significant chunk of young people disillusioned with the country's judicial system, these punishments have gone beyond being religious tenets and may have become representations of justice itself."<sup>148</sup>

This implies a future Pakistan which is:

- Highly conservative– this is not to be confused with extremism
- Aware of its sectarian identity
- Ethnically aware
- Increasingly frustrated and dissatisfied with service delivery and dispensation of justice

<sup>148</sup> Herald, "Youth Speaks," p.57.

## **Pakistan's Problems**

As surprising as it may be for Western audiences, terrorism is a distant third when it comes to rank ordering the problems Pakistani youth think their country is facing today. Their two top concerns, inflation and unemployment, strike at the heart of governance and economic management and put a high premium on government performance. Arguably then, the youth are likely to become increasingly impatient if economic pressures on their everyday lives are not eased in years to come. Already, politicians remain the single most loathed group in the minds of the youth. They are considered to be most culpable in bringing political and economic problems to bear on average Pakistanis. Rather interestingly, the military is perceived as being less culpable than both the politicians and the United States, which is ranked after the politicians in terms of exacerbating Pakistan's political and economic problems. Anti-U.S. sentiments permeate deep among the Pakistani youth – even more interesting is the fact that the more educated tend to be more critical of the US – and are not likely to be reversed easily.

This implies a future Pakistan which:

- Demands better performance from its leadership
- Simultaneously remains impatient with the failures of this discredited leadership
- Is avidly anti-US

## **The political system**

There are mixed feelings about the Pakistani political system. Unsuccessful bouts of military rule seem to have convinced the youth that democracy is the way forward for Pakistan. A clear majority supports a democratic dispensation. That said, the longstanding puzzle associated with Pakistani voting behavior holds true for the youth as well: despite the importance of religion and support for an Islamic state, the youth favor mainstream, 'secular' political parties. The PPP remains the most popular outfit followed by PMLN and MQM. No Islamic party is featured among the favorites; national, regional, and ethnic parties are decisively more popular than Islamic ones.

The above is not to be taken to mean that the Pakistan military has been delegitimized in the eyes of the youth. Despite support for democracy, the trust in democratic institutions is far lower than in the military. Over 60 percent express confidence in the military – the poorer you are the less likely you are to buy into the merits of democracy – while more than 40 percent do so in religious institutions. Institutions associated with the national government receive support from less than 10 percent. Such a mindset leaves room open for an acceptable political role for the military, whether from behind the scenes or through direct intervention. This is one of the contradictions that Pakistani citizens have failed to resolve for years; the youth seem to have fallen into the same trap.

Perhaps most alarming is how averse Pakistani youth are to direct political activity. Despite being ardent followers of national politics, the data reveals dismal figures regarding youth participation in politics and their inroads into structures of power. Nearly half the youth do not vote, about 40 percent have no confidence in the utility of their vote, and a shocking 78 percent are categorical in their rejection of active politics. Less than one percent sees an active political role as desirable. Even philanthropic tendencies, otherwise strong, gravitate towards religious and social organizations, not political ones. This throws up yet another contradiction—Pakistani youth desire change, and are pessimistic about the ability or willingness of the current

political class to bring about positive change, but they are averse to becoming part of the political spectrum themselves. They remain politically disillusioned and disengaged.

This implies a future Pakistan which:

- Is supportive of democracy but associates some level of hope with the military
- Is ruled by moderate political parties
- Has youth who are politically disengaged but remain desperate for political change

### **Lifestyle**

Pakistan's society remains traditional at its core. Although trends are changing, social life of majority (66 percent) of young men and women still revolves around the house. Apart from the highest socio-economic strata, they report being closest to their parents (52 percent even when the highest strata is included). Arranged marriages are popular. Pakistani youth – especially females – are averse to friendship with members of the opposite sex, and although majority support working women, this is inversely correlated with the number of children desired. Since childbearing is an important consideration, in reality, a majority of the women end up staying at home. Most youth also feel constrained in expressing their views freely with those to whom they are closest (i.e. parents) and can only do so with friends. Religious institutions are one of the least hospitable in terms of allowing freedom of expression; only five percent of the respondents in the Center for Civic Education's survey believed they could express themselves freely at religious institutions.

One of the most profound changes in the lives of the Pakistani youth has been the advent of free media. Television has surpassed radio, newspapers and books to become the principal means of information for the country's rising generation. While entertainment remains popular, youth between the ages of 24 and 30 prefer to consume political news. Moreover, an overwhelming majority prefers the vernacular press and media, with English falling at a distant second. There is ample evidence in the disaggregated data from the studied surveys (not mentioned in Table 1) that the type of information received from TV has a deep impact on youth perceptions. The preference for particular channels is strongly correlated to youth views on, among others, religiosity, political dispensation, and key foreign policy questions like Kashmir.<sup>149</sup> Television thus stands out one of the principal avenues to influence young minds in Pakistan.

This implies a future Pakistan which:

- Is traditional and while modernizing (according to the Western lens), remains obsessed with holding on to traditional values and life styles
- Possesses TV as the principal source of information; it holds the power to mold views and opinions as it desires

### **Terrorism/Radicalization**

A majority of young Pakistanis see extremism as a growing concern and almost 86 percent believe that they can and should play their role to stem the tide. The majority sees madaris as part of the problem although the view is not as simplistic as is often portrayed in western discourse. A slim majority is supportive of the Pakistan military's operations in the tribal areas – the richer you are the more likely you are to support the operations, perhaps an indication

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid.,” p.59.

that you have more to lose – but use of force still remains unpopular overall. The majority believes that the Pakistani state should negotiate with the Taliban. This sentiment holds irrespective of at which end of the political spectrum youth lie. Sizable proportions of supporters of even the mainstream and ethnic parties like PPP and MQM are for negotiations.<sup>150</sup> Underlying this belief are two perceptions evident from the survey findings: (i) the root cause for terrorism in Pakistan is injustice as well as a failure in governance and delivering services that cannot be tackled by use of force; and (ii) Pakistan is ultimately fighting America's war (51 percent believe this to be the case), and the situation will get better if America packs up in Afghanistan. The latter suggests significant uptake of the popular narrative perpetrated on Pakistani TV channels in addition, of course, to the failure of Western policies to win the 'hearts and minds'.

This implies a future Pakistan which is:

- Anti-extremist but one that still remains opposed to heavy handed solutions to the problem unless they become an absolute necessity
- Susceptible to conspiracy theories and popular discourse that strikes an emotional cord even if it defies strict strategic logic

### **Reading of National History vis-à-vis India**

When it comes to national history especially vis-à-vis India, Pakistan's history textbooks seem to have retained their influence. Over 50 percent still wants Kashmir to be part of Pakistan while another 40 percent supports an independent Kashmir. Questions regarding India-Pakistan wars receive factually inaccurate responses. Majority blames India for initiating the 1965 war as well as for Kargil, and as many as 40 percent pledge ignorance on how the Pakistani state treated East Pakistanis. That said, a positive trend is obvious from the fact that a comfortable majority supports closer economic ties and a visa-free regime with India. There is an obvious desire to move on despite what they believe are Indian transgressions of the past.

This implies a future Pakistan which is:

- Influenced by state-sponsored historical narratives

There is one other important conclusion that can be drawn from these surveys. Findings do not bode well for the Pakistani federation in the coming years. The much discussed discontent among the lesser provinces has carried over to the next generation. Baloch youth stand out as most distraught with the federation. Except for a minority, they are least enthusiastic about being part of Pakistan and are least proud to be Pakistanis. They are also the keenest to leave Pakistan if given an opportunity, and they oppose the military and state institutions more staunchly than youth in other provinces.

This implies a future Pakistan where:

- Barring institutional transformation, today's youth will inherit a federation held together tenuously and where the fundamental terms of co-existence remain indeterminate

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p.88.




