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Did India's demonetization policy curb stone-pelting in Indian-administered Kashmir

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ABSTRACT



On 9 November 2016, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his 'demonetization' policy which rendered all Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes null and void. His government claimed that this policy, among other things, would curb stone-pelting in India's restive Jammu and Kashmir by rendering valueless the copious illegal currency that, according to India, Pakistan pumped into the state to pay protestors to throw stones. Subsequently, New Delhi claimed success despite countervailing evidence for this claim. Here, we assemble a novel dataset to evaluate these assertions. After controlling for other factors that may explain variation in stone-pelting, we find that demonetization corresponded to increased stone-pelting. This finding is important for at least two reasons. First, Indian efforts to depict all protests in Jammu and Kashmir as the result of Pakistani payments both delegitimize Kashmiris' grievances by reducing them to anti-state behaviors and diminish public appetite for addressing those grievances. Second, the current populist Indian government, which caters to Hindu nationalists, selectively curates facts to justify its actions, big and small, to the detriment of democratic accountability and governance.

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KEYWORDS Kashmir; demonetization; Pakistan; proxy war; stone-pelting/stone-throwing

Introduction

Since 2008, stone-throwing has become an iconographic form of protest against the Indian government in Indian-administered Kashmir.¹ While stone-throwing has often been viewed as a form of non-violent protest,² the tactic has killed and injured many civilians as well as security forces in Kashmir.³ On 8 July 2016, Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a young and popular militant leader, after which violent confrontations with Indian security dramatically expanded. In turn, security forces killed numerous youths rousing yet more unrest.⁴

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One popular explanation for the explosion in stone-throwing by Kashmiri youth has been financial support from Pakistan's notorious intelligence agency, the Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Nearly a week after Wani's death, Indian intelligence claimed that Pakistan was paying Kashmiri youth Rs. 500 to throw stones as part of the Rs. 100 Crore (\$13.6 million) the organization expended in the past year to fuel violence in Jammu and Kashmir (hence J&K).⁵ In 2017, captured stone-pelters confessed that the ISI paid them some Rs. 5,000 to 7,000 (\$68-\$95) per month in addition to clothes to throw stones at security forces.⁶ Moreover, the Indian Army asserted that '83% of all youth who become militants start with throwing stones for Rs 500 and therefore needed to be stopped.'⁷

Motivated in considerable measure by these narratives about Pakistani-sponsored violence in Kashmir, on 8 November 2016, the Indian government rendered 86% of the nation's currency valueless overnight in what was known as demonetization.⁸ Citizens waited in lines for hours in hopes of exchanging their now worthless Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 bills for usable currency, which had been produced in inadequate supply. As the nation plummeted into fiscal chaos, the government defended this move on several grounds including a desire to nudge the country towards greater digitization, to enervate the black market, and to disable Pakistan-supported violence. The government oddly claimed success in the latter objective despite robust evidence against it: 2018 was in fact the deadliest year in a decade.⁹ Even more puzzling is that many Indians, who otherwise denounce the policy, believe that it curbed violence in Kashmir despite evidence to the contrary: a nationally-representative survey of 2,100 respondents found that more than 70% believed that demonetization "played an important role in curbing terrorism as it has dealt a huge blow to the funding of terror in states like Jammu & Kashmir as well as left-wing extremist violence across several states' even while the same survey evinced respondent doubts that the policy achieved its other objectives.¹⁰

While the Indian government prefers to characterize all violence in the state as the outcome of Pakistani chicanery, many scholars are dubious about this claim. Kashmiri Muslims, particularly in the Muslim-predominant valley, are frustrated with Indian policies towards the state and are exhausted by the brutality and oppression of the myriad counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency forces in the state, including extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions among other excesses committed under the envelope of impunity afforded by the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1990 and its predecessor, the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA).¹¹ India refuses to publicly acknowledge the number of security personnel deployed to the state, which includes the army, various central and local police forces as well as paramilitaries; however, in August 2019, Sharma estimated that they numbered nearly one million.¹²

Pakistan *is* sponsoring various kinds of violence in Kashmir and elsewhere in India and it is most likely true that some stone-throwers are compensated but it is unlikely that *all* do so because of Pakistani remuneration or that these payments are their only or primary motivation.¹³ While the truth lies somewhere between India's maximalist claims of Pakistani culpability and Pakistan's blanket claims of innocence, Kashmiris are caught in the middle.

Interrogating India's claim on this narrow issue is important for several reasons. First, India's claims that Kashmiri violence is attributable to Pakistani incitement rather than a deep malaise or various expressions of Kashmiri Muslim nationalism or even Islamist mobilization serves to further delegitimize Kashmiri grievance and justifies evermore draconian moves in the name of securing India's territorial and ideological integrity from foreign and domestic threats alike.¹⁴ Second, India – like many democracies at present – is governed by a right-wing populist government busily revising India's past while authoring dubious accounts of the present.¹⁵ Finally, despite the limited scope of this effort, we hope to make methodological contributions to study an important and complex issue in a low-information environment, given the Indian government's efforts to restrict accurate and independently verifiable official information about this policy and its outcomes.

To assess Delhi's assertion that demonetization curbed stone-throwing in Kashmir, we assemble a novel district-level dataset of daily stone-pelting events between 1 August 2013 and 31 December 2017 along with other explanatory variables to study whether demonetization had the stated effect upon stone-throwing in Kashmir. We confine ourselves to this period for practical reasons. With respect to the beginning date, we sought to avoid a date that was in the distant past because this would require controlling for numerous confounding events both within India as well as between India and Pakistan. With respect to the end date, we assume that Pakistan lost no time in developing countermeasures (e.g. creating new counterfeit currency, paying proxies to exchange the worthless cash at banks, etc.). Moreover, subsequent events in the valley continued to exacerbate tensions which would further compound our narrow interest in assessing the impact of demonetization. Notably, in August 2019, the Indian government abrogated Kashmir's special status by vitiating the so-called Article 370 and Article 35, declaring a months-long curfew, shutting off cell phone and internet communications, arresting thousands, and placing state politicians – including three former Chief Ministers – under various kinds of arrest (without cause or charge) for months. As of the time of writing, many are still under arrest without charge.¹⁶

In summary, we find no empirical support for the Indian government's claim that demonetization reduced stone-pelting; rather, stone-pelting *increased* after demonetization even after controlling for other confounding factors such as temperature, precipitation, economic opportunity costs, and

demographics of the district among other variables. These findings also cast a significant pall over the Modi's government's preferred explanation that stone-throwers are overwhelmingly Pakistani contractors.

We organize the remainder of this paper as follows. First, we briefly summarize the Kashmir conundrum and the unique challenges that stone-throwing poses to political science. Second, we describe Modi's demonetization policy and his stated motivation for this controversial gambit. Third, we posit various hypotheses that may explain observed variation in stone-throwing during our study period. Fourth, we describe data assembly and data analyses. In the penultimate section we present and discuss our results. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications.

