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Rational Islamists: Islamism and regime preferences in Bangladesh

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ABSTRACT
Scholars have long studied whether Islam is compatible with democracy. Quantitative analyses of survey data of Muslim polities have drawn from three broad theoretical and epistemological frameworks: civilizationalist or culturist; modernizationist, and rational choice. In this article, we contribute to this discussion by drawing from survey data from an important but under-studied country: Bangladesh. We use respondent-level data from a novel, nationally representative survey of Bangladeshis which was fielded in 2017 to inveigh upon these debates. Our analysis overwhelmingly undermine civilizationalist and culturalist claims. We find considerable support for modernist assertions that education and urbanization positively correlate with tastes for democracy, but we find little evidence that economic standing does. Our findings lend strong support for rational choice approaches to this puzzle: respondents who want more Sharia also prefer more democracy while those who want more secularism actually want less democracy. We aim to make modest contributions both to the theoretical literature on the relationship between Muslims' religious and political preferences and to the empirical base of knowledge about Bangladesh, an important, yet neglected country.

For more than two decades scholars have questioned Islam's compatibility with democracy. While Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" argument spawned this debate,[1] subsequent events such as al Qaeda's 2001 attacks on the United States, the Arab Spring (December 2010–2012) and the Islamic State's 2014 rise to prominence revivified speculation that Muslims – by dint of their faith – may prefer political Islam ("Islamism", "Islamic law", or Shariah) to democracy.

Scholars pursuing this inquiry empirically invoke three broad theoretical frameworks: civilizationalist or culturist; modernizationist, and rational choice. Civilizationalists and culturalists deploy highly reductionist arguments about the fundamental nature of Islam and those who espouse it, while often disregarding the sectarian, cultural, historical, political and ethnic cleavages across Muslim communities. Modernizationists claim that economic development best predicts whether a proponent of any

faith will embrace democracy. Finally, proponents of rational choice assert that regime preferences derive from expectations about the rewards and costs associated with particular outcomes. The empirical literature, reviewed below, offers divergent conclusions depending upon, *inter alia,* the polities investigated, the survey data used, and/or the particular survey items used to operationalize study variables.

Here, we engage these debates by analysing data from a 2017 nationally representative survey of respondents in an important but under-studied country: Bangladesh. There is little political science scholarship on Bangladesh even though Bangladesh is home to one of the largest Muslim populations in the world[2] and is regularly one of the largest contributors of military and police forces to UN Peacekeeping Missions.[3] Bangladesh's contribution to global security is particularly notable considering that it in 2019, Global Fire Power ranked it modestly at 45 (out of 137 countries the organization evaluated that year).[4] Bangladesh also hosts more than one million Rohingya Muslim refugees who escaped waves of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar.[5] While Rohingyas have not figured prominently in Islamist terrorism, both Al Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Islamic State (IS) have identified them as a *cause célèbre.*[6] Bangladesh itself is the site of AQIS and IS competition, both of which have perpetrated several attacks in Bangladesh using local cadres. Additionally, several domestic and Pakistani Islamist militant groups operate in and from Bangladesh.[7] However, as described herein, while tensions between Muslim nationalism on the one hand and Bengali ethno-cultural nationalism on the other have long vied for primacy, Bangladeshis have a strong history of both preferring democracy and participating in democratic politics. Calls by niche Islamist groups, some of which are violent, to end democracy are somewhat new yet enjoy support by somewhat large minorities.[8] For these reasons, Bangladesh is an important country for such empirical probes into the relationship between faith and regime preferences.

Here, we contribute modestly to the theoretical literature on the relationship between Muslims' religious and political preferences generally and scholarship about Bangladesh specifically. Our evidence overwhelmingly undermines civilizationalist and culturalist claims, provides support for modernist assertions that education and urbanization positively correlate with tastes for democracy, but we find little evidence that economic standing does. Our results lend strong support to rational choice approaches: respondents' preference for Sharia and democracy are positively correlated while preference for secularism and democracy are negatively correlated.

Next, we summarize the tense relationship between Islam and democracy in Bangladesh, which foregrounds the subsequent section in which we review the extant academic literature on the relationship between religion and regime preference. We focus upon civilizationalist, modernizationist and rationalist epistemological arguments for the purposes of hypothesis generation. We then describe our data and empirical strategies, after which we discuss our results. We conclude with an exposition of the implications our analysis.

Islam and democracy in Bangladesh

In 1947, the British divided the Raj into India and Pakistan after Muslim League activists demanded a separate Muslim state by mobilizing the so-called "Two Nation Theory", which held that Muslims could not live with security and dignity in a

Hindu-dominated, democratic, India. The Pakistan that emerged had two wings, East and West, separated by the expanse of India. While East Pakistan was ethnically homogenous and dominated by a Bengali ethnic majority; nearly one in four were Hindu. West Pakistan was ethnically diverse but overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. After enduring decades of economically extractive and discriminatory policies as well as military-sponsored political Islam to suppress their ethnic affinities, Bengalis in East Pakistan launched a civil war for independence.[9] Pakistan deployed its army as well Islamist militias, some of which were associated with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), to brutally suppress the Bengali rebellion.[10] On 3 December 1971, India intervened in the civil war, as a consequence of which, on 16 December, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Some three million people died in the conflict, and millions more were displaced.[11]

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) and other elites in his Awami League (AL) adopted Bengali nationalism, secularism and democracy as state policy in the 1972 constitution in direct response to Pakistan's explicit use of Islamism to suppress ethnic nationalism as well as Pakistan's condominium of military and bureaucratic rule that contrived divest those in East Pakistan of political rights. However, as Hossain reminds us, the average Bengali fought Pakistan for survival rather than to establish a secular society that diminished Islam.[12]

Given the popular belief that JeI collaborated in what historians have called the Bengali genocide in East Pakistan, Mujib's government banned JeI, which after 1971 became the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (BJeI). JeI's role in atrocities during the war remains a politically salient issue and explains why many Bangladeshis are charry of Islamism generally and BJeI specifically.[13] [N.B. There are myriad other less politically salient Islamist groups in Bangladesh, which we cannot discuss at length due to space constraints.[14]]

Within a few years of independence, the AL's popularity waned as its government was marked by corruption, slow economic growth, and incompetence and Islam-based Bangladeshi nationalism experienced a resurgence.[15] Islam's political utility deepened as Mujib sought the support of other Muslim countries, the majority of which viewed Bengalis' independence movement as an effort to destroy Pakistan and divide the Muslim world. Desperately requiring these countries' economic assistance, during the 1973 meeting of the Non-Alignment Movement in Algiers, Mujib sought formal recognition and support of several Arab countries.[16] Fearful of losing their aid and alienating yet more of the public, Mujib abjured criticizing Islam and expanded Islamist movements' freedom. Bangladeshis increasingly viewed secularism as being synonymous with dishonoring Islam and tantamount to dependence upon secular and anti-Muslim India.[17] As skepticism towards secularism grew, political parties and leaders competed with one another to be more in tune with Bangladeshis' sentiments and, in doing so, strengthened Islam as a factor in the power struggle in Bangladesh.[18] Mujib was assassinated in an August 1975 military coup which was followed by a counter-coup foisting Major General Ziaur Rahman (Ziaur) to power in late 1975. He remained in power until 1981.