## The Realities Youth will Have to Contend With

The previous section analyzes youth opinions and posits what the future Pakistan may look like if youth were to carry their current sentiments into their adult lives. In reality, however, what they can achieve for Pakistan will be impacted by the socio-economic realities with which they have to contend. Relevant literature argues that a youth bulge can act both as a blessing or a curse depending on how youth energies are challenged by societies. Empirical evidence suggests that among other factors, youth outcomes are strongly correlated to socio-economic conditions, educational standards, access to avenues for social and economic mobilization, and cultural polarization. The discussion below outlines the current projections for Pakistan in these areas in order to predict the future environmental conditions under which these youths will live.

### Education


Educational attainment is the fundamental prerequisite for a country looking to channel youth energies positively. Unfortunately, trends in Pakistani education remain worrisome. Access to education indicators have improved constantly, and youth literacy at 68.9 percent is 15 percentage points higher than adult literacy (see figure 3). Yet, in absolute terms, these figures are abysmal. Gender disparity is high as well; a mere 58.8 percent of young females are literate as compared to 78.5 percent males. In the coming years, quantitative education indicators such as literary rates and school attendance are projected to improve. The goal of universal Net Enrollment and Primary Enrollment rates may be farfetched but there is growing consensus that Pakistan would have gone beyond MTDf targets by 2015 (see Figure 4). This will leave a lesser – still very high in absolute terms – number of children out of school and average schooling years would rise. The gender gap may also begin to shrink, but here the prognosis is less optimistic. Since present adult female literacy levels are very low, and mother's education is found to be strongly correlated with daughters' education,<sup>151</sup> the next generation of girls is at a disadvantage.

Figure 3: Adult and Youth Literacy trends



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, [http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143&IF\\_Language=eng](http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143&IF_Language=eng)

Figure 4: Primary Education Trend and Targets



Source: Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution, *Pakistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2005*, Planning Commission, Islamabad, 2005

Quality of education is an even greater concern. The projected quantitative improvements will largely remain ineffectual if the educated youth are not trained well-enough to find a respectable place in the economy. Pakistan's education system is stratified such that only the urban-based, elite private schools catering to less than 15 percent of school-going children

<sup>151</sup> Minhaj ul Haque, "Discrimination Starts at Home," p.2, [http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/Pak\\_AYP004.pdf](http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/Pak_AYP004.pdf). The analysis is based on results from the Population Council's Survey, "Adolescents and Youth in Pakistan 2001-02: A National Representative Survey," project sponsored by UNICEF, 2002.

exhibit decent quality. Quality of the public education system and the religious madaris remains abysmal. This is a potentially explosive situation since over 60 percent of the youth attend public schooling.<sup>152</sup>

The danger from the stratification of the education system extends beyond mere qualitative concerns. There is a socio-economic dimension to the equation as well. Madaris cater to the poorest, public schools to the lower-middle class, and private schools to the upper-middle and elite segments of society. There are also differences in the messages they impart to their students. Madaris produce graduates with narrow-minded conservative (though not necessarily radical) ideological bases, the public school graduates have only a slightly more tolerant vision, and private school students are fairly liberal in their thinking. The differences in their outlook are so severe that the elite kids harbor extreme disdain for their counterparts while poorer youth see the elite as surrogates of the West whose extravagant lifestyles are much to blame for economic inequality in Pakistan. Over time, youth in the three systems have become isolated from each other to the point that they can, and do, pass through the school system without having to undertake any meaningful interaction with each other.<sup>153</sup>

Virtually all these qualitative problems are recognized, and education reform policies discuss them in detail. The forward looking strategy, however, is realistic and acknowledges that a restructuring of the education system will be a gradual process. The future then entails improved access to education but the problem remains that over 65 percent of school-going children in Pakistan who attend public schools and madaris are still being poorly educated. Moreover, they will continue to develop divergent outlooks across the three parallel systems and remain antagonistic towards each other's vision. All this points to much internal societal friction and polarization.

This implies a future Pakistan where:

- Quantity of education and gender disparity in this realm improve, but overall levels still leave much to be desired
- Overwhelming majority receives poor quality education
- The three parallel education systems create divergent world visions which are difficult to reconcile
- Different socio-economic strata are increasingly isolated from each other and continue to harbor disdain and apathy for each other
- The society is increasingly polarized


### Opportunities for Economic Security

Adequate economic opportunities commensurate with the level of educational attainment are the single most important requirement for youth energies to be challenged

<sup>152</sup> Federal Bureau of Statistics, <<http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publ>

<sup>153</sup> For a slightly more detailed discussion on Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy," Ar

Figure 5: Unemployment (% of Total Labor Force)



Source: World Development Indicators, 2009

positively. Pakistan is likely to fall short on this count too. Although Pakistan’s macroeconomic growth over the years has been respectable (average growth has been just above five percent over the past two decades), the task of keeping up with Pakistan’s burgeoning labor force is too monumental. Official estimates suggest that Pakistan will have to grow at a rate of 6.35 percent on average to keep unemployment at the current, rather impressive level of 5.32 percent (see figure 5) but that the expected growth over the next five years, at best, will be 5.5 percent. In fact, any attempt to push growth rates above 5.45 percent will be unsustainable and is expected to result in a balance of payments crisis at some point.<sup>154</sup> Unemployment is thus certain to grow in the medium term.

Pakistan’s natural resource crunch may make it difficult to achieve India or China-like growth rates even over the longer term. Pakistan will be an increasingly resource-starved country in the coming years. The water table is falling by 2 to 3 meters in some regions. The renewable water per capita halved in the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and is projected to reach just above the ‘water scarcity’ level of 1000 per capita cubic meters of internal renewable water by 2025.<sup>155</sup> Energy shortages are presently causing havoc with the economy. Although the current shortfall of 6,000 MW is expected to be overcome in 2-4 years, to create a sustainable policy, Pakistan will have to invest in a variety of local ventures in addition to finding dependable and feasible import options. This in itself is a tall order and requires huge amount of investment in the next decade.

Pakistan’s economic problems are compounded when one considers that its growth model has persistently benefited the rich more than the poor. Even though poverty levels have declined in the past decade – a little less than a quarter of the population is now below the poverty line. The ratio of the highest to the lowest income quintiles has increased persistently since 1970 (see table 2) and stands at a staggering 4.2.<sup>156</sup> Malnourishment has also become another measure of the deprivation among the marginalized segments of society because it has increased since the mid-1990s despite the fact that Pakistan has traditionally been a food secure country. . Using a Youth Development Index (YDI), Faizunnisa and Ikram (2004) argue that youth development in Pakistan differs significantly depending on gender, location, and socio-economic status.<sup>157</sup> Youth from higher socio-economic strata have a development score that is twice as high as those in the lower socio-economic strata.

Table 2: Trends in Inequality in Pakistan

Years	Rural	Urban	Overall
1963-64 to 1966-67	↓	↑	↓
1966-67 to 1968-69	↓	↓	↓
1968-69 to 1970-71	↓	↓	↓
1970-71 to 1971-72	↑	↑	↑
1971-72 to 1978-79	↑	↑	↑
1978-79 to 1984-85	↑	↓	↑
1984-85 to 1987-88	↑	↑	↑

<sup>154</sup> Planning Commission, *Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy for Pakistan*, final report of the Panel of Economists, Government of Pakistan, April 2010, p.26.

<sup>155</sup> C. Christine Fair, et al., “Demographics and Security: The Contrasting Cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No.4, Summer 2005, p.66.

<sup>156</sup> Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2007-08*, 2008, p.218.

<sup>157</sup> Azeema Faizunnisa and Atif Ikram, “Determinants of Youth Development in Pakistan,” *Lahore Journal of Economics*, Vo.9, No.2, 2004, pp.125-26.