The Kashmir conundrum and stone-throwing

A detailed accounting of the so-called Kashmir conflict is beyond this paper's purview. Moreover, given that scholars have become deeply polarized with some more closely aligning with Pakistan's preferred narrative and others with India's, no account will please all. Here we provide a brief overview, adhering to legal and historical facts.¹⁷

The conflict's origin lies in the process with which Britain partitioned the erstwhile Raj into the successor states of India and Pakistan. Pakistan asserted, without legal basis and in contradiction of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, that it was entitled to the princely state of Kashmir both because Kashmir was the only Muslim-majority state in British India and because Pakistan was founded upon the so-called 'Two Nation Theory' propounded by Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Two Nation Theory contended that Muslims and Hindus were separate but equal nations even though Muslims were outnumbered by Hindus. Jinnah insisted upon partition, arguing that in a united India, Muslims would be subject to the will of the Hindu majority. These claims remain salient to date: Pakistani officials still argue that partition is incomplete until it acquires Kashmir.¹⁸ While many countries remain embittered over lands lost, Pakistan nurtures a grievance for territories to which it was neither entitled nor possessed.¹⁹

Pakistan first sought to take Kashmir by force in October 1947, using tribal fighters initially. The ensuing war concluded with an UN-brokered ceasefire which came into effect on 31 December 1948. The ceasefire left about three-fifths of Kashmir under Indian control, and the remainder with Pakistan.²⁰ The ceasefire first required Pakistan to withdraw entirely. Second, India had to withdraw except for a minimum, defensive force. Once these sequential conditions were met, a plebiscite would be held under UN auspices (United Nations Security Council, 1947). Pakistan never withdrew.²¹

Subsequently, Pakistan sustained low levels of conflict in Kashmir in hopes of making India's possession of the territory so costly that India would

abandon it.²² Pakistan again tried to capture Kashmir in 1965. Scholars assert that the war ended in a stalemate with no significant change in territory; although there is strong evidence that India could have won decisively had poor civil–military coordination not led India to seek a premature UN-brokered ceasefire.²³ They fought another war in 1971 which resulted in the liberation of East Pakistan as independent Bangladesh, but Kashmir was not a key battlefield in that conflict. In 1999, Pakistan initiated a third war in the Kargil district of Kashmir, after both states tested nuclear weapons in May 1998.²⁴ Since 1989, Pakistan has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir after India dismissed a popularly elected government and rigged elections to enmesh a puppet government.²⁵

Since 1989, Pakistan has cultivated and deployed numerous Islamist proxies to harass India in Kashmir and beyond (e.g. the largely Punjabi Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) as well as the mostly Kashmiri Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)). These groups espouse different ideologies, tactics, and targeting. In addition to employing these Pakistan-based assets, Pakistan also invests in locals to perpetrate violence. Pakistan engages in this proxy warfare under the security of its nuclear umbrella, understanding that its nuclear arsenal generates risk for Indian policy makers who seek to punish Pakistan for any specific terrorist attack much less deter future attacks.²⁶

This has created a dilemma for India, which Pakistan exploits: India cannot relax the enormous force deployment in the state because of Pakistan's nearly incessant efforts to support terrorism in the valley and to further exploit the legitimate governance grievances among Kashmiri Muslims.²⁷ Given these security forces' lack of training, equipment, and effective doctrine to pacify Kashmir and lurking antipathy towards Muslims (very few of whom are Muslim), human rights abuses and other outrages routinely occur.²⁸ This generates evermore outrage among Kashmiris which Pakistan, as well as international Islamist terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-Indian Subcontinent, instrumentalize.²⁹ What India seeks is normalcy. To achieve this goal, India has generally relied upon brute force. It has never developed a genuine strategy to deal with the deep discontent among those people whom India claims as its citizens, despite various homages to 'winning hearts and minds,'³⁰

Sushil Aaron, speaking of the government's preferred means of handling Kashmir, argues that the current policies are politically useful, even if they fail to abate violence in the state, because the

flawed counterinsurgency strategy –and the reactions it [generates] in the Valley and in Delhi by way of charged media narratives – also neatly dovetails with the BJP's goal of polarising India on religious lines ... Kashmiris will continue to resist, influential sections of the Indian media will continue to represent them as saboteurs inspired by Pakistan in ways that rallies support

for the BJP's strong-arm tactics, while glossing over the shooting of unarmed civilians. The up and down cycles of civilian uprisings in Kashmir will thus serve to periodically infuse nationalist sentiment in India's body politic.³¹

Given perduring enduring disgruntlement among Kashmiri Muslims in Indian-administered Kashmir and the omnipresence of India's counter insurgency grid, stone-throwing has become the *sina qua non* of Kashmiri protest against the Indian state since 2008. Given that Kashmiris appear to be diminutive Davids challenging the Goliath of the Indian state, many commentators and even scholars are inclined to view this as a form of non-violent protest.³² However, we contend that stone-throwing is a form of violent protest precisely because the stone-thrower intends to cause harm and knows that there is a significant probability of such harm occurring. While one may assume that security forces are generally injured in these skirmishes, ordinary citizens have been injured or killed in these melees.³³ In 2016 alone, 83 civilians were killed and another 748 were injured.³⁴ Even scholars such as Ganie who view stone-pelting as a form of unarmed resistance concede that Kashmiris try to 'disrupt gunfights between armed rebels and the government forces by throwing stones, thus compounding the security challenges for India. In 2018, around 60 civilians were killed near gunfight sites while trying to save trapped rebels by throwing stones at the Indian armed forces.'³⁵

For stone-throwers in Kashmir, the act is 'politically instrumental for it draws valuable media attention. For many young people in Kashmir, [stone pelting] is an expression of resistance, dissent, anger, frustration and a last resort for risky catharsis when severe personal loss or damage has been incurred at the hands of the state.'³⁶ Moreover, stone-throwing – unlike gunfire – is a 'tactic that could work hand-in-hand with mass participation.'³⁷ This, along with the fact that scholars and analysts alike seem to view it as a form of unarmed violence suggests that stone-pelting is not going away any time soon in Kashmir.³⁸

However, there is little evidence that stone-pelting has been efficacious in compelling the state to make concessions. Media coverage precipitated by these encounters has not generated sympathy for the political grievances of Kashmiri citizens elsewhere in India and may help explain the widespread support for the government's heavy-handed tactics such as the August 2019 revocation of Article 370 and 35A. This is likely in part because of the government's consistent efforts to depict such expressions of rage as Pakistan-sponsored or even Pakistan-engineered. For example, in November 2019, Indian Home Minister Amit Shah said that Pakistan has 'misguided the youth of the region, armed them and propagated terrorism. He added that India's response is determined by Pakistan's action and if they want peace, they'll have to end terrorism.' During the same speech, he argued

that ‘it was impossible to defeat terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir’ until the provisions under Article 370 were abrogated”.³⁹ Generally, a majority of Indians support these various contentions. According to a December 2019 national survey of 12,141 Indians, 58% of respondents in North India believed that abolishing Article 370 would ‘provide a permanent solution to the Kashmir issue’ whereas 60%, 67% and 50% respectively answered similarly in the East, West and South.⁴⁰ While Indians support the measure, the 2019 Lokniti National Election Survey found that among residents of Jammu and Kashmir, 71.5% wanted Article 370 to remain in force while only 16.9% wanted to scrap it.⁴¹

It is also likely that stone-pelters over-estimate the coercive impact of media coverage. Domestically, the government can and does suppress media outlets for unfavorable coverage of events as well as harass individuals for vexing reportage.⁴² It also has Kashmir-specific tools to restrict coverage, such as severely restricting internet and cell-phone services and handpicking journalists to cover events in the region.⁴³ Hostile international media coverage does not deter the Modi government which denounces such reports as ill-informed, biased or advancing an ‘anti-India agenda.’⁴⁴ Delhi denies unfavored journalists the requisite permissions to visit Jammu and Kashmir and expels critical foreign journalists by revoking their status (e.g. visas or Overseas Citizen of India card).⁴⁵

Demonetization: a brief summary

On 8 November 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the nation to explain the surprising move to demonetize:

To break the grip of corruption and black money, we have decided that the five hundred rupee and thousand-rupee currency notes presently in use will no longer be legal tender from ... 8 November 2016 The five hundred- and thousand-rupee notes hoarded by anti-national and anti-social elements will become just worthless pieces of paper.⁴⁶

Modi explained this policy aimed to nullify black money, restrain corruption, push the country towards a cashless economy, and curb the resources available to terrorism including counterfeit notes.⁴⁷

