

# United States Internal Security Assistance to Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

C. CHRISTINE FAIR\* & PETER CHALK<sup>†,2</sup>

\*United States Institute of Peace, <sup>†</sup>Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation

**ABSTRACT** Pakistan confronts numerous domestic security challenges including jihadist extremism, Sunni-Shi'a sectarian violence, drug trafficking, illegal commodity smuggling, endemic corruption, and systemic problems with the provision of justice and law enforcement. While much has been written about US military assistance to the Government of Pakistan (GOP) and the ever-evolving political relations between the two countries, basic questions of highest policy significance related to Pakistan's internal security have never been fully studied or considered. This essay begins to address these empirical lacunae. It first provides a comprehensive examination of Pakistan's internal security environment and the effectiveness of the GOP's criminal justice structures in dealing with these challenges. The paper then goes on to assess the impact and utility of the current suite of US law enforcement assistance in helping to fortify Pakistan's domestic security environment. The study raises a number of difficult questions pertinent to the long-term impact of this support, particularly in terms of its effect on fostering a viable, accountable and transparent system of civilian governance and policing.

## Introduction

Within South Asia, Pakistan is the most important partner in the Bush Administration's global war on terror (GWOT). The country has been critical to degrading the operational capabilities of al-Qaeda and Taliban elements which have fled into Afghanistan and into Pakistan. To ensure that Pakistan has the resources and capabilities to be optimally effective in the GWOT, Washington has enacted several internal security-related programs that have included enhanced control of border areas; activities to counter illicit movement of goods, narcotics and persons; police reform and augmentation of investigative capabilities; and other civilian counterterrorism-related training. These initiatives reflect US recognition that simultaneously addressing these threats is necessary to the effective conduct of the war of terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Analyses of Pakistan-US relations tend

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*Correspondence Address:* C. Christine Fair, c/o USIP, 1200 17th St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036; E-mail: cfair@usip.org. Peter Chalk, RAND, 1776 Main St., Santa Monica, CA 90407.

to focus upon the military aspects and this important area of cooperation has remained under-evaluated.

This article addresses this analytical gap by providing an assessment of the current scope of US civilian security assistance to the Government of Pakistan (GOP) and the extent to which it is addressing Pakistan's internal security and governance challenges.<sup>4</sup> After providing an overview of Pakistan's principal sources of domestic instability and the GOP's extant capabilities to counter these challenges, the paper outlines the major US civilian security assistance programs in the country, highlighting their various shortcomings. The article considers the putative relationship between security assistance and good governance in Pakistan and concludes with several recommendations for optimizing this important – if neglected – engagement.

### **Principal Threats to Pakistani Internal Security and Extant Civilian Law Enforcement Capacity**

#### *Threats to Domestic Security*

Pakistan's internal threat environment is plagued by a multitude of internal security threats and governance challenges including, *inter alia*, numerous varieties of terrorism, organized criminal activity, and corruption. Terrorism remains a particularly serious problem with bomb attacks and random killings emerging almost as a monthly occurrence over the last few years. Sectarian militant organizations have been consistently active, with Sunni–Shi'a clashes accounting for some 314 deaths between 2002 and 2005.<sup>5</sup> The chief protagonists in this domestic inter-religious rivalry include Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) on the Sunni side and the Tahrik-e-Jafaria (TJP) and its militant wing Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) on the Shi'a side.<sup>6</sup>

In addition various militant ethnic groups exist, particularly in Baluchistan, which witnessed a major resurgence of violence during 2004. Renegade tribal militias fighting for an equitable share of the province's sizeable gas reserves have been at the forefront of much of this unrest. During 2005, groups such as Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch People's Liberation Army (BPLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) were linked to no fewer than 141 attacks between January and June, injuring 190 and killing 56.<sup>7</sup>

The overall terrorist threat has been considerably exacerbated in the wake of OEF, which has resulted in several problems. First, there are growing indications that foreign extremists connected to the Taliban and al-Qaeda have logistically relocated to the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and are now using these areas to consolidate resources for anti-Western attacks as well as renewed offensives in Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup>

Military sweeps through South Waziristan in 2004, which represented the first time that Islamabad militarily intervened in FATA, confirmed that some external Islamist penetration has taken place. Between their initiation in February and termination in December, a total of 302 militants were killed with a further 656 arrested. Some 80 per cent of these fighters were foreign, mostly comprising Afghan Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens as well as a smaller number of Uighurs from China.<sup>9</sup>

Second, several prominent jihadist tanzeems (organizations)<sup>10</sup> that have traditionally focused on the struggle in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)<sup>11</sup> appear to be reorienting their activities. Certain groups are now clearly emphasizing a wider anti-Pakistan agenda to protest the country's support for the US-led GWOT. This has been most notable with Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM),<sup>12</sup> Harakat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), all of which have been variously implicated in high-level assassination attempts against government and military officials, including President Musharraf, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and the Karachi Corps Commander, General Ahsan Saleem Hyat.<sup>13</sup>

US-based analysts have further suggested that certain 'globalized' elements within Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)<sup>14</sup> may be taking on an explicit ideological and operational agenda that extends well beyond India and Indian-administered Kashmir. The 2002 arrest of Abu Zubaydah, which took place at a LeT safe house in Faisalabad, has been hailed as evidence that members of the group have actively cooperated with al-Qaeda and possibly assisted with the movement of cadres throughout Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> In addition there have been periodic claims that Lashkar has been instrumental in recruiting and training Islamists to engage American forces in Iraq,<sup>16</sup> and, in the wake of the July 2005 bombings of the London underground, had provided some form of training to foreign jihadists wishing to carry out terrorist strikes in western capitals.<sup>17</sup>

Organized criminal activity – particularly narcotics trafficking – further complicates Pakistan's internal security situation. Intelligence from western drug officials show that, on average, at least a quarter of the unrefined and morphine-based opiates produced in Afghanistan (the world's leading supplier of heroin)<sup>18</sup> pass through the country, which acts as a central conduit to both Turkey and Iran – the main hubs for the movement of narcotics to the European market. Overall volumes have steadily increased since 2001, with a record 34 metric tons (mt) of heroin seized in 2003. This haul represented just under half (47 per cent) of all the narcotics intercepted in the wider Afghan opiate containment zone that year, an area that takes in Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia. Although the figure for 2004 registered a slight decline – down to 24.7 mt – it still equated to a 65 per cent increase on the combined total for 2002 and 2003 (14.9 mt).<sup>19</sup>