1987-88 to 1992-93	↑	Stagnant	↑
1992-93 to 1998-99	↑	↑	↑
1998-99 to 2005-06	↑	↑	↑

Source: Planning Commission, Medium-Term Development Imperatives and Strategy for Pakistan, final report of the Panel of Economists, Government of Pakistan, April 2010, p.156.

In light of the fact that the richest 20 percent of the population are continuing to get richer and possess virtually all luxuries, the poor youth are bound to feel increasingly alienated from the system. With unemployment and underemployment tipped to continue nagging the economic equation, Pakistani youth, especially the non-elite are likely to face an uphill battle in matching their optimism about finding employment and having a better future reflected in the quoted surveys. Rising inequality implies high levels of underemployment for the young who possess relatively less marketable skills. Children of the poor, with generally little access to the corridors of power and already disadvantaged due to the poor skill set developed in public schools, are invariably the first ones to be denied respectable employment. A disproportionate amount of entry level positions thus end up going to the already rich, which leaves others from lower socio-economic classes underemployed. For educated (even if poorly) young men, underemployment ends up having just as much of an alienating effect as unemployment. This is the fate the underprivileged segment of Pakistani youth is staring in the face.

This implies a future Pakistan with:

- Higher unemployment levels (it may still be low in absolute terms)
- Growing underemployment
- Increasing resource scarcity
- Higher inequality levels

#### *The disconnect between expectation and reality*

The challenges faced by the Pakistani state in the education sector have been discussed. Pakistani parents and youth, however, are increasingly cognizant of the importance of education. Parents are generally supportive of facilitating education for their children. This is true even for poor households among whom it is becoming increasingly common to save or take loans for children's schooling. The youth themselves show great interest in obtaining education. According to a Population Council Survey (2002) 80 percent of the male respondents and over 70 percent of their female counterparts expressed a desire to be educated at secondary and tertiary levels.<sup>158</sup> The more recent surveys confirm this sentiment.

Theoretically, a strong desire for education ought to be considered a positive attribute. A deeper look however suggests that educational attainment is a double-edged sword. Churning out youth who are educated and, therefore, expectant of a bright future without providing them requisite avenues for employment and economic gains can backfire. This is especially true if like Pakistani youth, the majority desires to work provided suitable opportunities are available.<sup>159</sup>

The on ground realities hint at an impending crisis. If the quality of public and rural private sector education and the madaris remains poor, and the labor market continues to favor children of the elite, the disconnect between expectation and reality could result in added

<sup>158</sup> Population Council, "Adolescents and Youth," p.56.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., pp.67-68.

discontent among the youth. Already, the quoted surveys point to educated youth feeling extremely disgruntled by the lack of meritocracy and absence of a level playing field. Half of working youth surveyed by the British Council had taken more than six months to find a job, and many pointed to corruption and discrimination as disrupting their work lives.<sup>160</sup> One can find ample empirical validation of the expectation-reality disconnect on the streets of urban towns in Pakistan as well. Increasingly, reasonably eloquent, post-secondary degree-holders are seeking financial help; i.e. begging. The author's discussions with such individuals reveal great contempt for a state that cannot provide opportunities. There is also envy and resentment against the elite who are believed to have deliberately created entry barriers for the poor, and there is a sense of alienation from the larger society.


This implies a future Pakistan where:

- Expectations of those entering the workforce remain unfulfilled
- The underprivileged may get increasingly disillusioned and disgruntled with the system

### Migration

Figure 6: Total Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 population)

Migration is often seen as one of the obvious outlets for countries which have a bloated labor force and are unable to provide sufficient resources internally. Emigration eases pressures on domestic resources and provides a potent avenue for foreign exchange as overseas workers send remittances home. Traditionally, Pakistan has utilized the migration option to good effect with thousands of unskilled and semi-skilled Pakistanis finding employment in the Gulf and the skilled force exploring avenues in Europe and North America. With the labor force projected to grow and socio-economic problems at home lingering, Pakistan is desperate to export labor. As already mentioned, the majority of Pakistan's young population is willing to leave the country as well. All this however is academic in the face of projected trends. Net migration rates are set to decline after a rather successful period in terms of labor export between 2000-2010. The migration graph will begin to taper off at a modest less-than-150 per 1,000 population by 2020 (see figure 6). In short, Pakistani youth will have to find productive endeavors within their country for the most part.



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database, <http://esa.un.org/unup/>


This implies a future Pakistan with:

- Declining, and later stagnant outbound migration trends

### Urbanization

Opportunities to migrate abroad for Pakistanis may dwindle but this will not slow down internal migration.

Figure 7: Percentage of Urban Population



Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population Database, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

<sup>160</sup> British Council, "Pakistan: The Next Generation"

Pakistani youth will be living in an increasingly urban Pakistan and will have to contend with the changing power structures and social realities that come with it. Currently, 37 percent of Pakistan's population lives in cities. By 2030, urban dwellers would have equaled the rural population (see figure 7).

The urbanization trend will produce mixed results for Pakistan. It will throw up all the challenges usually associated with this process – higher population density, poor living conditions, health and environmental hazards, greater possibility for crime, sectarianism, etc. – but there will be significant positives as well. Urbanization will inevitably alter the power balance between the urban bourgeoisie and rural landed elite. The hold of feudal mindsets that has traditionally plagued Pakistani politics and is widely believed to have stifled growth of the urban classes and perpetuated a client-patronage based political system will loosen. A move towards more educated and entrepreneurial urban dwellers thus augurs well for future dispensations. Already, young urban males and females are far more developed than their rural counterparts. Migrants from rural areas will therefore become associated with youth who have attained higher levels of development.<sup>161</sup> The net result could be constructive in channeling productiveness.

This implies a future Pakistan:

- Which is increasingly urbanized
- Where political contours and power structures begin to change in favor of the urban dwellers

### Pakistan 2025

The Pakistan of 2025 will depend on just how youth preferences and the socio-economic realities impact each other. Table 3 repeats (paraphrased) what were listed above as the likely attributes Pakistan may possess based on these youth preferences and socio-economic realities. The discussion that follows explores the possible interaction between them and its implications for Pakistan.

**Table 3: Summary of the Current Youth Preferences and Projected Socio-economic Trends**

<i>As the Youth Will Have it</i>	<i>To What the Socio-Economic Realities will Bring it</i>
<i>Attributes of the Pakistan of 2025.....</i>	
<i>Religious and national identities will remain intrinsically linked</i>	<i>Quantity of education and gender disparity in this realm improves but overall levels still leave much to be desired</i>
<i>Difficulties and challenges will be psychologically (not operationally) neutralized by a coping mechanism that provides hope and resilience even when it defies reality</i>	<i>Overwhelming majority receives poor quality education</i>
<i>Highly conservative– this is not to be confused with extremism</i>	<i>The three parallel education systems create divergent world visions which are difficult to reconcile</i>
<i>Aware of its sectarian identity</i>	<i>Different socio-economic strata are increasingly isolated from each other and thus may continue to harbor disdain and apathy for each other</i>
<i>Ethnically aware</i>	<i>Society is increasingly polarized</i>
<i>Increasingly frustrated and discontented with service delivery and dispensation of justice</i>	<i>Higher unemployment levels (it may still be low in absolute terms)</i>

<sup>161</sup> Faizunnisa and Ikram, Determinants of Youth,” pp.125-26.

