

14 Insurgency, instability, and the security of Afghanistan

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Afghanistan is entering its fourth decade of nearly incessant conflict. Even before this sustained violence, Afghanistan was among the world's least developed countries with few roads and no railway, a poorly developed economy, and an abysmal state of human development by most indicators. It remains so today.¹ The most recent cycle of conflict began in October 2001, when the United States and its coalition partners initiated Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington D.C. and New York. In December 2001, the United Nations (UN) issued United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 which authorized the deployment of a multinational force (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) in and around Kabul to help stabilize Afghanistan and create conditions for peace. ISAF's mandate was extended to all of Afghanistan in October 2003, under UNSCR 1510.²

Since the rout of the Taliban in late 2001, the United States, NATO, and the United Nations have pursued a process of state building along with the Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai. In the intervening years, the Afghan government and the international community can lay claim to several important achievements including a new constitution, the direct election of Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan's president in the fall of 2004, and the 2005 elections which produced a new parliament and provincial councils.³ There have been important economic and fiscal developments as well. The International Monetary Fund reports that inflation, despite some volatility, has largely declined from 13.2 percent in 2004 to 7.6 percent in 2008.⁴ While the real value of non-drug gross domestic product rose by 20 percent in 2002, it has fluctuated unevenly since and the World Bank cautions that "sources of growth are largely temporary and are running into their limits," as reflected in the diminishing growth since 2002.⁵ Businesses have been revived; construction is booming; international banks dot Kabul; cell phones and several other technologies and media enterprises have proliferated.⁶

Despite these gains, the adverse benchmarks of decline and failure seem more evident than the successes. In 2005, the Taliban—once believed vanquished—reemerged as formidable foes.⁷ While their support among Afghans remains limited and geographically restricted to the south and southeast and small pockets in the north, they enjoy sanctuary and an expanding net of allies in Pakistan despite that state's various efforts to contend with the various militants ensconced in the areas abutting Afghanistan. While international military forces can clear territory, neither they nor the Afghan forces they are developing have the human and other resources needed to maintain those gains either militarily or through development. Thus while the international community and Afghan forces have won many battles, victory over the Taliban remains elusive. The result is that the south

and southeast have become increasingly inaccessible to national and international entities since 2005 and the Taliban have even secured pockets of support in the north.⁸

Exacerbating the security situation, Afghanistan is a *de facto* narco-state with the total export value of the country's opium (\$3.1 billion in 2006) comprising about 32 percent of its licit and illicit GDP. Afghanistan supplies 93 percent of the world's opium demand and almost all of the world's heroin demand.⁹ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that in 2007, Afghanistan cultivated some 193,000 hectares of opium poppies—a 17 percent increase over 2006. This exceeds the corresponding area for coca cultivation in Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia combined.¹⁰ Poppy funds the insurgency, degrades the state's germinal financial institutions, and further entrenches the pervasive corruption within the government.¹¹ Under the massive international investments, Afghanistan has become ever more a rentier state: Afghanistan can govern only with internationally provided security and resources, which exacerbates the ever-deepening crisis of legitimacy imperiling the Afghan government.¹²

Against the backdrop of ongoing insecurity, this chapter assesses the enduring structural features of Afghanistan's chronic instability. Many of Afghanistan's problems are deeply rooted in the country's history such as its underdevelopment, weak ability to raise revenue and perennial vulnerability to predatory near and far neighbors. At different times in the country's modern history, its leadership has pursued centralized modernization policies which have inevitably resulted in armed uprising against the state. For this reason, this chapter next recounts significant historical events that undergird the path dependency of the state's myriad challenges. In the third section, the chapter draws out from the historical discussion several enduring sources of instability that bode ill for the country's future ability to achieve peace, including: perennial economic dependence, sustained and deepened military dependence, and inability to sustain a stable and sovereign role within the comity of nations due in part to predatory near and far neighbors. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the current security challenges and the dim prospects for future stability.

Historical lineaments of contemporary challenges

The birth of a buffer state

Afghanistan entered the Eurocentric state system in the eighteenth century, largely under British suzerainty, as a result of a power competition between imperial Britain and Russia as they advanced throughout South Asia and Central Asia respectively. Both Russia and Britain agreed that Afghanistan should be a buffer state between their two empires and they agreed that the Amu Darya¹³ would comprise Afghanistan's northern border. Until the early twentieth century, successive Afghan rulers obtained resources from the British or from Qajar Iran. (Later, the Soviet Union superseded Britain as the main purveyor of assistance and interference.) Following the second Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan achieved some degree of independence while Britain still controlled Afghanistan's foreign policy. In 1893, the British established the border between Afghanistan and British India, the so-called Durand Line, which separates Afghanistan from modern-day Pakistan.¹⁴ Afghanistan represented the outer frontier separating the two great regional empires to avoid conflicts between the two. The tribal areas, now the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, on the east of the Durand Line served as an interior buffer further safeguarding British India.¹⁵

To compensate Kabul for forfeiting its sovereign foreign policy and to ensure its continued dependence upon British India, Delhi provided extensive funding, including armaments and cash subsidy. In 1882, the British granted Amir Abdul Rahman Khan a subsidy of Rs. 1.2 million Indian rupees and increased it to Rs. 1.8 million when he agreed to the Durand Line. When the British and Russians wanted the nearly impassible Wakhan Corridor¹⁶ to become part of Afghanistan to ensure that they would have no common border and thus no border skirmishes, the British achieved Abdul Rahman Khan's acquiescence by increasing the subsidy to Rs. 1.85 million. The cash subsidy and value of the armaments to Kabul comprised as much as 40 percent of the Amir's expenditure on police and the military. Because the subsidy was insufficiently generous for Abdul Rahman Khan to dispense with domestic revenue collection altogether, he used the expanded and strengthened army to increase domestic revenue.¹⁷