The Indian government asserts that demonetization successfully curbed Pakistan-sponsored violence.⁴⁸ A senior police officer interviewed by the *Deccan Herald* right after the policy took effect explained that ‘There were inputs that separatists and their Pakistani-handlers were pumping in money to keep the pot boiling and most of such transactions would take place in big currency notes as the stone-pelter would charge at least Rs 500 per day [The] ban on big currency notes has closed all such shops of selling violence in Kashmir.’⁴⁹ Speaking a year after the policy took effect, Arun Jaitley, the Finance

minister, contended that after demonetization, entities distributing funds to recruit stone-pelters in J&K were unable to gather even 100 young people to do so.⁵⁰ The then Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, similarly claimed that ‘since the big currency ban, terror funding has come down to zero and there hasn’t been stone-throwing on security forces in Kashmir,’ whereas ‘Earlier, there were rates – Rs. 500 for stone pelting (on security forces in Kashmir) and Rs. 1,000 for doing something else. PM has brought terror funding to zero.’⁵¹ Hansraj Gangaram Ahir (Minister of State, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India) mobilized government data in support of the policy and its salubrious outcomes: he claimed that while there were 730 incidents in 2015, there were 2,808 in 2016 and only 1,261 in 2017 (Government of India 2018). These claims were immediately countered by others who, marshalling alternative data, found no palliative impact (Naseem 2017).⁵²

The public seems to have been swayed by the government’s assertions: according to a nationally representative survey of 2,100 respondents, more than 70% believed demonetization “played an important role in curbing terrorism as it has dealt a huge blow to the funding of terror in states like Jammu & Kashmir as well as left-wing extremist violence across several states’ even while the same survey showed greater suspicion that the policy advanced its other objectives (Das 2019).⁵³

We take the government’s claims as the basis of our principal testable hypothesis:

H₁: Demonetization is associated with a decline in stone-pelting, all else equal.

Other explanations for trends on stone-throwing

Simply evaluating trends in stone-pelting is inadequate to attribute cause (demonetization policy) and effect (variation in stone-throwing across the state geographically and temporally). To disambiguate what, if any, impact demonetization had upon stone-pelting, one must control for other confounding variables. Below, we draw upon the germane empirical literature to identify such factors.

The killing of Burhan Wani

On 8 July 2016 – right after the conclusion of Ramazan – Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, an extremely popular militant leader. The chaos that followed Wani’s death destabilized several years of relative peace in the valley. For this reason, we must explicitly control for this event in our models.

Rural vs. urban areas: target richness and accessibility

Where stone-throwing occurs is likely a function of target richness (density of persons or things vulnerable to stone-pelting), value of target (security forces vs. a Muslim civilian), and ability to disrupt by shutting off chokepoints. Another important factor (for which we cannot explicitly control) is the presence of mosques. Generally, mosques are more densely distributed in urban areas than rural areas and may be important organizational centers for protest, particularly after Friday Prayers. Butt, in his study of the effect of Friday prayers on mobilizing street protests in Karachi (Pakistan), found that higher density of mosques was associated with more mobilizations.⁵⁴ These arguments suggest that we consider whether the district is rural or urban, district population density, and district-wise religious demographics.

Opportunity costs of stone-throwing

Inherent to India's claim that Kashmiri youth accept payment for stone-throwing is the assumption that stone-pelters are sensitive to the opportunity costs of stone-throwing which Pakistani funds may offset. Opportunity costs manifest themselves in several ways, including *inter alia*: wages sacrificed to engage the security forces; foregone domestic production; and lost opportunities to make products to sell in the market. These costs are even greater if one is arrested as they one may be detained for days or months. Note that the state fares well relative to most Indian states: the nominal, urban regular wage in India (2011–12 INR) was Rs. 449 while in J&K it was Rs. 495 which places J&K in fourth place behind Haryana, Assam, and Jharkhand. Overall, nominal, rural regular wages for India (2011–12 INR) was Rs. 300, in J&K it was Rs. 431, which puts J&K in third place behind Jharkhand and Uttarakhand. The state also fares well for nominal, casual wages: the urban average across India was Rs. 171 (2011–12 INR) compared to Rs. 212 in J&K, placing it second overall behind Kerala. This is also true for rural casual wages where it also ranks second in the union, also second only to Kerala.⁵⁵

The state is also reasonably placed when we examine unemployment rates. For all age groups, the overall rural unemployment rate in India is 5.3% compared to 4.2% in rural areas for J&K. The overall urban unemployment rate is 7.8% while in J&K it is 10%, which appears to be driven by higher female unemployment rates. J&K fares better when we examine only male unemployment. In rural areas, the Indian male unemployment is 5.8% compared to 3.7% for J&K. The overall male unemployment rate for urban areas in India is 7.1% compared to 6.1% in J&K. Contrastingly, unemployment rates for women in J&K are higher than India overall: 3.8% for rural Indian women compared to 5.4% of women in rural J&K and 10.8% for women in urban Indian compared to 22.9% for women in urban J&K.⁵⁶

As these data suggest, there are considerable differences in opportunity costs for various groups. The opportunity costs for female and teenage stone-pelters is, on average, lower as they are significantly more likely to be unemployed. There are large differences for persons in rural and urban areas: on the one hand while rural unemployment is lower, so are wages. Given that rural areas are less target-rich, persons in rural districts must travel to a more target-rich protest site. Should they be arrested, the Rs. 500 enticement offers little recompense for lost wages. These realities require us to control for opportunity costs.

Ramazan and Friday prayer

There is a growing corpus of research into the impact of religious congregational activity upon political motivation across numerous religions, employing different research methods and empirical commitments. Arikan and Bloom, using data from the World Values Survey, found that involvement in religious social networks fosters individual propensity to protest.⁵⁷ Calhoun-Brown found that among African Americans, attending a political church was a strong predictor of political involvement and motivation.⁵⁸ Campbell, in his study of evangelical Christian political behavior, concluded that the tight social networks formed through intensive church activity can facilitate intense and rapid political mobilization.⁵⁹ Harris, in studying religion and political behavior among African Americans, found that religion acts as both a psychological and organizational resources for individual as well as collective action.⁶⁰

Focusing upon Muslim polities in particular, Hoffman and Nugent, using survey data from Lebanon, found that communal prayer increased individual support for arming political parties among those groups engaged in conflict while religious practice tended to foster opposition to militarization among non-combatants.⁶¹ They propose that communal religious practice increases the salience of group interests both through informational mechanism as well as identity formation. Clingingsmith, Khwaja and Kremer, in their study of the effects of Pakistanis who undertake the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), found that those who did the Hajj were more inclined towards peace and harmony with non-Muslims and more likely to embrace ethnic harmony, as well as sectarian harmony among the Muslims of different interpretative traditions.⁶² Ginges, Hansen and Norenzayan, using survey data for Palestinians, found that attending religious communal services positively correlated with support for suicide attacks, likely because communal services enhanced coalitional commitments.⁶³

Finally, Ahsan Butt examined the impact of Friday prayers on street mobilization in Karachi and found that street mobilizations were far more likely on

Friday than any other day of the week.⁶⁴ The reasons for this are numerous. First, many Muslim men who do not ordinarily attend communal prayer at other times of the week will attend Friday prayer. Many private and public businesses will close on Friday while those that remain open may have long lunch hours to accommodate opportunities to eat and pray communally, some of which will remain closed for the rest of the day. Friday prayer serves to aggregate people in large numbers who are free to attend these prayers, which decrease the transactional costs of organizing large numbers of persons who are available for protests as well as opportunity costs.⁶⁵ An additional consideration is the content of the *khutba*, or sermon. (Note that there is also a robust literature on “day of the week effects,” which remains highly disputed.⁶⁶)

The potential impact of Ramazan is more complicated. During the month of Ramazan, which moves around the Gregorian calendar as Islam uses a lunar calendar, persons are enjoined to fast from sunrise to sunset. Prior to sunrise persons typically eat large meals in effort to sustain themselves throughout the day and they will do so again when the fast ends at sunset. During Ramazan, persons maintaining their fast are also enjoined to abstain from drinking anything (including water), smoking or other carnal pleasures. Persons who are ill or traveling are exempted from the obligation to fast, although breaking fast in public is difficult as many restaurants are closed and eating in front of fasting persons is considered discourteous. On the one hand, throwing stones may be an activity that requires more caloric energy than some fasting persons may have. However, based upon the mobilizing impacts of communal religious activities, Ramazan may motivate one to participate in stone-pelting despite restricted caloric intake. Because some Muslim-owned businesses operate only partially during Ramazan, opportunity costs of stone-pelting are decreased for their employees. Another important dimension of Ramazan pertains to the climactic conditions of the month when Ramazan occurs. Ramazan during the winter months can be bitter cold and snowy in parts of J&K, while Ramazan during the hot summer can be miserable given the injunction on drinking water. Ramazan in the winter is associated with fewer days of sun-light and fewer fasting hours whereas in the summer fasting periods are much longer. Some of these factors suggest that Ramazan could be more propitious for stone throwing, while others suggest that it may not be.