Pakistan has a habitual (as opposed to recreational) drug population of between 3.5 and 5 million – including roughly 1.5 million chronic heroin abusers<sup>20</sup> – who help to fuel an underground economy that some analysts believe could be worth as much as US\$1.4 billion a year.<sup>21</sup> The country's most powerful organized crime entity is the Karachi mafia. The syndicate controls most of the international conduits used to transport South Asian opiates and has emerged as a key player in the smuggling of light weapons and explosives. Sources in Delhi believe that the Karachi group has established a working relationship with the Indian underworld and is currently providing safe haven to Ibrahim Dawood, the ostensible 'Don' of the Bombay mob with suspected links to international terrorists and currently one of the most wanted men in India.<sup>22</sup>

Besides drug trafficking, Pakistan has emerged as a major center for the illicit smuggling of goods and people. Black market commodity vendors deal in everything from tea, clothes, chinaware and electronics to car parts, oil and petroleum products, selling these items in bazaars (or 'baras') located along the country's porous border with Afghanistan. The World Bank has estimated the value of this 'stealth economy' at over \$30 billion, roughly a tenth of the country's official GDP and one of the most severe ratios of any state in the world.<sup>23</sup>

Organized trafficking of people is just as pervasive and mostly involves women and girls sold into prostitution and bonded labor and male children sent to the Middle East to become camel jockeys. The true extent of this trade in human flesh is unknown, although the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) in Islamabad claims to receive, on average, five reports a day of attempts to smuggle people through the country. Overall, it is thought that between 100 and 150 illegal migrants cross the border in any 24-hour period, most of who are women from Bangladesh and Burma who have been kidnapped or married to agents by parents in their home countries.<sup>24</sup>

Complicating and exacerbating Pakistan's domestic security challenges is pervasive corruption. Over the last ten years, the country has consistently ranked in the upper 10 per cent of Transparency International's (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI),<sup>25</sup> with scores ranging between 2.1 to 2.7 (out of a possible maximum 'clean' of 10).<sup>26</sup> Surveys of academics, business people, risk analysts and ordinary citizens reveal a startling picture, highlighting a state in which virtually no arm of government has been free of some form of graft and institutionalized dishonesty.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Extant Internal Security Capacity in Pakistan*

Unfortunately, by almost every measure Pakistan has only a limited capacity to deal with these myriad threats. Even though the Musharraf government has been active in detaining jihadists linked to al-Qaeda,<sup>28</sup> the country remains ill-equipped to counter the generalized lack of law and

order that is serving to frustrate both Washington's operations in the region and Islamabad's own goals of social, political and economic rehabilitation.

The police lack basic investigative skills in collecting evidence and following chains of custody and have few technical resources at their disposal. The state has no centralized criminal database and, until recently, no forensic laboratories were available for collecting and assembling evidence against criminal or terrorist suspects.<sup>29</sup> The immigration system is equally archaic. International airports have only recently begun to operationalize a digitized system for tracking those entering and leaving the country (see below) and are yet to develop robust structures for communicating with one another in such a way that would allow for the effective institution of a dedicated terrorist or criminal watch list. Land borders suffer from even greater deficiencies, particularly those in the remote northern and western areas where frontier posts are largely devoid of any formal regulations or controls.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, Pakistan's civil authorities have inadequate investigatory and intelligence collection assets. The most competent organization is the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. While the agency has become increasingly involved in managing or orchestrating domestic developments within Pakistan, the ISI is not an institution that serves the provision of justice and civil prosecution. Furthermore, the relationship between the Directorate and the police is not reciprocal, particularly in terms of information exchange.<sup>31</sup>

It is true that certain moves have been made to address some of these shortcomings. A principal component of these efforts has involved soliciting US assistance to help strengthen the state's law enforcement capacity. To this end, the former Minister of the Interior, Moinuddin Haider, played a key role in helping to convene a Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and Law Enforcement (JWG-CTLE). The forum's inaugural meeting was held in Washington, DC in May 2003 and covered a range of issues including: counter-narcotics, counter terrorism, extradition, money laundering, human trafficking, reducing demand for illegal substances, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal system reform, and issues pertaining to the repatriation of Pakistani nationals held on visa violations.<sup>32</sup> The forum now acts as an inter-agency coordination body for Pakistan's law enforcement agencies. This is important as the GOP has yet to promulgate effective coordination processes that clearly demarcate geographic and functional areas of responsibility for its internal security services.<sup>33</sup> Despite these benefits, the JWG-CTLE remains a nascent body, and because it meets periodically, it is essentially unable to influence the practice of law enforcement in Pakistan on a day-to-day basis.

### US Law Enforcement and Internal Security Assistance to Pakistan

Cognizant of the problems surrounding Pakistan's internal stability – both in terms of threat and response – the US has moved to invest considerable resources in helping to bolster and improve the country's civil security infrastructure. The bulk of this support has taken the form of law enforcement assistance and reform programs enacted through the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Justice (DoJ).

#### *Initiatives Enacted through the Department of State*

There are several entities within the US DoS that are involved in providing 'internal security assistance' (or alternatively 'civilian security assistance') to Pakistan. The bulk of these organizations come under the auspices of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), although several other agencies are also involved at varying levels of engagement, including the Office of Counterterrorism (S/CT), the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Each has its own set of objectives and perceived challenges, which are discussed below.