While the British built an extensive network of communications, roads, and railways throughout India and while Russia did the same throughout Central Asia as means of extending and consolidating control over their empires, Abdul Rahman Khan demurred from undertaking such projects in Afghanistan. (British India was in fact keen to extend its railway from Qalat and Quetta to Afghanistan.) He correctly understood that the country's security depended upon the difficulty in traversing its formidable mountain ranges. He refused to build modern schools as the British and Russians did in their empires because Afghanistan had no teachers capable of teaching modern subjects. Establishing such schools would require him to import foreign teachers or dispatch Afghans abroad. Because he feared that exposing Afghanistan to foreign influences would undermine his power, Abdul Rahman Khan chose to prioritize Afghanistan's security and isolation above other national goals. Abdul Rahman Khan, with British subsidy, was able to build a consolidated state which his son, Habibullah, peacefully inherited.¹⁸

Habibullah, who reigned between 1901 and 1919, expanded the state and opened the country to modern education. This created the first class of intellectuals who were independent of the clergy. He imported teachers and permitted foreign travel albeit with strict control. He also opened the first college (Habibia) in 1904, which was the first modern secondary school in Afghanistan. Habibia used mostly Indian Muslim teachers. In addition, he opened a military college and placed it under the supervision of a Turkish colonel. Importantly, he permitted the return of many Muhammadzais who were exiled by his father.¹⁹ Many of these exiles had studied in India or the Ottoman Empire. These returned exiles and graduates of new schools formed the first state elite and they became the first wave of reformers. Modern journalism came to Afghanistan during his rule. This was primarily the work of one of the returnees, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, who set up the nation's first newspaper, which became an important vehicle for the country's nascent modernization program. Habibullah also undertook significant infrastructure projects and invested in the health and communication sectors and encouraged trade with Central Asia and India.²⁰

During the First World War, Habibullah tilted towards Great Britain even though he maintained a formal policy of neutrality. He resisted German and Ottoman pressure to enter the war by conducting anti-British activities in British India. His slants towards the British, coupled with his modernization policies and deepening unrest over the Allies' treatment of the Ottoman Empire, drew evermore violent opposition to this rule. His opponents came from traditional sectors of Afghanistan's conservative society as well as from the modernists, who were led by his own son and who were influenced by Tarzi's papers. Ultimately, Habibullah was assassinated in 1919 when he declined to declare Afghan independence from the British.²¹

The constitutional monarchy: 1919–73

Habibullah's son, Amanullah, took the throne and declared independence. While the Soviet Union immediately recognized this claim, the British refused. Amanullah responded by organizing a "jihad" into the tribal areas at the western edge of the British Raj. Amanullah timed this third Anglo-Afghan war to coincide with the Indian nationalist movement that sought independence from the British and the Khilafat movement in India, which sought to restore the "Caliph" after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War.²² Amanullah's foray across the Durand Line resulted in his defeat and subsequent suit for armistice a mere month after the commencement of hostilities. Nonetheless, the British, exhausted by the First World War and deepening disaffection in India, ultimately granted Afghanistan its independence and cut off its ample subsidy. Amanullah spent the next decade trying to modernize the state without British resources.²³

Despite contributions from several countries, the state had difficulty paying for its much-needed technical assistance. In efforts to expand his resource base, Amanullah reversed Abdul Rahman Khan's isolationism and opened the country to international trade and tried to pursue state-led capital accumulation. He worked to develop a professional army, regularized the tax system, and simplified the customs duty and redoubled efforts to collect it. He sold off state land to create a new class of peasant proprietors, introduced a transportation network, and even planned a railroad, which never materialized. He promulgated the first constitution in 1921 which subordinated his action to law and endowed his rule with constitutional legitimacy. He abolished allowances to tribal leaders and other local power brokers and he tried to limit their role in tax collection and conscription. He tried to license *maulvis* (religious scholars) and *qazis* (religious judges) and he undertook social reforms such as expanding the state school system and encouraging women's civic participation. His efforts were given particular impetus by his international travel to India, Egypt, Italy, Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union in efforts to secure developmental assistance.²⁴

While he focused upon modernization from the top, he failed to generate grass-roots support for his controversial efforts. He countenanced numerous revolts by alienated tribal leaders who enjoyed Islamic sanction from the increasingly disgruntled *maulvis*. He fled to Italy where he died in 1960. After his government collapsed, Afghanistan was briefly ruled by *Bacha-i-Saqao* (lit. 'son of a water-carrier'), a Tajik rebel who crowned himself king. Under *Bacha-i-Saqao* anarchy prevailed in Kabul and the countryside. Amanullah's departure created a power vacuum which imperiled more than a century of British policy of maintaining Afghanistan as a reasonably stable, friendly buffer separating British and Russian interests. While the British worried about the anti-British stance of *Bacha-i-Saqao*, his Islamist tendencies discomfited the Soviets who feared the spread of Islamism and religious activism throughout the Muslim populations of its own Central Asian territories. The British supported Nadir Khan's successful efforts to oust him in 1929. Nadir Khan was assassinated four years later and nineteen-year-old Muhammad Zahir Shah assumed the throne. His uncles controlled the government as prime ministers. In 1953, his cousin Mohammad Daoud Khan seized control and became prime minister. Zahir Shah tried to exert himself between 1963 and 1973 but, in 1973, Daoud ousted him, abolished the monarchy, and Zahir Shah went into exile.²⁵

