FAITH OR DOCTRINE? RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

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Abstract   Around the world, publics confronted with terrorism have debated whether Islamic faith gives rise to a uniquely virulent strain of non-state violence targeted at civilians. These discussions almost always conceive of "Islam" in general terms, not clearly defining what is meant by Islamic religious faith. We engaged this debate by designing and conducting a large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan that measures multiple elements of religiosity, allowing us to separately consider the relationship between support for militant organizations and (1) religious practice; (2) support for political Islam; and (3) "jihadism," which we define as a particular textual interpretation common to Islamist groups espousing violent political action. We also measured support for militant organizations using a novel form of an "endorsement experiment" that assessed attitudes toward specific groups without asking respondents about them directly. We find that neither religious practice nor support

for political Islam is related to support for militant groups. However, Pakistanis who believe jihad is both an external militarized struggle and that it can be waged by individuals are more supportive of violent groups than those who believe it is an internal struggle for righteousness.

Discussions of terrorism in the United States, Israel, China, Western Europe, and South Asia have repeatedly touched on whether Islam is responsible for a uniquely virulent strain of non-state violence targeted at civilians. There is little agreement on this subject, even among those on the same end of the political spectrum. Writing in the *Washington Post*, conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer (2006) asserted: "It is a simple and undeniable fact that the violent purveyors of monotheistic religion today are self-proclaimed warriors for Islam who shout 'God is great' as they slit the throats of infidels—such as those of the flight crews on Sept. 11, 2001—and are then celebrated as heroes and martyrs." This view contrasts with messages from other conservatives who deny the existence of a link between Islam and violence. In 2002, for instance, President George W. Bush said: "All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true face of Islam. Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. It's a faith that has made brothers and sisters of every race. It's a faith based upon love, not hate" (White House Archives). These popular discussions almost always conceive of "Islam" in general terms, despite the enormous variation in interpretation of Islamic belief and praxis throughout the Muslim world, as well as the large differences between juridical interpretations and popular beliefs. Equally problematic, authors often fail to distinguish between belief and praxis on the one hand and political movements associated with Islam (Islamism) on the other (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan 2009; Kaltenthaler et al. 2010; Fair and Shepherd 2006).

We address debates about links between various aspects of Islamic belief and support for Islamist militancy by designing and conducting a large-scale public opinion survey of Pakistanis. The survey offers greater insight into the country that is perhaps the most important focus of efforts to combat Islamist militancy. In addition, it provides unusually strong empirical leverage on more general theoretical questions about the link between religiosity and support for non-state violence, given the great deal of heterogeneity in interpretive traditions (*masaliks*)[1] (Ahmad and Reifeld 2004; Metcalf 2004, 2009; Marsden 2006; Rozehnal 2007), beliefs about the role of Islam in the law, and the quality of religious education (Nasr 2000).

We introduce advances in measuring both our independent variables (elements of religious beliefs and practice) and the dependent variable (support for

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1. Serious cleavages divide the main interpretative traditions (masaliks) within Islam (Barelvi, Shi'a, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadis, Jamaat-e-Islami, etc.), each of which puts forward its own definition of *sharia*.

militant groups). With respect to the independent variables, we measure multiple aspects of religiosity, allowing us to separately consider the relationship between support for violent organizations and (1) religious practice; (2) support for political positions presented as Islamic ("political Islam"); and (3) "jihadism," which we define as a particular textual interpretation common to Islamist groups espousing jihad as violent political action. In doing so, we move beyond the simple question "Does fundamentalist Islam produce terrorism?"

With respect to the dependent variable, we assessed support for militant organizations through a novel form of an "endorsement experiment" that avoids asking respondents about the groups directly.[2] Doing so is critical because discussion of these groups can be highly sensitive, and respondents are particularly likely to offer what they believe to be the socially desirable response or to simply not respond to certain questions.[3] Furthermore, it is dangerous for survey teams operating in parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces (both of which have ongoing insurgencies) to ask directly about these issues.

Using this approach, we find that neither religious practice nor support for political Islam is related to support for militant organizations. A specific understanding of jihad, however, is. Respondents who define jihad as an external militarized struggle that can be waged by individuals are up to 2.7 percentage points more supportive of militant groups than those who believe it is an internal struggle for righteousness. As shown below, this difference is both statistically and substantively meaningful. As Wiktorowicz (2005) and others have argued, it is the *content*, not the *practice*, of one's religious beliefs that matters.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly reviews the literature on religion and support for political violence and derives three testable hypotheses. The following two sections describe our data and the methods of analysis. The final two sections present the results and discuss their implications.

