PART II

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHICS IN THE ARMED FORCES

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Pakistan

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Policy makers and analysts continue to be concerned about the purported Islamization of Pakistan, particularly in the Pakistan Army.[1] Concern, which is often seen as concurrent with deepening anti-Americanism in the country and the armed forces,[2] is undergirded by the army's six-decade-long reliance on Islamist militants to prosecute its interests in India and Afghanistan. These militants can be found in the Afghan Taliban, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and dozens of other groups terrorizing the region.[3] The United States has long worried about these groups operating in India, because a terrorist attack in that country remains the most likely precipitant of an Indo-Pakistan war, with possible nuclear escalation – either advertently or inadvertently. Some analysts and policy makers worry (with less justification) that Islamist militants will acquire nuclear technology or related assets either by stealth or through active or passive facilitation of the Pakistan Army. Recent U.S. legislation aims to reverse many of these ostensibly worrying trends.[4]

Some analysts of Pakistan contend that the lineaments of Pakistan's future Islamization can be traced to the arguments of early proponents of an independent Pakistan who believed there was a need for an independent Muslim state. Thus, even before independence, Pakistan was already conceived as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims. Other analysts claim that Islamization began in the first decade after independence as Islamists began vying for greater influence over Pakistan's developing state apparatuses. Still others argue that Islamization did not occur to a significant degree until much later.[5]

Despite these differences of opinion, most scholars of Pakistan agree that the impact of Islamization was clearly evident in the policies of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was an authoritarian autocrat who used lethal force to put down opposition. When his regime became increasingly compromised, he sought to cultivate Islamists by pursuing policies that would appease them, such as outlawing gambling and drinking and declaring the Ahmediya to

be non-Muslim. The process of Islamizing Pakistan intensified under Bhutto's successor, Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, and his military government. Perhaps contrary to popular expectations, however, Pakistan's urban areas, not its rural areas, have been the site of Islamization and Islamic revivalism.[6]

Several policy concerns emerge from the ways in which Pakistan in general and the army in particular are presumed to have Islamized. First, as previous collaborative work by the author has shown, the Pakistan Army is becoming increasingly representative of Pakistani society writ large and increasingly likely to draw officers from urban areas, where Islamist revivalism may be most apparent.[7] It is difficult to predict what this diversification may mean for the officer corps, much less soldiers in the ranks and the noncommissioned officers, about whom virtually nothing is known in policy analytic or academic circles. Indeed, U.S. analysts and commentators often speculate with alarm that the Pakistan Army has Islamized without consideration of what this label may actually mean.[8] There is a widespread tendency within U.S. policy circles to assume that deepening commitments to political Islam (Islamism) or increasing personal piety or conservatism is coincident with expanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan.[9] U.S. policy toward Pakistan aims to support "moderate" Pakistanis in an effort to marginalize those who are increasingly Islamist or conservative – or both – presumably because Islamists and conservatives will be more receptive to militant groups. This policy aim, which animates U.S. interests in expanding engagement with Pakistani military personnel, applies to Pakistan in general and to the army in particular. U.S. policy makers also tend to assume that any success in attenuating anti-U.S. sentiments will mitigate popular support for the Islamists and reduce support for terrorism. These common perceptions persist despite recent evidence that neither increased piety nor anti-Americanism explains support for militant groups once other factors are taken into consideration.[10]

Given the Pakistani state's long cultivation of Islamist militant groups as tools of foreign policy, many U.S. analysts firmly believe that some of Pakistan's army officers may be deeply sympathetic to these groups, their organizations, and their ethos.[11] This concern has produced a related fear that an increasingly Islamized or radicalized faction of the Pakistan Army may pose a security threat to the region or to the international community. There are also those who worry that a cadre of deeply Islamized, if not radicalized, army officers remains sympathetic to jihadist militants and will continue to advance their cause even if the army leadership were to strategically abandon militancy as a tool of foreign and domestic policy. Others continue to conjure the specter of an Islamist vanguard within the army that is sympathetic to global terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and may even provide terrorists access to Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal with devastating consequences.

Despite the importance of these issues, the body of empirically sound literature that has analyzed the Islamization of Pakistan and its polity is thin.[12] Extant analyses focus on case studies of the influence of particular devotional,

traditional, or revivalist movements; the rise and development of Islamist political parties (most notably, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood); the electoral outcomes of Islamist parties; qualitative assessments of pietic, political, or militant groups in specific geographical areas; or localized case studies of (usually sectarian) violence.[13] Unfortunately, there are few sources of empirical data that shed light on the various processes of Pakistan's Islamization, their manifestations, and their effects.

This chapter employs the existing body of literature and data to weigh in on the complex issue of religion and the Pakistan Army. It begins with a summary of the secondary literature on Islamization in Pakistan in general and then turns to the specifics of Islam, Islamism, and piety within the army – subject to numerous caveats described herein. Following this, the chapter employs district-level data on Pakistan Army officers from 1970 through 2005 that were obtained from the Pakistan Army General Headquarters. In addition, it uses several years of district-level household data to demonstrate that, contrary to popular views that the Pakistan Army is dominated by rural Punjabis, officers are more likely to come from urban areas and areas that are socially more liberal. They are also drawn increasingly from areas such as Balochistan.[14] The chapter concludes with a call for a research agenda on religion in the Pakistani military.

The Islamization of Pakistan?

The movement for an independent Pakistan was motivated by the "two-nation" theory, which held that Muslims represented a nation apart from either Sikhs or Hindus and therefore required a separate state to ensure their protection and rights. Muslim proponents of the two-nation theory feared that if Muslims remained in a united India, the country's Hindu majority would not protect their interests. While many of South Asia's Muslims imagined Pakistan to be their homeland, Pakistan's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, believed that it should also accommodate minorities that chose to remain in the country.