From 1947 onward, Afghanistan confronted a new geopolitical position. In 1947, India and Pakistan emerged as independent states with the former tilting towards the Soviet Union and the latter towards the United States. Afghanistan immediately objected

to Pakistan's inclusion in the United Nations citing its own irredentist claims of Pashtun territory and rejection of the Durand Line separating the two states. (These same issues continue to befuddle ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan.) Daoud actually preferred greater alignment to Washington in the Cold War. The Soviet Union's colonization of Central Asia and its treatment of Muslims there were all too obvious. In contrast to the Soviet Union across the Amu Darya, the United States was far away and unlikely to interfere in the country's domestic politics. However Pakistan was allied to the United States through the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and opposed U.S. support to Afghanistan. In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused Afghanistan request for military aid in deference to its ally's concerns about Kabul. One month later, Daoud accepted the Soviet Union's offer of assistance. Afghanistan had again become ensnared in great power politics with India and Afghanistan supported by the Soviet Union while both of its neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, received support from the United States. Washington made efforts to compete with Moscow in Afghanistan after 1956 but never achieved the same level of involvement in the country until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.²⁶

From 1973 onward, foreign grants and loans comprised some 80 percent of Afghanistan's investment and development expenditure with the government barely managing to pay the rest. Afghanistan became ever more a rentier state.²⁷ Using the increased flows of foreign aid, Daoud expanded his regime without increasing domestic revenue. In fact, taxes declined further in importance. Whereas in 1953, land and livestock tax were a mere 18 percent of domestic revenue by 1958 it declined further to only 7 percent. In the 1970s, taxes were less than 2 percent of domestic revenue. Whereas foreign trade was the principle source of tax revenues, it too diminished in importance under Daoud. (From 1968, Afghanistan also drew revenue from natural gas.)²⁸

During Daoud's tenure, international actors built the infrastructure with Washington and Moscow competing for influence. Washington built the Kabul-Qandahar highway with spurs to Pakistan as well as the Qandahar airport. Moscow built wide roads capable of carrying heavy military traffic including the Qandahar-Herat Highway with connections to Iran and the Soviet Union as well as the Salang Tunnel. This road system helped spur new national markets and labor migration within the country and to neighboring countries. (It also facilitated the movement of Soviet troops and war material into the country as Abdul Rahman Khan had feared.) Daoud's government dispensed foreign aid as patronage to secure the support of favored groups. Because development was done by foreign entities, as is the case with rentier states, expenditures did not follow a development plan; rather, they tended to follow the whims and strategic interests of foreign capitals and the concomitant availability of rentier income.²⁹

Daoud's state-building strategy focused heavily upon building the army to enable him to withstand any armed insurrection by religious or tribal elites in response to his reform program. This was eventually put to the test in 1959 when the women of his family and of the military appeared unveiled at Independence Day. He also let it be known that women everywhere were free to dispense with traditional covering. Unlike Amanullah who capitulated to tribal and religious rebellion in response to his rapid liberalization, Daoud's government responded to expanding unrest through coercion, encapsulation and fragmentation of traditional elites while pursuing a comparatively gradualist approach to modernization.³⁰

Daoud prioritized education. By 1960, Kabul University was receiving students who were often the first in their families to be educated. This created a generation of young

people who were less inured to tradition and more inclined to view change as positive. At the same time, the state incorporated graduates of the state's new educational system thus creating new stakeholders in the state. Two distinct intellectual movements developed at Kabul University. One was socialist and looked towards Moscow for inspiration. The other was based upon the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Daoud was sympathetic to the socialists even though he was predisposed towards a gradual and steady approach to modernization. Daoud was suspicious of the Islamists and he assiduously worked to suppress the Islamists and eventually expelled them to Pakistan. This afforded Pakistan an opportunity to begin using Islamist groups to interfere in Afghanistan long before the Soviet invasion.³¹

Daoud formally overthrew King Zahir Shah in 1973 and declared himself president. This republican phase lasted only five years. His ouster of the monarchy undermined governmental authority for a number of reasons. First, his republican government was not more efficient than the king's. Second, Afghans saw the monarchy as a legitimate form of governance. Third, lacking traditional legitimacy, Daoud increasingly relied upon coercion. Daoud's opponents were often killed in the enormous prison he built, Pul-e-Charkhi. Daoud described his removal of the king as "revolutionary," which only underscored how non-revolutionary his own corrupt regime was.³²

The communist period: the path to war and the rise of the Mujahidin

Daoud relied upon the Parcham (Flag) faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to oust the king. The PDPA had two deeply personalized factions: the Khalq (Masses) faction led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and the Parcham faction under Babrak Karmal. The two factions were riven by deep personal rivalries among the leadership. While Daoud shared many of the PDPA's ultimate goals, his gradualist approach to reform and modernization eventually brought him into conflict with the party. Moreover, Daoud was essentially a nationalist and sought greater independence from Moscow in domestic as well as foreign affairs. He pursued a (failed) rapprochement with U.S.-backed Pakistan and secured a promise of enormous assistance from Iran and the Arab Gulf states, which irked Moscow.³³ The PDPA seized power in a 1978 coup in which Daoud was killed. The coup was dubbed the Saur Revolution in reference to the Afghan month in which it transpired. The Soviet Union likely orchestrated the coup.³⁴

Within days of the coup, Taraki was named the president and prime minister and his rival, Babrak Karmal, was the deputy prime minister. The inclusion of Parcham and Khalq leaders did not address the pervasive hostility between the party's two factions. Taraki exiled Karmal and other Parcham leaders by using diplomatic postings and he purged those who remained in the country. Taraki's government hastily imposed socialism upon the population using extremely brutal methods (including mass executions), which precipitated a strong backlash from nearly every level of society.³⁵

The Soviet Union observed the ever-more sanguinary cycles of violence with growing alarm. In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin removed Taraki (who was later murdered) and became prime minister. Taraki enjoyed the relative confidence of Moscow and Amin believed that Taraki was conspiring to have him removed. Following Taraki's death, relations between Moscow and Kabul became ever more tense as Amin lacked any strategy to consolidate his rule other than terror. Fearing the loss of Afghanistan altogether, the Soviet Union invaded militarily on Christmas Day 1979. Soon thereafter the Soviets eliminated Amin and Babrak Karmal became the president.³⁶