In 1977 Ziaur, to deepen ties with Muslim states, replaced the reference to secularism in the constitution's preamble with the phrase "absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah".[19] In 1978, to bolster his government's legitimacy, he founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as an alternative to the AL. The BNP promoted a Bangladeshi nationalism with an explicitly Islamic character.[20] Because Ziaur sought political popularity by appealing to Islam, he legalized religious political parties after which the BJeI

re-entered politics in 1979. Ziaur normalized instrumentalizing Islam to build nationalism and bolster the government's legitimacy, as Pakistani generals had done.[21]

General Hossain Ershad (Ershad), Bangladesh's second military dictator (1982–1990), further consolidated Bangladesh's ties with Muslim countries and extended Ziaur's project of embedding Islam in governance. He established Islam as Bangladesh's state religion, denervated BJeI's political legitimacy, and appointed two BJeI war criminals to cabinet positions.[22] A popular uprising toppled Ershad in 1990, which ushered a return to democracy after a hiatus of fifteen years.

By 1991, the AL (led by Sheikh Hasina, Mujib's daughter) and BNP (led by Khaleda Zia, Ziaur's widow) had become the dominant – but deeply antagonistic – political parties whose rivalry has frequently been violent. BJeI is the third largest political party today.[23] Zia came to power in 2001 with the help of two Islamist parties, the BJeI and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ).[24] To reward them for being "queen makers", Zia granted the BJeI and IOJ cabinet positions and other perquisites that far exceeded their electoral performance. For similar electoral calculations, Hasina entered into an agreement to contest the 2006 polls with the Khelafat Majlis, another illiberal Islamist group; however, a military-led coup pre-empted those elections.[25]

Hasina won the generally fair 2008 elections organized by the army.[26] Since coming to power, she has used various means to deny the BJeI and BNP political space, including the 2010 establishment of a much-criticized International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) to investigate and prosecute persons suspected of committing genocide during the 1971 war. The ICT has exclusively pursued BJeI and BNP members.[27] A 2013 AC Nielsen poll found that while two thirds of respondents conceded the trials were "unfair" or "very unfair", most (86%) wanted them to proceed.[28] Hasina's relentless persecution of the BJeI has elicited criticism in the west.[29] Such critics fail to mention BJeI's explicit aim to use procedural democracy to establish Sharia. BJeI believes only a legitimate government elected by the people can make Bangladesh an Islamic welfare state.[30] Hasina's approach enjoys support domestically and in neighbouring India, currently ruled by the Hindu-chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), because people recall the rise of Islamist terrorism during Zia's tenure (2001–2016) and her unwillingness to combat them, presumably because she was wary of destabilizing her electoral coalition with the BJeI which many believed to be behind the terrorism.[31]

With Hasina's re-election in the deeply flawed elections of 2013 and 2018, Hasina has consolidated one-woman rule and eviscerated her opposition in the BJeI and BNP.[32] While many writers still use "secular" to describe the AL, neither Hasina nor her AL is secular in word or deed, in synch with the personal importance that ordinary Bangladeshis attach to Islam.[33] To diminish the perception that she is hostile to Islam, she co-opted the Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI) movement, an ultraconservative Islamist group based in Bangladesh's Qaumi madrassas. Ironically, HeI came to the fore in May 2013 when it mobilized thousands of protestors chanting "hang the atheist bloggers", which imperilled her government. Since then Hasina has worked out an array of accommodations with the group, in exchange for not challenging her government.[34] Moreover, through her management of the Rohingya crisis, she has styled herself as an important global Muslim leader. Despite the AL's increasing embrace of Islam since 1971, the chasm between the BNP and AL has not narrowed[35] with BNP and BJeI proponents still alleging that she is anti-Islam and pro-India.[36]

Islam, Islamism and support for democracy

Here, we review the literature associated with civilizational, modernizationist and rationalist frameworks, evaluate them with regards to Bangladesh' history, and develop hypotheses for subsequent testing.

Clash of civilizations and cultures

Since the 1990s, scholars have advanced various essentialist claims that Islam and democracy are incompatible galvanized by Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations".[37] Huntington's civilizationalist view, as well as similar cultural reductionist arguments espoused by culturalists, asserts that Islam over-determines Muslims' regime preferences and that Islamic theology and culture, variously defined, are inherently undemocratic.[38] This thesis posits an "inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts" which precipitated "the general failure of liberal democracy to take hold in the Islamic world".[39]

Others repudiate this claim empirically and by observing that the political role of Islam has varied over time and thus is unlikely to be inherently or immutably hostile to democracy.[40] Additionally, public opinion studies consistently find high support among Muslims for democracy even though the countries in which they reside may not be democratic and even though they may not agree that democracy is the best way to advance stability in their countries.[41]

This debate about the nature of Islam itself is closely tied to another body of contentious literature asserting that preferences for political Islam, also referred to as Islamism or Shariah, dictate regime preferences. Political Islam, in contrast to Islam, is a religio-political movement rooted in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century which tends to rejects democratic governance in preference to an Islamic state whose legal framework is based upon some understanding of Sharia (Islamic law) or even explicit demands for a caliphate (Islamic state founded upon particular understandings of Islamic law).[42] Social scientists have eviscerated these claims as well.[43] Stepan and Linz observe there is no Muslim-majority democracy that has established Shariah as its legal code, even if some of Muslim-majority countries employ some version of Sharia in matters of family law.[44]

Bangladesh generally comports with this observation. In 2005, a High Court ruled that Ershad's 1988 Eighth Amendment, which declared Islam as Bangladesh's official state religion, was illegal. This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court and the parliament subsequently amended the Constitution to restore secularism. However, the Constitution still identifies Islam as the state religion.[45] More generally, Bangladesh came into the international system with significant experience with democracy. The British used Bengal as the base of its empire from the seventeenth century until the early twentieth century. British efforts to develop democratic institutions in Bengal meaningfully began in 1861 with the Bengal Legislative Counsel. The 1935 Government of India Act expanded the Bengal Legislature which became the largest bicameral assembly in British India with separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims. The first elections for this restructured assembly took place in 1937. Moreover, Bengali Muslims in what became east Pakistan enthusiastically participated in the Muslim League, which secured Pakistan's formation. These imperfect democratic institutions predate the vivisection of South Asia into Pakistan and India. Finally, there have been few meaningful

calls for Sharia with any degree of popular support.[46] The empirical scholarship repudiating Huntington and the specifics of Bangladesh' history proffer two hypotheses.