Background and Hypotheses

In formulating testable hypotheses, we draw on policy analysis and scholarly discourse on Islam, Islamist politics, and Islamist militancy (as well as

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2. See Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011) for a justification of this approach in an ideal point framework and Blair, Imai, and Lyall (2011) for an application in Afghanistan.
3. In WorldPublicOpinion.org polling in Pakistan, for example, item non-response on questions about al-Qa'ida was 68 percent in February 2007, 47 percent in September 2008, and 13 percent in May 2009 (WorldPublicOpinion.org 2007, 2008, 2009). Surveys in Pakistan that ask directly about affect toward militant groups obtain don't know/no opinion rates in the range of 40 percent (Terror Free Tomorrow and New America Foundation 2008; Pew Research Center 2009). Surveys that indirectly measure affect by asking whether groups "operating in Pakistan are a problem" (International Republican Institute 2009) or pose "a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan" (WorldPublicOpinion 2009) still obtain item non-response rates as high as 31 percent.

on decades of in-country fieldwork) to explore potential connections between support for militant groups in Pakistan and three aspects of Islamic faith: religious practice, support for Islamist politics, and views of jihad.[4]

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

The academic literature positing ties between Islam and support for militancy began with the "clash of civilizations" thesis (e.g. Huntington 1993, 1996; Lewis 1990), which held that tensions between the Muslim world and the West were driven by an inherent conflict between Islam and Christianity.[5] In line with this idea, many public intellectuals argued that support for terrorism and violence against the West is rooted in Muslim religiosity or faith (see, e.g., Laqueur 1999; Calvert 2002; Stern 2003; Mendelsohn 2005).[6] Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009) found that although a 2003–2004 survey of Indonesian Muslims did not show an association between religious devotion and prayer frequency and support for suicide attacks, attendance at religious services did predict support for such attacks among Palestinian Muslims.[7]

However, it is difficult to find direct evidence for a link between religiosity and support for militancy, and there is substantial counterevidence for such a claim (see, e.g., Tessler and Robbins 2007). The overwhelming majority of Muslims around the world oppose violence committed in the name of Islam (Esposito 2002). Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) analyze public opinion data from Egypt, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon and find that prayer frequency exhibits no correlation with attitudes toward conflict with Israel. Further, Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2009) show that increased orthodoxy and feelings of Muslim unity among Pakistani pilgrims following the Hajj

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4. The first two correspond to hypotheses 1 and 2 in Tessler and Robbins (2007).

5. Proponents of this hypothesis often point to "the verse of the sword" in the Qu'ran (Sura 9:5) to justify the link between religious practice and militancy: "Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush." Of course, simply citing this verse simplifies matters incredibly, given that a principal issue in the scholarly discourse over jihad is whether this and other verses draw from the Meccan or Medinan period and whether or not later verses abrogate earlier verses. We explain this and other critical debates in greater detail in our development of H3.

6. For an excellent review of arguments about Islam and terrorism, see Jackson (2007). Some public opinion research has identified patterns that are consistent with such an association. Pew surveys of fourteen Muslim countries in 2002, for example, show that support for the use of terrorism "to defend Islam from its enemies" is higher among those who believe that Islam is under threat and among those who believe that Islam should play more of a role in politics (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2007).

7. These results suggest that future research should strive to differentiate between, on one hand, the effect of personal religious identity and practice (i.e., prayer, beliefs, maslak affiliation) on support for violence and, on the other hand, the "coalitional-commitment" effects that are a byproduct of religious involvement (e.g., attendance) with particular organizations (e.g., specific churches, mosques, and synagogues whose leaders express support for violent groups). Our current data do not allow us to make such a distinction.

were accompanied by *greater* feelings of peace and tolerance toward non-Muslims. Drawing on interviews with recruits in the militant British Islamist group al-Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz (2005) concluded that those who were more religious were actually less supportive of al-Muhajiroun's message. Ultimately, the evidence on the relationship between religious identity and support for militant groups can be interpreted as either weak or ambiguous. We therefore state the most prominent side of the public debate as a testable alternative hypothesis:

> H_1:   Religious practice is positively related to support for Islamist militant organizations.

ISLAMIST POLITICS

A second potential link between Islam and support for militancy may arise from sympathy with political positions presented as Islamic. With respect to Pakistan, support for violent politics is often thought to relate to support for Islamist political parties, in part because members of key Islamist parties in Pakistan do vocally support violent action (see, inter alia, International Crisis Group 2003, 2004; Ali 2010). Analysts assume therefore that a vote for such Islamist parties should be tantamount to supporting the party's jihadi politics.

Evidence for this conjecture is mixed. Tessler and Nachtwey (1998) find that "politicized Islam" (measured through responses to four yes/no questions regarding the role of Islam in politics) is negatively associated with peaceful attitudes.[8] However, Furia and Lucas (2008) use data from the 2002 Arab Values Survey, conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, to show that Arab Muslims with higher levels of "Islamic consciousness" are no more hostile to Western countries than others. Similarly, Fair, Ramsay, and Kull (2008) find no relationship between views on sharia law and support for violence.

Nonetheless, there are several reasons why we might observe a relationship between support for Islamist politics and militancy in Pakistan. First, many

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8. Kaltenthaler et. al. (2010) similarly find that Pakistanis who were more accepting of the imposition of extreme Islamist views (often called "Talibanization") were more likely to believe that attacks on civilians could be justified. There have been other studies that focus upon political beliefs that are not easily classified as "political Islam." Specific political grievances are one of the few reliable determinants of support for militant actions. Chiozza (2011) finds that among Muslims in Jordan and Lebanon, the strongest predictor of support for suicide bombings against American forces in Iraq is disaffection toward the American people, not religiosity, and that religiosity is associated with support for attacks only when accompanied by fear for Muslim identity. Similarly, research on Palestinian public opinion toward Israel has repeatedly found that the perception of Israel as posing a threat is strongly associated with support for violence, but that support for political Islam exhibits no association (Tessler 2003, 2004; Shikaki 2006). National surveys of Algeria and Jordan in 2002 also showed that although higher levels of religious involvement did not make individuals more likely to approve of terrorist acts against the United States, there was a significant relationship between respondents' attitudes toward their government and U.S. foreign policy and their support for terrorism (Tessler and Robbins 2007).