INL has three principal aims in Pakistan: (1) to strengthen control of and access to the Pakistan–Afghanistan border; (2) to improve Pakistani law enforcement capacity and interagency cooperation; (3) to enhance the country's counter-narcotics capabilities.<sup>34</sup> After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, INL received \$73 million dollars in supplemental funding to help fortify the GOP's border areas – compared to less than \$2 million dollars the previous year. While funding has fallen off somewhat since 2001, it remains substantial, with \$30.5 million apportioned in FY04 and \$40 million requested in FY05.<sup>35</sup>

INL has been involved in several prominent assistance programs in Pakistan. Among the more important are the introduction of a computerized Personal Identification Security, Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) to capture details about all persons entering or exiting Pakistan. PISCES is now operational at all of the country's main airports and there are plans to install additional components at key land crossings as well.<sup>36</sup> INL has also helped to establish an airwing in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) located in Quetta (Baluchistan) to facilitate counter-terror and counter-narcotics operations.<sup>37</sup> INL programs have also helped to lay numerous paved border security and counter-narcotic access roads in FATA as well as the construction of more modern entry/exit points along the Pakistan–Afghan border.<sup>38</sup> In addition INL has supported basic police training and reform and initialized an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). At the time of writing, 239,000 fingerprints had been collected and stored in the



nascent system.<sup>39</sup> INL also undertakes diverse Counter-narcotics programming (undertaken in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)).<sup>40</sup>

The S/CT and DS/ATA are also involved in efforts to enhance Pakistan's internal security. Programs instituted through these two agencies are inherently linked: S/CT provides policy guidance and funding to DS/ATA, which in turn implements respective initiatives on the ground. S/CT determines the relative priority of select countries to receive specific kinds of training.<sup>41</sup> Officials at S/CT have identified two main goals for its programs in Pakistan. First, fostering Islamabad's *will* to meaningfully engage in the war on terrorism; and second is to provide the GOP with the *tools* decisively to confront militant extremist threats emanating from within its borders. Compared to other programs, S/CT's budget is somewhat small, amounting to only \$10 million in FY05. Most of these monies are directed toward to enhancing Pakistan's basic investigative capabilities. In the view of S/CT officials, to the extent that the country has such expertise, it resides within the ISI, which is primarily an army-directed operation. It is the objective of S/CT to develop these skills within the *civilian* sector.<sup>42</sup> The most important effort has been the establishment of a dedicated Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group (SIG) at the National Police Academy in Rawalpindi.<sup>43</sup>

USAID returned to Pakistan in June 2002, following a seven-year hiatus precipitated by the GOP's nuclear tests in 1998, with the mission to 'tangibly improve the lives of the poor . . . and to build support for [Islamabad's] decision to join the international war on terrorism and thwart further terrorist recruiting'.<sup>44</sup> Overall, USAID is providing some \$147.6 million to Pakistan, which is being used to enhance the country's education and health sectors; create employment and economic opportunities; and strengthen governance.<sup>45</sup> USAID is also contributing to INL's efforts in FATA by constructing schools. This work is being coordinated with the GOP in an effort to both win the 'hearts and minds' of the local residents and to open up the tribal areas so they can be integrated into the mainstream parameters of the Pakistani state.<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, USAID's projects in Pakistan do not directly affect the most important security threats confronting Pakistan described above.

#### *Initiatives Enacted through the Department of Justice (DoJ)*

Security assistance to Pakistan from the DoJ essentially takes place under the auspices of the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

ICITAP programs have five objectives: (1) Border security; (2) law enforcement reform and training; (3) the establishment of an automated finger print identification system (AFIS); (4) the institution of a national

criminal database; and (5) forensics.<sup>47</sup> ICITAP, which coordinates much of its work with INL,<sup>48</sup> is responsible for several key initiatives in Pakistan, the main thrust of which are directed toward improving the state's ability to detect and intercept illicit cross-border activities. Relevant training takes place in Quetta and Peshawar and focuses primarily on institutional building within the Frontier Corps (FC, the main security detachment in FATA), the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), customs and customs intelligence agencies, the FIA and Immigration.<sup>49</sup> In addition to the provision of in-country support, ICITAP runs various external instructional courses in the US and had, at the time of writing, organized specific modules on Border Security Augmentation;<sup>50</sup> Crime Scene Investigator and First Response;<sup>51</sup> and Senior Executive Management.<sup>52</sup>

Paralleling its efforts on border security has been a concerted attempt to improve Pakistan's highly rudimentary forensics capabilities. The bulk of this assistance has been aimed at furnishing the country's existing four laboratories with the means to undertake such essential operations as testing and comparing blood samples and ballistics. The long-term objective is to work with Islamabad on establishing a true national forensics infrastructure housed within the National Police Research Bureau and falling under the jurisdictional authority of the FIA.<sup>53</sup> Notably, however, ICITAP is not currently helping to build any sort of DNA analysis capacity in Pakistan.<sup>54</sup>

The bulk of DEA assistance to the GOP is directed toward the ANF and is aimed at stemming the flow of heroin originating in Afghanistan. This backing has primarily involved the provision of new investigative resources, all-terrain vehicles and surveillance motorcycles.<sup>55</sup> In addition, the DEA has been instrumental in setting up at least one Special Investigative Unit (SIU) in Pakistan. The detachment, which is staffed by carefully vetted personnel who are trained and equipped to US standards, has been instrumental in several significant seizures of opiates and traffickers.<sup>56</sup>

### **Assessment of US Law Enforcement Assistance to Pakistan**

The general consensus within US and Pakistani policymaking circles is that the current regime of American law enforcement assistance is relevant to Islamabad's needs and is playing an important role in helping the government address some of the more glaring deficiencies in its domestic security set up. PISCES, AFIS and the SIG have all been hailed as particularly useful, providing the foundation for a far more robust regime of frontier control as well as the means to undertake decisive terrorist and related criminal investigations.<sup>57</sup> In commenting on the utility of these and other programs, Akhtar Munir Marawat, the Joint Secretary of the MoI, affirms: 'US assistance has been channeled to the appropriate places and reflects the priorities of the government'.<sup>58</sup> That



said, the true potential of US aid has been limited both by shortcomings in Pakistan as well as by the specific way programs have been developed and initialized by Washington.

### *Shortcomings in Pakistan*

American officials have identified several problems specific to the mission of police training and reform in Pakistan. First, several of the numerous law enforcement entities that operate on the country's borders and adjacent areas<sup>59</sup> lack training and equipment and have inadequate communication capabilities. Second, many of these agencies are insufficiently coordinated and are overburdened. Third, the western border's topography, the dearth of roads and other infrastructure in the tribal areas and the region's tenacious support for al-Qaeda and Taliban elements, have dramatically complicated the ability of extant law enforcement organizations to fulfill their statutory mandates effectively.<sup>60</sup> Fourth, while the USG has expended significant resources in establishing an SIG within the FIA, the jurisdiction of this body has yet to be determined in law. Fifth, Pakistan has made only desultory progress in executing meaningful police reform despite a promising effort in the now defunct Police Order Act (POA) of 2002. This is problematic, as US assistance for police reform has largely been premised on the full application of the 2002 legislation.<sup>61</sup> Without a rigorous framework to ensure proper oversight and transparency for the country's law enforcement community, it is doubtful how effective US support will be in advancing the twin goals of human rights and good governance. This issue is taken up in more detail below.