Since Jinnah's death in September 1948, the role of Islam within the Pakistani state has remained a divisive issue, with successive Pakistani leaders moving away from his notion of Pakistan as a state for Muslims toward one that is in some measure an Islamic state. Shortly after independence, the Islamists demanded an Islamic constitution. Their efforts, spearheaded by Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, culminated in the Objectives Resolution of 1949 by the first Constituent Assembly. The resolution declared Pakistan to be a sacred trust of Allah, sovereign of the universe. Although the actual meaning of the resolution was unclear in practice, it was an important symbolic recognition of the role of Islam in the new state.[15]

After Pakistan's loss of Bangladesh in the 1971 war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought to promote Islam as a unifying factor to mitigate fissiparous tendencies among the country's remaining ethnic groups. The government and Islamists

alike viewed the embrace of Islamic ideals of governance and society as the most likely means of maintaining state cohesion. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto expanded the state's connections to the Arab Gulf states; broadened the role of Arabic in the school curriculum, creating new jobs for specialists in Islamic studies; declared Ahmediyas to be non-Muslims; outlawed drinking and gambling, among other efforts to promote his notion of Islamic socialism; and laid the foundations for an official Islamization policy by enshrining Islamization within the framework of the 1973 constitution, clearly stating that Pakistan was an Islamic state.[16]

After the 1977 coup against Bhutto, Gen. Zia worked to strengthen the place of Islam within the Pakistani state and polity. As Hassan Rizvi writes, Zia's Islamization efforts were "regulative, punitive, and extractive."[17] Zia reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology to allow for greater representation of conservative and orthodox ulema in advising the government of the polity's Islamization, including efforts to review extant laws and bring them into greater conformity with the Quran and Sunna. Zia amended the constitution to establish a Sharia bench within the four provincial high courts and an appellate bench in the Supreme Court in 1979. In 1980, he established a Federal Sharia Court to replace those benches.[18]

Under Zia, the government passed four laws in early 1979 to enforce Islamic punishments for various crimes. Known as the Hudood Ordinances, the laws prescribed physical punishments (e.g., whipping, stoning, and amputation) for a variety of sex-related crimes, theft of property, possession of drugs and alcohol, and other transgressions.[19] Zia also introduced interest-free banking based on an alternative system of profit and loss sharing as well as a system of compulsory Islamic tax, the Zakat, which was highly controversial.[20]

Under Zia, a Sharia faculty was established at the Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad in late 1979, and later a separate Islamic University was established in Islamabad with the financial assistance of Arab Gulf states. In addition, schools and colleges revised their syllabi to provide greater emphasis on Islamic principles and teachings as well as on the "Ideology of Pakistan." This concept, sometimes called Pakistaniyat, refers to the belief that Pakistan was created as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims because Muslims and Hindus could not live in one unified state after 1947. The ideology of Pakistan thus enshrines Islam as a fundamental tenet of Pakistani identity. The Zia government informed leadership of print and electronic media that their content should reflect orthodox Islamic values. The government exerted greater film censorship and issued dress codes for women, and government servants were instructed to wear national dress (*salwar kameez*). In addition, the government imposed obligatory prayer breaks during its working hours and encouraged private-sector employers to do the same.[21]

During his time in office, Zia began to posit Islamization as justification for his martial law regime. This effort only intensified as his legitimacy began to falter after he failed to hold promised elections and as the goals of regime expanded.[22] Nonetheless, Zia's attempts to Islamize Pakistani society were

hindered by the military government's failure to appreciate the diversity of Islamic schools of thought in Pakistan, most of which disputed fundamental lineaments of Sharia.

Despite the assumptions of many Western analysts that Islamic revivalism would be more popular among illiterate rural Pakistanis, the trend has been a decidedly urban phenomenon. Cities are the loci for Islamist discourse, and it is there that Islamist policies and actions are formulated by its proponents, including Islamist political parties, their student wings, and ulema. As Mohammad Qadeer has noted, "Urban Islam tends to be relatively puritanical and textual compared to the ritual/folk thrust of beliefs and practices in rural/tribal areas."[23] In Pakistan, Islamic revivalism is often rooted in the newly educated and prospering groups, which tend to have an urban outlook and lifestyle despite their personal piety. Upwardly mobile village families whose members are educated and choose service and industrial occupations are frequently drawn to this exegetical Islamic discourse. After enrolling in college in Pakistan's cities, boys and girls – including those from villages – often become involved in student wings of Islamist political organizations. Whereas in the village they may have voted for one of Pakistan's mainstream parties, once ensconced in an urban, university setting, they are more inclined to vote for Islamist parties.[24]

Currently there is no way demonstrate empirically the impacts of the trends discussed earlier on Pakistanis' views toward Islamism, militancy, or pietism, much less the views of the army. Simply put, although the historical accounts posit a slow but steady process of Islamization of Pakistani institutions – including the army and civil society – Pakistani public opinion polls provide few consistent measures of this finding.[25] Indeed, even if they had included means of identifying members of the armed forces, none of these polls have the sample power to enable any specific assessments of the army.[26]

Islamization and the Pakistani Army

The role of Islam in the Pakistani state remains a highly volatile area of inquiry, with vocal opponents and proponents divided on the notion that the Pakistan Army has become Islamized. It is unsurprising, then, that analysts have sought their own assessments of the role of religion in the Pakistani armed forces. For example, in his 1984 groundbreaking study of the Pakistan Army, Stephen Cohen noted that on achieving independence, the army "moved immediately to emphasize Islam as a unifying force."[27] During both the 1965 and 1971 wars, the government repeatedly invoked Islam to mobilize soldiers and civilians alike.[28] This was apparent in the civil war of 1971, which pitted Bengalis in East Pakistan, aided by India, against West Pakistan. The commander in chief and president of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, motivated his soldiers by declaring the Bengali guerrillas a "kaffir" (non-Muslim) army against which the Pakistan Army was waging a legitimate jihad. Cohen cites one senior officer who told him

that "expressions like the 'ideology of Pakistan' and the 'glory of Islam,' normally outside a professional fighter's lexicon, were becoming stock phrases. … The Service Chiefs sounded more like high priests than soldiers."[29] The value of Cohen's work derives from his extensive access to the Pakistan Army, which included numerous interviews. The disadvantage, as he readily concedes, is that it preceded some of the most important changes brought about the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

As mentioned earlier, Zia-ul-Haq vigorously sought to Islamize the institution of the army, first as chief of army staff and later as president. Deeply sympathetic to Jamaat-e-Islami, Zia began using his post of army chief to distribute the party's literature among the soldiers and rank and file.[30] In March 1976, he gave the army a new motto: "Imam, Taqwa, wa-Jihad-fi-sibilillah" (Faith, Piety, and Holy War [or also "striving"] in the name of God). Rizvi has written that although the adoption of this motto reflected Zia's personal religious inclinations, it was not a major departure from the army's culture, because military education in Pakistan has always emphasized Islamic principles, teachings, and history as well as Muslim war heroes and their battles.[31] Reportedly dismayed with Zia's activities, Bhutto summoned him before the cabinet to explain himself. During his trial before the Supreme Court, Bhutto remarked: "I appointed a Chief of Staff belonging to the Jamaat-i-Islami and the result is before all of us."[32]

After the 1977 coup, Zia began his efforts to Islamize the army specifically and Pakistan generally. As the army chief, he set the tone of the army. His highly visible and vocal advocacy of Islamism likely encouraged similarly inclined individuals to join the army while discouraging those who did not share his views.