<i>As the Youth Will Have it</i>	<i>To What the Socio-Economic Realities will Bring it</i>
<i>Attributes of the Pakistan of 2025.....</i>	
<i>Demands better performance from its leadership</i>	<i>Growing underemployment</i>
<i>Simultaneously remains impatient with the failures of the already discredited leadership</i>	<i>Increasingly resource starved</i>
<i>Is avidly anti-US</i>	<i>Higher inequality levels</i>
<i>Is supportive of democracy but associates some level of hope to the military</i>	<i>Expectations of those entering the workforce will remain unfulfilled</i>
<i>Is ruled by moderate political parties</i>	<i>Underprivileged may get increasingly disillusioned and disgruntled with the system</i>
<i>Has youth who are politically disengaged while remaining desperate for political change</i>	<i>Declining, and later stagnant outbound migration trends</i>
<i>Is traditional and while it is modernizing (according to the Western lens), it remains obsessed with holding on to traditional values and life styles</i>	<i>Increasingly urbanized</i>
<i>Possesses TV as the principal source of information; it holds the power to mould views and opinions as it desires</i>	<i>Political contours and power structures begin to change in favor of the urban dwellers</i>
<i>Anti-extremist but one that still remains opposed to heavy handed solutions to the problem unless they become an absolute necessity</i>	
<i>Susceptible to conspiracy theories and popular discourse that strikes the emotional cord even if it defies strict strategic logic</i>	
<i>Influenced by state-sponsored historical narratives</i>	
<i>Barring institutional transformation, today's youth will inherit a federation held together tenuously and where the fundamental terms of co-existence are yet to be settled</i>	

Barring any unforeseen game changers, some of the current trends are almost certain to hold as Pakistan moves forward. The Pakistani identity seems set to continue being a religious-national one. The division between church and state will remain a misnomer. Islam will also maintain its centrality as a faith and the society shall continue striving to retain its traditional values and conservative core. This, however, will not come about without a constant tussle with the forces of modernization to which more and more young men and women shall be exposed as the country urbanizes. Notwithstanding, the ‘traditionalists’ are likely to retain an upper hand – certainly for the next 10-15 years and perhaps much beyond.

In terms of Pakistan’s prosperity as a state, signs are ominous. Current trends suggest that Pakistan may transform into a society that is highly fractured and polarized – even more so than at present. Combine the problems of modest economic performance, rising inequality, underemployment becoming the norm for youth from lower socio-economic strata, an expectation-reality disconnect playing out in the open, and dwindling resources over the longer run and the story becomes obvious. The underprivileged segment which forms the overwhelming majority of Pakistan will inevitably become more and more disgruntled with the absence of a level playing field and will look for channels to vent its frustration. Urbanization in this case may play a negative role whereby it brings scores of resentful youth together with little opportunity for constructive behavior. Crime is an obvious outlet. In Pakistan’s case however, the extreme

sectarian, ethnic, and provincial awareness may create additional cleavages. Most likely, all of these would create a complex milieu of co-existent points of friction; they will interact with one another in unpredictable, and largely counterproductive ways. The state's capacity to maintain order will be severely tested.

Underlying the predicted frustrations of the Pakistani youth is the state's inability to provide amicably for its people. Historically, the Pakistani citizenry has been extremely impatient with this inability; poorly performing governments are not tolerated for long. In fact, Pakistanis have remained indifferent to abrupt changes in rulers and shied away from opposing undemocratic dispensations openly. The overwhelming support for democracy in Pakistan has never translated into a popular consensus on the rules of the political game. Looking ahead, we are faced with an irreconcilable conundrum since in reality Pakistan is suffering from a crisis of the state system, one that transcends particular governments. Democratic failure becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if the population's desires are impossible to match in a prescribed term in office and if the citizens themselves are not pathologically opposed to a non-democratic alternative. As the situation stands, the economic and educational constraints identified in this paper cannot be turned around without persistent good performance over the next decade or two. This means that no dispensation will be able to perform 'well enough' in the interim. The lack of credibility of the political elite and the extreme desire to see positive change among the youth will likely keep the discourse viciously anti-incumbent and push for quick changes in government rather than allowing for continuity of the political process and retaining faith in a particular government's policymaking ability. The relatively high confidence in the military may kick in sooner or later. In essence, should large segments of the youth continue to be alienated, democratic consolidation will remain an uphill task.

In terms of future of the political system, a ray of hope is provided by the changing power structures that will shift the balance in favor of the urban bourgeoisie. Even if the philosophical commitment to democracy is lacking over the next decade or so, the vacuum created by the changes in power structures could theoretically be filled by a new, urban class of politicians who do not carry the baggage of the current political elite and will likely receive greater leeway and maneuvering space from the average citizen. Unfortunately, here the upcoming generation's own averseness to active politics is inherently counterproductive; the very segment which is to craft Pakistan's future and seeks positive change is willing to leave power structures in the hands of the same elite in whom it has seemingly lost hope.

Important to note is that neither the potential for greater polarization and internal discord nor risks to the future of democracy necessarily point to a rise in extremism. Support for political parties is convincingly in favor of the mainstream ones. In fact, if there is any shift, it is towards ethnic and regional outfits largely opposed to the 'Islam-as-uniting-factor' agenda. The consensus against a Talibanized Pakistan is also very strong among young men and women. Even the argument that frustration and discontent with the present system may make the Taliban a likable alternative does not hold. Ironically, increased ethnic and sectarian awareness is likely to stand at odds with Talibanization in the Pakistani case; the ethnic and sectarian diversity in the country will not allow a pro-Taliban consensus. In fact, far more realistic is a strong anti-Taliban commitment that temporarily pacifies the other sub-national cleavages as Pakistan fights to survive; this is much like the present-day Pakistan.

The above said, a contradictory trend may also co-exist. Over the next decade, the conflation between Islamic principles, radical discourse, and anti-West sentiment will linger.



Pakistani popular narrative will not change drastically until the Pakistani media has gone through its learning curve and text books are revised to present a more objective view of history. Until then, the Pakistani populace will remain susceptible to conspiracy theories that strike an emotional cord. The deep rooted anti-Americanism will always leave the window open for the Islamist enclave to couch their message within an anti-West and pan-Islamist narrative. US policy towards the region, thus, holds critical value. Any western policy that allows the Islamists to paint the national leadership as surrogates of the West will backfire. It will keep the present Pakistani mindset entrenched; Pakistanis will remain anti-extremist and anti-West at the same time. All said and done, the youth seem to have learnt the lesson from recent developments in Pakistan that Taliban is not an alternative to look towards.

### **Turning Pakistan Around**

The analysis presented here paints a fairly bleak picture for Pakistan over the next 10-20 years. A turnaround is only possible over the longer term, and to do so, the upcoming two decades must be viewed as a corrective phase in the country's history during which difficult policy choices are made for the greater good of the country and its people. Pakistan will have to adopt a correction course in the immediate future and implement it sincerely. It will have to persist without any major politically-motivated reversals.

Much of the concerns for Pakistan's future flow out of one fundamental shortcoming: poor socio-economic and educational prognosis. Pakistan requires an inclusive macro-economic growth model and sound economic management over the next decade. Projections suggest that if corrective policies are persistent (these include not only economic policies but also ones that address the need for better natural resource management), Pakistan will be able to rid itself of the structural anomaly whereby it cannot sustainably grow above 5.45 percent a year in the short term. As the macroeconomic fundamentals improve, higher growth rates would become possible. Should this happen, the size of the economic pie will increase, and the economy will be able to cater to a greater number of entrants into the labor market.

The inclusionary model is also required to address the persistent rise in inequality levels. More inclusive economic policies combined with the loosened hold of the feudal classes will gradually lead to lower inequality. More inclusive growth would also imply that Pakistan's lesser provinces become fully integrated in the mainstream economy and, thus, have little incentive to opt out of the federation. Furthermore, an improved socio-economic scenario will automatically eliminate the expectation-reality disconnect and dampen some of the negative effects associated with urbanization and the concern about internal polarization. A greater number will find avenues to channel energies positively. Luckily the latest economic policy documents suggest that the future vision about macro-growth is in fact leaning towards a more inclusive model. Inequality is explicitly recognized as a major social and economic threat that ought to be tackled at all costs.