H_1 = Individual piety (i.e. dedication to the tenets and practices of Islam) will be uncorrelated to support for democracy.

H_2 = Individual support for political Islam will be uncorrelated with support for democracy.

Modernization theory

Modernization theorists generally posit that modernizing processes (e.g. industrialization, urbanization, higher educational attainment) augur religious decline and concomitant ascension of secular and liberal values that are conducive to democracy. Proponents of this thesis contend that economic development facilitates the twinned transitions from traditionalist to modern and from religious to secular. Several studies provide various degrees of support for this argument: Cifti finds that modernization variables best account for public support for democracy in Muslim countries;[47] Jamal, using survey data from Egypt and Jordan, concludes that support for Islamism rather than democracy is driven by poor socio-economic conditions;[48] while Benstead, using Arab Barometer data from Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and Yemen conducted in 2006 and 2008 found mixed support for modernization theories. While results from Morocco, Yemen, and Lebanon buttressed modernization theory, Muslim identity and values predict attitudes inconsistently and sometimes in unexpected directions: in Lebanon, Shi'a Muslims are more likely than Christians to view democracy as suitable while, in Jordan, Christians are more likely than Muslims to view democracy as suitable, consistent with cultural and civilizational theories.[49]

Kostenko, Kuzmichev and Ponarin use Arab Barometer data for Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon and Yemen collected between Spring 2006 and Fall 2007 to study the individual determinants of support for democracy and gender equality. They found that individuals' support for democracy and gender egalitarianism had little correlation. They surmise that two simultaneous processes exist in the countries they studied, namely "On the one hand, people are getting more educated, urbanized, etc., which means the continuation of modernization. On the other hand, the fact that older people are the most liberal age group may point to a certain retrogression of social values in the younger generations".[50]

Evaluating these factors with respect to Bangladesh specifically, Bangladesh is undergoing rapid urbanization: in 1974, only 8.78% lived in urban while in 2011, 27.66% were in urban areas. By 2017, 36% of Bangladeshis lived in urban areas.[51] This urbanization has resulted in a "mix of urban-rural functions and traits in both metropolitan cities and rural towns as well as in villages".[52] Bangladesh has also exhibited great strides in various aspects of human development. Between 1990 and 2017, GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$) increased from $310 to $1470.[53] In the same period, life expectancy at birth increased from 58.4 to 72.8 years[54] and the mean years of schooling increased from 2.8 years to 5.8 years.[55]

Modernization theory suggests three testable hypotheses:

H_3: Persons who live in urban areas are more likely to support democracy.

H_4: Persons with greater educational attainment are more likely to support democracy.

H_5: Persons with higher economic standing are more likely to support democracy.

Rational believers

Another body of scholarship embraces a rational choice view of religion and derivative preferences.[56] There are few notable studies which employ this framework using respondent-level data to explain what relationship exists – if any – between religious and political preferences. Baydes and Linzer problematically inventory a litany of practices which range from imposing limitations upon female mobility (i.e. veiling, requiring the women to have male escorts in public) to causing extreme physical harm and even death such as honour killing and feminine genital mutilation. They observe that many Muslim women support and identify with what they label "fundamentalist Islamic social and political movements that promote these practices and beliefs" and even participate willingly in them.[57] They use respondent-level data from the World Values Survey to identify the lineaments of female support for such practices. They find that women with limited economic opportunities are more likely to espouse these belief systems and practices because they materially enhance their value as a marital partner.[58]

Maseland and van Hoorn use a rational choice framework to explain an often-posited paradox: if Muslims evidence such generally high stated preferences for democracy in opinion polls, why is there so little democracy in Muslim countries?[59] They assert that there is, in fact, no paradox, and that the appearance of one arises from scholars who mistake "marginal preferences (the preference for increasing satiation of an objective given current levels of satiation) for attitudes (the preference for satiating the objective in general)".[60] In other words, persons who live in democracies experience a diminishing marginal utility of democracy. In contrast, persons who live in democracy-deprived countries experience no such diminishing value. Consequently, it should not be a surprise that persons who reside in non-democratic, Muslim-majority states will have a higher marginal preference for it relative to those living in democracies and thus their stated preference for democracy merely reflects their relative deprivation of it.

An alternative explanation: Bangladesh's rational Islamists?

The insights of Maseland and van Hoorn, coupled with the existential fight between the AL on the one hand and the BJeI and the BNP on the other, suggest an alternate relationship between observable preferences for Islamism and procedural aspects of democracy. Specifically, as exposited above, Hasina has relentlessly denied the BJeI and the BNP access to competitive democratic elections since coming to power in 2008 while co-opting Islamist groups like HeI which do not contest elections. An individual who supports her may also embrace her anti-democratic efforts to deny the BNP and BJeI political space, fearing what Hasina has dubbed a return of the "terrorists of BNP-Jamaat".[61] If there were a truly competitive electoral environment, the BJeI and BNP would be able to regain some of their political standing.

Conversely, those who support the explicitly Islamist nationalism of the BJeI and BNP, all else equal, may prefer procedural democracy in which their vote counts and in which parties that best represent their interests can participate without handicap. In other words, for AL supporters, procedural democracy has diminishing margins of return; while for those who embrace stronger political associations with Islam – especially the BJeI which wants to use democracy to undermine democracy – it does not. Note that this is a very different kind of argument than that advanced by Driessen

whose analysis of ten Muslim-majority countries, excluding Bangladesh, finds broad support for some kind of Sharia law plus democracy.[62]

This alternative explanation is not unique to Hasina's supporters who support her nondemocratic efforts to eviscerate the BNP and BJeI. In the United States, several scholars have observed that Republicans' preference for autocracy has increased in recent years. In contrast to popular narratives that have reduced support for President Trump to economic deprivations, several scholars have linked these preferences to white Americans' perception that they are losing their dominant group status. For those who dread the decline of white race privilege, truly competitive elections may result in institutions that are more representative of racial and religious minorities.[63]

This literature generally, and the particulars of Bangladesh's political history, gives rise to two final testable hypotheses,.