For reasons described below, we focus upon the years 2013–2017. Ramazan began in July/August in 2013 and with each subsequent year, it began earlier. In 2017, it began in late May. (See Appendix [Table A1](#)). This means that Ramazan may have become more conducive to protesting each year: while days were longer, the days became less hot. At no point in this timeline did Ramazan occur in the winter. (Appendix [Tables](#)

C1-C5 contain temperature and precipitation data for the state's five most populous cities.) Because of these varied considerations, we must control for Ramazan in our analysis.

Other possible factors

As the data in Appendix Tables C1-C5 demonstrate, across the calendar year, there is considerable variation in the temperature and precipitation throughout the state. While the climate in Jammu may not vary that much from other northern Indian states, Srinagar is strikingly different. Because an area's target-richness may also vary with extremes in weather, we must account for temperature and precipitation in our models.

The data

Here we describe the data sources used to assemble our analytical dataset, including our dependent variable (stone-pelting) and our various explanatory variables.

The dependent variable: stone-pelting

To test the above-posed hypothesis, we require daily data on stone-pelting events for each district over several years. Because of the enduring nature of this conflict, we limit our scope of inquiry to 1 August 2013 through 31 December 2017. Expanding our timeline would necessitate controlling for major events in India and Pakistan bilateral relations as well as significant developments in relations between J&K and the central government. For this reason, our timeline excludes the repeal of Article 370 and related changes, which bifurcated the state and altered its constitutional status. We also sought to limit our scope of inquiry to one year after demonetization because we presume that Pakistan – sooner rather than later – developed countermeasures to thwart the demonetization policy even though we are dubious about India's maximalist claims on the salience of this factor. Our extensive efforts to find extant data, which included filing multiple Right to Information requests, foundered. After the revocation of Article 370, multiple well-informed Indian sources clarified that obtaining official data would be impossible given its politically charged nature. Perforce, we assembled a novel dataset of stone-pelting events for this study using three different sources.

We first obtained data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), which employs four types of sources: traditional media; reports from international institutions and non-governmental organizations which publish

accounts of political violence; data from local partners about which little is given; as well as targeted and verified information from new media, such as social media.⁶⁷ Because ACLED concedes that its data may preclude highly local information, we next accessed data from the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) which draws largely from Indian national media sources. We summarize stone-pelting incidents from ACLED and SATP by date and district to create daily tallies of district-wise incidents. The ACLED dataset comprised 603 stone-pelting incidents over 532 observations whereas the SATP dataset included 357 stone-pelting incidents spanning 239 observations.⁶⁸ Finally, we conducted a manual search of four Kashmir-based, English-language dailies (i.e. *Daily Excelsior*, *Greater Kashmir*, *Kashmir Observer* and *Kashmir Times*) for stone-pelting occurrences, which yielded 126 observations of stone-pelting.

Next, we merged the data by districts and day. To precluded double-counting, we created a dichotomous dependent variable of stone-throwing which was set to one to indicate whether in any district on any given day, a stone-pelting event occurred; otherwise, its value was zero. This yielded a balanced dataset with either a zero or a one for each district on each day in our timeline. In our final dataset, there are 797 observations of stone-throwing from 1 August 2013 until 31 December 2017 which we depict in [Figure 1](#).

The study variable

To test H_1 , which assessed the impacts of demonetization, we created a dummy variable which we coded as 1 if the observed date occurred after the demonetization policy was announced on November 8, and 0 otherwise.




Figure 1. Stone-pelting incidents by district. Source: In-house tabulation of data.

Other control variables

To control for the killing of Burhan Wani, we created a binary variable (value equaled 1 if the data occurred after 8 July 2016, the day he was killed; and 0 if before or including 8 July 2016).

To control for the urban and rural distribution, population density, and Muslim predominance of each district, we collected the district-level data for each of the 21 districts in J&K, prior to the revocation of Article 370. We obtained requisite data on the urban composition and population density of each district from the Digest of Statistics, which is published by the J&K Government.⁶⁹ These data indicate the percentage of population living in an urban setting and population density from India's 2011 Census. We calculated the population density by dividing the total population in a district by the area of each district. Using data on the religious demographics of the district from India's 2011 Census, we created a binary variable to indicate whether a district was Muslim Majority (value was one if district had more than 50% Muslims and zero otherwise). Summary data for each district are available in Appendix [Table B1](#).

To properly disambiguate cause and effect, we require a proxy for opportunity costs that varies by time as well as district. While India offers various consumer price indices for the country and while some private vendors offer such indices at the level of the state, there is no such district-level measure. Per force, we identified a second-best option: the local price of onions on any given day for this measure. This approach is justified for several reasons. First, Indian food generally (with important exceptions) relies heavily upon onions. This is also true of Kashmiri cuisine, whether Muslim or Hindu. Second, onions—unlike a unique kind of Kashmiri potato or rice grown in the state—tend to be brought into the state from other states and sold at wholesale markets called *mandis*. Third, Indians in general are sensitive to onion price fluctuations: when the price drops, onion growers become angry because they cannot make a profit and when the price skyrockets, consumers become furious—and even riot. Consequently, politicians are sensitive to onion prices because fluctuation in one direction or another will aggravate blocks of voters, whether consumers or growers.⁷⁰ Because of the centrality of onions and the extreme sensitivity to their prices, we use the average daily price of onions for a given district as an exogenous proxy for economic opportunity costs. This measure is not perfect, but it is the best measure available given the variation we require across time and geography.

We obtained price data on onions from the Government of India's Ministry of Agriculture and Farmer's Welfare. Data were available for less than 13% of our observations for each day in each district. For this reason, we interpolated onion prices for the missing observations. For some districts we had partial onion price data (i.e. onion prices only for some days). For these districts, we

Table 1. Day-level descriptive statistics.

	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Standard Deviation
DV = Instance of Stone-throwing (1 = Yes)	0.00	1.00	0.0	0.02	0.15
Demonetization Policy (0 = Before, 1 = After)	0.00	1.00	0.0	0.26	0.44
Killing Burhan Wani (0 = Before, 1 = After)	0.00	1.00	0.0	0.34	0.47
Onion Prices (in Constant 2012 INR)	640.51	7645.97	1869.6	1990.71	740.43
Friday Dummy (1 = Friday)	0.00	1.00	0.0	0.14	0.35
Ramazan (1 = Ramazan)	0.00	1.00	0.0	0.08	0.27
Temperature (in Celsius)	-4.00	49.00	22.0	21.24	10.57
Precipitation (in mm)	0.00	85.00	0.1	1.16	3.60
Observations	33,894				

Source: In-house calculations of analytical dataset.

substituted the missing data with the average of the surrounding dates for which we had data. This is an appropriate way to interpolate onion prices within districts because there is less variation in onion prices within a district than between districts. Those few districts for which we had no onion data, we used the average onion prices each day for all districts in the state for which we have data.⁷¹ This is the best, if still sub-optimal, strategy for missing districts because the average onion price across the state differs from the national average.