A positive spin-off of improved socio-economic performance can also be envisioned in terms of support for democracy. If the system begins to deliver, more patience may be exhibited towards the rulers, in turn, providing greater room for policy continuity and some sort of consensus on the rules of the game.

On the educational front, quantity is all set to rise. The qualitative aspect needs immediate attention; even if qualitative gains must follow quantitative improvements, the stratification of the school system and the poor quality of public schooling ought to be addressed

through a concerted policy effort starting now. Again, the 2009 Education Policy suggests that the next decade will see disproportional focus on these two failings. Next, textbook reform is long overdue. A conscious effort needs to be made to present a more objective and less paranoid historical narrative to Pakistani children. Pakistan's internal problems will be dealt with more effectively through enhanced civic consciousness and awareness about the society's responsibilities towards the state rather than by creating a siege mentality that makes a security-centric vision inevitable.

The above said, if Pakistan is realistically to produce better results, the present lot of Pakistani youth will have to rid themselves of their political inactiveness and strive to become part of the power structures. A new class of politicians is a virtual prerequisite to move Pakistan away from the entrenched client-patron based political model. Moreover, a more tolerant and strategically adept polity is also a necessity in an increasingly globalized world. Perhaps the single most important node of policy intervention in terms of molding young Pakistani minds is the TV. The TV industry's learning curve needs to be accelerated by injecting professionally trained human capacity which is visionary in its thinking. The narrative would have to move away from mere populism; it ought to provide a fresh discourse on Pakistan's strategic compulsions and future potential. Greater debate on civil-military relations and priority in terms of resource allocation is also long overdue. Much more emphasis is also warranted on civic education of the citizens.

Western – i.e. U.S. – policies hold paramount importance. Looking ahead, western policy must be extremely careful about Pakistani sensitivities. For one, Pakistan is set to remain a highly conservative, Islamic state that is opposed to forced modernization or moves that could be construed as an attempt to impose western values. All dealings must be conducted without any ambition to alter this framework. Western military presence and its overall policy towards the Muslim world will also influence the narrative in Pakistan; to shy away from this fact serves no purpose. Further, the ability of the Islamist enclave to sell their view point to Muslim societies is strongly correlated with how western policies are perceived by them. If short-term interests continue to dictate the western agenda and the people of Pakistan see themselves being left out of the bargain, western policy will continue to fuel the very discourse and mindset it is seeking to eliminate in the first place. Western engagement will have to be much more patient, long term, transparent, and sensitive to Pakistani concerns.

Should Pakistan persist with its corrective course, the Pakistan of 2050 may well be more stable, progressive, and developed than the Pakistan of 2025. It may never be a secular, liberal democracy, and it may still possess contending and divergent narratives about the Pakistani identity; yet, it will be a Pakistani federation where the question of an internal rupture would have become moot and where the youth of the time will not feel the disillusionment their parents did. Make no mistake, however. Getting to the Pakistan of 2050 envisioned here will be a tall order; the margin of error in the corrective phase is minimal.

# Appendix: Predictions of Pakistan's Future

Stephen P. Cohen

Just before and after 9/11, the official and establishment Pakistani narrative was that the country could, with outside assistance, surmount its economic difficulties, take its rightful place as an ally of the West and become an anchor of the moderate branch of the Islamic world. Pakistan would be a bridge: the gateway to modernity for other Muslims, and a gateway to Islam for the West.<sup>162</sup> This was also the view of the George W. Bush administration, which had begun to rebuild relations with Islamabad.

This optimistic narrative has recently been challenged by gloom-and-doom scenarios that portray Pakistan as an already-failed state, a malign supporter of radical Islamic causes, and the epicenter of global terrorism. “Failed,” “flawed,” and “unraveling,” are adjectives that are now widely used to describe the country. It is now typically described as having failed, in the process of failing, or a monster state of one sort or another.<sup>163</sup> Many Western states see Pakistan as so close to failure and so important that assistance is essential because of its weakness, not because of its strength.

Several analyses of Pakistan completed before Musharraf's departure anticipated the current crisis. Perhaps the toughest was the view of a group of experts on Pakistan convened by the National Intelligence Council in 2000 as part of its projection of global developments in the year 2015.<sup>164</sup> The passages on Pakistan and India are worth quoting in full, because the predictions were presumably gathered before 9/11 and at the peak of President Musharraf's popularity.

Regionally, the collective judgment of experts was that by 2025 South Asian strategic relations would be defined by the growing gap between India and Pakistan and their seemingly irreducible hostility. The experts were wary of the possibility of small or large-scale conflict. *India will be the unrivaled regional power with a large military—including naval and nuclear capabilities—and a dynamic and growing economy. The widening India-Pakistan gap—destabilizing in its own right—will be accompanied by deep political, economic, and social disparities within both states. Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on international financial assistance.*

*The threat of major conflict between India and Pakistan will overshadow all other regional issues during the next 15 years. Continued turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan will spill over into Kashmir and other areas of the subcontinent, prompting Indian leaders to take more aggressive preemptive and retaliatory actions. India's conventional military advantage over Pakistan will widen as a result of New Delhi's superior economic position. India will also*

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<sup>162</sup> The one country that has taken the latter very seriously has been China, which from the 1960s used Pakistan as the jumping-off place for the expansion of its diplomacy and military assistance programs in the Middle East, although now Pakistan is less useful as China has developed important direct economic, diplomatic and military ties with the Gulf, the Arab world, and Africa.

<sup>163</sup> I have dealt with the “failure” syndrome in Chapter one of *The Idea of Pakistan*.

<sup>164</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts*, (Washington: National Intelligence Council, NIC 2000-02, December 2000), pp. 64 ff.

*continue to build up its ocean-going navy to dominate the Indian Ocean transit routes used for delivery of Persian Gulf oil to Asia. The decisive shift in conventional military power in India's favor over the coming years potentially will make the region more volatile and unstable. Both India and Pakistan will see weapons of mass destruction as a strategic imperative and will continue to amass nuclear warheads and build a variety of missile delivery systems.*

This assumes that India will be able to translate its new global status into regional hegemony, at best, or at worst, that a rising India and a declining Pakistan are likely to clash. As for Pakistan itself, by 2050, the conferees concluded that it *will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesion of the military—once Pakistan's most capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government's control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.*

A few years later, despite these experts' concerns, the NIC barely mentioned Pakistan, and then only in the context of one of three global change scenarios.<sup>165</sup>

In 2004 a CSIS project came to a cautiously optimistic conclusion about Pakistan.<sup>166</sup> Completed after Musharraf's third year in power it looked at the prospect for change and reform in Pakistan, dealing mostly with macro-political and economic factors, stressing the importance of rebuilding Pakistan's institutions, Pakistan's external relations, and American interests were the framework for the analysis:

*The two and a half years since the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 have intensified the internal pressures Pakistan faces. The U.S. decision to start its antiterrorism offensive by seeking Pakistani support was based on the presumption, widely shared in policy and academic circles in the United States, that Pakistan is central to the prospects for stability in South Asia. This study bears out that assumption. Every major aspect of Pakistan's internal stresses that we examined—the economic prospects, the role of the army and of political parties, the role of Islam and of the militants, and even the tensions between states and regions—is linked to developments outside Pakistan's borders. Positive scenarios from the point of view of key U.S. interests—regional stability, diminution of terrorism, reduced risk of conflict with India, and nuclear control—all involve a stabilized Pakistan and a strengthened Pakistani state. If one adds U.S. economic interests and hopes to the list, the importance of a Pakistani revival is even greater.*<sup>167</sup>

The CSIS study suggests that to have any kind of impact on Pakistan the United States will have to increase the level of attention and resources it devotes to South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular—noting that the US has a number of objectives in that country, and all must be taken seriously. This project reflected the thinking behind the Biden-Lugar legislation,

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<sup>165</sup> Pakistan is barely mentioned in another major NIC publication, a scenario building exercise that posits three future worlds, and only in the context of an Islamic Caliphate, in which it is one of the battlegrounds between the forces of the Caliph, and the "Crusaders."