H_{6a}: Preferences for Islamism should be positively correlated with preferences for democracy.

H_{6b}: Preferences for secularism should be negatively correlated with preferences for democracy.

Data and methods

We use data from a face-to-face, nationally-representative survey of 4067 persons in Bangladesh, fielded in Bangla (Bangladesh' nation language), by gender-appropriate teams, under IRB supervision on behalf of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and executed by the RESOLVE NETWORK, under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The survey effort was led by two co-principle investigators (Ali Riaz and C. Christine Fair), who developed the instrument, oversaw the quality control of the translation, identified and worked with a highly regarded Bangladeshi survey firm (which wishes to remain un-named) to conduct focus groups about the instrument and pre-test it to ensure that it performed as expected. The instrument collected demographic information for the respondents as well as their beliefs about an array of issues including religion, governance, and violent extremism. The survey was fielded in April 2017, which was a tumultuous period in the country, which made collecting some kinds of data difficult if not impossible (e.g. the firm demurred from asking some kinds of questions altogether).[64]

The firm used a stratified random sampling design that was nationally representative at the levels of Bangladesh's eight division. At the division-level, the samples were evenly split by gender with a 75/25 rural-urban split, and proportionate to population and religion, per the 2011 Census.[65] The survey response rate was 70%, which accords with similar surveys in Bangladesh. Initially, the firm planned to attain a sample of 8000 respondents. Nearly halfway through the survey effort, local authorities objected to specific survey questions and demanded their removal. The team decided to discontinue further enrolments both for scientific reasons and because the distribution of the sample that had been collected was representative of the eight administrative divisions with reference to gender, religion, and urban/rural residence. Note that the survey excluded questions about support for Islamist parties despite the team's interest because the firm feared antagonizing the government. The original margin of error for the survey with a sample size of 8000 was about 1.10% at a 5% level of significance. The margin of error for the reduced sample was 1.54% at a 5% level of significance. While the resultant sample is smaller than planned, it is still four times larger than other publicly available surveys, including Pew's Global Attitudes Survey.[66]

Variable instrumentalization

To measure support for procedural democracy, we developed four dependent variables employed by Freedom House.[67] The first (Preferred Democracy Index) is an additive index from five survey items which asks respondents to rank how important it is for them to live in a country that is governed by elected representatives, where court decisions are independent of political influence, where people are free to express their political views, where people can assemble to discuss political issues, and where property rights are secure. This Preferred Democracy Index ranges from 0 to 20, where higher numerical values indicate higher support for democratic procedures and principles (Appendix A).

The second is an additive index variable that indicates preferences for civilian control over the military, which is important given Bangladesh's experience with military coups. This index draws from two survey items which ask respondents how much control civilians should exert over the military and the circumstances under which the military should oust civilians from governance. Unlike the other dependent variables which we use in this analysis, we created this dependent variable by taking the average of two survey questions because the questions were initially on a different scale. This index ranges from zero to one with higher numerical values indicating a higher preference for civilian control of the military (Appendix A).

Third, we created a variable (Democracy Perception Index) to assesses the degree to which respondents believe that the conditions present in Bangladesh accord with the democratic procedures identified in the Preferred Democracy Index. This index draws from five questions about the degree to which respondents believe that: Bangladesh is governed by elected representatives, court decisions are independent of political influence, people can express their political views and assemble to discuss political issues, and where property rights are secure. We summed the responses to these questions to create a democracy perception index for each respondent ranging from 0 to 20, where higher numerical values indicate higher perception of democracy (Appendix A).

Fourth, we created an index which measures respondent dissatisfaction with the level of perceived procedural democracy. We created this index by subtracting the respondent's score for democracy perception from the respondent's score for democracy preference (Appendix A). This variable ranges from −20 to 20 with negative values indicating that respondents want less democracy than they perceive and positive values indicating that respondents want more democracy than they perceive.

To evaluate H_1 we created an additive piety index from four survey items (Appendix A) that asks respondents about attendance of Quran study classes, individual and congregational prayer frequency, and praying Tahajjud Namaz (a voluntary prayer). This index value is scaled from 0 to 1 (higher values indicate higher piety).

To evaluate H_2 and H_{6a} we used the following survey item: "Seeing the current situation in Bangladesh, what role do you think Sharia (or Islamic law) should play in Bangladesh law?" Responses range from zero ("No Role at All") to five ("Much larger role"). This survey item does not tell us what respondents *believe* Sharia to be. To understand what they believe Sharia to be, we follow the approach taken by Fair, Littman and Nugent (2018),[68] Fair, Hamza and Heller (2017)[69] and Ciftci, O'Donnell, and Tanner (2017)[70] who argue for several distinct measures of Sharia. First, we created an additive index derived from four survey items which measure respondent beliefs about Sharia as physical (Hudood punishments). We rescaled responses to these questions from 0 to 1,

where 0 represents complete opposition to Hudood punishment and 1 represents absolute preference for Hudood. We subsequently combined these responses by taking the respondent mean for each and adding them. The Sharia as Hudood variable is coded from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more support for use of physical punishment (Appendix A).

We developed a second measure reflecting respondent beliefs that Sharia imposes restrictions upon women by adding the average respondent value to questions that frame Sharia as restricting women (Appendix A). This variable ranges from zero to one, with higher values indicating beliefs about Sharia as imposing higher restrictions on women.

Our final variables measures respondent beliefs that Sharia pertain to good governance.[71] These questions asked respondents to indicate whether they believed Sharia is about providing government services, corruption-free governance, personal security and access to justice through non-corrupt courts. To create this index, we employed values from four questions (Appendix A). We rescaled this variable to 0 if respondents disagree with all the statements relating Sharia to aspects of good governance and 1 if they agree with the statements.

Notably these indices are very similar to the attributes that BJeI ascribes to the Islamic state it seeks to establish per its manifesto.

To evaluate H_3 through H_5, we use several demographic variables regarding respondent's rural or urban residence, educational attainment, perceived economic well-being to proxy income, and expenditures in the previous month. We use this instead of a direct question about income as respondents are likely to dissemble when asked directly about income (Appendix A).