The Soviet occupation had two phases. The first was militarily focused and spanned December 1979 to May 1986, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and concluded that the war could not be won militarily. From 1986 to 1989 when the Soviets withdrew, the strategy was increasingly political and focused upon a process of national reconciliation that would leave in place a communist, pro-Moscow regime. Moscow had hoped that the military intervention would help bring about a reunification of the PDPA and restore credibility to the government. Karmal could never truly become a legitimate president because he came to power due to the Soviet intervention. He failed to bring about a unified PDPA and the majority of Afghans opposed the reform regime as they remain unconvinced that the reforms were consonant with Islam and Afghanistan's traditional values. Increasingly, what mattered most to Afghans was the Soviet occupation. Karmal eventually proved an embarrassment to Moscow after March 1985 when Gorbachev had concluded that the war was a debacle for the Soviet Union. Karmal's close association with the Soviet Union made him an unlikely candidate to lead national reconciliation. Moscow had to replace him to reach a diplomatic solution through the Geneva negotiations. In 1986, Mohammad Najibullah became the president. Najibullah had secured the confidence of Moscow through his leadership of the KhaD, despite its massive record of rural and urban repression. (KhaD, the State Information Service, was explicitly modeled on the KGB.³⁷) Najibullah sought to publically decouple his government from the Soviet Union and blend the party back into Afghan society. His efforts failed and the mujahidin resistance, described below, continued. It was during his tenure that the fiercest Soviet fighting took place against the mujahidin. While his government sought a compromise with the mujahidin, they refused.³⁸

As is well known, the exiled Islamist parties in Pakistan afforded the opportunity to the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia among others to muster an Islamist resistance in the guise of "mujahidin." Money from the United States and Saudi Arabia, funneled through Pakistan's intelligence agency and military forces, funded mushrooming madrassahs, burgeoning refugee camps, and other institutions to raise "mujahidin" to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Because Pakistan sought to minimize Pashtun nationalist aspirations, it insisted upon routing military as well as humanitarian assistance through seven explicitly Sunni Islamist organizations.³⁹ Pakistan preferred to support Pashtun Islamist militant groups, notably Gulbadin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. Apart from support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other national and multi-national organizations, Arab individuals began arriving in theater to support the mujahidin, preeminent among them Dr. Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden.⁴⁰

In April 1988, the Soviet Union agreed to a complete withdrawal under the Geneva Accords. Between 1978 and 1987, nearly 1 million people died unnatural deaths, over 1.5 million were physically disabled, and over 6 million became refugees. When the Soviets withdrew, the state could not function with any degree of autonomy. It was unable to pay for the running of the state with domestic revenue and the state verged on collapse. Worse, while Daoud had institutionalized politics during the democracy period, his coup undermined those achievements and the Saur Revolution tainted those institutions by associating them with Marxism. Najibullah was left with the daunting challenge of reinstitutionalizing political institutions and restoring their legitimacy. Political elites too had changed. On the regime side, traditional authority figures were supplanted by party cadres and militarized militant activists populated the opposition.⁴¹

Under the most harrowing of circumstances, Najibullah managed to retain power until 1992. He was able to do so, in part, because the Soviet Union continued military and

economic assistance, which enabled him to purchase the allegiance of numerous militia commanders. Najibullah sought to reassert Afghan nationalism as the basis of support and abandon the communist rhetoric of the PDPA. (He changed its name in 1990 to Hizb-e-Watan (Party of the Homeland).) However, Najibullah was unable to forge a national consensus and opposition within communist and resistance circles alike intensified. Moscow continued to support Najibullah until September 1991 when, amid serious turmoil in the Soviet Union, Moscow and Washington agreed to cease all lethal support to Kabul from January 1, 1992 from whence the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Without these resources, Najibullah succumbed to anti-regime militants in April 1992. He barely escaped assassination and took refuge in the UN compound in Kabul.⁴² He spent the rest of his life in virtual detention at the compound until he was savagely killed by the Taliban in September 1996 when they seized Kabul.

Various militia factions fought to control the state. In April 1992, a temporary political solution was forged (the Peshawar Accord) according to which the major militia commanders would serve as rotating presidents. Sibghatullah Mujaddidi was to serve for two months followed by Burhanuddin Rabbani for four. Other key warlords such as Pakistan-backed Gulbadin Hekmatyar refused to recognize the government. While Rabbani clung to power for four years, the various mujahidin parties failed to cohere around a single approach to governing and engaged in sanguinary in-fighting which destroyed Kabul and left the country ungoverned and vulnerable to the predations of the various warlords who had become powerful through the meritocracy of jihad. Rabbani's government lasted until 1996 when it fell to the Taliban.

The rise and fall of the Taliban

The Taliban emerged in opposition to various "Mujahidin" and enjoyed considerable popular support at least in part because they provided security, freedom of movement without harassment, and swift justice. While the Taliban were ethnically Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan, their organizational and ideological roots were to a significant extent based in Pakistan although they did rely upon kinship networks in Afghanistan and key madrassahs near Ghazni and Kandahar. During the international jihad to repel the Soviets, Pakistan established hundreds of madrassahs in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to produce mujahidin. The Deobandi madrassahs in particular educated a generation of displaced Afghans who were divorced from their tribal structure and therefore less inclined to acknowledge tribal authority. It was this generation of madrassah students that coalesced into the Afghan Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Omar, a veteran mujahidin commander who previously headed a madrassah in Kandahar. Indicative of their madrassah roots, the movement named itself the Taliban, which is the Persian plural of "Talib" or student. In these madrassahs and refugee camps, many members of the Taliban were exposed to and became sympathetic to Salafism and jihadi Salafism in particular due to the presence of Saudi charities and the Deobandi teachings at the madrassahs.⁴³