<sup>166</sup> Teresita C. Schaffer, *Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004).

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

which urged massive economic assistance for Pakistan beside the growing military aid relationship. The CSIS report also urged support for India-Pakistan dialogue, and support for civil society, noting that the “social development in Pakistan so badly needs cannot be supplied entirely by the government.” P. 5) Above all, the report emphasizes the weakness of Pakistani institutions, civil and governmental, and that these should be the focus of reform efforts and assistance by the United States, notably the judiciary, education, and institutions that had to deliver power and water to the Pakistani people. As part of the project a simulation exercise was run, testing two scenarios, one in which Musharraf slowly rebuilt Pakistan, and a second in which political turmoil overtook his regime, but the dependent variable was India-Pakistan relations, not the future of Pakistan.

My own study, published in 2004 warily concluded that Pakistan may have reached the point of no return along several dimensions and that extreme scenarios were no longer inconceivable. I gave the establishment-dominated system a fifty-fifty chance of survival, but specified no time line, and also set forth a number of indicators, all of which were blinking bright red by 2006. The book anticipated Musharraf’s demise and set out the problems that would be faced by a successor government.

There is also an Islamist narrative which sees Pakistan as the vanguard of an Islamic revolution that will spread from Pakistan to India and then to other lands where Muslims are oppressed.<sup>168</sup> The language is eerily reminiscent of the Marxists of the 1970s, who saw Pakistan as a vanguard of an Islamic-socialist revolution. As Hasan Askari Rizvi notes, *Tariq Ali’s suggestion to reshape the Pakistani society from top to bottom is advocated by Islamic orthodox and neoconservatives, albeit, in an Islamic framework. They view militancy as an instrument for transforming the society, and warding-off the enemies of Islam and their local agents. They talk of the control of the state machinery to transform the state and the society on Islamic lines as articulated by them.*<sup>169</sup>

There is a strong similarity between the totalitarian vision of orthodox Marxist-Leninists and that of the extreme Islamists. In many countries, the dislocated and angry intellectual class that would have turned to Marxism in the past now finds comfort in radical Islam.

Of the serious studies of Pakistan written over the last few years none predict either failure or success, most opt for some intermediate “muddling through” scenario. Most, also,

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<sup>168</sup> For prime examples of this rhetoric see Simon Henderson, “Pakistan on the Brink: Implications for U.S. Policies,” May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2009, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=3050>), the website of the Jamaat-e-Islami is a good source for the Islamist narrative, <http://jamaat.org/beta/site/index>, and the authoritative study of the Jamaat is by Vali Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan* (London: I.B. Taurus, 1994).

<sup>169</sup> Rizvi, Bellagio Papers. Tariq Ali has written that “the choice will be between socialist revolution – that is, people’s power – [and] complete and utter disintegration,” and underlined the need for building “the revolutionary vanguard which will enable us to achieve a socialist workers’ and peasants’ republic in Pakistan.” Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power* (New York: William Morrow & Co.), 1970, pp.243-244

identify certain factors as determinative. One European study emphasizes the importance of state integrity.<sup>170</sup>

Jonathan Paris, an American analyst based in Great Britain, has written the most comprehensive study in the prediction genre, *Prospects for Pakistan*, in 2010.<sup>171</sup> He had not visited Pakistan before completing the study but nevertheless offers a methodology and analytical patience that sets his work apart. His time frame is 1-3 years, and his approach is to look both at challenges to Pakistan and “topics” which seem to be of particular importance; the latter are roughly equivalent to the factors or variables deployed in this project. Paris’ list of challenges contains no surprises:

- State fragmentation and loss of control over various territories that undermined the integrity, solidarity, and stability of the country
- Security and terrorism throughout Pakistan
- The economy
- Governance issues, including corruption;
- Rebuilding the Pakistan brand,

The last item in the list is also used by Shaukat Aziz, the former Finance advisor and prime minister, and it is not clear whether this refers to Pakistan’s image abroad or the nature of the allegiance of Pakistanis to the state, and the purpose of Pakistan, what has been termed as the “idea” of Pakistan.

Paris’ list of ‘topics’ include:

- The economy;
- Civil-military issues;
- Trends in Islamism;
- The future of Pushtun nationalism;
- The Future of the Pakistani Taliban;
- Pakistan’s relations with three countries: India, China, and the United States

In the body of the paper there is also a discussion of demography, the insurgency in Balochistan, and other factors. Notable by their absence are discussions of the role of the media, the rise of civil society, the new role of the courts, and constitutional developments, although some of the latter, such as the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment, were still being formulated while the study was underway.

One of the most useful aspects of this study is Paris’ exploration of a range of futures for the main topics or variables. For the economy he examines both a “glass half-full” and a less optimistic “glass half-empty” scenario; he does the same for civil-military relations, where three futures are discussed: a return to military dominance, continuation of the present status quo, and a third scenario involving movement towards a democratic consolidation. There is less scenario building regarding Islamic trends in Pakistan, but he rules out either the emergence of religious

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<sup>170</sup> Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, Country case study: Pakistan, State–Society Analysis, , January 2009, Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations [http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.com/pdf/Pakistan\\_State\\_Society\\_Analysis.pdf](http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.com/pdf/Pakistan_State_Society_Analysis.pdf)

<sup>171</sup> Jonathan Paris, *Prospects for Pakistan* (London, UK: Legatum Institute, 2010)

parties as a dominant factor in Pakistani politics or a Taliban takeover. These are eminently reasonable predictions in the short time frame of the study.

In his summary evaluation Paris argues that, when evaluating Pakistan's expected challenges, it will "muddle through," but the "unexpected challenges" make it so difficult to predict even the next one to three years in Pakistan." Noting that the spike in food costs, the rise of the Pakistan Taliban, the military's push back against militants in Swat and Waziristan, and the Mumbai attack, were all unpredicted and perhaps unpredictable. Thus, Pakistan is likely to "muddle through or slightly worse. Absent a major unexpected shock, it is not destined to become a 'failed state.'"

Bearing in mind the 1-2 year time frame this is sensible, but the uncertainties are still considerable. The phrase, "muddling through," has become the standard optimists' characterization of Pakistan, although it remains undefined and the time-frame is always in the short term. One senior American official with extensive contacts in Pakistan, notably the military, remarked that Pakistan may be below the waterline as defined by "muddling through." Other studies, by observers more familiar with Pakistan's history and society have come to somewhat different conclusions.

Written just after Paris' study, a team of Indian experts organized by the government-funded Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis used a methodology similar to his, and came to approximately the same conclusions.<sup>172</sup> After a general discussion of recent events and trends, *Whither Pakistan* identifies six "key drivers" that will "decide the direction in which Pakistan is likely to evolve in times to come."<sup>173</sup> These are "political dynamics," radicalization of Pakistani society, the military, the economy, relations with India and foreign policy. All are seen as critically important, and all are seen as very uncertain; indeed, the drivers are phrased in the form of questions, and the analysis consists of about 40 questions. The drivers are not sequenced or ranked in terms of importance, and some factors, such as demography are not considered at all.