avowedly Islamist parties in Pakistan take positions that are explicitly tolerant of some forms of political violence. In fact, the ulema political parties associated with two of the most important interpretive traditions in Pakistan (Deobandism and Jamaat-e-Islami[9]) have long had direct and indirect ties with an array of militant groups. For example, the Deobandi ulema party, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami, has overlapping membership with militant groups that operate in Afghanistan and India and against religious minorities in Pakistan (e.g., the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi). Jamaat-e-Islami, both a masalik and a political party, has long had direct ties with militant groups, such as Hizbol Mujahideeen and al Badr, that operate in Afghanistan and India (Haqqani 2005a,b).[10] This gives rise to our second proposition:

> *H₂:*   *Support for Islamist politics and/or the goals of Islamist parties is positively related to support for Islamist militant organizations.*

VIEWS OF JIHAD

All consequential Islamist militant groups operating in and around Pakistan justify their actions in terms of a narrative of jihad. We should therefore expect that individuals whose understandings of jihad harmonize with these groups' actions and stated positions will be most supportive. In Pakistan, beliefs about jihad encompass two sets of interrelated but ultimately distinct discourses (see, e.g., Rahman 2009; Peters 1996), which can be summarized by two main questions: (1) Is jihad a personal or militarized struggle? and (2) Who has the authority to wage jihad—the government or non-state actors?[11] In Pakistan, as elsewhere, answers to these two questions are derived from the complex interplay between textual and interpretative sources.

9. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is most often associated with its activities as a political party. Although it is indeed one of the most prominent ulema (plural of *alim*, religious leader) parties in South Asia, it is also one of the five recognized masaliks (interpretive traditions) in Pakistan. In this capacity, it runs several mosques, madrassahs, and other schools and clinics, and it is one of the five *waqifs* (seminary boards) in Pakistan. Though it has historical ties to another masalik in Pakistan, Deobandism, it is not strictly speaking a Deobandi party. JI was founded in 1941 by a Deobandi cleric named Maulana Abul A'la Maududi. Maududi's vision diverged from that of the Deobandi ulema in that he sought to reform the state and politics, in contrast with Deobandi's focus on reforming the individual. For example, in a striking departure for Pakistani Deobandism, JI has eschewed sectarianism, embracing Deobandis, Barelvis, and even Shia within its ranks. Its goal is to achieve an Islamist state through grassroots political action. Like the Deobandi groups, JI has had a record of Islamist militant activities since at least 1971 (Haqqani 2005a; Nasr 2000; White 2010).
10. Though some of the Ahl-e-Hadith ulema in Pakistan have rejected militarized jihad waged by any actor other than the state, Lashkar-e-Taiba (now known as Jamaat ud Dawa) is the only jihadi group in Pakistan that is associated with the Ahl-e-Hadith masalik (Rana 2004).
11. For a more extensive discussion of jihad, the understandings of jihad espoused by the different schools of jurisprudence, and key proponents of particular views, see Wordsmiths Compilation (2001).

Islamic law (sharia) is constructed through many sources: the *Qur'an* (which is believed to be the word of God revealed through the Prophet Mohammad in the Arabic language), the *Sunnah* (sayings and actions of the prophet), *ijma* (consensus of Islamic jurists), and *qiyas* (analogy). *Fiqh* (exegesis or juridical interpretation) and *usul-al-fiqh* (the tools, sources, and rules used to establish or define Islamic law) comprise an important expansion of sharia (Schuett 2006). There are several schools of fiqh that in Pakistan are known as *mazhabs* (*maddhabs* in Arabic), each of which has its own interpretation of sharia (Schuett 2006; Esposito 2003).[12]

Although jihad is frequently referenced in both the Qur'an and the Sunnah, its meaning remains contested in ways that are critical for determining the religious legitimacy of different kinds of political violence. Derived from its use in the Qur'an, jihad is usually described as being either "the greater jihad" (*jihad-e-akbar*, a personal struggle to be pious) or "the lesser jihad" (*jihad-e-asghar*, a militarized struggle). The general trend within Sunni schools is that the "lesser jihad" is under the jurisdiction of an Islamic state or its leader (*caliph*), whereas the greater jihad is the responsibility of all believers. But there is substantial variation within this general tendency (Esposito 2002, 2003). Religious scholars can and do issue *fatwas* (judgments) against leaders of Muslim polities, declaring them to be corrupt or apostate and urging their polities to rebel.[13] Such rhetoric effectively blurs the distinction between jihad that is "state-led" and "individual-led."