To evaluate H_{6a} we create an additive index from two survey items (Appendix A) to measure respondent preference to exclude religious leaders from governance and legal disputes. It ranged from zero to one (higher values indicate greater preferences for secularism).

Model estimation

We estimate four models, using three measures of preference for democratic governance. In Model 1, our dependent variable is the preferred level of democracy. In Model 2, our dependent variable measures preference for civilian control over the military. In Model 3, our dependent variable reflects perceived levels of democracy. In Model 4, our dependent variable is respondent dis/satisfaction with the level democracy they perceive relative to their preferred level of democracy.

We estimate all models using Ordinary Least Squares regression with fixed division effects and division-clustered standard errors, using survey weights from the firm. Our independent variables include: indices for secularism, preferred level of Sharia, Sharia as hudood, Sharia as restrictions upon women, Sharia as good governance, piety, educational attainment, rural or urban residence, and a measure of economic well-being. We have two measures for economic well-being: perceived economic standing and respondent monthly expenditures (a proxy for income). Because we found these two measures to be weakly correlated, we estimated two sets of models, each using one measures. We estimated a third model with both measures. We estimate all models using age, gender, and whether or not the respondent attended a religious seminary (Quami or Aaliya madrassah). Summary statistics for all variables are in Tables 1 and 2.

We use the below formula to estimate all models:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1*Piety + \beta_2*Hudood + \beta_3*Restriction\ Women + \beta_4*Good\ Goveranc$$
$$+ \beta_5*Rural + \beta_6*Education + \beta_7*Economic\ Well\ Being + \beta_8*Preferred\ Sharia$$
$$+ \beta_9*Secularism + Controls + Division\ Fixed\ Effects + \epsilon$$

We provide the estimates for these models in Tables 3 and 4. (Table B1 with both measures of economic well-being is in Appendix B).

Discussion of results

Across all models and all specifications of the models, our findings undermine reductionist/civilizational assertions. We find no evidence that personal piety influences support for democratic practice (H_1); however, we found that those who believe that Sharia is understood as Hudood punishments have higher tastes for procedural democracy (H_2) in all specifications of Model 1. Additionally, preferences for Sharia and democracy are significantly and positively correlated in all specifications of Model 1 (H_{6a}). These findings are consistent with the "rational Islamist" proposition that supporters of the BJeI and BNP may prefer more procedural democracy for the political opportunities it would afford their preferred parties. We find no correlation between the notion of Sharia as Hudood and preferences for civilian control over the military; or with the perception of how democratic Bangladesh is; or level of dissatisfaction with the state of democracy.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables.

	Minimum	Maximum	Median	Mean	Standard Deviation
Democracy Index	3	20	17.0	16.51	3.11
Civilian Control Over Military	0	1	0.6	0.62	0.17
Perceived Democracy Index	0	20	11.0	10.44	4.42
Democracy Dissatisfaction Index	−10	20	6.0	6.08	5.12
Observations	3350				

Source: In-house manipulation of survey data.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of independent and control variables.

	Minimum	Maximum	Median	Mean	Standard Deviation
Piety Index	0	1	0.2	0.25	0.21
Sharia as Hudood	0	1	0.8	0.74	0.26
Sharia as Restriction to Women	0	1	1.0	0.71	0.37
Sharia as Good Governance	0	1	1.0	0.87	0.26
Rural (Urban = 0)	0	1	0.0	0.42	0.49
Education	0	8	1.0	1.68	1.64
Perceived Relative Economic Standing	1	5	2.0	2.44	1.12
Monthly Expenditure	0	362000	5000.0	7032.54	12087.90
Preferred Amount of Sharia	0	5	4.0	4.15	1.05
Secularism Index	0	1	0.3	0.30	0.25
Age	18	88	35.0	37.94	13.93
Female (Male = 0)	0	1	1.0	0.50	0.50
Attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah	0	1	0.0	0.07	0.25
Observations	3350				

Source: In-house manipulation of survey data.

Table 3. Regression with fixed effects results (division clustered standard errors) – with perceived income.

	(1) Preferred Democracy Index	(2) Civilian Control Over Military	(3) Democracy Perception Index	(4) Democracy Dissatisfaction
Culturalist/Civilizationist Theory				
Piety Index	−0.34	−0.01	0.29	−0.64
	(0.29)	(0.03)	(0.57)	(0.70)
Sharia as Hudood	0.81***	0.02	0.37	0.44
	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.48)	(0.56)
Sharia as Restriction to Women	−0.29	0.04	−0.34	0.04
	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.66)	(0.77)
Sharia as Good Governance	0.54	−0.02	−0.11	0.64
	(0.29)	(0.03)	(0.43)	(0.52)
Modernization Theory				
Rural (Urban = 0)	−0.57*	−0.03	0.21	−0.78
	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.62)	(0.61)
Education	0.16*	0.00	−0.13	0.30*
	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Perceived Relative Economic Standing	0.10~	−0.00	0.25~	−0.14
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Rational Choice Theory				
Preferred Amount of Sharia	0.54**	0.01*	−0.21	0.75***
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Secularism Index	−1.17~	−0.01	−0.09	−1.08
	(0.60)	(0.03)	(1.02)	(0.61)
Controls				
Age	0.02***	0.00	−0.01	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Male = 0)	−1.25**	−0.03	−0.40	−0.85
	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.81)	(0.74)
Attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah	0.38~	−0.00	−0.01	0.39
	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.42)	(0.39)
Constant	13.76	0.57	12.04	1.72
	(0.70)	(0.09)	(1.38)	(1.19)
Observations R^2	3350	3350	3350	3350
	0.19	0.04	0.05	0.13

Notes: ~Significant at the 0.1 level; *at the 0.05 level; **at the 0.01 level; ***at the 0.001 level.
Source: In−house manipulation of survey data.

Turning to the three hypotheses from modernizationist theory, we find limited support for the posited relationships. With respect to H_3, we find that those who live in rural areas prefer less democracy (Model 1) in all specifications (0.05 level). While our data do not permit greater exposition, this finding may be related to some variant of Jensen and Skaaning's observation that at lower levels of ethnic fractionalization, modernization has a stronger effect on democratization than in areas with greater ethnic fractionalization. In Bangladesh, factionalization along patrilineal kinship ties will be stronger in rural areas.[72] We also find education levels to positively correlate (H_4) with preference for procedural democracy (Model 1, all specifications. 0.05 or 0.01 level) and greater dissatisfaction with the level of democracy (Model 4, all specifications, at the 0.05 level). We find tentative support for H_5's posited positive correlation between relative socio-economic standing and taste for democracy (Model 1, Table 3 and Table B1) and level of perceived democracy (Model 3, Table 3 and Table B1, at the incautious 0.1 level). We find no relationship between the four dependent variables using expenditures, which may be due to respondents' inaccurate recall of expenditures.