Rizvi has identified several developments in Zia's army that had a far-reaching impacts on the role of Islam in that institution. First, Zia mobilized conservative Islamic groups to legitimize his increasingly problematic rule, and he encouraged Islamic orthodoxy within the army. These actions dovetailed with subtle changes in army recruitment patterns, which saw officers coming increasingly from the middle to lower socioeconomic strata and from urban areas and small towns, where conservative Islamic ideology is more prevalent than in rural Pakistan. Thus the values that Zia promulgated in the army aligned with those of the new Pakistani soldier. Officers (and soldiers) were also assigned to militaries in the Arab Gulf, exposing them to ultraconservative Wahhabist teachings. The degree to which officers embraced Islamic conservatism influenced their path to promotion. Although officers' private lives were always under scrutiny, under Zia an officer's piety and religious practices became a part of assessment for promotion. This bias may have encouraged some officers to begin growing beards and eschew the consumption of alcohol. In the past, officers had been known to relax with an alcoholic beverage.[33]

Second, Zia promoted Islam as "an important part of the public profile of the in-service personnel."[34] He permitted key Islamic groups, such as the

Tablighi Jamaat (a revivalist group dedicated to proselytization that avoids political activities), to expand their presence in the army. This decision would have been anathema to past army chiefs. Zia was the first head of state to attend its annual meeting in Raiwind (in the Punjab, near Lahore) – a step that encouraged several officers to openly associate with the group in a demonstration of their piety. In addition, other conservative Islamic groups, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, made inroads into the army and other services. Many officers also began overtly affiliating with Jamaat Islami and its founder, Maulana Maududi.

Third, the 1979 Islamic Revolution had an effect on Pakistan's military and civilian institutions and civil society. In response to Iran's efforts to export its Shi'a revolutionary ideal, Pakistan's Shi'a mobilized against Zia's efforts to render Pakistan a Sunni Muslim state (as evidenced by the way he imposed the Quranic taxes of Ushr and Zakat).[35] Iran backed Shi'a militants, and Iraq supported Sunni militants. Pakistan was soon joined by Arab Gulf states that supported these groups' efforts to confront Iran's proxies. In short order, Pakistan became the site of a sectarian proxy war fought by Iran and those aligned against Tehran. Although the sectarian identity of the revolution was Shi'a, some retired and serving officers in the army were moved by the principle of an Islamic revolution and began talking openly about the possibility of a similar revolution in Pakistan. None, however, could identify the methods for fomenting a successful revolution or for preparing for a postrevolution Pakistan.[36]

Fourth, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan mobilized Pakistani and international resources to fund and field a force of mujahideen to repel the Soviets. These mujahideen were Afghans, Pakistanis, Arabs, and other Muslims from around the world who flocked to Afghanistan to defend the Afghans against the Communists. Although Pakistan had promoted Afghan Islamist proxy groups ousted by Afghan president Mohammed Daoud in the early 1970s, it was the 1979 invasion that brought massive resources into Pakistan, allowing it to expand and deepen these efforts. Pakistan funneled the international resources through a number of explicitly Islamist militant groups to ensure that ethnic Pashtun nationalist groups would not have the resources to mobilize coethnics on Pakistani territory. Pakistan relied on a network of refugee camps, madrassahs (religious seminaries), mosques, and Islamist political parties in the Pashtun belt and beyond to provide foot soldiers and other resources for the effort. These same institutions became the breeding ground for the Taliban, which emerged in the early 1990s. Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi/Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan have their origins in the Afghan War. Some of these groups later deployed to Kashmir following the Soviet withdrawal (with support from the Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence directorate and the Pakistan Army).[37]

Another important development was the use of Pakistani military personnel in Arab Gulf state militaries – Saudi Arabia in particular. For example, the Pakistan Army maintained division- and brigade-strength presences in

several Arab Gulf states during the Arab-Israeli wars, with Pakistani air force pilots flying on the side of the Arabs in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Ramadan/Yom Kippur War. Pakistan also established an independent armored brigade group in Saudi Arabia. While little is known about this force, it is known that Jahangir Karamat, who later became Pakistan's army chief under Nawaz Sharif, served as the first commander of this unit from 1985 to 1988. At one point, Pakistani air force pilots could enhance their chances of promotion by flying with the Abu Dhabi air force. Pakistan continues to provide technical and training assistance to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.[38] The Pakistan Army chose to curtail a larger Pakistani presence in order to comply with the requests of the Gulf States to limit its deployment of Shi'a troops and because of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Cohen notes that Pakistani and Saudi intelligence agencies have historically enjoyed strong ties as well.[39]

The long association between Pakistan's armed forces and Arab Gulf states raises an important – if unanswerable – question: Did exposure to these states and to Wahhabism encourage Islamism among Pakistanis who served in these states and those who interacted with them, including their families? Alternatively, those same individuals could have been off put by the decadence and maltreatment of South Asians living in the Arab Gulf states.

Under Zia, Islamic training was introduced into the curriculum of the Command and Staff College. In lectures by Col. Abdul Qayyum at the Staff College throughout the 1970s, officers were encouraged to respect – rather than mock and deride – mullahs and maulvis (i.e., scholars who had undergone rigorous training at a madrassah). Before Zia, the maulvis' lack of genuine religious knowledge and financially dependent social status had led many Pakistanis to see them as charlatans more worthy of derision than reverence. Zia required maulvis to go into battle with the troops. Qayyum thought of these "clerical" figures as bridges that officers could use to span their Westernized profession and their faith.[40] Qayyum also urged students to base their education on the Quran.