Further complicating the picture, beliefs about who can wage jihad lawfully are not explicitly articulated in the Qur'an. Rather, different *ulema* derive an answer by interpreting references to jihad in the Qur'an in the context of the two periods of Muhammad's life discussed in the Qur'an: the Meccan period and the Medinan period (Afsaruddin 2007; Bassiouni 2008). The twelve-year Meccan period began with the onset of God's (Allah's) revelations to the Prophet Muhammad in c. 610 CE and ended in 622 CE, when the Prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina. Even though Muslims were brutally oppressed in Mecca, physical retaliation was proscribed. Thus, the nonviolent or defensive aspects of jihad are most prominent in this period (Afsaruddin 2007; Bassiouni 2008). During the Medinan period,

12. There are four classical interpretative schools of jurisprudence (fiqh) in Sunni Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I, and Hanbali) and three major schools in Shi'a Islam (Ja'fari, Ismaeli, and Zaidiyya), all of which are named after the classical jurists who founded them. These schools share many rulings, yet they differ with respect to the various *hadiths* (statements of Muhammad) that they accept as authentic. Each of the schools differ, in important yet subtle ways, in their understanding of key concepts such as jihad and blasphemy, as well as personal law and other aspects of daily life. The Hanafi is the dominant school among Pakistani Sunnis; the Jafari and Ismaeli among the Shias of Pakistan (Esposito 1980).

13. Prominent examples include statements, issued by al-Qa'ida and prompted by Pakistan's ongoing cooperation in the U.S.-led war on terror, denouncing the Pakistan government and the military as apostates (As-Sahab 2010). Similarly, Qari Hussain Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban used the Pakistan-U.S. alliance as justification for the ongoing use of suicide bombing against Pakistani security forces (Wolfe 2010).

which began in 622 CE with the Prophet's arrival in Medina and lasted ten years, the Prophet Muhammad focused on setting up a Muslim state during which time the prominence of a militarized form of jihad increased (Afsaruddin 2007; Bassiouni 2008).[14] Opinions on whether an individual can declare militarized jihad, or whether doing so is the prerogative of the state alone, are largely rooted in the understanding of this latter use of jihad in the context of Muslim state-building.

Islamist jihadi leaders and religious scholars are more recent entrants into these debates (Esposito 2002, 2003). The emergence of the political and militant ulema began in the 1980s, with the rise of *madrassahs* and Pakistan's use of militant Islam as a tool of foreign policy in Afghanistan and, later, in India (Nasr 2000). Madrassahs are often tied to Islamist political parties, militant groups, or both, and their scholars therefore have strong reasons to push a vision of jihad that is consistent with individual violent action (Hussain 2005).[15] Not surprisingly, scholars who espouse a jihadi agenda utilize exegetical tools to undermine those verses in the Qur'an that emphasize jihad as an inner struggle and focus instead upon those verses that describe a militarized jihad.[16] This message is influential because control of madrassahs often—but not always—allows a religious leader to shape the opinions of madrassah students and attendees at affiliated mosques, as well as the sermons of affiliated scholars (Nasr 2000; Fair 2008). Given Pakistan's overwhelmingly low literacy rates (in any language) as well as the cultural injunctions against reading the Qur'an (which was revealed to the Prophet in Arabic) in translation, few Pakistanis would be able to challenge these ulema by engaging original source materials on jihad, either the Qur'an or the enormous body of exegetical work.

With jihad thus possessing multiple potential sources of legitimacy—ranging from the Qur'an to the opinions of learned exegetes or modern jihadi leaders—there is great variation in what Pakistanis believe about: (1) the relative importance of the greater (internal) jihad vs. the lesser (militarized) jihad; and (2) who has the right to declare a militarized form of jihad (e.g., state or non-state actors). Clearly, the programs of jihadi organizations are based on the premise that jihad is an external, militarized struggle (as these groups use violence to achieve their ends) and that jihad can be conducted by non-state actors (as these groups are not associated with the government). Therefore, individual beliefs have obvious connections to support for militant groups, producing our third hypothesis:

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14. Thus, the Medinan verses of the Qur'an deal with establishing a state (e.g., organizing the polity, establishing ethics, managing communitarian concerns, and physically defending Muslims against their foes). During this period, three major and several minor wars were fought, providing the occasion for the Qur'an's clearest exhortations to Muslims to fight the unbelievers (Qur'an 9:5, 9:29).

15. Unfortunately, in the case of Pakistan in particular, many of the individuals involved in this "jihadist" jurisprudence are not well-trained scholars (if trained at all). The link between their advocacy and true scholarly debate can thus be quite tenuous.

16. See, for example, the exposition of Lashkar-e-Taiba's defense of jihad in Fair (2011).

> H_3:   *Those who believe jihad involves militarized struggle and can be conducted by non-state actors will be more supportive of militant groups.*

DATA AND MEASURES

Our survey was designed to achieve three goals. First, we sought to measure attitudes toward specific militant organizations in a way that would minimize the item non-response on these sensitive questions that had plagued previous surveys in Pakistan. We met this objective by using the "endorsement experiment" described below to measure support for four specific groups. Second, we wanted to measure various dimensions of religiosity. Finally, we wanted to survey a representative sample of the Pakistani population, including rural and urban areas in each of Pakistan's four main provinces. This required having interviewers travel to remote areas.

SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO), we used the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame to draw a stratified random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four main provinces of the country: Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan.[17] The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009, and May 25, 2009. The AAPOR RR1 response rate was 71.8 percent, which is comparable to the high response rates achieved by high-quality academic studies such as the American National Election Studies. Full question wordings are provided in the appendix. All variables described below were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a 100β-percentage-point change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable. We pretested the questionnaire to residents of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi between March 20 and 26, 2009, to assess the functioning of the items and experiments (see online appendix A for additional details). As described below, our measures of the two dimensions of jihad, as well as the elements of religious belief and practice, were refined based on what we learned during pretesting. Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.