Turning to the final hypotheses drawn from rational choice frameworks, we find considerable support for H_{6a} which holds that those who want more Sharia – such

Table 4. Regression with fixed effects results (division clustered standard errors) – with income proxy

	(1) Preferred Democracy Index	(2) Civilian Control Over Military	(3) Democracy Perception Index	(4) Democracy Dissatisfaction
Culturalist/Civilizationist Theory				
Piety Index	−0.32	−0.01	0.36	−0.68
	(0.28)	(0.03)	(0.55)	(0.67)
Sharia as Hudood	0.83***	0.02	0.37	0.47
	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.47)	(0.55)
Sharia as Restriction to Women	−0.29	0.04	−0.33	0.04
	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.67)	(0.77)
Sharia as Good Governance	0.52	−0.02	−0.12	0.64
	(0.29)	(0.03)	(0.43)	(0.52)
Modernization Theory				
Rural (Urban = 0)	−0.55*	−0.03	0.26	−0.81
	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.65)	(0.63)
Education	0.18**	0.00	−0.09	0.27*
	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Monthly Expenditure	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rational Choice Theory				
Preferred Amount of Sharia	0.55**	0.01*	−0.20	0.74***
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Secularism Index	−1.18~	−0.01	−0.12	−1.07
	(0.60)	(0.03)	(1.01)	(0.61)
Controls				
Age	0.02***	0.00	−0.01	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Male = 0)	−1.21**	−0.03	−0.36	−0.84
	(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.79)	(0.72)
Attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah	0.40~	−0.00	0.02	0.38
	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.42)	(0.39)
Constant	13.90	0.57	12.50	1.39
	(0.65)	(0.08)	(1.42)	(1.34)
Observations R^2	3350	3350	3350	3350
	0.19	0.04	0.04	0.13

Notes: ~Significant at the 0.1 level; *at the 0.05 level; **at the 0.01 level; ***at the 0.001 level.
Source: In-house manipulation of survey data.

as those who support the BJeI and their allies – also want more procedural democracy. As already noted in evaluating H_2, we find that preference Sharia and procedural democracy are positively and significantly correlated (Model 1, all specifications, 0.01 level). Preferences for Sharia are positively correlated with desire for civilian control over the military (Model 2, all specifications, 0.05 level), greater dissatisfaction with the actual state of democracy, and desire for more democracy than exists (Model 4, all specifications, 0.001 level) which is consistent with the "rational Islamist" concept.

We find only weak evidence for H_{6b}. While secular persons prefer less democracy (Model 1, all specifications), this finding is significant only at the injudicious 0.1 level. This finding may reflect the general paucity of truly secular persons in the country.

Conclusions

This article modestly contributes to the evolving body of scholarship repudiating reductionist Civilizationalist and Culturalist arguments while augmenting the body of scholarship confirming Modernizationist and Rational Choice explanations.

Perhaps the most important insight from this effort pertains to our understanding of Bangladeshi politics. This case is interesting because, at first blush, these results seem counterintuitive: Islamists with greater taste for Sharia and who hold the most severe interpretations of Sharia are the strongest proponents of greater democracy in Bangladesh while the secularists seem to prefer less democracy. However, when one is familiar with the AL's relentless persecution of BJeI and their political allies in the BNP since returning to power in 2008, these findings are not surprising. Supporters of BJeI and the BNP understand that they are not competing in a level playing field and if there were greater procedural democracy in Bangladesh, they likely would be able to regain their place in Bangladeshi politics.

In contrast, as noted earlier, Hasina and her AL supporters often point to the rise of Islamist militancy that occurred on the watch of the BNP, under Khalida Zia, and her BJeI partners to justify the degradation of democratic culture in the country. Those who are wary of Islamists and fearful that they will facilitate Islamist terrorism in the country, are content to have less democracy if it keeps the Islamists at bay.

While suppression of democracy may achieve these aims in the short term, serious questions loom over the longer-term negative externalities of this policy. Some degree of Islamist violence serves Hasina's purpose as it provides a further justification for her harsh repression while also garnering international support for her zero-tolerance policy towards terrorism. But the question remains: for how long can Hasina and her AL maintain its brutal authoritarianism without the emergence of violent opposition, buoyed by Islamists she has not co-opted or has failed to satisfy?

Notes

1. Huntington, *Clash*; Lewis, *Cultures in Conflict*.
2. Country Meters, "Bangladesh Population."
3. UN Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors."
4. Global Fire Power, "Bangladesh Military Strength."
5. UNOCHA, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis."
6. Fair, *Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army*.
7. Fair, Hamza, and Heller, "Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh."
8. Fair and Abdullah, "Islamist Militancy"; Hossain, "Contested"; Basu and Brown, "Governance."
9. Van Schendel, *A History of Bangladesh*.
10. Biberman, *Gambling*.
11. Riaz, "Muslim Identity"; Bass, *Blood Telegram*.
12. Hossain, "Contested."
13. Huque and Akhter, "Ubiquity of Islam," 200; Bass, *Blood Telegram*.
14. Ali Riaz, *Lived Islam*.
15. Huque and Akhter, "Ubiquity of Islam," 205; Riaz, *Religion and Politics*.
16. Huque and Akhter, "Ubiquity of Islam"; Chowdhury, "Strategy of a Small Power"; Kaur, "Foreign Policy."
17. Huque and Akhter, "Ubiquity of Islam."
18. Ibid.
19. Riaz, *Religion and Politics*, 48.
20. Siddiqi, "Political Culture," 19.
21. Singh, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh," 57.
22. Swami, "Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami ban."
23. Hossain, "Contested."
24. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh in 2001."
25. "Hasina's choice of ally criticized."