In his discussion of army officer training at the Pakistan Military Academy and other training institutions such as the National University of Science and Technology, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema notes that underlying these educational programs "is a strong grounding in general Islamic teaching including the concept of Jihad. This is inevitable in a Muslim country: the concept of Jihad is an important pillar of Islam."[41] Cheema also writes that the officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army have a solid understanding of the "concept of Jihad, as Islamic ideas have become an integral part of training in the armed forces."[42] Cheema believes that this is necessary because Pakistan confronts a larger, better-equipped Indian Army. The Pakistan Army therefore must rely heavily on a "great measure of moral superiority which encompasses a high degree of professional competence, in-depth study of modern concepts and doctrines of war, better leadership and inspired ideological orientations."[43]

Cohen has written that the Pakistan Army's professional journals contain numerous essays that study the question of the Islamization of the military and the degree to which the Pakistan Army should part ways with the traditional practices of the old Indian Army to achieve greater adherence to Islamic principles. For example, Pakistani regiments adopted distinct Islamic battle cries. The Pakistan Frontier Force began voicing the expression "Nadar Hazar Ali!" ("I am present before the Almighty!"). Signboards remind recruits that "life and death are the same thing: and when the experiment of life is completed, then the eternal life – which we call death – begins." Other boards declare that "fighting in the name of Allah, fighting in the name of truth, is the supreme sort of worship, and anybody who does service in the armed force with the intention of doing this job in worship, his life is a worship" (Photo 5).[44]

One retired officer wrote that the cumulative result of Zia's army policies was the "rise of religious orthodoxy among a cross-section of the armed forces. For this small group, ideology can be stretched to radicalism and takes precedence over professionalism. Their attitude needs to be countervailed otherwise it will erode the very foundation of a cohesive, professionally competent, and technologically adept armed forces."[45]

Despite these efforts to Islamize the army and the state, Cohen found that the changes in the officer corps were in fact modest. (Cohen's fieldwork for his book was completed before the culmination of Zia's efforts.) He also found that while there is an "Islamic presence" in the regimental training centers, it "derives from the Indian Army tradition and is moderate in tone." Further, there was considerable divergence within the officer corps over the role of Islam, which mirrored the divergence of views about the origins of the state and Islam's place in it.[46] Cohen did find other officers who were dissatisfied with the ostensibly sluggish pace of Islamization in the military. For example, he came across a number of officers who criticized the Staff College and army rules as having a "distinct aroma of subjugation suited to a colonial power" rather than "reflecting a true Islamic equalitarianism."[47]

The Pakistan Army, similar to all other armies, has long had the responsibility for territorial defense. During Zia's tenure, however, the army began assuming a new role: defending Pakistan's "ideological frontiers." Zia argued that "Pakistan's armed forces were responsible for not only safeguarding the country's territorial integrity but also its ideological basis."[48] Elaborating on this point, Zia contended that the "preservation of that Ideology and the Islamic character of the country was … as important as the security of the country's geographic boundaries."[49] Although Zia's view was perhaps paramount given that he was both the president and chief of army staff, he was not alone in having this perspective. Rizvi contends that the army's proclaimed commitment to protecting the ideology of Pakistan has allowed the army to interfere in domestic politics when it deems necessary, presumably on the pretext of protecting this ideology.

Some in the senior army leadership who succeeded Zia appreciated the impact of Zia's policies on the army and feared that some members had come

Photo 5 Soldiers from the 57 Punjab Regiment (Cheeta Battalion), 326 Brigade, in the Makeen Valley, South Waziristan, August 2010. Their vehicle, a Hilux outfitted with a machine gun, is used for counterinsurgency operations in mountainous areas but is also vulnerable to insurgent attacks. It is inscribed "God is Great" (top) and the Islamic creed "There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet" (bottom, partially obscured). Photo by C. Christine Fair.

to substitute "professionalism and discipline with Islam-oriented activism."[50] Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua, who was the army chief between August 1991 and January 1993, and his successors tried to push back the politicized Islamic elements within the force and reinstate the tradition of "keeping Islam and professionalism together but treating the former as a component of the latter."[51] Nevertheless, Zia's successors continued to acknowledge the role and importance of Islam within military ideology.

Rizvi, anticipating contemporary concerns about Pakistan's military, argued that it would face major challenges in the twenty-first century. First, it would have to ensure the professional and cohesive disposition of the new breed of

officers who came up during the Zia years and had begun taking command. Second, it would need to maintain the delicate balance between Islam and service discipline as Islamic and Islamist groups continued to develop inroads within the army. No doubt Pakistan's utilization of Islamist militant groups as a tool of foreign policy has fostered deeply sympathetic elements within the army for whom abandoning jihad would be very difficult. Third, the military would have to contend with ethnic imbalances resulting from the overrepresentation of Pashtuns and Punjabis and the underrepresentation of Sindhis relative to their population distribution in the country. Arguably, the army's deep involvement in running Pakistan intensified the need for a representative army. The skewing of the ethnic balance is complicated by privileges that the army has reserved for itself, such as higher-quality schools, hospitals, and other social services that are denied to nonmilitary personnel and their families.[52] The interplay between ethnicity and religiosity has undoubtedly been deeply affected by the ongoing Islamist insurgency, in which largely Punjabi and Pashtun militants terrorize Pakistan's largely Pashtun tribal belt.[53]

Army Recruitment: A District-Level Assessment

The preceding summary of the secondary literature on the Pakistan Army and the role of Islam in that organization is truncated to the early 1990s. The sanctions placed on Pakistan as a result of its nuclear program made it extremely difficult for the U.S. government to garner insights into the Pakistan Army after it excluded Pakistan from its International Military Education Training program and cut off almost all defense ties in 1990.[54] Unlike the Indian Ministry of Defense, which publishes an annual report that resembles a national security strategy document, Pakistan puts out no such documents. Moreover, Pakistan came to view the United States as an adversary keen on shutting down its nuclear weapons program and was not very interested in permitting Americans access to its military.

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan again became (a not unproblematic) ally in the U.S. war on terror in general and the U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan in particular. Before the launch of military offensives in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the United States lifted or waived its sanctions against Pakistan.[55] Concerns about the Pakistan Army and the posited "Islamists within," however, have only intensified over the past decade. U.S. analysts talk about "beard counts" at the graduation ceremonies at the National Defense University and keep track of officers presumed to have Islamist credentials, fearing they may be the masterminds of the next terror attack against India or a purveyor of nuclear technology to terrorists, among other nightmare scenarios.