Other problems pertain to '... the absorptive capacity of the organizations receiving the training, loss of tacit knowledge and sustainability resulting from [staff] rotations, commitment of personnel, operational integration and mission ... caps'.<sup>62</sup> Desk officers at the DoS especially lament that frequently the right people are not sent to instructional courses – especially those taking place in the US<sup>63</sup> – and even when they are, tend to be re-assigned to areas that have little (if any) relevance to the training that was imparted (for example, bomb-disposal or traffic control in the case of counter-terrorism).<sup>64</sup>

Moreover, INL and ICITAP representatives have noted that because Pakistan's law enforcement officers are severely underpaid, they remain 'susceptible to outside influences and corruption, and are not respected by the public'.<sup>65</sup> Finally, Justice officials deride the police's critically low organizational investigative ratio, which currently stands at just 12 per cent (that is, 12 per cent are officers capable of undertaking substantive investigative activities)<sup>66</sup> as well as the fact that only 0.7 per cent of the overall force is management.<sup>67</sup>

Statutory problems have also prevented the comprehensive implementation of certain assistance programs. This has been most evident with efforts to establish a rigorous regime for countering terrorism financing. Although Pakistan has been singled out as a country of high priority in terms of receiving this support – not least because of the presence of al-Qaeda and other foreign jihadists who are widely believed to transfer funds on the back of the state’s informal, cash-based hawala system – very little progress has been made in actually instituting key schematic initiatives such as the creation of a dedicated Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).<sup>68</sup> This is because Islamabad has neither signed the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism nor passed an adequate suite of fiscal legislation that meets international standards.<sup>69</sup> Until the GOP does so, more assistance cannot occur.<sup>70</sup>

#### *Problems Associated with US Program Development and Implementation*

On the American side, officials in both the US and Pakistan have highlighted several problems in the way assistance programs have been developed and implemented. First, the bulk of American assistance has emphasized hard security while paying scant regard for wider (and just as critical) civic outreach programs designed to ameliorate underlying drivers for militant extremism.<sup>71</sup> Although USAID is moving to address certain socio-economic externalities that are believed to contribute to popular malaise, alienation and frustration (such as poverty, unemployment, lack of adequate housing/education),<sup>72</sup> modalities for establishing robust structures of transparent and accountable community-based policing – which are vital to the institution of any effective system of local law enforcement that is fully respectful of human rights – have yet to feature prominently in the scope and parameters of current US assistance to Pakistan.<sup>73</sup>

Second, the Bush administration has tended to anchor the majority of its counter-terrorism (both civilian and military) assistance on enhancing border security primarily along Pakistan’s northern and western frontiers with Afghanistan. Although this region is undoubtedly an important point of infiltration for al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, it is not the only zone of concern. Indeed according to Pakistani intelligence officials, the crux of the problem has steadily shifted to the country’s hinterlands as well as major cities such as Quetta, Lahore and especially Karachi. Problematically, the direction of Washington’s counterterrorism assistance has not kept pace with these developments.<sup>74</sup>

Third, questions have been raised over certain aspects of US counter-narcotics assistance. Officials with Pakistan’s ANF point out two main problems with programs as currently instituted:<sup>75</sup> One area of ANF concern is the funding tradeoffs that are inherent in Washington’s

sizeable near-term allocation of counter-narcotics assistance to Afghanistan. Pakistani officials note, with considerable merit, that the nascent government in Kabul simply does not possess the necessary national infrastructure to absorb this support effectively. The ANF contends this is deeply problematic given the unprecedented volume of poppies that were cultivated inside Afghanistan during 2004 and the concomitant need to strengthen the interdiction capabilities of the six Asian containment states that are critical to limiting the dispersion of this crop. More specifically, there is a palpable fear that the current direction of USG funding priorities will deprive those states that are most able to countenance the flow of drugs from South Asia.<sup>76</sup> ANF representatives also lament the lack of initiatives to deal with the demand for narcotics in Pakistan, pointing out that funding for initiatives such as addict rehabilitation services, safe needle exchanges and public educational out-reach programs remain at marginal levels.<sup>77</sup>

Finally, there are various areas that the US is not addressing in terms of its law enforcement support to the GOP. These include, inter alia, organized crime (especially the white collar aspects of illicit syndicate activity), the trafficking of human beings, the provision of DNA training<sup>78</sup> and, perhaps most importantly, the fostering of viable structures of civil governance.

### **Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

Pakistan currently counts as one of the principal recipients of US security support, reflecting the key importance Washington attaches to the country as a front-line state in the GWOT. If sustained, US internal security assistance will help the GOP lay the foundation for a more robust and effective policing and criminal justice infrastructure to deal with the numerous threats that it presently faces. However, as this article has highlighted, the true potential of US backing is being hindered by limitations in Pakistan's intent, its absorptive capacity as well as implementation problems with respect to the actual institution of the US assistance package – both in terms of coverage and wider considerations of good governance and human rights. Certainly, the US cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of reforming Islamabad's internal security structure on its own. However, given the goals of the USG with respect to strengthening the provision of civilian law enforcement in Pakistan and the magnitude of threats confronting the country, there are key areas which likely merit greater attention. These are presented below for consideration.

### **Bolstering Pakistan's Will to Do More**

It is an inescapable conclusion that there are specific areas where different aspects of the Pakistani polity have competing equities that

clash with the objective of comprehensive law and order reform and/or the interests of the US and the wider global community. Most important in this regard is the question of state support for Islamist militants based in the country. It is very unlikely that international assistance to the GOP will have a long-term palliative impact unless Islamabad makes a strategic decision to fully abandon militancy as a means of prosecuting its foreign and security policy – particularly in terms of prosecuting the insurgency in J&K and expanding strategic depth in Afghanistan.