This study develops three scenarios, "Lebanonization," a stable Pakistan, and a sharp downward slide and implosion. The authors note, unhelpfully, that there are several intermediate scenarios, in which "some drivers pan out and others do not," but these are not listed or discussed. The analysis concludes with the observation that Pakistan's stability and democratization is in everyone's interest, but "the big question is whether Pakistan can succeed in holding itself together against various fissiparous tendencies that afflict it today." Thus, Pakistan's relations with other countries, notably India, are not critical to its future (the study looks at a ten year time frame), but domestic trends and developments are the independent variable. We will later discuss the report's policy recommendations in a discussion of India as a factor, but only point out here that from the perspective of the authors of this report, India is blameless regarding Pakistan's plight; it is the victim of Pakistani misdeeds and miscalculations.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> IDSA *Whither Pakistan* <http://www.idsa.in/book/WhitherPakistan>

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.* p. 135.

<sup>174</sup> An earlier Indian attempt to develop scenarios for Pakistan's future was done at a leading Delhi think tank, The Observer Research Foundation. Wilson John, ed., *Pakistan: Struggle Within* (New Delhi: Longman Pearson, 2009)

A scenario-building approach was taken by one of Pakistan's most distinguished retired generals, at a 2009 Canadian conference on Pakistan's futures.<sup>175</sup> Lieutenant-General (ret) Talat Masood, a former Secretary in the Ministry of Defense and now an active participant on the Track II and seminar circuit posited three scenarios, best case, worst case, and nuanced, but provided no probability estimate.<sup>176</sup> The best case scenario is one in which both civilians and the military see the need for change and discard outdated policies; rule of law is re-established, especially in the frontier region; the military return to the barracks; and economic reform begins to take hold. Relations with India improve, and Pakistan regains its prior international status as a progressive state with continuing good with the United States, China, and the Muslim majority world.

In Masood's worst case, none of this happens, the Taliban problem continues to fester, Pakistan-based militants continue their activity in Kashmir and elsewhere in India, leading to another India-Pakistan crisis, and as a result of these security problems foreign investment ceases to flow to Pakistan and, ultimately, the military again come to power in a new coup d'état.

A "nuanced" case has a continued domestic disorder, but the economy is kept afloat by remittances from overseas Pakistanis, the international economy continues to aid Pakistan, and dialogue with India is restored, with the ISI and army restraining themselves. Of course, other outcomes are possible and General Masood's mixed outcome could have several permutations.

### Other Studies

Several other attempts to predict, or discuss Pakistan's future are worth noting.

One of Pakistan's most thoughtful scholars, **Pervez Hoodbhoy**, attempts a five year projection, and warns of the consequences for the country if reform does not happen quickly.<sup>177</sup> **B. Raman**, India's leading Pakistan-watcher, a former intelligence officer, considers the possibility of Pakistan's favor, and concludes by arguing that India has a stake in the survival of a moderate Pakistan.<sup>178</sup> Two liberal Pakistani journalists, **Najam Sethi and Ahmed Rashid**, have also expressed their concern about a failing Pakistan.<sup>179</sup>

**Farzana Sheikh**, a Pakistani scholar resident in Great Britain, dismisses the rhetorical flourishes of "country on the brink" or "failed state," and argues that Pakistan's problems stem from its very origins, that the identity of Pakistan has never been clear nor has a consensus been developed as to the purpose of Pakistan.<sup>180</sup> The failure of the economy, political incoherence,

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<sup>175</sup> Johannes Braune, ed., *Pakistan's Security: Today and Tomorrow* (Ottawa, Canada: CSIS, April, 2004).

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> See both Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Whither Pakistan? A five-year forecast," June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2009, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online (<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/whither-pakistan-five-year-forecast>), and Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Pakistan: Road From Hell," June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2009, OpenDemocracy.Org (<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/pakistan-the-road-from-hell>)

<sup>178</sup> B. Raman, "Pakistan: Quo Vadis?" May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2010, Raman's Strategic Analysis Blog (<http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/05/pakistan-quo-vadis.html>)

<sup>179</sup> Ahmed Rashid, "The Scary Unraveling of Pakistan," November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2009, The Daily Beast (<http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-11-30/gunning-for-zardari/>) and Najam Sethi, "Islam and the West: Dilemmas of a Failing Pakistan," June 25<sup>th</sup>, 2010, New Age Islam ([http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamIslamAndWest\\_1.aspx?ArticleID=3048](http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamIslamAndWest_1.aspx?ArticleID=3048))

<sup>180</sup> Farzana Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: Hirst & Co., 2009).



separatism, corruption, and the rise of extremists are all problems, or in Paris' term, factors. However, underlying these are the absence of a national purpose, notably the ambiguous but generous role accorded to Islam since the founding of Pakistan which has restricted its progress ever since.<sup>181</sup> She remains somewhat optimistic, buoyed by the rise of new media, an active judiciary and legal community, and human rights activist who have tried to imagine Pakistan in a new way. As **Benedict Anderson** has argued, nations are "imagined" communities, they can be re-imagined and at bottom they are ideas. However, Pakistan the nation resides uneasily alongside Pakistan the state, and not only is the nation in deep trouble, and has been since independence, but the state of Pakistan is also crumbling, raising the question, to be addressed later, as to whether the state can support the idea, or the idea can sustain the state.

**Bruce Riedel**, a former American intelligence analyst with long contact with Pakistan, presumes but does not predict an Islamic militant victory in Pakistan. He points to Pakistan's creation of, and collusion with, militant groups, which he believes has left Islamabad vulnerable to an Islamic coup.<sup>182</sup> Riedel dates the crisis back to the war against the Soviet Union, then in occupation of Afghanistan, but the collusion began much earlier, with state patronage of militant Islamic groups going back many years. Riedel sees Pakistan as ripe for change, "but it could be radical change for the worst," and that the battle for the soul of Pakistan has never been so acute." He develops a scenario in which Islamist and Taliban forces push to the east, and establish an Islamic Emirate of Pakistan, virtually dividing the country between Islamists and moderate Muslims, and anchoring Pakistani influence in the Pushtun parts of Afghanistan. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would be at stake, and relations with India would also worsen, as would relations with the United States. Riedel's policy recommendation is that this is a future to be avoided at all costs, and that America must work with remaining moderate elements in Pakistan.

Riedel's "Emirate of Pakistan" is a fictional device, he does not specify the time frame in which it might come about, but there is no mistaking the urgency and depth of his concern about Pakistan's future—and he seems to assume that the US at least still has an opportunity to deflect Pakistan from a dangerous and self-destructive course, one that would turn it into a major enemy of the United States, not an ally.

Even more pessimistic is the analysis by **John R. Schmidt**, a former American diplomat serving in Islamabad. He traces Pakistan's problems to its feudal political culture, in which the wealthy refuse to tax themselves, the parties are arrayed around powerful families, not ideas, and that it matters little who governs, so deep is the decay in Pakistani political institutions.<sup>183</sup> With the rise of the Islamists, not a unified body themselves, but able enough to challenge Pakistan's crumbling establishment, the state faces a threat to its very existence. The "muddling through" preferences of the establishment were only confirmed by such events as the attack on the Sri Lanka cricket team. They are not likely to engage in serious reform, but will kick the proverbial

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<sup>181</sup> See the review of Sheikh by Andrew Buncombe, "Review of *Making Sense of Pakistan*, By Farzana Shaikh," June 21, 2009, The Independent (retrieved from:

<http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=NDQ1NTI1NQ%3D%3D>)

<sup>182</sup> Bruce Riedel, "Armageddon in Islamabad," June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2009, The National Interest Online (<http://www.nationalinterest.org/printerfriendly.aspx?id=21644>)

<sup>183</sup> John R. Schmidt, "The Unraveling of Pakistan," June-July 2009, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (<http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2009/year-2009-issue-3/the-unravelling-of-pakistan/>)

can down the road. There are solutions to Pakistan's many problems, and Schmidt, writing in 2009, observes that it is probably "not too late" if the government undertakes the struggle against the Islamic threat and the army treats the Taliban insurgency seriously. He warns that the day of reckoning is coming, and that the more time that is taken to address the rot, "the bloodier and more protracted the confrontation is likely to be." And, of course, the fall of Pakistan to radical Islamic forces would be calamitous for the rest of the world, even though there is probably "little that the rest of the world can do to prevent this." Ibid. "The matter rests, as it always had, with the Pakistani people and the political class that rules them."