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17. Respondents were selected randomly within 500 primary sampling units (PSU): 332 in rural areas and 168 in urban ones (following the rural/urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We substantially oversampled in the smaller provinces (Balochistan and KPK) to ensure that we could collect sufficient samples in these sparsely populated provinces. We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the 1998 census, the most recent available. Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for design effects. Full details on PSU selection are available from the authors.

MEASURING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: SUPPORT FOR VIOLENT POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS

Directly asking about support for militant organizations presents two main
difficulties in areas suffering from political violence. First, it can be unsafe
for enumerators and respondents to discuss such issues. Second, item non-
response rates to such sensitive questions are often quite high, given that
respondents often fear that providing the "wrong" answer will threaten their
own and their family's safety. We therefore use an endorsement experiment to
measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations.

The experiment involves assessing support for various real policies, which
are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feel-
ings (as we learned during pretesting) and works as follows:

-Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (half
of the sample to each group).
-The control group is asked their level of support for four policies on a
five-point scale.
-The treatment group is asked identical questions but also told that one of
four groups supports the policy. The association of groups to policies is
randomized in the treatment group to avoid order effects and ensure that
measures of support are not issue-specific.
-The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides
a measure of affect toward the groups, since the only difference between
the conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure 1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control ques-
tions, and illustrates the randomization procedure in visual form.[18] As shown
in table 1, randomization checks indicate covariate balance between treatment
and control groups.

The advantage of this approach is that the militant organization is not the
primary object of evaluation; the policy is.[19] We expected respondents to be
more willing to share their opinions on uncontroversial policies rather than
controversial groups and, judging by the non-response rates, they were.[20]

18. Online appendix B describes our randomization protocol for conducting this design on paper
questionnaires.
19. This approach draws on extensive research on persuasion in social psychology (see Petty and
Wegener [1998] for a review). Individuals are more likely to be persuaded and influenced by like-
able sources (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Cialdini 1993). Endorsements of policies and positions
are much more effective when an individual has positive affect toward the source of the endorse-
ment (Wood and Kallgren 1988; Chaiken 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983).
20. Our survey posed a number of less-sensitive direct questions (i.e., without an endorsement
experiment) about militant groups such as "What is the effect of group X's actions on their
cause?" Non-response on these items ranged from 22 percent for al-Qa'ida to 6 percent for the
Kashmir *tanzeem* (group). Item non-response on the endorsement experiment questions, by
contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6 percent for al-Qa'ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Checks

	Full sample (%)	Control (%)	Treatment (%)
Gender ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.04, $p = 0.85$, $N = 6,000$)			
Male	52.4	52.1	52.2
Female	47.7	47.9	47.8
Married ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.13, $p = 0.72$, $N = 6,000$)			
Unmarried	23.0	22.6	22.8
Married	77.0	77.4	77.2
Age ($\chi^2(5)$: 3.8, $p = 0.58$, $N = 6,000$)			
18–24	23.2	22.5	22.8
25–29	19.1	18.5	18.8
30–39	29.0	30.7	29.8
40–49	17.5	17.2	17.3
50–59	7.8	7.3	7.6
60+	3.4	3.9	3.6
Access to Internet ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.27, $p = 0.60$, $N = 6,000$)			
Yes	7.5	7.7	7.3
No	92.5	92.3	92.7
Use cell phone ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.85, $p = 0.36$, $N = 6,000$)			
Yes	48.5	47.4	48.0
No	51.5	52.7	52.1
Read ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.19, $p = 0.66$, $N = 6,000$)			
Yes	71.2	70.7	71.0
No	28.8	29.3	29.0
Write ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.19, $p = 0.66$, $N = 6,000$)			
Yes	70.1	69.6	69.8
No	29.9	30.4	30.2
Simple math ($\chi^2(1)$: 0.13, $p = 0.72$, $N = 6,000$)			
Yes	76.1	75.7	75.9
No	23.9	24.3	24.1
Education ($\chi^2(6)$: 6.0, $p = 0.43$, $N = 6,000$)			
Illiterate	32.5	32.9	32.7
Primary	13.4	12.3	12.8
Middle	13.8	15.1	14.5
Matric	19.3	18.9	19.1
Intermediate	13.0	12.2	12.6
Graduate	6.4	6.4	6.4
Professional	1.7	2.2	2.0
Monthly income w/no response ($\chi^2(4)$: 3.6, $p = 0.46$, $N = 6,000$)			
Less than 3,000 PKR	15.6	15.4	15.5
3,000–10,000 PKR	52.7	51.1	51.9
10,001–15,000 PKR	21.8	22.3	22.0
15,001–25,000 PKR	8.0	9.0	8.5
More than 25,000 PKR	1.9	2.3	2.1