The USG and international community must give this issue the prioritization that it deserves. This may mean leaning on New Delhi and Kabul, *inter alia*, to foster conditions that will enable the GOP positively to recalibrate the perceived need of employing Islamist proxies to prosecute its foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and India. It will most certainly require tangible progress in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. A number of prominent South Asia analysts have further suggested that the provision of certain aspects of military aid should be made contingent on Pakistan meeting significant benchmarks in comprehensively cracking down on all forms of militancy in the country.<sup>79</sup>

There is little doubt that many of the GOP's difficulties in these areas stem from the government's own policies and preferences for the country's inherited political structure. For this reason, 'top-down' efforts at change may never fully fructify and filter down through the inner institutional workings of the state. This suggests that the USG should work more closely with Pakistani civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to promote good governance at the grass roots level, emphasizing such tools and mechanisms as neighborhood action committees and even dedicated public service announcements. Washington needs to pay far closer attention to these wider 'domestic concerns', not least because the direction they ultimately take will directly impinge upon the overall efficacy of US assistance investments and support programs.

### **US Anti-Narcotics Programming**

As noted, officials in the ANF have questioned certain aspects of US counter-narcotics aid, especially with regards funding and the general prioritization of resource allocation.

To be sure Pakistani agencies have a vested interest in arguing that they are not receiving adequate support and assistance and US officials based in Islamabad have even raised significant questions about the ANF's utilization of the resources it has received.<sup>80</sup> However, the concerns highlighted are important and need to be duly considered in terms of the manner by which the USG presently determines the provision of its counter-narcotics assistance to Pakistan. Given Pakistan's central importance as a trafficking hub for the South Asian

drug trade, it is critical the country receives aid that is not only sufficient, but also appropriate for buttressing its overall counter-narcotics capabilities and resilience.

### **Jihadist and Sectarian Violence**

Currently, Islamabad differentiates between the threat posed by al-Qaeda and select Taliban affiliates on the one hand and domestic jihadists on the other.<sup>81</sup> It is the opinion of the authors that this is an artificial distinction and one that may prove highly dangerous given that many of these groups are integrated at the level of membership and ideology, share the same mosques and madaris and continue to enjoy support from renegade members of the intelligence services and armed forces. Militant Islamist extremism in Pakistan must be seen in its totality and its various dimensions must all be recognized as representing a direct threat to the GOP, to US interests and to regional security.

### **Areas Beyond FATA**

The US should significantly reconsider the overwhelming emphasis it is currently giving to FATA in terms of internal security assistance. While this focus is undoubtedly important for the conduct of US and coalition military operations in Afghanistan, it gives significant short shrift to the myriad and growing domestic law and order challenges that exist beyond the tribal and border areas. Notable areas of neglected concern include major urban conglomerations (where the vast bulk of al-Qaeda high-level operatives have been caught), Pakistan's ports and the thickly forested and jungle areas of Sindh, NWFP, Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Punjab.

### **Good Governance**

Most South Asia observers understand that just as Pakistan's current internal situation has taken decades to evolve, it will likely take considerable time for the state to emerge as a fully democratic entity that respects human rights and provides both security and good governance for its citizens. It is probably less well appreciated, however, that present US interventions to support the GOP, while instrumental to the short-term war on terror, may be serving to seriously impede the long-term prospects for peace and stability in the country and the development of democratic processes and institutions. Washington's actions in the region during the 1980s provide ample evidence of the necrotic effects such tradeoffs can have on wider social, political, and military growth. One of the prime challenges for the USG as it seeks to further define its policy towards Pakistan, therefore, is how best to use US resources

in a manner that is not only expeditious today, but also consistent with the goal of shaping a viable and effective polity tomorrow. Critically, to what extent is the current suite of assistance that is being offered to President Musharraf and the Army impacting on other aspects of Pakistan's social and political development? The current focus on the army not only undercuts stated US goals for democracy, governance and human rights in Pakistan, but Pakistanis themselves are critical of the US propensity to support the military and concurrent disregard for democracy and human rights and view this prioritization cynically as further evidence of US duplicity.<sup>82</sup>

### **Getting the Balance Right**

The US has a major stake in ensuring it formulates an aid package that appropriately balances immediate security concerns with more latent considerations of open and responsible government. Not only will this be vital to enriching the lives of some 150 million Pakistanis who deserve to live under a solid democratic system, but in at least three respects it is also integral to the stability of the greater South Asian region. First, the fate of Afghanistan is intrinsically linked to that of Pakistan: policies aimed at stabilizing and rehabilitating the former will almost certainly fail if the latter continues to exist in the absence of a professional and transparent security infrastructure that utilizes cross-border interference as a useful and justified tool of statecraft.

Second, Pakistan's continued culture of Islamist militancy and criminality has been a major factor in exacerbating bilateral tensions with India. This is particularly acute with regards to the contentious issue of Kashmir. More effective institutions for tracking, detaining and ultimately bringing to justice terrorists, drug syndicates and other subversives implicated in cross-border activities would undoubtedly help to stabilize government to government contacts with Delhi. Over the longer-term, this could provide the necessary baseline of trust for the development of a more active program of economic and cultural cooperation.

Third and finally, an opaque and non-accountable security apparatus raises the continual specter of Pakistani nuclear materials finding their way to dangerous non-state actors. While Pakistan may contend that it has ample control over the fissile material, the weapons designs, and the actual weapons; the A.Q. Khan story demonstrates the salience of these concerns, even if the actual details of his activities and the level of state support he enjoyed remain elusive. Moreover, there is little doubt that Pakistan is a desirable potential source country that is targeted by non-state actors seeking weapons of mass destruction. Even if some of these materials and technologies are under adequate control in Pakistan, the consequences of terrorist groups obtaining materials or designs from



Pakistan would be enormous and gruesome. For these and other reasons, it is of paramount interest to the international community to ensure that Pakistan has both the will and capability to counter these myriad threats of regional and extra-regional consequence.

### Disclaimer

The views of the authors are their own and do not represent those of their organizations.