The Taliban came into contact with the Pakistan government through their ties with a faction of the Pakistani Deobandi political party, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI, headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman). Rehman, who was an important political partner of Benazir Bhutto, facilitated contacts between the Taliban and her Minister for the Interior Nasirullah Babar. Babar, who had been in charge of Pakistan's Afghan policy during her father's tenure, began providing logistical and other support for the Taliban. Amidst the

warlords' wrangling for state control, the Taliban emerged in 1994 in Kandahar intent upon establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan. The Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISI, Pakistan's external intelligence agency) welcomed their emergence as the ISI had concluded that Hekmatyar could not deliver a stable Afghanistan inclined towards Islamabad. Afghans, exhausted with war and the predations of the infighting mujahidin, generally welcomed the Taliban and the prospect they offered for security and peace. The Taliban worked to re-establish law and order. Various commanders had established checkpoints along the highways to collect bribes for safe passage and some of the armed groups even raped women and young boys. The Taliban put an end to these practices and were widely seen as restoring safe passage along Afghanistan's roads. As they moved out from Kandahar, the Taliban co-opted local warlords and institutions to expand their area of control. The Taliban enjoyed the support of grateful traders and truckers who were long victimized by the warlords.⁴⁴

With massive covert assistance by the ISI, the Pakistan army and air force, the Taliban were able to overthrow the largely Tajik mujahidin regime in Kabul by 1996. By 1998, the Taliban had succeeded in controlling most of Afghanistan. The Taliban formed a religious police to enforce their religious regime and peculiar interpretations of Islam. As they consolidated their power, Afghans began to fear the Taliban, which used excessive physical punishment to enforce their version of Sharia, denied women educational and employment opportunities, and forced men and women alike to abide by their edicts. While the Taliban controlled much of the country, an important pocket of resistance remained under Ahmad Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance in the Panjshir valley. The Northern Alliance enjoyed the support of India, Russia, and Iran among other regional actors who were increasingly concerned about the rise of the Taliban.⁴⁵ Massoud remained the Taliban's most formidable adversary until September 2001.

Osama bin Laden and key al-Qaeda associates took up residence in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. While the United States was inclined to recognize the Taliban as the only viable means for stability which would permit exploitation of Afghanistan's resources and pipelines connecting gas fields of Central Asia to hungry markets in South Asia, the Taliban's provision of sanctuary to bin Laden brought the Taliban under increasing international pressure. Initially, Mullah Omar was not entirely comfortable with bin Laden. He resolved to protect bin Laden following the U.S. 1998 missile strikes to kill bin Laden in retaliation for the African embassy bombings. In preparation for the September 11, 2001 attacks, al-Qaeda surmised that Washington would seek to conduct retaliatory military strikes in concert with the Northern Alliance and increase pressure upon the Taliban to hand over bin Laden. Thus on September 9, 2001 al-Qaeda operatives assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud. Removing Massoud, the Taliban's key rival, assured Mullah Omar's commitment to bin Laden even if it did not substantially deter the U.S. military response which began less than one month after the attack.⁴⁶

During the early months of Operating Enduring Freedom, India engaged in the largest military mobilization since the 1971 war in response to the December 2001 terrorist attack on its parliament, by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), a Pakistan-based militant group. In response, Pakistani forces swung from their westward positions supporting U.S. operations towards India. This allowed Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives to flee to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas where they regrouped and re-emerged as a formidable fighting force in 2005. The United States and NATO were taken by surprise. They had believed that major offensive operations had been complete. Since then, the United States, NATO and the Afghan government have continued to fight a resurgent Taliban.

At the time of writing, there are few prospects of defeating the Taliban as they continue to make inroads and as NATO contributing countries show diminished enthusiasm for the fight.⁴⁷ While in late 2008, the United States pledged to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, skeptics believe that the addition is too few troops too late.

Structural sources of Afghanistan's insecurity

Rehearsing this brief history of insecurity in modern Afghanistan allows one to discern several enduring structural sources of the country's continued instability. Notably, virtually every regime that sought to modernize and liberalize Afghanistan did so perhaps too quickly and from the top-down with too few effective programs to establish grass-roots support for the initiatives. Inevitably, religious and tribal elites alike rebelled against the state and undermined the various regimes. The current and past governments' approaches to state-building and foreign relations reveal several enduring structural features that presage continued insecurity, namely: economic dependence, military dependence, and a precarious geographical location which precludes it from forging an independent position within the comity of nations.

Economic dependence

As the foregoing narrative underscores, over time Afghanistan has become more—not less—dependent upon the economic largesse of other states. Outside support has increasingly funded the state's development. At present, Afghanistan struggles to raise domestic revenue. In 2003–4, domestic revenue was a mere 4.2 percent of GDP. In 2005–6, it increased to 6.4 percent.⁴⁸ Whereas industrialized countries have ratios of domestic revenues to GDP of around 45–55 percent, for least developed countries the ratio is closer to 20 percent. Afghanistan is an outlier even among this group.⁴⁹ The extreme dependence upon the donor community is underscored by the new budgetary structure that was introduced in 2004. Rather than maintaining Afghanistan's old structure, which entailed an operating and a developmental budget, the new budgetary regime called for a core budget handled by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and an external budget, which was controlled by the donors.⁵⁰

Among other concerns, the external budget is essentially unknowable as there is no comprehensive tracking mechanism. (An effort to institute a database of all international investment in Afghanistan was undermined by the donors who failed to report all activities or to update older information.) This means that the Afghan government cannot know what expenditures are made and by whom. In 2005/2006, the external budget was estimated to be 181 billion Afghanis compared to the national core budget of 53 billion Afghanis. The external budget accounted for 42.5 percent of the GDP in 2003/4 and this increased to 55.4 percent in 2005–6. In fact, most spending occurs outside of government channels through the external budget. Currently, domestic revenues cover less than half of the recurrent budgetary expenditures and only a quarter of all recurrent expenditures. (A benchmark for fiscal sustainability, in contrast, is reaching a fiscal position where domestic revenues pay for total recurrent expenditures.) In 2005–6, the external budget (direct donor expenditure) was more than 2.5 times that of the core budget.⁵¹