We created one dummy variable to indicate whether the day of the week in question was a Friday⁷² and another variable indicating whether the day in question occurred during Ramazan. Finally, we obtained data on temperature and precipitation per day for each district from World Weather Online. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables.⁷³

Analytical methods

To test our primary hypothesis about the impact of demonetization upon stone-pelting, we estimate several logit models using mixed effects, generalized linear modeling (also known as multilevel modeling or hierarchical generalized linear modeling). We employ multilevel modeling because we have variables at two different levels of analysis—day level (level 1) and district level (level 2). Multilevel analysis is appropriate because we are estimating a level 1 dependent variable using both level 1 and level 2 independent variables. With multiple levels of analysis, the independence of observation assumption in generalized linear models is violated, which in turn produces biased parameters. Multilevel models correct these biases and produce unbiased standard errors, confidence intervals, and significance tests.⁷⁴

The general specification of the day level (level 1) model is:

$$\log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{1-p_{ij}}\right) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} * \text{Temperature} + \beta_{2j} * \text{Friday} + \beta_{3j} * \text{Ramzan} + \beta_{4j} * \text{Onion Prices} + r_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where p_{ij} is the probability that day i in district j had an incident of stone-throwing (dependent variable = 1). For purposes of this estimation, we assume that temperature, onion prices, Ramazan, and Friday are fixed effects, or that they have the same effect in all districts.

The general specifications of the country level (or level 2) model is:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * \text{Muslim} + \gamma_{02} * \text{Urban} + \gamma_{03} * \text{Population Density} + u_{0j}, \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10}, \\ \beta_{2j} &= \gamma_{20}, \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where β_{0j} is the observed aggregate instance of stone-throwing in each of the 21 districts.

In the Level-2 model specified here, this aggregate is hypothesized as a function of whether the district is majority Muslim, percentage of urban population, and its population density plus a stochastic error term (u_{ij}).

Combining equation 1 and equation 2 produces the following multilevel model:

$$\begin{aligned} \log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{1-p_{ij}}\right) &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10} * \text{Temperature} + \gamma_{20} * \text{Friday} + \gamma_{30} * \text{Ramzan} \\ &+ \gamma_{40} * \text{Onion Prices} + \gamma_{01} * \text{Muslim} + \gamma_{02} * \text{Urban Population} \\ &+ \gamma_{03} * \text{Population Density} + r_{ij} + u_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The first two models (which we refer to as our “full models”) are estimated using equation 3 and a dummy variable for either demonetization or for Wani’s demise.⁷⁵ We did not include the dummy variables for killing Wani and demonetization in the same model because demonetization was enacted in part because of the public unrest following Wani’s death.⁷⁶ Estimates are in [Table 2](#).

Because we could not estimate the binary variables for demonetization and Wani’s death simultaneously, we estimated the same model (Equation 3) using three different time periods to disentangle the effects of demonetization policy and Wani’s death. The first period is before Wani’s killing (1 August 2013 until 8 July 2016). The second period is after his death but before demonetization was enacted (9 July 2016 until 9 November 2016). The third period is after the demonetization policy was enacted (10 November 2016 to 31 December 2017). These results are in [Table 3](#). (N.B.: We also ran

Table 2. Results from the estimation of the full models.

	Model 1	Model 2
Percentage Living in Urban Setting	0.03* (0.02)	0.03a (0.02)
Population Density	2.80* (1.12)	2.64* (1.07)
Muslim Majority District (1 = Muslim)	2.52** (0.82)	2.28** (0.79)
Onion Prices (in Constant 2012 INR)	-2.62*** (0.56)	-0.71 (0.58)
Friday Dummy (1 = Friday)	1.18*** (0.08)	1.24*** (0.09)
Ramazan (1 = Ramazan)	-0.03 (0.13)	0.46*** (0.13)
Temperature (in Celsius)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Precipitation (in mm)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Demonetization Policy (0 = Before, 1 = After)	1.21*** (0.08)	
Killing Burhan Wani (0 = Before, 1 = After)		2.04*** (0.09)
Constant	-7.65 (0.73)	-8.16 (0.70)
Level 2 Intercept	1.95 (0.69)	1.79 (0.64)
Observations	33,894	33,894

Source: In-house analyses of the data.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

the same models using months instead of days: the results were the same.) In [Table 4](#), we report the results of the full models whereas [Table 3](#) reports the marginal effects of key variables from the logit regressions.

We grand mean centered the non-dummy variables for the ease of interpreting the intercept term. With multilevel models, the intercept, and slopes in the Level-1 (all the β s) model become the outcome variable at Level-2 (see equations above). We chose to grand center all variables because doing so only changes the magnitude of the intercept without changing the magnitude of the coefficients. Grand mean centering in multilevel modeling permits us to interpret the intercept as the expected value of the dependent variable when all the independent variables are held at the mean.⁷⁷

Results and discussion

How do these estimates allow us to evaluate the claims of the Modi government? Results from Model 1 indicate that stone-pelting was more likely after demonetization policy than before ($p < 0.001$), controlling for all other

Table 3. Results from the estimation of the models after dividing observations into three periods.

	Before Killing BW & Demonetization Model 3	After Killing BW & Before Demonetization Model 4	After Killing BW & Demonetization Model 5
Percentage Living in Urban Setting	0.04** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)
Population Density	0.97 (0.99)	2.19* (0.93)	2.90* (1.25)
Muslim Majority District (1 = Muslim)	1.84* (0.75)	2.86** (1.08)	1.86* (0.89)
Onion Prices (in Constant 2012 INR)	-1.78* (0.84)	17.70*** (5.37)	0.71 (1.02)
Friday Dummy (1 = Friday)	0.86*** (0.17)	1.69*** (0.19)	1.29*** (0.12)
Ramazan (1 = Ramazan)	0.70** (0.21)		0.56** (0.18)
Temperature (in Celsius)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
Precipitation (in mm)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.00 (0.01)
Constant	-7.39 (0.69)	-5.50 (1.11)	-6.06 (0.78)
Level 2 Intercept	1.28 (0.55)	0.96 (0.47)	2.19 (0.90)
Observations	22,533	2583	8778

Source: In-house analyses of the data.

* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 4. Results from the estimation of the models after dividing observations into three periods.

	Before Killing BW & Demonetization	After Killing BW & Before Demonetization	After Killing BW & Demonetization Model 5
Districts			
Muslim	0.008	0.049	0.043
Non-Muslim	0.001	0.003	0.008
Day of the Week			
Friday	0.011	0.097	0.074
Other Days	0.005	0.021	0.025
Urban Population			
Min	0.003	0.12	0.016
Mean	0.003	0.12	0.017
Max	0.003	0.12	0.017

These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all other variables in the model at their means.

variables. Results from Model 2 suggest that stone-pelting was positively correlated with Wani's death, which we anticipated.

With respect to our control variables, we found that stone-pelting was more common, all else equal, in districts with higher urban population ($p < 0.05$), greater population density ($p < 0.05$), and a Muslim majority ($p < 0.01$). These variables speak to "target richness" and availability of stone-throwers in a district who need not travel far to engage in protests. With respect to our imperfect measures of opportunity costs (proxied by district-wise, daily onion prices), evidence from Model 1 suggests that as onion prices increase, stone-pelting decreases *ceteris paribus* ($p < 0.001$). This evidence undermines Delhi's popular claims that stone-pelters engage in this violence because of Pakistan's pecuniary incentives, which would have presumably blunted such sensitivities to opportunity costs. Note that our below analysis by timeline offers deeper insights into the issue of opportunity costs.

Estimates from both models suggest that stone-pelting is more likely to occur on Fridays, consistent with the findings of Butt (2016) and the claims of Devadas (2019). Disambiguating the impacts of Ramazan upon stone-pelting is challenging – evidence from Model 1 is negative but statistically insignificant, while the estimates in Model 2 suggest a positive and significant relationship ($p < 0.001$). As noted, with each passing year, Ramazan occurs in a more climactically favorable time for protests. In other words, owing to the lunar cycle, Ramazan occurs in increasingly hot and humid months in the earlier years in our sample. We scrutinize this more closely in our subsequent analyses in which we break out our sample over time.

Turning to the potential climactic preferences of stone-throwers, evidence from both models indicate that stone-pelting is more likely on warmer days ($p < 0.01$). We find no statistically significant relationship between stone-pelting and precipitation.