Continued

Table 1. *Continued*

	Full sample (%)	Control (%)	Treatment (%)
Province (χ^2(3): 0.41, $p = 0.94$, $N = 6{,}000$)			
Punjab	42.0	41.6	41.8
Sindh	24.7	24.9	24.8
NWFP	18.6	19.0	18.8
Balochistan	14.8	14.4	14.6
Religious sect (χ^2(1): 0.13, $p = 0.72$, $N = 6{,}000$)			
Sunni	96.6	96.4	96.5
Shi'ite	3.4	3.6	3.5
Attendance at dars-e-Qur'an (χ^2(2): 2.8, $p = 0.25$, $N = 6{,}000$)			
Daily	20.6	19.1	19.9
Sometimes	37.3	37.1	37.2
No	42.1	43.8	43.0
Motivation for attending dars-e-Qur'an (χ^2(5): 4.3, $p = 0.51$, $N = 5{,}956$)			
In touch with neighbors	0.7	0.6	0.8
See my friends	0.9	1.0	0.8
Be closer to Allah	22.5	22.6	22.4
Fulfill my religious duty	8.6	8.3	8.8
Learn more about Islam	24.0	24.9	23.2
Do not attend	43.3	42.5	44.1
Supports right-wing party (χ^2(1): 0.18, $p = 0.67$, $N = 5{,}237$)			
Yes	53.7	53.1	53.4
No	46.3	46.9	46.6
Sharia law means a government that uses physical punishment (χ^2(1): 0.09, $p = 0.76$, $N = 6{,}000$)			
Yes	55.3	55.7	55.5
No	44.7	44.3	44.5
Role of sharia law in Pakistan (χ^2(4): 0.50, $p = 0.97$, $N = 5{,}854$)			
Much smaller role	2.1	1.9	2.0
Somewhat smaller role	7.6	7.7	7.7
About the same role	23.1	22.7	22.9
Somewhat larger role	31.7	31.8	31.8
Much larger role	35.5	35.9	35.7
Views of jihad (χ^2(2): 0.38, $p = 0.83$, $N = 4{,}915$)			
Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness	31.4	30.7	31.0
Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad	30.1	30.8	30.4
Jihad is a militarized struggle and can be conducted by individuals	38.5	38.6	38.6

NOTE.—Balance tests calculated on all respondents who provided data on the variable.

Figure 1. Illustration of the Endorsement Experiment.

We used this method to measure support for four groups—the Kashmiri tanzeems (e.g., Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and related groups), the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the sectarian tanzeems (e.g., Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan). We chose these four because they represented the majority of the militant groups operating in Pakistan.[21] This required asking about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation (the legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan), and requiring madrassahs to teach math and science.[22] We then average across groups to generate a measure of support for militancy that is (a) based on support for specific organizations; and (b) unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy.

For an endorsement experiment of this type to work, the policies selected need to have two characteristics (Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro 2011). First, respondents should not have overly strong prior opinions about them, so that a group's endorsement can affect their evaluation of the policy. Second, the policies have to be at least somewhat familiar to respondents in order for the group endorsement to be meaningful. Although the policies we studied may seem

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reform to a low of 0.6 percent for the sectarian tanzeems endorsing polio vaccinations. Although this approach is not perfect, the low item non-response rate in our survey provides *prima facie* evidence that it also reduced respondents' concerns about reporting sensitive information.
21. Background information on the four groups, as well as details on which specific organizations fall into each group, is provided in online appendix C. During pretesting, respondents understood these as coherent categories and consistently identified the major constituent organizations for the Kashmir tanzeem and sectarian tanzeem.
22. We did not employ this method to assess support for the Pakistani Taliban. Our budget for the survey allowed us to interview 6,000 respondents, which meant we could study only four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while still getting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint, we omitted the Pakistan Taliban, which at the time of fielding was not as prominent as it has since become.

highly salient to professional students of politics, they do not appear to be important to most Pakistanis. During pretesting, we found that most respondents knew about all four issues but did not have strong opinions on them. Our enumerators, all professionals with an average of 4.6 years of experience, agreed that these issues would be ones respondents would know something about but on which they would not have extremely rigid positions.

To construct our dependent variable of support for militancy, we measure the average support reported by the respondents for the four policies on five-point scales, yielding a twenty-point scale. We then leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure support for militant organizations as proxied by the difference in support for the policies between the treatment and control groups. The main dependent variable was recoded to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) and 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). In the control group, the resulting policy support scale had a mean value of 0.79 (s.d. = 0.15).

MEASURING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: RELIGIOSITY AND VIEWS OF JIHAD

We employ a range of questions to study the relationships between various aspects of religious belief and support for militancy.

Religious practice: To test H1, we measured two dimensions of religious practice: frequency of attendance (a measure of religious devotion) and motivations for attendance. First, we asked respondents: "Do you attend *dars-e-Qur'an*?"[23] Second, to assess motivations for religious attendance, respondents who reported attending dars-e-Qur'an were also asked: "What do you like most about attending dars-e-Qur'an?"[24]

Islamist politics: To test H2, we measure three variables that capture whether respondents are generally supportive of the policy positions of Islamists in Pakistan. First, we asked respondents: "Which political party best represents

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23. Dars-e-Qur'an is a regular session of lessons (*dars*) about the Qur'an in which groups of men or women gather to "listen to religious lectures or read the Qur'an and hear its exegetical commentary from the *dars* leader" (Ahmad 2009, p. 39). Respondents who said "yes" were then asked: "How many times do you go to dars-e-Qur'an per week, on average?" We divide respondents into three groups: (1) those who attend dars-e-Qur'an daily (19.9 percent of respondents); (2) those who attend less than daily (37.2 percent); and (3) those who do not attend at all (43.0 percent).