As noted, past Afghan governments have been to varying degrees dependent upon outside financing. In 1973 (at the beginning of Daoud's presidency), domestic revenue

covered 63 percent of total expenditure even though he launched massive investments paid for by the Soviet Union. In 1979, at the beginning of the communist period, domestic revenue paid for 52 percent of total expenditure and in 1982, domestic revenues accounted for 71 percent. In 2005, if one includes both core and estimated external expenditures, domestic revenues cover a mere 12 percent of total expenditures. Thus, this government is more dependent upon the international community than any other recent regime. As long as aid monies continue to be the main source of revenue, dependence upon the donor community will persist.⁵²

As has been noted, Afghanistan has for the last two centuries tended towards being a rentier state. As the foregoing discussion underscores, this trend has worsened with the most recent bout of international support to the government. As is well known, rentier states are not conducive to economic development or the evolution of democratically accountable governments. In part, this is because being a rentier state undercuts the formative relationship between the governed and the government: the government extracts resources from the public and redistributes them as public services in a transparent and accountable way. At present, the Afghan government is mostly accountable to the donors rather than its polity. Unlike rentier states which are dependent upon national resource endowments (e.g. gas, oil, gems, etc.) which can be managed, Afghanistan is dependent upon the largesse of states which in turn is dictated by the strategic interests of the donors in question and the vicissitudes of their domestic political processes. Moreover, few donor countries can make multi-year commitments, which means that committed aid may never be delivered. The modalities of the current international intervention have exacerbated Afghanistan's fiscal challenges. The international community, dominated by the United States, has insisted upon building state apparatus (especially police and military forces) which the state will be unable to sustain on its own for the foreseeable future if ever. While the international community could sustain those forces in perpetuity, Afghanistan cannot simply depend upon this funding situation to endure.

Since 2002, there have been steady calls to increase aid flows to Afghanistan.⁵³ An influential RAND study contributed to these demands in considerable measure. That well-cited study reported that in Afghanistan, the average annual per capita assistance was only \$57 compared to \$679 in Bosnia, \$233 in East Timor, \$526 in Kosovo, and \$206 in Iraq. Proponents of greater resources have argued that this relative under-commitment is even more egregious when one considers the state of under-development in Afghanistan compared to these other theatres.⁵⁴ Yet it is not clear that more financial investments will help Afghanistan without serious expansion of Afghan capacity. Afghanistan has had poor absorption capacity and has been unable to effectively use the massive aid it has received thus far. Afghanistan's low absorption capacity should caution those who demand even more resources.⁵⁵ To work around Afghanistan's human capital deficits, the international community has tended to employ large numbers of international consultants in the Ministry of Finance and elsewhere. These individuals tend to work for firms under contract with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and similar national aid agencies.

This approach has at least two problems. First USAID (and other national aid agencies) tends to use international contractors which extract large fees. One USAID worker told this author that for every dollar allocated to Afghanistan, some 90 cents go back to the United States. Thus the "investments" in Afghanistan tend to be substantially less than would appear. Second, these schemes have not transferred skills to Afghans. In short, while much needs to be done in Afghanistan, it is not obvious that expanding aid

contributions will meaningfully address the country's needs under the current approach to providing assistance. Quite the contrary, large flows outside of government control or supervision does little to foster government accountability and absorption capacity and does little to help the Afghan government improve budget execution.

Military dependence

Afghanistan, as noted above, has historically been dependent upon outside powers and it has relied upon its strategic importance to great powers operating in the region to extract rents. An important sub-set of this dependence pertains to enduring military dependence upon outside powers. This remains the case today. The international community has been criticized (rightly) for providing too few troops to stabilize Afghanistan since the onset of hostility in late 2001. Whereas there are 2 international soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in Afghanistan, there were 17 in Bosnia, 10 in East Timor, 20 in Kosovo, and 7 in Iraq.⁵⁶ In part to compensate for the relatively thin international presence, the United States has committed itself to build unprecedentedly large, professional, and well-paid army and police forces. Unfortunately, analysts widely agree that Afghanistan will simply be unable to pay for the armed forces being built to defeat the contemporary insurgency over the policy-relevant future, if ever.⁵⁷ As Rubin and Rashid have recently noted, President Karzai decreed in 2002 that the Afghan National Army should be capped at 70,000. However, in 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that the army would be increased to 122,000 and the police force to 82,000.⁵⁸ (The Afghanistan Compact only called for 62,000).⁵⁹ However, the Karzai government increasingly wants an even larger—and less sustainable—security force.⁶⁰ The United States military has largely paid for training the Afghan National Army, which currently includes more than 57,000 soldiers, through Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). In recent years, the United States also took over efforts to build a police force. (Germany was the original lead nation for this effort. Germany focused upon building a national police academy to train several hundred professional and competent officers while leaving the rank and file largely untouched.)⁶¹

This program of building police and military forces has required international police and military trainers who were, before the announced expansions, severely inadequate in numbers and quality. Thus far, both programs have been under-staffed, so limiting the ability of the international community to raise these forces with adequate speed and capability to counter the expanding security threat. CSTC-A has estimated that it had a 22 percent shortage of mentors for the Afghan National Army⁶² and a 67 percent shortfall in international police mentors.⁶³ (With the early 2009 infusion of additional U.S. soldiers, NATO and CTSC-A officials are optimistic that some of these short-falls can be reduced.⁶⁴)