Because Wani's death and the promulgation of the demonetization occur so closely together and because the stone-pelting following Wani's death motivated the demonetization policy, we conducted separate analyses in which we break up our sample into three distinct time periods to really see the effects of these variables on stone throwing. Our three time periods are 1 August 2013 till 8 July 2016 (Time 1, Model 3); 9 July 2016 till 9 November 2016 (Time 2, Model 4); and 10 November 2016 till 31 December 2017 (Time 3, Model 5). [Table 3](#) presents the estimations for these models.

For several variables, we obtain similar results across the three periods, namely: higher urban population, Muslim majority districts, and Friday all result in higher likelihood of stone-pelting as they did in Models 1 and 2. We also see higher stone-pelting on days during Ramazan. This variable is not included in Time 2 because there is no variation (Ramazan in 2016 ended right before Wani was killed, therefore it is not included in Time 2). However,

we observe three important differences. First, while population density does not influence stone-pelting before Wani's killing; after his killing and after demonetization, it is positively and significantly correlated with stone-pelting ($p < 0.05$). Second, temperature is significant in Time 1 and 3 but not Time 2. Third is the differing impacts of the price of onions, which we use to measure opportunity costs of stone-pelting. Prior to the Wani's death, we observe sensitivity to opportunity costs since an increase in onion prices makes stone-throwing less likely ($p < 0.001$). If Pakistan's intelligence agencies were inundating the region with significant amounts of cash, as Modi's government insists, we should expect little or no sensitivity. This means that, irrespective of what Pakistan was doing on the margins, the impacts of Pakistan's actions did not significantly dampen peoples' sensitivities to opportunity costs. After Wani's killing and prior to the onset of demonetization, opportunity costs correlate with stone-pelting consistent with the possibility that people were so enraged that they simply did not care about the economic repercussions of protesting. In the third period, which lasted 13 months, we find no relationship between opportunity costs and stone-pelting with other variables accounting for the observed variation in stone-pelting.

These results may be attributable to measurement problems or because many of the stone throwers were teenagers who may not have been employed.⁷⁸ While we cannot rule out the former without a better measure of opportunity costs, which we do not have, for the poorest of families we should still observe sensitivity. While the stone-throwing youths may not have formal jobs, their absence from household production or informal labor should still be important for poorer families as would be any costs associated with their participation or arrest and detention. Appendix [Table D1](#) summarizes the various results across all five models.

Implications and conclusions

Here, we dilate upon one kind of political violence: stone-pelting in J&K. We narrowly interrogate the Indian government's claim that demonetization curbed stone-pelting in J&K, which is largely premised upon the incredible claim that Kashmiris generally throw stones at the behest of Pakistan rather than personal or communal grievances about poor governance, human rights violations and a lack of democratic accountability in the state. While this may sound absurd to those who are not familiar with Indian politics on this issue, the belief is popularly held among a wide swathe of Indians as we have demonstrated in this paper. Concomitantly, despite criticisms of demonetization with respect to Modi's other stated goals, most Indians *still* believe that the policy curbed stone-pelting and other violence in Kashmir.

To evaluate these claims, we compiled a novel dataset of stone-pelting events and used various econometric models to investigate the impact of demonetization, considering other variables that would likely affect stone-pelting. When we look at the impact of the demonetization variable, we find that the policy was in fact associated with *increased* likelihood of stone-pelting, holding other variables constant. We also found that stone-pelting was most common in urban, more densely populated, Muslim-dominant districts; on Fridays and during Ramazan; and on warmer days, all else constant. This is generally consistent with expectations about target density and the roles of Friday prayer and possibly Ramazan in both decreasing the organizational cost of mobilization but also the opportunity costs of doing so.

The most illuminating variable is the price of onions, which we used as a proxy measure for opportunity costs of stone-pelting. The Indian government justified demonetization by the assertion that Pakistan instigated unrest by paying stone-throwers daily and monthly sums as well as clothes and other in-kind goods. By rendering the previous currency null and void, whatever currency Pakistan had injected into the fractious population would no longer be useful, and thus they should be sensitive to the opportunity costs of protest after demonetization. In our full models, onion prices are in fact negatively correlated with stone-pelting, although it is significant only in Model 1, which included the dummy for demonetization and excludes the dummy for Wani's death. This suggests that stone-pelters were sensitive to such costs. This finding undermines the government's claim about the extent of Pakistani payments which would've mitigated this sensitivity if it were on a significantly large scale.

Our period analyses cast more light on this issue. Prior to Wani's killing, people seemed sensitive to opportunity costs. If the Pakistanis were inundating the region with significant amounts of cash as the government claims, we should not expect to observe this sensitivity. After Wani's death and prior to the onset of demonetization, opportunity costs correlate with stone-pelting consistent with the possibility that people are so enraged that they simply do not care about the economic repercussions of protesting. In the third period, which lasted 13 months, we find no relationship between opportunity costs and stone-pelting with other variables accounting for the observed variation in stone-pelting. In this period, if the government's claims about Pakistani support were valid on a large scale, we should have seen a negative correlation between onion prices and stone-pelting because the Pakistan-supplied large notes were now useless.

We deliberately chose the information cut off for our analyses to exclude the more recent provocative moves of the BJP government to strip J&K of its special constitutional status; to bifurcate it into two union territories (effectively stripping it of its erstwhile state status); harass and detain mainstream political actors; among other outrages such as depriving the residents of

internet and cell phone access because doing so would frustrate efforts to answer our key research question. Unfortunately, this analysis cannot offer insights into the current situation. Nonetheless, with the narrow remit we established for this exercise, our collective results provide strong evidence that not only did the policy of demonetization not have the advertised impacts of curbing stone-pelting, it may have exacerbated it. Our results also undermine India's claims that stone-pelters do so primarily because they are remunerated by Pakistan to do so.

While this query is narrow in its focus, it is still important. Indians who believe this narrative that all disturbances in the troubled state are an artifact of Pakistani manipulation necessarily view Kashmiri discontent as illegitimate despite the various sources of data that attest to sustained grievances among Kashmiri Muslims, particularly in the valley.⁷⁹ The official discourse depicts Kashmiris as 'misguided youth' who are 'guided by remote control from across the border' and 'working under a well thought-out long-term plan of Pakistan to create a situation where people would not participate in any election in the future.'⁸⁰ Prime Minister Modi himself, while addressing an audience in Srinagar in November 2019, has described the stone pelters as 'misguided youths who are under the influence of false propaganda from a foreign power' and elaborated that 'Every stone or weapon picked up by the youth of this state is only meant to destabilise their own state.'⁸¹ Such characterizations render the stone-pelters the primary obstacle to development and democratization in the state rather than state-failures and as such there is no concomitant moral requisite to engage Kashmiris on the sources of their disaffection. Consequently, this characterization of the stone-pelters and their motivations shrinks any political space throughout India to consider their grievances within any constitutional or political framework. Perhaps, this is in fact, the intent of these claims in the first instance.

Notes

1. Parthasarathy, "Understanding Kashmir's Stone-pelters."
2. Pressman, "Throwing stones in social science."
3. There are no comprehensive and/or reliable estimates available. In 2018, the Union Minister of State for Home Hansraj Ahir informed the upper house (Rajya Sabha) that between 2015–2017, there were 4,799 stone-pelting incidents in which 17 protestors and two security personnel were killed. However, this report doesn't indicate whether the protestors were killed by the stone-pelting or by the security forces themselves (Rajya Sabha, "Unstarred Question No-556;" "4,799 stone-pelting incidents.").
4. Ray, "The Case for Revising."
5. Bhalla, "Pakistan funded terrorism."