24. The response options were "learn more about Islam" (42.4 percent of attendees), "be closer to Allah" (39.7 percent), "fulfill my religious duty" (15.1 percent), "see my friends" (1.7 percent), and "get in touch with neighbors" (1.2 percent). Motivations such as "be closer to Allah" and "fulfill my religious duty" could be construed as more pietistic reasons for attending dars-e-Qur'an than scholastic or social purposes. The list of reasons was refined based on pretest feedback. We therefore generate two dummy variables: one indicating attendees who mentioned the two pietistic reasons and one indicating attendees who mentioned the other reasons. In the analysis, non-attendees are the baseline category.

your views or do you like the most?" and identified respondents who chose an explicitly Islamist or right-of-center party (53.4 percent).[25] Second, we asked respondents how much they supported the imposition of sharia law: "Seeing the current situation in Pakistan, do you think that Shari'a should play a much larger role in Pakistan law (35.7 percent), a somewhat larger role (31.8 percent), about the same role (22.9 percent), a somewhat smaller role (7.7 percent), or a much smaller role (2.0 percent)?" Third, because Pakistanis dispute the exact content of such laws (based on varying interpretations of the injunctions of foundational Islamic texts), we measured the extent to which respondents agreed with Islamist arguments. Specifically, Islamist parties, in Pakistan and elsewhere, often argue that the implementation of sharia law would involve using physical punishments for crimes such as theft and adultery.[26] We asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that sharia government meant "A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law." Of the respondents, 55.5 percent agreed that sharia law implied these physical punishments. Taken together, these three questions provide a range of ways of capturing sympathy with Islamist political positions.

Interpretation of jihad: We tested H3 by eliciting respondents' views about jihad in terms consistent with the two above-described debates in Pakistan about the nature of jihad and who has the appropriate authority to wage it. With respect to the nature of jihad, we asked respondents: "Some people say jihad is a personal struggle for righteousness. Others say jihad is protecting the Muslim Ummah

25. In Pakistan, there are several explicitly Islamist religious parties, such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), various factions of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), and a now-defunct coalition of several religious parties known as the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). These parties are often called "ulema parties," because their leaders and candidates are purportedly Islamic scholars or *alims*. Additionally, there are several so-called mainstream parties that adopt policies that are sympathetic to or even identical with those of the ulema parties. However, their leaderships tend to consist of laypersons (although technically JI's leadership also draws from the lay population). Parties that fall into this "right-of-center" category include the various factions of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as well as the newly ascendant Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Though there is no longer any genuinely secular party in Pakistan, there are a number of groups that can be classified as "left-of-center." In general, these parties offer a more progressive social agenda and prefer greater distance between "the mosque and the state." Parties that are often considered "left-of-center" are the ethno-nationalist parties in Sindh, Balochistan, and KPK (e.g., Muttahida Quami Movement [MQM], factions of the Awami National Party [ANP], and the Balochistan National Party [BNP]). In many cases, these ethno-nationalist parties are deeply antagonistic to the ulema parties (Baxter et al. 2002; Cohen 2004; Fair et al. 2010). Note that Islamist political parties are not the only ones that have demonstrated support for Islamist militants. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which governs the Punjab, has provided financial and political support to Jamaat ud Dawa and has been sympathetic to the Deobandi sectarian militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Kharal 2011; Dhume 2011). This is in addition to the PML-N's long-standing claim to be an Islamic democratic party that seeks to Islamize the state (Nasr 2004).

26. This can be seen most recently in the use of such punishments by the Pakistani Taliban in the tribal areas and Swat (U.S. Department of State 2011a).

through war. What do you think?" and provided three response options: "Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness"; "Jihad is both a personal struggle for righteousness and protecting the Muslim Ummah through war"; and "Jihad is solely protecting the Muslim Ummah through war."[27]

Later in the survey, we asked those respondents who responded that jihad could mean a militarized struggle: "Some people say only a Muslim state/government can use military force to protect a Muslim country or Ummah in the name of jihad. Others say individuals and non-state organizations can use military force in the name of jihad. What do you think?" Respondents were provided three response options: "Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad"; "Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of jihad"; and "Only individuals should use military force in the name of jihad."[28] Roughly 82 percent of the sample (n = 4,915) provided responses to both questions. Others were excluded from the analysis of H3.

Based on their responses to these two questions, respondents were placed into three categories: (1) those who answered "Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness" in response to the first question (31.0 percent of respondents); (2) those who answered "Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad" in response to the second question (i.e., those who believe that jihad is an external, state-level struggle) (30.4 percent); and (3) those who answered either "Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of jihad" or "Only individuals should use military force in the name of jihad" in response to the second question (i.e., those who believe that jihad can be an external, non-state struggle) (38.6 percent). In the analysis, the first group (respondents who conceive of jihad as a personal struggle for righteousness) is the baseline category. We also present robustness checks where we consider each question independently.