It remains to be seen whether, with the recent infusion of U.S. troops, the international community will be able to build quality forces of the sizes desired by the Afghan government and international community in the required timeframe. Yet there is no doubt that maintaining these forces will remain far beyond the means of the Afghan state under any likely future circumstances. Rubin and Rashid report that current estimates of the annual cost approximates \$2.5 billion for the army and \$1 billion for the police. In 2007, the Afghan government raised a mere \$670 million in revenue (est. 7 percent of the licit GDP of \$9.6 billion). They calculate that if even if one heroically assumes that Afghanistan's economy experiences sustained annual real growth of 9 percent and

doubled revenue extraction of 12 percent, after ten years, Afghanistan's total domestic revenue would total \$2.5 billion a year. Pipelines and mines (if developed), they assess could contribute another \$500 million at the end of a decade. Even under these exceptionally optimistic assumptions, the army and the police will cost more than Afghanistan's total revenue.⁶⁵ This suggests that the international community will have to support the recurrent costs of these forces as long as doing so comports with international security interests. The fate of these forces when the international community eventually withdraws support remains to be determined. For this reason, analyst such as Rubin and Rashid call for a new approach that focuses upon smaller forces and which is more in line with the traditional modes of retaining soldiers. This means perhaps a less professional force but one which the government has some hopes of being able to sustain from its own resources in the future.

Great power politics and predatory neighbors

Afghanistan lives in a tough neighborhood surrounded by predatory neighbors. This has shaped the calculus of successive Afghan regimes since the eighteenth century. Afghan leadership has been all too willing to trade upon its strategic significance for near and far powers to receive rents. These rents have subsidized state-building including development initiatives and building and maintaining Afghanistan's armed forces. This dependence upon outside powers has invariably left the state weaker in the long term and have fostered, rather than mitigated, regime illegitimacy. Near and far neighbors have been willing to subsidize various Afghan regimes in efforts to secure strategic influence while denying such opportunities to their adversaries.

The current government is no exception. Karzai's extreme dependence upon the international community for economic and military support has undermined his legitimacy as a sovereign leader among the public. This has rendered Karzai and the new government susceptible to rebellion and encourages hedging among Afghans who cannot be certain that the international-backed government can prevail over the Taliban-led insurgency. Afghans have an acute sense of their history and of the willingness of foreigners to leave when their interests change or when the costs of staying in Afghanistan outweigh the benefits. Citizens in the insurgency-affected areas face strong incentives to hedge their bets in the event that the Taliban will eventually prevail.

Afghanistan's strategic location ensures that it will remain a perpetual focus of great powers and its predatory neighbors alike. Afghanistan has been the terrain over which imperial Russia and Britain negotiated the limits of their empires and it was the bloodiest Cold War battlefield over which the Soviet Union and the United States confronted each other. Currently, a new "Great Game" is emerging with India and Pakistan seeking to undermine each other's influence in the country. Pakistan continues supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan in hopes that its interests will be protected in the future. India has taken advantage of the Taliban's removal to expand its influence in Afghanistan both to serve its larger strategic interests in Central Asia and to outflank Pakistan. Iran, a historical power in Afghanistan, has also worked to expand its influence and has increasingly provided low-level support to insurgents to attack NATO and U.S. forces. Similarly, Russia has worried about the prospects for a permanent American presence in Afghanistan while it has worked to ensure its pre-eminence in Central Asia. These national actors are in addition to numerous sub-state actors engaging in illicit trafficking of drugs, gems, and timber among other criminal and terrorist non-state enterprises.

With the increasing energy demands in South Asia and the vast (gas and hydro-electric) energy resources in Tajikistan and other Central Asian Republics, stabilizing Afghanistan for pipelines will continue to motivate its near and far neighbors. Afghanistan is therefore unlikely to recede in importance. It is doubtful that a weak, fractured and dependent Afghanistan will be able to thwart the multiple and incessant sources of outside influence of a raft of states seeking to establish influence and access to this country that sits astride South, Southwest and Central Asia.

Conclusion: prospects for future security?

Afghanistan's government structures remain weak and threatened by numerous rivals at the national and sub-national level, including warlords, insurgents, traffickers in narcotics and other illicit goods, tribal and religious elites and outside actors and their proxies. The current threat environment in Afghanistan can be characterized as a "complex adaptive system"⁶⁶ with at least five categories of actors in this system. The first is comprised of insurgent groups who seek to overthrow the Afghan government and force international forces to leave the country. These actors include Mullah Omar's Taliban, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, al-Qaeda, and Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba who have joined the Afghan jihad. A second group is comprised of criminal enterprises including drug-trafficking and illicit timber and gem smuggling. The third category includes local tribes, sub-tribes, and clans. A fourth group includes warlords and their militias. Many of these warlords became more powerful after the ousting of the Taliban because they became U.S. allies. A fifth set of actors includes government officials and security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other neighboring states, all of which assist insurgent and/or criminal groups in various ways.⁶⁷

These five clusters of actors are present in different combinations in different parts of the country. In the south and southeast, the Taliban and narcotics traffickers are in evidence. A central front (abutting Pakistan's FATA) is contested by the Haqqani network, Gulbadin Hekmatyar and several Pakistan-based militant organizations such as Baitullah Mehsood's Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan) among others. In the north, al-Qaeda is active along with Gulbadin Hekmatyar and several Pakistan-based militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba as well as a host of gem and timber smugglers.⁶⁸ Along both sides of the Afghan border, corrupt officials and security personnel facilitate militant and criminal activities.

This system of threats has evolved in some measure because the Afghan government is weak, faces declining legitimacy, and remains nearly wholly dependent upon the international community. At the same time, the international community has provided too few military forces to contend with the growing insurgent and criminal groups operating along the various fronts across the country. For this reason and in recognition that insurgencies are ultimately defeated only by local forces, the international community has struggled to build a large and capable Afghan security establishment—under the assumption that the international community will always be willing to absorb the costs of maintaining these forces.