6. Pathak and Khan, "Stone-pelters on Hire in Kashmir."
7. "Stone-pelters today."
8. Doshi, Vidhi, "Cash for queues."
9. Slater and Naseem, "2018 is the deadliest year."
10. Das, "De-mon-niversary."
11. Devadas, *The Generation of Rage*; Wani and Desai, "The Road to Peace," and Human Rights Watch, "India."
12. Sharma, "Forces deploy 1 million."
13. Ganie, "All I got is stones."
14. See *inter alia* Mohanty, "The New Wave;" Khandy, "No place for "Kashmiri;" and Ganie, "All I got is stones."
15. Ranganathan, "Re-Scripting the Nation."
16. Note that while Pakistan has vocally impugned India for what it deemed a 'unilateral and illegal' move, Pakistan revoked the 'state subject' status (comparable to 35-A) for Gilgit-Baltistan in 1974 and has engineered demographic change by encouraging Pakistanis from other provinces to move into the area. Shahid, "Pakistan Is Doing Its Own Political Reengineering in Kashmir."
17. For a range of accounts, with different sympathies, empirical and ontological commitments see, *inter alia*, Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir*; Devadas, *The Generation of Rage*; Duschinski et al., *Resisting Occupation in Kashmir*; de Bergh Robinson, *Body of Victim*; and Schofield, *Kashmir in the Crossfire*.
18. *Inter alia*, "Pakistan Resolution Day"; and "Pakistan is incomplete without Kashmir, says Bilawal."
19. Tinker, "Pressure, Persuasion, Decision."
20. Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir*; Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*; and Nawaz, "The First Kashmir War."
21. The issue of the plebiscite is complex but important, particularly given Pakistan's incessant yet disingenuous demands for its conduct. In 1948, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, first insisted that a plebiscite be held under UN auspices at the urging of the last Viceroy Louis Mountbatten. At that time Jinnah demurred, fearing that the plebiscite would not favor Pakistan given Kashmiris' anger at the Pakistani marauders and their rapine violence. While Pakistan never fulfilled the necessary but insufficient conditions to hold the plebiscite, other factors also undermined its prospects. First, over successive decades, J&K has undergone considerable ethno-religious cleansing through violence and migration to other parts of India and Pakistan. While that part of Kashmir under Pakistan's control is nearly all Muslim, many are Shia (e.g. as in Baltistan). In India, Kashmir (especially the Valley) is overwhelmingly Muslim (97%, most of whom are Sunnis, except for the Kargil district which is overwhelmingly Shia). Jammu has a Hindu Majority (65%) and in Ladakh, 52% espouse Buddhism, Hinduism or other non-Muslim faith. The vast majority (95%) of the state's Hindu pandit population (150,000–160,000) were ethnically cleansed by Muslims when militancy seized the state in 1990. See Raghavan, *War and Peace in Modern India*; and Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir*; Evans, "The Kashmir Insurgency." The afore-noted UNSC resolution called for the situation *ex-ante* to be restored, which has long been superseded by these voluntary and forced migratory events. Second, per the 1972 Shimla Agreement which ended the 1971 war, India and Pakistan 'are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.' See "Shimla Agreement"

Text. India interprets this to mean that the United Nations is no longer relevant. Pakistan rejects this and routinely and duplicitously calls for the plebiscite to be held.

22. Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad*.
23. Raghavan, "Civil–Military Relations."
24. Tellis et al., *Limited Conflicts*.
25. Evans, "The Kashmir Insurgency"; and Varshney, "India, Pakistan, and Kashmir."
26. Fair, "Insights from a database;" Fair, *Fighting to the End*; and Kapur, *Jihad as Grand Strategy*.
27. Also see Human Rights Watch, "With Friends Like These"; and Human Rights Watch, "Everyone Lives in Fear."
28. Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla*; and Ray, "The Case for Revising"; and Human Rights Watch, "India: Abuses Persist."
29. Mohanty, "The New Wave of Mobilisation."
30. *Inter alia* Staniland, "Kashmir since 2003"; and Nabi and Ye, "Of Militarisation, Counter-insurgency."
31. Aaron, "The Modi government."
32. Pressman, "Throwing stones in social science;" Ganie, "All I got is stones in my hand." For example, a reviewer of a previous draft of this essay wrote, without interrogating his or her own ethical commitments that: 'I found it troubling that the authors have no qualms, reservations, or caveats about the ethical implications of their argument. They state numerous times that stone-pelting is a violent act, one that should be grouped alongside acts of political violence rather than nonviolent protest. This is a fair enough claim and I have no issue with it. But in their zeal to show the physical costs attendant with pelting stones, the authors may pause to consider the militarized, trained, and ruthless states that these stone-pelters are facing. From Israel to India, these are big economies with big defense budgets, allied to the strongest country in the world, acting essentially with impunity and zero legal accountability, either domestic or international. Can the authors at least signal attentiveness to the ethical issues in criticizing stone- pelting as they do . . . ?' (Anonymous Reviewer Report 15 August 2020).
33. "4,799 stone- pelting incidents."
34. Singh, "2019 Recorded Most Number."
35. Ganie, "All I got is stones in my hand," 117; and Devadas, *The Generation of Rage in Kashmir*.
36. Ganie, "All I got is stones in my hand," 117.
37. Pressman, "Throwing stones in social science," 520.
38. Ganie, "All I got is stones in my hand."
39. "Stone pelting reduced."
40. "58% back Modi."
41. Lokniti, "All India Postpoll."
42. Peerzada, "The Kashmir journalists."
43. Allsop, "In Kashmir"; and John and Grewal, "How foreign media."
44. Singh, "How foreign media."
45. Mehta, "How I was Deported from India;" Ellis-Petersen, "India strips overseas citizenship from journalist who criticised Modi regime"; and Committee to Protect Journalists, "Indian government expels two foreign journalists for visa violations."
46. "Full text: PM Modi's."

47. Ibid.
48. Venugopal, "Note ban takes toll."
49. Majid, "Kashmir sees sharp decline."
50. "Note ban had major impact."
51. "Omar Abdullah Takes A Dig."
52. Naseem, "A year of demonetisation."
53. See note 10 above.
54. Butt, "Street power."
55. International Labour Organization, "India Wage Report."
56. Government of India, "Annual Report".
57. Arikan and Bloom, "Religion and Political Protest."
58. Calhoun-Brown, "African American Churches."
59. Campbell, "Acts of Faith."
60. Harris, "Something within."
61. Hoffman and Nugent, "Communal religious practice."
62. Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer, "Estimating the Impact of the Hajj."
63. Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan, "Religion and support for suicide attacks."
64. See note 54 above.
65. Devadas, *The Generation of Rage in Kashmir*.
66. See Taylor, "Tell Me Why."
67. Raleigh et al., "Introducing ACLED."
68. We compile a dataset with district-day level data. Therefore, observations here refer to district-days.
69. Government of Jammu & Kashmir, "Area and Population."
70. Gettleman et al., "India Isn't Letting a Single Onion Leave the Country;" "India's onion crisis"; and B, "Onion prices and state intervention."
71. We had partial onion price data for the following districts: Anantnag, Badgam, Baramullah, Jammu, Kathua, Pulwama, Rajauri, Srinagar and Udhampur. For the remaining districts we did not find any data on onion prices.
72. To generate this dummy variable, we used the lubridate package (Grolemund and Wickham, "Dates and Times Made Easy.") in R.
73. We ruled out any correlation between and among our Ramadan dummy variable, temperature and precipitation. Of all the possible combinations, the highest correlation was between temperature and Ramzan (0.23), which is still a weak correlation. The correlation between precipitation and Ramazan was also weak at 0.01 as was the correlation between precipitation and temperature at 0.12.
74. Guo and Zhao, "Multilevel Modeling;" Steenbergen and Jones, "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures"; and Raudenbush and Bryk, *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods*. We also conducted multiple likelihood ratio tests comparing logit models with mixed effects logit models. The results indicated in all instances the best model for this data is a mixed effects logit model ($p < 0.001$).
75. We did not include both demonetization and killing of Burhan Wani in the same model because there is a high correlation between these two variables. The tetrachoric rho (which is used to measure correlation for binary variables) = 1 and Pearson's rho = 0.87. Demonetization and Burhan Wani are level 1 variables; therefore, Full Model 1 = equation 3 + γ_{50} **Demonetization*, and Full Model 2 = equation 3 + γ_{50} **Killing of Burhan Wani*.
76. We grand mean centered the non-dummy variables for the ease of interpreting the intercept term. With multilevel models the intercept and slopes in the Level-

1 (all the β s) model become the outcome variable at Level-2 (see equations above). We chose to grand center all variables because doing so only changes the magnitude of the intercept without changing the magnitude of the coefficients. Grand mean centering in multilevel modeling permits us to interpret the intercept as the expected value of dependent variable when all the independent variables are held at the mean (Paccagnella, "Centering or Not Centering"; Luke, *Multilevel Modeling*; Kreft and De Leeuw, *Introducing Multilevel Modeling*; and Snijders and Boskers, *Multilevel Analysis*).