Although questions about the Pakistan Army are extremely important, data do not exist to permit analysts either in or out of government to address them to any serious degree. U.S. officials – civilian and military – are extremely

constrained in who they can meet from the Pakistan military. They rarely meet officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel, with the exception of those U.S. Army majors who attend the Command and Staff College for one year at Quetta. U.S. defense analysts have told the author that U.S. officials interact with about 100 Pakistani officers at most. They meet no junior noncommissioned officers and no enlisted soldiers from an active army composed of approximately 550,000 personnel and an officer corps estimated to number in the tens of thousands.[56] Cooperation with the Pakistan government, and the army in particular, is fundamental to collecting data needed to understand the role of Islam and Islamism within the Pakistan armed forces, the degree of support for militant groups, and the connections – if any – among support for militancy, personal piety, Islam, and Islamism.[57]

Such support is unlikely to be forthcoming, however. While the Pakistan Army bristles at aspersions cast upon it and takes great care to put forward a modernized face of scotch-drinking generals with a fondness for women, it has not – and perhaps cannot – provide data to analysts to address this issue. The army has not been amenable to actual studies of attitudes among its armed forces personnel and guards information about its officer and enlisted personnel with the utmost secrecy. Some Pakistan military and intelligence officials see no need for studies about the attitudes and beliefs of the officer corps, telling the author that all services screen officers rigorously, particularly when the officers are promoted from major to lieutenant colonel. According to U.S. military attachés, this process involves intelligence agencies scrutinizing officers on the basis of, among other things, their personal beliefs and private lives. U.S. defense officials have told the author that Pakistani intelligence officials will even compare their "beard counts" with those of American defense officials.

Given the importance of these issues, the author assembled a research team to mine a unique – but imperfect – dataset on district-level Pakistan Army recruitment and retirement figures. These data provide aggregates of district-level officer recruitment and retirement information from 1970 to 2005. Recruitment data pertain to the number of candidate acceptances into the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, which is the principle means of becoming a commissioned officer in Pakistan. Data are aggregated by the officer's district of origin, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kashmir, and the Northern Areas – in other words, areas not typically included in federal surveys. The team also had access to district-level aggregates of the numbers of officers who retired from these districts. These data are organized according to the district from which the officer was recruited, not the district to which he retired.[58]

The optimal empirical approach to understanding changes in the officer corps requires analysis of the social and economic characteristics of officer candidates. Unfortunately, our team could obtain only district-level aggregated data, not officer-level data. The data, provided in spreadsheet form, yielded no additional information apart from aggregate counts of yearly recruits and

retirements. Per force, we adopted a "second best" approach that focused on the characteristics of officers' home districts and how these have changed over time. This approach, although limited, does provide insights into the larger social and economic environment of districts that produce officers, including proxies for social conservatism. Equally important, these data do not directly weigh in on the issue of Islamization, even though they do cast light on the relative social conservatism or liberality of the persons inhabiting the districts. Although social conservatism or liberalism is not a direct proxy for Islamism and although these results may ultimately prove unsatisfying, these data offer the only available insights into this important officer corps.

Despite the suboptimal nature of the data, they did permit a unique opportunity to evaluate claims that the Pakistan Army has increasingly recruited from socially conservative areas over the years, even while they shed no light on the characteristics of individual officer candidates.[59] The data, methods, and results are briefly discussed below.

Data and Methods: A Brief Overview

Our team employed several kinds of data.[60] First, we used annual data on the home districts of officer recruits and retirees, as noted earlier, for 1970 and 2005; although again for reasons noted earlier, we could use data only from 1991 to 2005.[61] Second, we used district-level estimates of economic, demographic, and social characteristics. These data were derived from respondent-level data from the 1991, 1998, 2001, and 2005 waves of household surveys conducted by the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS), such as the Household Integrated Economic Survey, Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, and Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey. These include data on education and the kinds of schools used to educate children, economic and employment data, social factors such as rates of contraceptive usage, and demographic factors such as the age distribution. Unfortunately, the data come only from the four provinces of the Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province). The team constructed weights with which we collapsed the data to annual, district-level observations to match the army recruiting and retirement data. We also included other variables that could affect military recruitment outcomes, such as density of military installations, variables on economic performance nationally, assistance to Pakistan that could be used to build up its military, and so forth.[62]

For purposes of analysis, we used only those districts and years for which three conditions obtained. First, we examined only those years for which we were able to acquire and process survey data and only those districts that were covered in all waves of the survey data. Second, we examined only years for which we could create "lag" variables; that is, years in which data for the following year were also available. For example, we excluded 2005 survey

data because no army data were available for 2006, as required for lag effects. Third, we examined only those districts/years for which we have full set of individual and community characteristics collected by the FBS. These restrictions left us with a dataset of 294 observations (three years for each of the ninety-eight districts).[63]

Given these limitations, we view our initial results as a call for more careful analysis, not as a definitive analysis of factors driving recruitment to the Pakistan Army. Such analytical refinement is only likely to be achieved, however, with officer-level recruitment and retirement data along with other key information about these officers, which is unlikely ever to be forthcoming. With these important caveats, this analysis is the first and most rigorous attempt to analyze extremely difficult to obtain (legally) Pakistan Army recruitment data using econometric tools. As such, this effort should have important if limited relevance to ongoing speculation about the Pakistan Army.

Because this chapter is not meant to offer a quantitative analysis, I recount only the relevant – if preliminary – findings most germane to the inquiry at hand. First, the team found that the officer corps is drawn primarily from more urban areas, a fact that has not changed much over the period in question.[64] This finding suggests that the Pakistan Army has not sought to recruit officers from more rural areas in any consistent way. Second, even after accounting for the concentration of officer recruits in urban areas, we found that the army recruits substantially more officers from places with above-average literacy rates. (This is also true of the U.S. Army.)