### NOTES

1. This paper summarizes the key findings of ongoing work done by C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). See their forthcoming 'Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance' (USIP, forthcoming 2006). See also Chalk and Fair, 'Domestic Disputes: Pakistani Internal Security'.
2. C. Christine Fair is a Senior Research Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation.
3. One reviewer questions the utility of considering en masse these various internal security threats and suggested that Pakistan may have to make 'choices' about the threats with which it can contend. The reviewer suggested that such posited linkages between these threats may even provide incentives to terrorists and other criminals to collaborate. The reviewer noted that drug smugglers on the US–Mexico border have a 'very powerful incentive not to aid terrorists' because they do not want to draw the attention of counter-terrorism activities. While this observation may have validity in Mexico, it does not have validity in Pakistan. For one thing, the active counter-terrorism activities in this area are recent and have been initiated only *after* well-established synergies between terrorists and other criminal syndicates have been formed. In Pakistan, there is no evidence that terrorism is financed by narcotics. However, it is believed that criminal and drug syndicates and various terrorist organizations have significant overlap in logistics channels and finance channels.
4. In Pakistan, US security assistance takes two forms: military and civilian security. Along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, there is a military dimension *and* a law enforcement dimension to US–Pakistan initiatives. In this paper, we are looking at civilian security assistance – not military assistance. Analysts are often not cognizant of the fact that there are two operational foci in FATA: the military approach and the law enforcement approach. For example, anti-narcotics activities – a huge concern in the border area – are civilian security operations. Similarly, the primary security service that provides law and order in FATA is a police entity (the Frontier Constabulary and several local police-like entities) – not the Pakistan military. There are significant jurisdiction problems within and between civilian and military security organizations. The military angle has been covered extensively elsewhere (see, for example, Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions*). This paper's major contribution is that it looks at the less examined (yet equally important) issue of civilian security. Moreover, this paper argues that it is building civilian security capabilities – not military capabilities – that create the greatest prospect for a stable Pakistan that has respect for freedoms and democratic principles – something that is desired by Pakistanis as consistently demonstrated in poll data. See Inglehart, *Human Beliefs and Values*, E124, E116, E117, E123.
5. Figures from Indian sources are even higher. See, for instance, data on the South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi, available on-line at <http://www.satp.org>. It should be noted, however, that the overall tempo of sectarian violence in Pakistan has declined somewhat in recent years. According to Zaffar Abbas, bureau chief for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in Islamabad, two reasons account for this: (1) Shi'a groups have been increasingly marginalized and disempowered as a decisive force in their own right (a process that essentially began with the overrunning of their training bases in Afghanistan following the emergence of the Taliban); and (2) Sunni groups now have a wider agenda, which over the last

four years has systematically shifted to criticizing the Musharraf government for its support in the US-led GWOT. Author interview, BBC, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.

6. The genesis for these groups traces its roots back to the confluence of two events in the late 1970s: (1) the program of Sunni Islamization deliberately propagated by the regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, which were viewed with hostility and suspicion by Pakistan's Shi'a community; and (2) the 1979 Iranian revolution, which was directly instrumental in politicizing Shi'a identity and emboldening the course of sectarian mobilization vis-à-vis the country's Sunni majority. For further details see Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'a and Sunni Identities' pp.692–93; and Nasr, 'International Politics, Domestic Imperatives and Identity Mobilization. Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979–1988' pp.175–76.
7. Khan, 'Back to the Hills', pp.51–53, 51–63; Rahman, 'The Balochistan Issue'; 'Baloch Will Resist Military Offensive, Warns Senator'; 'Six Blasts Rock Pakistan', and 'Four Explosions Rock Balochistan'.
8. Author interviews, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, Nov. 2004, the Pakistani Federal Investigative Agency (FIA), Islamabad, Jan. 2004 and the United Nations, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. See Risen, 'Mountains and Border Foil Quest for Bin Laden'. According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sources cited in this report, the tribal areas continue to form an important crux of the residual Bin Laden network, including, allegedly, the base for an 'elite' unit dedicated to preparing for and coordinating attacks against western interests in differing parts of the world.
9. Author interview, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, Rawalpindi, Jan. 2005. Similar comments were also made during the 'Tribal Areas of Pakistan: A Haven for Terrorists?' Conference, Royal United Services Institute, London, 19 Jan. 2005. Khan, 'Who Are These People?' pp.60–67.
10. For detailed information about the various 'tanzeems' originating in Pakistan see M Rona, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*.
11. For further details on the Kashmir conflict see Evans, 'The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad as it gets'; Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir*; Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace*; Wirsing, *India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute*; Varshney, 'India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism'; and Blank, 'Kashmir-Fundamentalism Takes Root'.
12. JeM was proscribed in 2002 and now operates under the banner Jamaat-ul-Furqan.
13. Author interviews, FIA and MoI, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. See also Mir, *The True Face of the Jihadis*; Abbas, 'What Happened'; Zaidi, 'Militant Flourishes in Plain Sight'; Terzieff, 'Assassination Tries Linked to al Qaeda'; Lancaster and Khan, 'Investigation of Attacks on Musharraf Points to Pakistani Group'.
14. In common with JeM, LeT was proscribed in 2002 and now operates under the name of Jama-ul-Dawa.
15. Kronstadt and Vaughn, *Terrorism in South Asia*, 5; US Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002*.
16. According to officials in the US Embassy in Islamabad, there has been no credible and substantive accounts of LeT's presence in Iraq beyond a 2004 report that the British detained two individuals with ties to the organization. Swami and Shehzad, 'Lashkar Raising Militants for Iraq'; Wilson, 'Laskar-e-Toiba: New Threats Posed by an Old Organization'.
17. Thus far, the most ambitious of these claims have not been substantiated. Three of the four British citizens involved in the bombings had ethnic ties to Pakistan. In addition, two of the perpetrators are known to have traveled to the South Asian country, among whom at least one – Shehzad Tanweer – reputedly visited the LeT headquarters in Murdike (which is located 20 miles outside of Lahore). Harding and Cowan, 'Pakistan Militants Linked to London Attacks'; Foster and Malick, 'Suicide Bombers Flew to Pakistan Together'; and Rayment, Alderson, Foggo and Ansari, 'London bombers "recorded video in Pakistan" with help of al Qaeda'.
18. According to the US Department of State, 2004 was a record year of poppy cultivation with in excess of 206,700 hectares grown. This amount more than trebled the area devoted to poppy in 2003. In terms of opiate base, some 4,950 metric tons of opium gum was produced in Afghanistan during the year – a 35 per cent increase over the previous 'high' of 3,656 metric tons set in 1999. This amount exceeded Burma's 292 metric tons – the second largest producer – by a multiple of 17. Office of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International*

- Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2004*. For historical assessments see Chouvy, 'Afghan Opium Production Predicted to Reach New High', 29; Loof, 'UN Agency Warns Afghanistan Over Opium'; and Schmitt, 'Afghan's Gains Threatened by Drug Traffic'.
19. Author interviews, Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), Rawalpindi, Jan. 2005. See also section on Southwest Asia in *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2004*; and 'Tonnes of Heroin Worth \$8.4 Million Seized in Pakistan'.
  20. Author interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. See also *Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of the ODCCP* p.27. The overall prevalence of chronic abusers in Pakistan, expressed in terms of the population as a whole, is roughly a third of 1 per cent – a ratio that is amongst the most severe anywhere in the world.
  21. Blood, *Pakistan-US Relations*.
  22. Briefings given to authors, National Security Council Advisory Board, Delhi, 9 Sept. 2002. Delhi's claims pertaining to Ibrahim are largely shared by the US. According to a 2003 report by the Treasury, the Karachi-based criminal 'has found common cause with Al Qaida, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamist extremists aimed at destabilizing the Indian government. He is wanted ... for the 1993 Bombay Exchange bombings and is known to have financed the activities of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous)'. Pursuant to these findings, Washington has officially designated Ibrahim as a terrorist supporter. United States Treasury, 'US Designates Dawood Ibrahim as a Terrorist Supporter: Indian Crime Lord has Assisted Al Qaida and Supported Other Terrorists in India'.
  23. 'Dark days for a Black Market'; Behar, 'Kidnapped Nation' p.84; Ahmad, 'Regulations to Curb Smuggling, Under-Invoicing a Must'.
  24. Author interviews, FIA, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. Haqqani, *Countries at the Cross-Roads: Country Profile of Pakistan* (2004); 'Pakistan Gears up to Tackle People Smugglers'.
  25. The CPI provides a comparative assessment of national integrity systems based on interviews and surveys – both resident and non-resident – aimed at gauging perceived levels of corruption among politicians and public officials. Scores of 2 or less generally reflect a pervasive problem that is not being met by any concerted counter-measures. In 2003, this ranking was accorded to Bangladesh, Nigeria, Haiti, Paraguay, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Georgia, Cameroon, Azerbaijan, Angola, Kenya and Tanzania. Transparency International, 'Nine Out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently Need Practical Support to Fight Corruption, Highlights New Index'.
  26. *Pakistan's Anti-Corruption Program: Observations and Recommendations*.
  27. According to TI's 2003 *Pakistan Country Study Report*, the most severely affected sectors – in order of magnitude – include law enforcement, power (Water and Power Development Authority; Karachi Electric Supply Corporation), taxation, judiciary, customs, health, land, education, telephone, railways, non-government organizations (NGOs, primarily those dealing with development projects), the Post Office and banks. In all of these cases bribes are routinely paid for everything from being relieved of a traffic fine and ensuring connectivity to an electricity supply to having a case heard by a sympathetic judge, availing access to medical care, settling land disputes and altering exam results. National Integrity Systems, *Transparency International Country Study Report – Pakistan 2003* p.8; Haqqani, *Countries at the Cross-Roads: Country Profile of Pakistan* p.7; 'IMF Asks Pakistan to Reduce Corruption'.
  28. Pakistan's contribution to the war on terror in terms of the detention of leading al Qaeda members was universally acknowledged by a wide array of officials interviewed at the Pentagon, the United States Department of State, the United States Central Command and at the United States Embassy in Islamabad between 2002 and 2005.
  29. Pakistan has only rudimentary forensics capabilities in each of its provinces. For example, while laboratories can determine whether or not blood is from a human or an animal, they cannot type-detect samples. American officials in Islamabad are trying to upgrade these facilities with essential equipment, including such basic items as microscopes and ballistic-testing apparatus. Notably, however, no move (at the time of writing) has been taken to transfer DNA technology to Pakistan. Currently, the country only has one of these repositories – a private facility in Karachi that is used primarily for paternity purposes. Author interviews, US officials in Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
  30. Author interviews with US Department of State officials, Washington, DC, November 2004. See also Chalk and Fair, *Internal Security Reform in Pakistan*.

31. Author interviews with Pakistani-based journalists, Islamabad, Jan. 2003. According to these commentators, many of whom have interacted with local police in Karachi fighting sectarian and ethnic militant groups, the ISI is loath to provide local law enforcement with actionable intelligence, but insists on receiving raw data that is derived from arrests and detentions. Somewhat more controversial have been allegations that the ISI actively suppresses details pertaining to high-profile cases (such as the Daniel Pearl homicide) to ensure that untoward information about the Directorate's activities do not become public. This has been a major (and recurrent) point of contention among Pakistani police officials.
32. *Fact Sheet: Official Working Visit of President Musharraf of Pakistan*, United States Department of State, 'US-Pakistan Joint Group on Counter-Terrorism Meets'.
33. Author interviews, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, November 2004 and Pakistani and US officials, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
34. US Department of State, 'An Overview of INL Programs in Pakistan: Combating Terrorism, Narcotics Production, and Trafficking'.
35. Ibid.
36. Author interviews, MoI and FIA, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
37. There are plans to provide two additional helicopters over the next year or so.
38. At the time of writing, 426 kilometers of road had been laid with an additional 391 kilometers under construction.
39. AFIS was originally meant to be developed in conjunction with a separate National Criminal Database (NCDB). However, insufficient funds were allocated to support both initiatives (\$10 million was allocated) and, at the request of the Secretary of the MoI, the projects were split – largely because it was felt that AFIS was more important and that resources and effort should, accordingly, be directed at this initiative. At the time of writing, little progress had been made with regards the NCDB.
40. Author interviews, US Department of State, Washington, DC, Nov. 2004 and FIA and MoI, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. See also US Department of State, 'An Overview of INL Programs in Pakistan: Combating Terrorism, Narcotics Production, and Trafficking'.
41. See Office of Antiterrorism Assistance webpage; Black, 'Foreign Assistance and International Terrorism'.
42. Ibid.
43. Author interviews, US State Department, Washington, DC, Dec. 2004 and FIA, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
44. See USAID Pakistan, 'USAID/Pakistan Interim Strategic Plan: May 2003–September 2006'.
45. US Embassy, Islamabad. 'USAID Provides \$147 Million to Improve Pakistan's Health, Education, Economic, Governance Sectors'.
46. USAID Pakistan, 'FATA School Rehabilitation and Refurbishment'.
47. Author interview with ICITAP official, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
48. Although ICITAP falls under the auspices of the Department of Justice, it is funded by INL as a 'subcontractor' for the State Department. Fiscal information figures for its programs in Pakistan are not publicly available although Justice officials in Washington indicate that they constitute only a small proportion of the INL's overall budget.
49. Author interview, ICITAP official, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
50. This course is intended to build core competencies of fixed border position police personnel through a proficiency skill-based program that covers on-site operational assessments, border entry post operations, narcotics recognition, evidence collection and processing, explosives/weapons recognition, management of intelligence, tacking and sign-cutting, line operations, international refugee law, systemized vehicle search techniques and other topics deemed critical to Pakistan's entry border post operations. See *ICITAP Project Overviews for Pakistan*.
51. Key topics covered in this course include basic crime scene investigation techniques, evidence collection and processing and crime scene reconstruction. *ICITAP Project Overviews for Pakistan*.
52. This series of seminars focuses on building organizational capacity and sustainability and decision-making in the use of force. *ICITAP Project Overviews for Pakistan*.
53. Author interviews, ICITAP official and FIA, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. Projected costs for developing these areas is expected to be in the range of \$4 million.