Finally, **Hasan Abbas**, a former Pakistani police officer now resident in the United States, offers, along with Paris, the most comprehensive assessment of Pakistan's multiple crises, and is more optimistic than Riedel and others about a positive transformation.<sup>184</sup> After a comprehensive assessment of recent threats to the state and to the very idea of Pakistan, including a detailed study of the rise of terrorism, sectarian violence, and the rise of political and criminal extremism, he suggests that both the Lawyers movement and the rise of new media offer an opportunity for Pakistanis and outsiders to save Pakistan from what could be comprehensive failure. Noting that Pakistan ranks as ninth out of 177 of the world's weakest countries, "the challenges of militancy, weak governance, and economic insecurity are feeding each other in a dangerous cycle, which must be broken if Pakistan is to be saved."<sup>185</sup> There follows seven recommendations each for Pakistani and American policy makers. The former involve a new social contract between the government and the people, the removal of colonial-era laws, major investment in education and health care reform, the reconfiguration of state and governance structures, bringing in the Army Education Corps and Medical Corps to meet educational and health targets, providing support for progressive religious groups in order to help defeat the "idea of Talibanization," defeating the communication strategy of the Taliban, closing down militant Madrassas, overhauling the police, law enforcement and intelligence services, reviving the peace process with India, and enhancing the security of the nuclear weapons establishment while enhancing civilian oversight over the entire nuclear establishment. The United States is offered a similarly comprehensive agenda, including developing a more comprehensive strategy towards Pakistan, avoiding condition-heavy aid packages, addressing the Kashmir problem and India-Pakistan relations, accepting Pakistan's status as a nuclear weapons state, stressing education and health in American aid to Pakistan, helping Pakistan improve its civilian law enforcement capabilities, replacing drone attacks in K-P with a "Humanitarian Aid package," and, finally, creating an effective oversight mechanism for Pakistani aid and assistance programs.

The scope of Abbas' recommendations is breathtaking, and point to a complete transformation of Pakistan to be led by Pakistanis themselves with full support by the United States. They reflect the deep problems facing Pakistan, and the urgency of the reform agency, as seen by a thoughtful and expert former member of Pakistan's police force. Abbas is cautiously optimistic, while the indicators are increasingly negative, and while there are credible "gloom and doom" scenarios, "many things are going well," notably the slow and sure transition to democracy since the January 2008 elections. As he notes, "politicians are settling down; however if they do not deliver they will be out of a job. The army's non-interference posture in relation to

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<sup>184</sup> Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan Can Defy the Odds: How to Rescue a Failing State*, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (Clinton Township, MI: ISPU, May 2009)

<sup>185</sup> Abbas, p. 28.

the political arena also deserves to be acknowledged although it will take a while for the civilian and democratic leadership to assume complete control and be in a position to decisively define the overall direction of domestic and foreign policy. Two of the “Signs of Hope” he discusses are the lawyers movement of 2007-09 and the rise of new media. Left unsaid is Pakistan’s future if such a reform program is *not* initiated and carried out successfully. Abbas does not consider the shape and timing of failure.

# Participant Biographies

**Laila Bokhari** is a Research Fellow with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and an Associate Fellow with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), Kings College, United Kingdom. She is currently posted to the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.

**C. Christine Fair** is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously, she has served as a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul, and as a senior research associate in USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is also a senior fellow with the Counter Terrorism Center at West Point.

**Ambassador (ret.) Tariq Fatemi** is a retired member of the Pakistan Foreign Service, who has served in Moscow, New York, Washington and Beijing. He was Pakistan's Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Jordan, the USA, Belgium and the European Union. Currently, he teaches at various institutions, writes a weekly column for the Pakistani newspaper Dawn and appears in other publications.

**Mohan Guruswamy** is Chairman and founder of Centre for Policy Alternatives. He has over three decades of experience in government, industry and academia. He is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center. He is the author of several books on policy issues, the latest being *The Looming Crisis in India's Agriculture; India-China Relations: The Border Issue and Beyond*.

**Brig. (ret) Shaukat Qadir** is a retired Brigadier in the Pakistani Army. He is a research scholar and author living in Islamabad, Pakistan. He is co-founder, former Vice President and former President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). Currently, he writes a weekly column for the Pakistan Daily Times and the UAE's Daily National, and appears regularly in other publications.

**Ambassador (ret.) William Milam** is a Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC. He writes a bi-weekly column for the *Daily Times of Pakistan*. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, he was a career diplomat. He retired from the U.S. Foreign Service at the end of July 2001, but continues to take on temporary assignments for the State Department. His last post before retirement was as Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan where he served from August 1998 to July 2001.

**Shuja Nawaz** is Director of The Atlantic Council's South Asia Center. He is a graduate of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, where he won the Henry Taylor Award. He was a television newscaster and producer with Pakistan Television from 1967 to 1972 and covered the 1971 war with India on the Western front. He has worked for **The New York Times**, the World Health Organization, as a Division Chief for the International Monetary Fund, and as a Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

**Hasan Askari Rizvi** is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of the Punjab, Lahore, and author of several books on the Pakistani army. Rizvi has also served as the Quaid-e-Azam Distinguished Professor of Pakistan Studies at Columbia

University's School of International and Public Affairs from 1995-1999 and was a Visiting Research Scholar at Sandia National Laboratory in 2002.

**Aqil Shah**, a former Rhodes Scholar, recently finished his PhD dissertation in Political Science at Columbia University. His dissertation explored the origins and persistence of divergent patterns of civil-military relations in Pakistan and India. In 2010, he was inducted into Harvard University's Society of Fellows, where he will conduct post-doctoral research.

**Sir Hilary Synnott, KCMG**, is a retired British diplomat and is a Consulting Senior Fellow for the International Institute for Strategic Studies specializing in South Asia, Iraq and Nuclear strategic matters. He served as the Coalition Provisional Authority's Regional Coordinator for Southern Iraq from July 2003 until January 2004, as the British High Commissioner in Pakistan from 2000 until 2003 and as Deputy High Commissioner in India from 1993 to 1996.

**Marvin G. Weinbaum** is a Scholar-in-Residence at the Middle East Institute, a former Pakistan and Afghanistan analyst in the U.S. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has also held adjunct professorships at Georgetown University and George Washington University.

**Prof. Anita Weiss** is Professor of Sociology and head of the Department of International Studies at the University of Oregon. She specializes in Pakistan, South Asia and comparative Muslim societies. She has a long-standing involvement with the Berkeley Urdu Language Program in Pakistan and the American Institute of Pakistan Studies, on which she serves as the Institutional Trustee from the University of Oregon.

**Moeed Yusuf** is Director of Pakistan studies at the US Institute of Peace and a PhD candidate at Boston University. Before joining USIP, Yusuf was a fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, and concurrently a research fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center at Harvard Kennedy School. He has also been affiliated with the Brookings Institution as a special guest researcher.

**Stephen P. Cohen** is a Senior Fellow in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense Initiative in the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy department. Prior to joining Brookings, he was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He served as a member of the US Department of State's Policy Planning Staff from 1985-87. He is also the co-author of *Arming Without Aiming*.

**Erum Haider** was a MA student at the University of Chicago and research assistant in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, 2009-10. Before receiving her MA, she worked as a reporter for the Pakistani newspaper Dawn. She now lives in Karachi, where she writes for a variety of publications.