26. One of the authors was an election observer with the National Democratic Institute. See National Democratic Institute, "Bangladesh's 2008 Parliamentary Elections." Also see "Bangladesh election loser disputes result."
27. Chopra, "International Crimes Tribunal Bangladesh," 211–20; Human Rights Watch, "Bangladesh: War Crimes Verdict"; and Amnesty International, "Bangladesh Nizami execution"; Shaon. "Eight years of trials"; Ahmad, "Bangladesh in 2013."
28. "Bangladesh's War-Crimes Trials."
29. Inter alia.Ahmad and Kugelman, "The Death of Democracy in Bangladesh."
30. Election Manifesto 2008: Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, available at http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Jamaat_2008_English.pdf.
31. Singh. "Modi, Hasina Reiterate Zero Tolerance for Terrorism During Bilateral Meeting."
32. Fair, "Bangladesh in 2018."
33. Riaz, God Willing.
34. Zaman, "Social Movements."
35. Riaz, Unfolding State, 234.
36. Hossain, "Contested."
37. Huntington, Clash; and Lewis, Cultures in Conflict. See also, inter alia, Lewis, What Went Wrong?; Kedourie, Democracy & Arab Political Culture, 5–6; Bilgrami, "The Clash within Civilizations"; Kramer, "Ballots and Bullets"; Venkatraman, "Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism"; Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims"; Phares, The War of Ideas; Pasha, "Islam, Nihilism & Liberal Secularity"; Neumann, "Europe's Jihadist Dilemma."
38. See discussion in Collins and Owen, "Islamic Religiosity & Regime Preferences," 499–515.
39. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 114.
40. Lapidus, "The Golden Age"; Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy.
41. Inter alia, Acevedo and Chaudhary, "Religion, Cultural Clash"; Acevedo, "Islamic Fatalism"; Russett, Oneal, and Cox, "Clash of Civilizations"; Norris and Inglehart, "Islamic Culture and Democracy"; Fair, Littman, and Nugent, "Conceptions"; Tessler, "Islam and Democracy"; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins, "Arabs and Democracy"; Jamal and Tessler, "Attitudes in the Arab World"; Teti, Abbot, and Cavatorta, "Beyond Elections"; Driessen, "Support for Muslim Democracy."
42. Esposito, The Islamic Threat.
43. Inter alia, Tessler, "Islam and Democracy"; Jamal and Tessler, "Attitudes in the Arab World"; Fair, Littman, and Nugent, "Conceptions"; and Collins and Owen, "Islamic Religiosity & Regime Preferences."
44. Stepan and Linz, "Democratization Theory & 'Arab Spring'."
45. Bhuiyan, "Secularism."
46. Riaz, Lived Islam.
47. Ciftci, "Modernization, Islam, or Social Capital."
48. Jamal, "Reassessing support for Islam."
49. Benstead, "Arab citizens."
50. Kostenko, Kuzmuchev, and Ponarin, "Attitudes towards Gender Equality," 862.
51. World Bank, "Urban Population (% of Total)- Bangladesh."
52. Islam, "Urbanisation in Bangladesh."
53. World Bank, "GNI Per Capita- Bangladesh."
54. World Bank, "Life Expectancy at Birth- Bangladesh."
55. UNDP, "Human Development Data (1990–2017)."
56. Kalyvas, Rise of Christian Democracy; Gill, "Religion and Comparative Politics"; and Roháč, "Religion as a Commitment Device."
57. Blaydes and Linzer, "Women's Support for Fundamentalist Islam"; Note: there is nothing inherently "Islamic" about these practices; rather, they are cultural and, in many cases, pre-date Islam.
58. Blaydes and Linzer, "Women's Support for Fundamentalist Islam."
59. Inter alia, Rowley and Smith, "Islam's Democracy Paradox"; Mogahed, "Special Report"; Bratton, "Islam, Democracy, and Public Opinion in Africa"; Hoffman, "Islam and Democracy"; Norris and Inglehart, "Islamic Culture and Democracy"; Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy."
60. Maseland and Van Hoorn, "Why Muslims like Democracy," 482.
61. "Take BNP's Money, but for AL," The Daily Star, 21 December. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/re-elect-awami-league-keep-progress-pm-sheikh-hasina-1676386.

62. Driessen, "Support for Muslim Democracy."
63. Mutz, "Status Threat, not Economic Hardship," E4330–9; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta, "Explaining White Polarization"; Pettigrew, "Social Psychological Perspectives on Trump Supporters"; and Miller and Davis, "White Outgroup Intolerance."
64. Riaz and Aziz, "Democracy and Sharia in Bangladesh"; Fair and Abdullah, "Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh."
65. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, "Population and Housing Census 2011."
66. Pew Research Methods, "International Methodology."
67. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2011"; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro, "Democratic Values and Support for Militancy"; Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy."
68. Fair, Littman, and Nugent, "Conceptions."
69. Fair, Hamza, and Heller, "Suicide Terrorism in Bangladesh."
70. Ciftci, O'Donnell, and Tanner, "Who Favors al-Qaeda?"
71. Reviewed in Fair, Littman, and Nugent, "Conceptions."
72. Jensen and Skaaning, "Modernization."

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Appendices

Appendix A. Variable construction dependent variables

Dependent Variables

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Description
Preferred Democracy Index	di	This index was created by taking adding the following variables: How important is it that … . (1) Q1030: you live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people? (2) Q1050: you live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political authority? (3) Q1070: individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them? (4) Q1090: individuals be able to meet with others to discuss political issues? (5) Q1110: individual property rights be secure? These variables ranged from 0 = not at all important to 4 = extremely important. The responses for all of these variables were added up to create a democracy index for each respondent. The Preferred Democracy Index ranges from 0 to 20, where higher numerical values indicate wanting more democracy.
Democracy Perception Index	dpi	This index was created by taking adding the following variables: In your opinion how much do … (1) Q1040: you believe Bangladesh is governed by elected officials. (2) Q1060: do people believe that in Bangladesh, the decisions of the courts are not influenced by political authority? (3) Q1080: do people believe that in Bangladesh individuals are able to express their political views even though other people may not agree with them.

Continued.

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Description
		(4) Q1100: people believe that in Bangladesh individuals are able to meet with others to work on political issues?
		(5) Q1120: people believe that in Bangladesh property rights are secure?
		These variables ranged from 0 = not at all to 4 = completely.
		The responses for all of these variables were added up to create a democracy perception index for each respondent. The democracy perception index ranges from 0 to 20, where higher numerical values indicate higher perception of democracy.
Democracy Dissatisfaction Index	ddi	This index was created by taking the Preferred Democracy Index for each responding and subtracting from it the democracy perception index (di-dpi). This variable ranges from −20 to 20. The more negative the numbers the respondents want less democracy than they actually see. The more positive the numbers the respondents want more democracy than they actually see. The higher the numbers the greater the dissatisfaction with democracy (i.e they want more democracy).
Civilian Control Over Military	civ	This index was created by taking the mean of the following variables:
		(1) Q1130: The constitution of Bangladesh says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians here over the military?
		(2) Q1140: Some people say the military has the right to take over from civilian leaders when they have become too corrupt or fail to govern. Should the military be able to do whatever it wants only in times of emergency or never?
		Q1130 and Q1140 were rescaled from 0 to 1 so that the higher numerical values indicate more civilian control of the military.
		Note: Unlike the other dependent variables in this article, this dependent variable is created by taking the mean because the original variables used to create the variables were initially on a different scale (Q1130 ranges from 0 to 4, while Q1149 ranges from 0 to 2).