The Pakistan Army has also expanded the geographical distribution of officer recruitment. Although recruits from Punjab and KPK are somewhat overrepresented in annual cohorts, Balochistan appears to be producing recruits roughly in proportion to that province's population distribution. In contrast, Sindh is massively underrepresented in new officer intake per its share of Pakistan's population.[65] These changing geographical patterns may have important implications for the role of Islam, piety, and support in the army. For example, Pashtuns are often characterized as being "more pious" than other Muslims, although this claim is impossible to verify with current data and may reflect such pervasive stereotypes about Pashtuns held among Pakistanis. Moreover, Fair and Nawaz found that the southern Punjab is increasingly producing officers.[66] As this region has long been the epicenter of Deobandi-inspired anti-Shi'a sentiment and militancy, officers who embrace these stereotypes may decide in increasing numbers to enter service. Although it is impossible to evaluate these propositions with the available data, researchers should design future studies that permit assessment of these issues.[67]

When we controlled for other factors, the "urban" effect diminishes. While officers generally come from more urban parts of the country, this is an artifact of the army's tendency to recruit from wealthier areas.[68] Once economic conditions and other characteristics of the districts are controlled for, the association with urban areas disappears. Moreover, we found that army officers

are likelier to come from more socially liberal districts than conservative ones. We used two variables from our survey data to evaluate this claim. First, we used the ratio of female to male literacy. The greater literacy advantage of men to women was used as a proxy for increasing social conservatism. Second, we examined household education utilization. We used the district-level aggregate of madrassahs utilization as a proxy for conservatism and private-school use a proxy for social liberality.[69]

Finally, as with other armed forces, military recruitment in Pakistan is strongly regionally and socially influenced. Although some changes are the result of growth in certain districts, the continued influence of social factors suggests that the Pakistan Army remains conservative and will change only slowly.

These findings may suggest important shifts that are germane to this study. Given disproportionately high Pashtun representation and the ongoing confrontation with Islamist militants across the Pashtun belt, it is entirely possible that this confrontation has influenced how officers who have served in these areas understand the role of Islam and Islamist militancy. For example, the ways in which some Pakistani militants justify their war on Pakistanis and the state may repulse some officers and motivate them to reconsider how the army has instrumentalized both Islam and Islamist political and militant groups. Other officers may instead understand the problem to be "Pashtun," focusing their vexation with internal affairs on an ethnic group that already suffers racist stereotypes. Still other officers may see an Indian hand behind the groups targeting the Pakistani state and embrace Islamism ever tightly as the best means to ensure Pakistan's coherence as a nation and as a state. Unfortunately, these recruitment data do not permit insight into these questions.

Similarly, given that many officers are now coming from urban areas and given the propensity in recent years of the Pakistan Taliban to target important urban areas such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Lahore (in and around the Punjab) as well as important cities in KPS such as Peshawar and Mingora, the recruitment bases from which officers draw may be reconsidering the threats posed by militants. Such officers may see them as menaces who have turned on their erstwhile proxies and who must be eliminated. Others may see them as Indian agents and embrace more intently the utility of these groups to operate in India.[70]

During fieldwork in Pakistan in June and July of 2010, the author met extensively with military and intelligence personnel. The author noticed an important shift in thinking between those officers who served in the tribal areas combating militants and those who had not yet deployed. Meeting with officers in North and South Waziristan, the author observed that they referred to their domestic foes as "terrorists," whereas those who had not deployed and were training at Pakistan's new Anti-Terrorism Training Center near Mangla Dam still referred to them by the term "miscreants."

The author also observed, however, the debates about whether these militants should be properly characterized as "terrorists" or "miscreants." As

suggested earlier, some officers insisted that India was behind this domestic menace. They point to noncircumcised captured militants, with obvious reference to "Hindus."[71] It is impossible to discern whether the Pakistani military high command believed these individuals to be Hindu (i.e., Indian) operatives or whether this was a ploy to mobilize both the troops and polity to support internal military operations because the actual foe is "Hindu India."[72] Given the high-profile media attention these uncircumcised militants received and given the well-known role of the intelligence agencies and the Inter-Services Public Relations arm of the military to use the domestic media to manage perceptions, both are likely true in varying measures. In October 2009, Pakistan's interior minister Rehman Malik even claimed that India was funding the Taliban, a claim India obviously dismissed.[73]

Conclusion

Historians have examined the Islamization of the Pakistan Army through the Zia period. Yet there is little if any support for conventional fears about the army becoming increasingly Islamist and thus prone to supporting militancy today. Equally important, there is no evidence that this is not the case given the data available to scholars. Even if the army as an institution is becoming more "pious" as a result of the ways in which it both uses Islam within the institution and defines the external threat from "Hindu India," this cannot be used to suggest that increasingly pious persons are more inclined to support militancy. In fact, work by the author and Jacob Shapiro employed here undermines this hypothesis. But because they are based on recent but still preliminary studies or are derived from negative evidence, all of these findings are tentative.

These data limitations should not motivate the policy community to become insouciant about developments within the Pakistan Army. The consequences of radicalization of the Pakistan Army – however unlikely – have enormous import for U.S. national security interests. This study is the first effort to empirically characterize the different environments that produce officers and to illuminate a sustained, important area of empirical inquiry.

The preliminary findings of this study suggest an urgent research agenda. The analytical community must make an effort to obtain data about army personnel (officers and enlisted) and their family backgrounds. This can be done by fielding large national-, household-, or individual-level surveys that incorporate questions about responders' military experience, veteran status, and so on. Similarly, the addition of a handful of military status questions to the census would go far in enabling clarifications of the questions that this essay has sought to address. This study provides a first glance that allows analysts to identify important districts in Pakistan that play an important role in producing officers and thus may provide important insights into how analysts can best capture information about army personnel on a local level. The sampling for such an exercise would have to be multistage to identify the distribution

of military families writ large, followed up with a well-constructed and robust sample.

Such a survey effort would permit analysts to identify officer personnel as well as household characteristics and compare them to nonmilitary individuals and households, and similarly compare officer personal among themselves based on their area of residence. Repeated surveys administrated regularly would make it possible to carefully assess trends and changes in army composition and under certain conditions permit more definitive inference of causal effects. Such exercises would yield important insights into how the values, worldviews, and socioeconomic and demographic background of military families differ from those of nonmilitary families, how they differ across regions, and in which directions changes are occurring. In particular, such an effort would cast enormous light on the role of Islam, attitudes toward Islamism, pietistic trends, and beliefs about Islamist militancy in the single most important institution that sets the course for Pakistan's external as well as domestic policies.

Notes

1 A version of this chapter was published as C. Christine Fair, "Increasing Social Conservatism in the Pakistan Army: What the Data Say," *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 3 (July 2012): 438–462.

2 See Jonathan Paris, "Prospects for Pakistan," Legatum Institute, January 2010, http://www.li.com/attachments/ProspectsForPakistan.pdf. This report derives from an earlier report by the author for Booze Allen Hamilton, under contract from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment.