54. At the time of writing, only one functioning laboratory existed in the country, a privately-run facility in Karachi with no connection to the police (who have to pay to access it) and used primarily for paternity cases. Author interviews, US Embassy, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
55. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*.
56. Tandy, 'Testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources Committee on Government Reform'.
57. Author interviews, MoI and FIA, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
58. Author interview, Akhatar Marawat, MoI, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
59. These include, inter alia, the FC, the ANF, the FIA, the Frontier Constabulary and Customs.
60. ICITAP *Project Overviews for Pakistan*.
61. Chalk and Fair, *US Efforts to Fortify Pakistan's Internal Security*; Shigri, *Implementing Police Order*; 'A Dilemma for Provinces'; Shigri, 'Dismantling the Police Command Structure'; Naqvi, 'Devolution: The Savior'.
62. Ibid.
63. Certain commentators suggested that placements for courses run in the US tend to be reserved for the sons and nephews of Police Commissioners who use them as a 'junket' to visit America.
64. Author interviews, US Department of State, Washington, DC, Nov. 2004.
65. ICITAP *Project Overviews for Pakistan*. Justice Department officials assert low salaries have led graft to emerge almost as an institutional practice to augment the personal incomes of police officers as well as a means to generate revenue for covering the operating expenses of the police services.
66. The comparative figure for more developed countries stands at well over 60 per cent. By contrast, the majority of police in Pakistan are constables that lack the skills and expertise necessary to engage in professional investigative pursuits.
67. Interviews with ICITAP official, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. See also ICITAP *Project Overviews for Pakistan*.
68. Author interview, US Department of State, Washington, DC, Nov. 2004. See also Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2005*; and Simons, 'Starving Terrorists of Money: The Role of the Middle East Financial Institutions'.
69. One of the key benchmarks are those established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a 33-member body established to promulgate international anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing standards. See Greenberg and Factor, *Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*.
70. Author interview, State Department official, Washington, DC, Nov. 2004. It should be noted that Pakistan has enacted specific money laundering provisions (which are contained under Articles 11J and 11K of the country's (1987) Anti-Terrorism Act. However, these are not considered to be of a standard that meets the requirements of the FATF as noted above.
71. Washington's overall bias to hard security is further reflected by the fact that half of the country's support to Pakistan takes the form of foreign military sales (FMS) instituted through the Pentagon. These amount to roughly \$300 million a year. Author interview, US Department of State, Nov. 2004. See also *The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission Report* pp.367–69.
72. For more on the utility of socio-economic tools as part of a broader counter-terrorist strategy see Cragin and Chalk, *Terrorism and Development. Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism*.
73. Author interviews, MoI and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
74. Author interviews, MoI and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, Jan. 2005. Officials in Pakistan also pointed out a number of logistical problems with the airwing, namely that most equipment comes from the US (which has created an inefficient and excessively long maintenance tail) and the general lack of maintenance infrastructure on the ground – including such basic items as aircraft hangars and a proper workshop.
75. Author interviews, ANF, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
76. According to the ANF, the US is planning on earmarking some \$780 million to support counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan (compared to an annual allocation of only \$0.7 million to Pakistan). Most of this money will be invested in the Counter-Narcotics Directorate

- (CND) and Counter-Narcotics Police Agency (CNPA), both of which remain highly nascent whose effectiveness has yet to be proven. Officials also point out that there is, as yet, no standardized system of criminal penalization for drugs in Afghanistan, meaning that there is no legal recourse for taking the law to its final conclusions in narcotics cases.
77. By contrast, the ANF lauds the UK's approach to counter-narcotics, which in the opinion of one senior official is more complex, multi-dimensional and long term in nature. The British currently take the lead in instituting drug assistance to Pakistan, remaining particularly active in Baluchistan where more than 1 million GBP has been made available in funding.
  78. The Japanese, by contrast, are helping with building a more robust DNA capacity in Pakistan and, at the time of writing, were the major investors in the construction of a national laboratory for specific use in criminal cases. Author interview, US Embassy, Islamabad, Jan. 2005.
  79. See Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*.
  80. Conversation with US defense officials in Islamabad in Sept. 2005.
  81. Pakistan's record with respect to the Taliban is more questionable than its record on al Qaeda. To date, no high-value Taliban leader has been captured and many officials and analysts suspect that Pakistan is continuing to support some Pashtun militant elements as an alternative option in Afghanistan. See Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*. Also see Fair and Chalk's forthcoming *Stealing Pakistan*.
  82. One reviewer was less concerned about this balance and in fact lauded the current suite of programs (military and civilian) as a 'triumph of pragmatism over ideology'. The reviewer further contended that in Pakistan, there is not 'a lot of clamoring for democracy'. The authors respectfully disagree with both assertions. The well-known history of US engagement with Pakistan and the army has demonstrated that civilian institutions suffer and prospects for democracy diminish. The US *must* find better ways of balancing the inclination to engage the army as an expedient and the concomitant goal of establishing a stable, functioning state with respect for rule of law, human rights and democracy. Moreover, this is overwhelmingly what Pakistanis want. Despite the domination of the army for more than half of its independent history and despite periods of immediate support following military coups, opinion polls in Pakistan overwhelmingly demonstrate Pakistanis' preference for democracy. For instance, in a nationally representative survey, only 4 per cent of respondents indicated that having the army rule is very good or fairly good. When asked about having a democratic political system, 88 per cent said that it was very good or fairly good.

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