Explanatory Variables

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Description
Secularism	si	This index was created by taking the average of each respondent based on
		(1) Q915: In your opinion how much influence should religious leaders have in matters of political governance?
		(2) Q970: Do you favour or oppose giving Muslim leaders such as Imams the power to decide family and property disputes?
		These variables were transformed so that 0 represented large influence for Q915 and completely favour for Q970 and 1 represented no influence at all for Q915 and completely oppose for Q970. After these transformations, the index was created by taking the mean of these two variables. The Secularism Index variable (si) ranges from 0 to 1. Higher values represent more secularism.
Sharia as Hudood	hud	This index was created by taking the average of each respondent based on
		(1) Q975: Do you favour or oppose death penalty for Bangladesh Muslims who leave the Muslim religion?
		(2) Q985: Do you favour or oppose punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery.
		(3) Q990: Do you favour or oppose stoning people who commit adultery?

(*Continued*)

Continued.

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Description
		(4) Q140: Some people say a government under Sharia should use physical punishments to make sure people obey the law. Do you agree or disagree with this?
		These variables were rescaled from 0 to 1 where 0 represents completely oppose using physical punishment and 1 represents completely favour physical punishment. These rescaled variables were combined by taking the mean for each respondent. The Sharia as Hudood (hud) variable is coded from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more support for use of physical punishment.
Sharia as Restricting Women	rw	This index was created by taking the average of each respondent based on (1) Q145: Some people say a government under Sharia should restrict women's role in the public. Do you agree or disagree with this? (2) Q150: Some people say a government under Sharia should require women to wear hejab or miqab in public. Do you agree or disagree with this? These variables were rescaled to 0 if they disagree with the statements and 1 if they agree with the statement. The Sharia as restriction on women (rw) variable is coded from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher restrictions on women.
Sharia as Good Governance	gg	This index was created by taking the average of each respondent based on variables that ask that a government under Sharia should: (1) Q120: provide basic services such as health facilities, garbage collection, road maintenance. (2) Q125: not have corruption (3) Q130: provide personal security (4) Q135: provide justice through functioning non-corrupt courts These variables were rescaled to 0 if they disagree with the statements and 1 if they agree with the statement. The Sharia as restriction on women (rw) variable is coded from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher restrictions on women.
Piety Index	pietyindex	This index was created by taking the average of each respondent based on variables that ask: (1) Q030: Do you currently attend Quran study class (2) Q050: How often per week do you pray Namaz (3) Q051: How many times did you pray Namaz in congregation in the Mosque last Friday (4) Q052: Do you pray? Tahajjud Namaz? These variables were rescaled to 0 if they are not religious at all (don't pray or attend Quran class etc) and 1 if they are very religious (pray, attend Quran class, pray Namaz 29–35 times a week, and five times in congregation in the Mosque on Friday) . The piety index variable is coded from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher piety.
Age	age	Created using variable D30 in original data.
Gender	female	Created using variable D005 in original data. Recoded this variable. 1 represents Females and 0 represents males.
Rural	rural	Created using variable A12 in original data. Recoded this variable so that 1 = rural and 0 = urban
Marital Status	married	Created using variable D40 in original data. Recoded this variable so that 1 = married and 0 = single, divorced, or widowed.
Education	education	Created using variable D81 in original data. Recoded this variable so that 0 = Illiterate/no formal education 1 = Primary (grades 1–5) 2 = Junior Secondary (grades 6–8) 3 = Secondary (grades 9–10) 4 = Higher Secondary (grades 11–12)

Continued.

Variable	Variable Name	Variable Description
		5 = Technical/Vocational educ 6 = Graduate (BA BSc) 7 = Masters 8 = Professional (PhD or other professional degree)
Economic Perception	econperceived	Created using variable D220 in original data. 1 = much less, 2 = a little less, 3 = same, 4 = a little more, and 5 = much more
Attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah	madrasah	Created using variables D80 and D83 in original data. 1 = attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah 0 = did not attend either Quami OR Aaliya madrassah

Appendix B.

Table B1. Regression with fixed effects results (division clustered standard errors) – with income proxy and perceived income.

	(1) Preferred Democracy Index	(2) Civilian Control Over Military	(3) Democracy Perception Index	(4) Democracy Dissatisfaction
Culturalist/Civilizationist Theory				
Piety Index	−0.34	−0.01	0.30	−0.64
	(0.28)	(0.03)	(0.57)	(0.69)
Sharia as Hudood	0.82***	0.02	0.34	0.48
	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.47)	(0.56)
Sharia as Restriction to Women	−0.29	0.04	−0.33	0.04
	(0.43)	(0.02)	(0.67)	(0.77)
Sharia as Good Governance	0.53	−0.02	−0.10	0.63
	(0.29)	(0.03)	(0.43)	(0.51)
Modernization Theory				
Rural (Urban = 0)	−0.57*	−0.03	0.21	−0.78
	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.63)	(0.62)
Education	0.16*	0.00	−0.13	0.29*
	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Perceived Relative Economic Standing	0.10~	−0.00	0.25~	−0.15
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Monthly Expenditure	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rational Choice Theory				
Preferred Amount of Sharia	0.54**	0.01*	−0.22	0.75***
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Secularism Index	−1.17~	−0.01	−0.09	−1.08
	(0.60)	(0.03)	(1.02)	(0.61)
Controls				
Age	0.02***	0.00	−0.01	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female (Male = 0)	−1.23**	−0.03	−0.43	−0.80
	(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.79)	(0.73)
Attended Quami OR Aaliya madrassah	0.38~	−0.00	−0.02	0.40
	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.42)	(0.39)
Constant	13.73	0.57	12.10	1.64
	(0.70)	(0.09)	(1.34)	(1.17)
Observations R^2	3350	3350	3350	3350
	0.19	0.04	0.05	0.13

Notes: ~Significant at the 0.1 level; *at the 0.05 level; **at the 0.01 level; ***at the 0.001 level.
Source: In-house manipulation of survey data.