3 Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

4 One of the most recent pieces of U.S. legislation providing comprehensive assistance to Pakistan is the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, better known as Kerry-Lugar-Berman. This legislation sought to address, among other issues, a criticism lodged by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in its 2003 report (GAO-08–622). According to the report, the government had failed to develop a comprehensive plan that mobilizes all elements of U.S. national power – diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support – to address the various forms of terrorism and extremism emerging from Pakistan. See especially "Section 3. Findings" of the legislation. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ073.111.pdf. For a more comprehensive articulation of U.S. strategy toward Pakistan, see U.S. Department of State, Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report, 14 December 2009, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/134114.pdf.

5 Vali Nasr articulates the process of Islamization as incorporating "Islamic norms, symbols and rhetoric in the public sphere, and in the process, it has had a notable impact on politics, policy making, law and social relations." He notes that while Islamism is often seen as an ineluctable state response to social factors,

political developments, and grassroots pressure from Islamist groups (among other considerations), in many Muslim countries where Islamism has been interpolated into politics, the state has been a key agent proactively promoting Islamization. The state may do so to fortify beleaguered or increasingly illegitimate regimes, to exert social control over restless polities, and to expand control over state resources and policy among other aims. Pakistan, as Nasr notes, typifies this process. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 3.

6 See inter alia Mohammad A. Qadeer *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation* (London: Routledge, 2005); Anita Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986): 21–48; Richard Kurin "Islamization: A View from the Countryside," in Weiss, *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, 115–128; Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*. For accounts of how Islamization has affected women in urban areas, in particular, see Fawzia Afzal-Khan, "What Lies Beneath: Dispatch from the Front Lines of the Burqa Brigade," Social Identities, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 3–11; ; and Naeem Ahmed, "State, Society, and Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan after September 11, 2010," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Karachi, 2007, http://prr.hec.gov.pk/thesis/2511.pdf.

7 C. Christine Fair and Shuja Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 1 (2011): 63–94.

8 Without evidence, Paris writes that "the danger for the army, and for Pakistan generally, is not Talibanisation but Islamisation from Punjab-based militants and their allies." Needless to say, not only is the claim lacking in evidence, but Paris also fails to describe what he means by "Islamisation" and why this is necessarily dangerous. This analysis suggests that Islamists are more prone to hand the country to terrorists. Paris, "Prospects for Pakistan," 7.

9 A more nuanced articulation of the Islamist-militant nexus stems from the factual argument that Deobandi ulema parties have long supported Deobandi Islamist militants, and that these militant groups and the ulema parties (factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)) have overlapping membership. This does not mean, however, that all of the supporters of these parties (which usually pull in fewer than 10 percent of voters even during elections that are most rigged in their favor) support terrorism. Polling by the author shows that piety does not predict terrorism or support for ulema parties. Indeed, if piety did predict support for these parties, one would expect to see much higher support from them. For a nuanced discussion of these issues, see Ahmed, "State, Society, and Terrorism."

10 C. Christine, Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 495–521.

11 For an example of this analysis, see Paris, "Prospects for Pakistan." For a countervailing view, see Fair et al., "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan"; Julian Schoflield and Michael Zekulin, *Appraising the Threat of Islamist Take-Over in Pakistan*, Concordia University Research Note 34 (March 2007), http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/NOTE34.pdf.

12 A notable exception is Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.

13 Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia" in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby,

Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 457–531.; Sadaf Ahmad, "Identity Matters, Culture Wars: An Account of Al-Huda (Re)defining Identity and Reconfiguring Culture in Pakistan," *Culture and Religion*, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 63–80. Magnus Marsden, "Muslim Cosmopolitans? Transnational Life in Northern Pakistan," *Journal of Asian Studies* 67 no.1 (February 2008): 213–247; Magnus Marsden, "Women, Politics, and Islamism in Northern Pakistan," *Modern Asian Studies* 42 (2008): 405–429; Masooda Bano, "Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2007, pp. 43–68. M. Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'a and Sunni, *Journal of Asian Studies* 32, no. 2 (1998): 689–716; Vali R. Nasr, "International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1998," *Comparative Politics* 32, no. 2 (January 2000): 171–190; Vali R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34 (2000): 139–180; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); Yoginder Sikand, "The Tablighī Jama'āt and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal," *Muslim World* 96, no. 1 (2006): 175–195; Afzal-Khan, 2008.

14 This research was completed in collaboration with Claude Berrebi and Jacob Shapiro and in consultation with Shuja Nawaz, who provided these data.

15 Qadeer, *Pakistan*.

16 Christophe Jaffrelot, "Islamic Identity and Ethnic Tensions," in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2004), pp. 9–38; and Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.

17 Hassan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan* (London: Palgrave, 2000): 170.

18 Ibid., 171.

19 Ibid.; see also Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.

20 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 171–172.

21 Ibid.; Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.

22 Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984): 38–43; and Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 170–173.

23 Qadeer, *Pakistan*, 176; Kurin, "Islamization."

24 Qadeer, *Pakistan*, 176–177; see also Kurin, "Islamization."

25 *The Herald*, a prestigious monthly news magazine, has episodically polled Pakistanis on these issues, but it has relied on heavily urban samples. Pakistan is overwhelmingly rural. Sixty-four percent of Pakistanis reside in the countryside compared to 36 percent who live in urban areas (Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook Pakistan, 2010, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html..) More problematic, the magazine has used different questions across the various years in which it has conducted such surveys. The Pew Foundation Global Attitudes Survey has regularly surveyed Pakistan since 2001 – again with an overwhelmingly urban sample – using a somewhat similar core set of questions as well as new questions. The questions are poorly worded, however, and they have yielded extremely high nonresponse rates. Other surveys are done regularly, but respondent-level data are not available. Polling by the author in collaboration with various colleagues date only to 2007. For more details, see "The Sample Truth," *Herald*, January 1997,

141; "Sixty Years, Sixty Questions," *Herald*, August 2007, 87; C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, "Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S." (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace/Program on International Policy Attitudes, 7 January 2008). The author also collaborated with Clay Ramsay, Steven Kull, Stephen Weber, and Evan Lewis on "Pakistani Public Turns against Taliban, but Still Negative on US," 1 July 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf. See also C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (September 2010): 495–521.