At present, neither the international community nor the Afghan government can provide security and stability. Without security and stability, neither the Afghan government nor the international community will be able to make substantive investments in the country's infrastructure or human development—both of which are needed for

sustained economic growth. With a still diminutive international presence and ever more motivated regional powers which seek to manipulate Afghanistan's domestic affairs, Afghanistan is likely to remain a weak rentier state that is vulnerable to internal and external threats.

Notes

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- 13 The Amu Darya (formerly known as the Oxus river) currently forms the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
- 14 The Durand Line was agreed to in a treaty signed in 1893 between the Afghan Amir Abdul Rahman and the government of British India. Rahman conceded to its demarcation with various

- inducements. It is named after Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the British Indian government. The treaty granted Rahman an annual stipend and arms shipments. Modern-day Afghanistan rejects the treaty on various grounds, almost none of which are rooted in international treaty law.
- 15 See *inter alia* Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), p. 31; Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 24–69; Barnett Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 45–73.
 - 16 The Wakhan Corridor is the small strip of land jutting to the north and east, bordered by modern Tajikistan to the north, Pakistan to the south and China on a narrow eastern front. At some places, it is fewer than ten miles wide.
 - 17 Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, p. 35; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 35–38; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 47–49, 309–10.
 - 18 Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan, A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 35–39; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 35–39; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p. 49; Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, p. 38.
 - 19 The Mohammadzai is an important Pashtun tribal grouping centered around Kabul. The Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe of the Durrani confederacy in particular has been historically important. King Zahir Shah was a Mohammadzai as were several other rulers between 1826 and 1978. President Karzai is the head of the Popolzai clan of the Mohammadzai Durrani.
 - 20 Frank Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), pp. xviii; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 39–40; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 53–54.
 - 21 Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan*, p. xviii; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 39–40; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 53–54.
 - 22 The Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers in the First World War and suffered a significant military defeat. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) shrunk its territory and influence and the Caliph's status fell into ambiguity. Under the Treaty of Sevres (1920), Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Palestine were severed from the empire. Following the Turkish War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate in 1924 and transferred its powers to the new Turkish government.
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 - 24 Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 55–56; Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 38–39.
 - 25 Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 40–41.
 - 26 Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, p. 47; Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 20–21.
 - 27 Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p. 65; Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 70–75.
 - 28 Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p. 65.
 - 29 Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, pp. 117–32; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 965–66.
 - 30 Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 70–71; Peter Marsden, "Whither the Taliban?" *Asian Affairs*, vol. 39, no. 3 (November 2008), p. 363.
 - 31 Marsden, "Whither the Taliban?" p. 363; Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 75–80.
 - 32 See discussion in William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars* (London: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002), p. 17.
 - 33 Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 59, 118–19; Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, p. 23.
 - 34 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, p. 27.
 - 35 The discord between Parcham and Khalq was due to personal animus between Karmal and Taraki but also due to different approaches to reform. Parcham appreciated the paucity of Afghan bureaucratic capacity for swift reforms and the need for gradualism. Khalq sought to immediately squash the existing order and sought to banish the "backwardness of past centuries" within "the lifespan of one generation." Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, p. 29. See also Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 118–28.
 - 36 Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 169–88; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 118–28; Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 33–36.
 - 37 KhAD is an acronym standing for Khedamat-e-Ettaalaat-e-Dawlati, or State Information Service.

- 38 Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 128–34; Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, p. 85–125.
- 39 See Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- 40 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 57–84; Magnus and Naby, *Afghanistan*, pp. 135–57; Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 184–95.
- 41 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 154–58; Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 97–104.
- 42 Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, pp. 168–93; Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. 146–49, 265–80.
- 43 Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 17–81; Abdulkader Sinno, "Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns," in Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds), *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 59–89; Johnson and Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan," pp. 71–89.
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- 46 Gary Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (New York: Presidio, 2005).
- 47 See Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2008).
- 48 See International Monetary Fund, *IMF Country Report no. 08/72, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Statistical Appendix*. February 2008. Available: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0872.pdf> (accessed 31 January 2009).
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- 50 This external budget includes development expenditures and some recurrent expenditure such as operating expenses for the army, police, health services, education, special national programs and the cost of elections. See Suhrke, *When More is Less*.
- 51 See International Monetary Fund, *IMF Country Report no. 08/72, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Statistical Appendix*. February 2008. Available: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr0872.pdf> (accessed 31 January 2009).
- 52 Suhrke, *When More is Less*. Figures for 2005–06 are taken from International Monetary Fund, *IMF Country Report no. 08/72, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Statistical Appendix*. In 2005–05, domestic revenue accounted for 28 billion Af\$, total core expenditures were 53 billion Af\$, and the external budget expenditures were estimated to be 180 billion Af\$.
- 53 See for example Matt Waldman, *Falling Short: Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan* (Kabul: ACBAR, March 2008).
- 54 Figures are for the first two-years of the post-conflict intervention in question. See James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), p. 239.
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- 56 Figures are for peak military deployments. Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building*, p. 228.
- 57 Seth G. Jones argues that sustaining these forces would be a bargain for the United States and argued that the United States should pick up these costs. From an economic point of view, Jones is correct that subsidizing the Afghan security forces is less expensive (economically and politically) than sustaining a massive U.S. presence. However, this argument does not adequately consider the adverse effects this has for state legitimacy or sustainability. See Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Volume 4* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008).

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- 62 Fair and Jones, "Securing Afghanistan."
- 63 Fair and Jones, "Securing Afghanistan."
- 64 Fair interviews in Kabul in March 2009.
- 65 Rubin and Rashid, "From Great Game to Grand Bargain."
- 66 See Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*.
- 67 For a greater description, see Fair and Jones, "Securing Afghanistan;" and Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*.
- 68 See Fair and Jones, "Securing Afghanistan;" and Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*.

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