77. Paccagnella, "Centering or Not Centering in Multilevel Models?"; Luke, *Multilevel Modeling*; Kreft and de Leeuw, *Introducing Multilevel Modeling*; and Snijders and Bosker, *Multilevel Analysis*.
78. See Devadas, *The Generation of Rage*.
79. International Crisis Group, "Raising the Stakes."
80. Sahay, "Kashmir politics."
81. "Modi in Srinagar."

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author, Dr. C. Fair, upon request.

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Appendix

Table A1. Ramazan dates.

Year	Start Date	End Date
2013	July 9	August 7
2014	June 29	July 28
2015	June 18	July 17
2016	June 7	July 5
2017	May 27	June 24

Source: Ramazan 2013 – 2017 – Calendar date. (n.d.). Retrieved 28 May 2020, from https://www.calendardate.com/Ramazan_2013.htm https://www.calendardate.com/Ramazan_2013.htm.

Table B1. District demographics.

District	Total Population	Majority Religion	Land Area (in sq. km)	Pop. Density	% Urban	Average Altitude (in feet)
Anantnag	1,078,692	Muslim	3574	302	26.23	5869
Badgam	753,745	Muslim	1361	554	12.99	10,478
Bandipur	392,232	Muslim	345	1137	16.66	5242
Baramulla	1,008,039	Muslim	4243	238	18.1	5095
Doda	409,936	Muslim	8912	46	7.97	3467
Ganderbal	297,446	Muslim	259	1148	15.81	5157
Jammu	1,529,958	Hindu	2342	653	50	1072
Kargil	140,802	Muslim	14,036	10	11.6	9228
Kathua	616,435	Hindu	2502	246	14.55	1017
Kishtwar	230,696	Muslim	1644	140	6.44	5374
Kulgam	424,483	Muslim	410	1035	18.99	5869
Kupwara	870,354	Muslim	2379	366	12.03	12,588
Leh	133,487	Buddhist	45,110	3	34.21	11,748
Pulwama	476,835	Muslim	1674	516	14.36	3349
Poonch	560,440	Muslim	1086	285	8.1	5419
Rajauri	642,415	Muslim	2630	244	8.14	2936
Ramban	283,713	Muslim	1329	213	4.16	2451
Reasi	314,667	Muslim	1719	183	8.58	1669
Samba	318,898	Hindu	904	353	16.81	1669
Shupiyan	266,215	Muslim	312	853	6.15	6748
Srinagar	1,236,829	Muslim	1979	625	98.6	5121
Udhampur	554,985	Hindu	2637	210	19.5	2509
Total	12,541,302		101,387			

Source(s): Majority Religion: Jammu and Kashmir Religion Data – Census 2011.

Average Altitude*: Directory of cities and towns in Jammu and Kashmir. (n.d.). Available at <http://www.fallingrain.com/world/IN/12/index.html> (accessed 22 June 2020), *Ramban taken from Wikipedia. Remaining data from: Digest of Statistics (No. 1; Area and Population). (2013–14). Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Directorate of Economics & Statistics. Available at <http://ecostatjk.nic.in/publications/publications.htm> (accessed 22 June 2020).

When we truncated the data to only include the dates between 1 August 2013 until 31 December 2017, we found instances of stone throwing in all 22 districts in Jammu and Kashmir. However, our data only includes 21 districts because one of the districts, Reasi, only had one instance of stone throwing in our timeline and we could not find climate data on this district. Therefore, it drops out of our analysis.

Table C1. Jammu climate.

Month	Maximum Temperature (in C)	Minimum Temperature (in C)	Average Temperature (in C)	Average Precipitation (in mm)
January	19	5	12	28.9
February	22	9	15.5	66
March	28	14	21	41.4
April	33	18	25.5	55
May	39	23	31	42.8
June	39	26	32.5	74.9
July	36	26	31	255.3
August	34	26	30	209.1
September	34	23	28.5	69.2
October	32	18	25	21.3
November	27	11	19	27.8
December	21	6	13.5	22.8

Source: <https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/india/jammu/climate>

Table C2. Srinagar climate.

Month	Maximum Temperature (in C)	Minimum Temperature (in C)	Average Temperature (in C)	Average Precipitation (in mm)
January	8	-2	3	69.9
February	11	1	6	96.5
March	17	4	10.5	80.2
April	21	8	14.5	100.2
May	26	12	19	53.7
June	28	15	21.5	42
July	30	18	24	76.2
August	30	18	24	80
September	27	13	20	50
October	23	7	15	23.2
November	16	2	9	27.7
December	10	-1	4.5	41.1

Source: <https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/india/srinagar/climate>.

Table C3. Anantnag climate.

Month	Maximum Temperature (in C)	Minimum Temperature (in C)	Average Temperature (in C)	Average Precipitation (in mm)
January	8	-2	3	69.9
February	11	1	6	96.5
March	17	4	10.5	80.2
April	21	8	14.5	100.2
May	26	12	19	53.7
June	28	15	21.5	42
July	30	18	24	76.2
August	30	18	24	80
September	27	13	20	50
October	23	7	15	23.2
November	16	2	9	27.7
December	10	-1	4.5	41.1

Source: <https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/india/anantnag/climate>

Table C4. Kupwara climate.

Month	Maximum Temperature (in C)	Minimum Temperature (in C)	Average Temperature (in C)	Average Precipitation (in mm)
January	8	-2	3	69.9
February	11	1	6	96.5
March	17	4	10.5	80.2
April	21	8	14.5	100.2
May	26	12	19	53.7
June	28	15	21.5	42
July	30	18	24	76.2
August	30	18	24	80
September	27	13	20	50
October	23	7	15	23.2
November	16	2	9	27.7
December	10	-1	4.5	41.1

Source: <https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/india/kupwara/climate>.**Table C5.** Baramulla climate.

Month	Maximum Temperature (in C)	Minimum Temperature (in C)	Average Temperature (in C)	Average Precipitation (in mm)
January	8	-2	3	69.9
February	11	1	6	96.5
March	17	4	10.5	80.2
April	21	8	14.5	100.2
May	26	12	19	53.7
June	28	15	21.5	42
July	30	18	24	76.2
August	30	18	24	80
September	27	13	20	50
October	23	7	15	23.2
November	16	2	9	27.7
December	10	-1	4.5	41.1

Source: <https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/india/baramulla/climate>.**Table D1.** Summary of empirical results.

Hypothesis/ Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
H ₁ /Demonitization Dummy	+/***				
H ₂ /Burhan Wani Dummy		+/***			
H _{3a} /Urban Dummy	+/**	+/**	+/**	+/***	+/**
H _{3b} /Pop Density	+/**	+/**	+ / Not Significant	+/**	+/**
H _{3c} /Muslim Dominant	+/**	+/**	+/**	+/**	+/**
H ₄ /Onion Prices	-/***	-/Not Significant	-/**	+/***	+ / Not Significant
H ₅ /Friday Dummy	+/***	+/***	+/***	+/***	+/***
H ₆ /Ramazan	- / Not Significant	+/***	+/**		+/**
H _{7a} /Temperature	+/***	+/***	+/***	+ /Not Significant	+/***
H _{7b} /Precipitation	- / Not Significant	0 / Not Significant	+ /Not Significant	- /Not Significant	0 /Not Significant

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.