26 See discussions in Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan"; and Jacob Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, "Why Support Islamist Militancy? Evidence from Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 79–118.
27 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 37.
28 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 245.
29 Cited by Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 87.
30 Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.
31 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 245.
32 Cited in Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*, 97.
33 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 245.
34 Ibid., 246.
35 Anne Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamization and Taxation in Pakistan," in Weiss, *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan*, 59–78; and Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.
36 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 246; and Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan*.
37 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 246–247.
38 Simon Henderson, "Pakistan, Proliferation, and the Middle East," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy Watch* no. 415 (14 October 1999), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1293.
39 Stephen P. Cohen, personal communication, August 2009.
40 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 95.
41 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002): 82.
42 Ibid.
43 S. M. Rahman, "Motivation: The Ultimate Weapon," *Dawn*, 6 September 1984, cited by Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, 82.
44 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 38–39.
45 Cited in Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 247.
46 Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, 37.
47 Ibid., 96.
48 Rizvi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan*, 256.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 247.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 248.
53 See discussion in Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."
54 For a discussion of this at length, see C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004).

55 For a detailed discussion of the various nuances in the sanctions that were applied over time to Pakistan and for a nuanced discussion of the interagency process that resulted in the lifting of these sections, see Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*.

56 Robert G. Wirsing, "Political Islam, Pakistan, and the Geo-Politics of Religious Identity," in Yoichiro Sato Eds. *Growth and Governance in Asia* (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies), 2004): 173.

57 Curiously, the Russian military was amenable to survey work about attitudes of its armed forces, and some of these results were even made public. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, using a Munich-based polling group in cooperation with sociologists at a Russian military academy, interviewed 615 officers above the rank of major, including 60 generals and admirals. For a discussion of these data, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March–April 1995): 92–93.

58 The core team for this analysis comprises this author, Jacob Shapiro, and Claude Berrebi in consultation with Shuja Nawaz. These data were obtained under highly unusual circumstances, which are unlikely to materialize again. One of the team members, Shuja Nawaz, requested and received these data from Pakistan's General Army Headquarters to support his research for his book on the Pakistan Army, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). The Pakistan Army gave Nawaz this extraordinary access in part because his older brother served as Pakistan's tenth army chief of staff from 1991 until his death in 1993. See Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps." For more detail about the econometric approach, see C. Christine Fair, Claude Berrebi, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Graeme Blair, "Drivers of Change in the Pakistan Army: What the Data Say," working draft, October 2009 (available from the author).

59 For the data to shed light on the characteristics of individual officer candidates, one would need to assume that the Pakistan Army is choosing recruits who are average for their home districts. Given the selective nature of the army, this is an untenable assumption. Moreover, it is important to note that there are significant limitations to the causal inferences that can be drawn from these data. Any link between a district's characteristics and numbers or trends in officer recruitment could be the result of the district's characteristics affecting individuals' tendencies to apply for officer slots, the army targeting its recruiting efforts based on the district's characteristics, the tendency of individuals from these districts to join the army affecting the districts' characteristics, or other external factors influencing district characteristics and army recruiting regardless of whether the two affect each other (e.g., wars).

60 For a more detailed exposition of methods, see Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

61 Because the internal administrative boundaries of Pakistan changed substantially over this period, we recoded these data slightly to follow 100 districts over time that correspond to the 1995 administrative boundaries. The year 1995 was the latest year for which Geographic Information Systems district boundaries coordinates were available. This approach provides comparability across time and geographical areas.

62 The team augmented the data with other variables that could influence army recruitment, consistent with military recruitment models elsewhere. National level

variables, which vary over time but not across districts, include data on gross domestic product, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid, all obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. District-level variables that do not vary across time included district size, proportion of arable land, linguistic breakdown, and the presence of major army installations.

63 These restrictions increase the reliability of our estimates but meant having to drop observations. Because the FBS did not collect data on many of the measures of social characteristics in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northern Areas, these areas were dropped altogether.

64 Note that the years employed in this study are the post-Zia years and likely were after the urbanization of the army was under way. In the early years, Pakistan Army recruitment patterns followed those of the British Army, which relied heavily on rural, landed elites for its officer corps. For a discussion of the historical recruitment patterns and changes since independence, see Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

65 Remember that these refer only to places of origin, not ethnicity. We cannot discern if someone from Balochistan is ethnically Baloch or Punjabi, for example.

66 Fair and Nawaz, "The Changing Pakistan Army Officer Corps."

67 Indeed, the author currently has a survey in the field with Jacob Shapiro and Neil Malhotra that will be an important first step in trying to discern differences in attitudes between military and nonmilitary families toward an array of militant groups and other issues of relevance to this query.

68 The team found that urban areas are on average wealthier.

69 We found a mixed relationship between the economy and officer production. Recruiting likely increases with long-term economic performance because this provides resources for increased recruitment. Overall, recruits are more likely to originate from wealthier areas, but at the same time, they are more likely to come at periods when the districts' economic and labor market conditions are tight. This does not mean that the army is recruiting the unemployed. Rather, when the local labor market worsens, persons of all skill levels become available and more of them pass the recruiting criteria.

70 The author found that residents in the KPK were less likely than those in the other three provinces to support Islamist militants. This may be because the KPK has borne the brunt of the violence. C. Christine Fair, "Islamist Militancy in Pakistan: A View from the Provinces," *WorldPublicOpinion.org*, 24 July 2009, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brasiapacificra/629.php?lb=bras&pnt=629&nid=&id=. Recent work found similar results that were more robust. They employed the 6,000- person survey conducted by Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro in 2009, which relied on an endorsement experiment to determine levels of militant support. Controlling for the level of violence using WITS data, they found that "for each group, there exists a negative correlation between the total violence in the area and the average level of support." See Will Bullock, Kosuke Imai, and Jacob Shapiro, "Measuring Political Support and Issue Ownership Using Endorsement Experiments, with Application to Militant Groups in Pakistan," working paper, 16 June 2010, http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/papers/BIS_2010_Support.pdf.

71 A pediatrician from South Waziristan explained to the author that parents in the tribal areas do not circumcise their boys for fear that something could go wrong.

The lack of hospitals could mean that medical treatment would not be available. Additionally, the Mehsud tribe does not circumcise boys at all. Thus these men will typically be circumcised as adults and only if they enter government service. Author interview with a South Waziristan pediatrician in Peshawar in July 2010.

72 For an extensive discussion of the change of public opinion toward the war, see C. Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Own War on Terror: What the Pakistani Public Thinks," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 39–55.

73 Kamal Siddiqi, "India Funding Taliban Fighters, Says Pakistan Minister," *Hindustan Times*, 26 October 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-funding-Taliban-fighters-Pak/Article1–469345.aspx.