Method of Analysis

Our measure of support for the militant organization is the treatment effect of the endorsement, or the difference in policy support between the control group

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27. We chose this approach instead of direct use of the formal terms *jihad-e-asghar* and *jihad-e-akbar* because, although many respondents in pretesting did not understand these formal terms, all understood the substantive difference described in the questions we asked.
28. We did not ask the two questions on the meaning of jihad at the same time in a branched format because we learned during pretesting that asking repeatedly about this sensitive topic led to resistance from respondents. Accordingly, because the survey was administered on paper and not using an electronic instrument, it was most feasible to ask everyone the second jihad question, even though the question of who can conduct a militarized form of jihad is not meaningful for those who conceive of jihad only as an internal struggle for righteousness. These questions are being refined in ongoing research, but as is they represent an improvement over previous surveys of Pakistan and other Arab countries, which asked about support for jihad without discerning what respondents understand jihad to be.

and the treatment group. Recall that respondents in the control group reported their support level for all four policies without any endorsements. Respondents in the treatment group also reported their support for the four policies, but each policy was endorsed by one of the four militant organizations. In addition to randomizing the assignment of respondents to the control group and the treatment group, the assignment of group to policy was randomized within the treatment group, so we can construct a dependent variable measuring support for militancy by averaging the support for the four policies (each measured using a five-point scale), yielding a twenty-point scale.[29] This approach reduces measurement error and enhances the precision of estimates. As explained below, we also examine patterns of support for each of the four groups individually.

To assess the effect of our religion measures on support for the militant groups, we estimate the following equation via ordinary least squares (OLS):

$$P_i = \beta T_i + \eta R_i + \gamma T_i R_i + \lambda \mathbf{x_i} + \alpha_p + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where P_i represents the overall policy support, T_i is a dummy variable indicating whether respondent i is in the treatment condition, R_i represents a religiosity measure, $\mathbf{x_i}$ is a vector of demographic controls, α_p are region fixed effects, and ε_i is stochastic error. The parameter of interest is γ, which represents how the treatment effect varies with different values of the religiosity measures. This is a difference-in-difference (DID) estimate. In other words, we are comparing the differences in policy support between the treatment and control groups for two subgroups—those scoring "high" on a religiosity measure and those scoring "low" on that measure. We add additional terms to equation (1)—for example, interaction terms between the treatment dummy and the demographic variables ($T_i\mathbf{x_i}$)—to assess the robustness of significant findings.

Results

TEST OF H1 (RELIGIOUS PRACTICE)

Religious attendance: Respondents who attended dars-e-Qur'an either irregularly or daily were no more likely to exhibit higher treatment effects in the endorsement experiment than those who did not attend at all. In other words,

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29. Some policies will exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well formed. We use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of pre-treatment attitudes and weight each policy response by this variance. Hence, we place greater weight on policies for which we believe there is a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements. The results are substantively similar without this weighting, and so we report weighted results throughout, as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The weight vector **w** for the four policies (vaccination plan, FCR reforms, Durand line, curriculum reform) was (0.983, 1.15, 1.28, 1.18), meaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four individual weights (1.15). The post-stratification weight was multiplied by **w** to produce the overall sampling weight.

we found no relationship between level of religious activity and support for militant political organizations. As shown in column (1) of table 2, the interaction terms representing the DID estimates were both statistically insignificant and substantively small.[30]

Motivations for attendance: The reasons respondents attended dars-e-Qur'an also did not predict support for violent political organizations. As shown in column (2) of table 2, people attending dars-e-Qur'an for pietistic and non-pietistic reasons did not exhibit significantly different treatment effects than non-attendees. Additionally, respondents reporting pietistic motivations were no more supportive of the groups than those reporting scholastic or social motivations. A Wald test of the difference between the interaction terms is statistically insignificant ($p = 0.32$).

TESTS OF H2 (POLITICAL ISLAM)

Support for right-of-center political parties: Supporters of right-of-center parties were no more supportive of the militant groups than were those who supported avowedly secular parties (see column 3 of table 2). This null result may, of course, reflect our inability to distinguish supporters of positions espoused by both these parties and Islamists from those who like the parties for other reasons.[31] Still, it is inconsistent with an expectation that those on the right end of the Pakistani political spectrum are more tolerant of militant groups.

Views of sharia law: Muslims vary considerably in their views of what sharia law entails for Islamic practice. As mentioned above, the most common conception of sharia held by Westerners—corporal and physical punishment—is actually not universally accepted by Muslims in Pakistan. Nonetheless, even adherents of this more extreme form of sharia law are no more likely to support political violence than those who do not believe that sharia requires physical punishment (see column 4 of table 2). Further, regardless of their interpretation of sharia, respondents who thought that sharia should play a greater role in Pakistani law were no more likely to support militant groups than respondents who wanted a stricter separation of church and state (see column 5). Therefore, it does not appear that Islamism—or the belief that Islam should play a greater role in Pakistani government—is related to support for militancy.

30. The models used to test H1 and H2 include only demographic controls and region fixed effects. Because we fail to reject the null hypotheses, we present results from the least stringent tests here. Results are similar when estimating more saturated regression models.

31. At the time our survey was fielded, PML-N's and PML-Q's positions aligned with Islamist positions mainly on peace negotiations with Pakistani Taliban, on implementing sharia in Swat, and on supporting the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, among other foreign and domestic policy issues.

Table 2. The Effect of Religious Practice and Political Islam on Support for Militant Organizations (standard errors in parentheses)

	Personal piety			Political Islam	
Group cue	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.014)
Attend dars-e-Qur'an daily	0.011 (0.010)	—	—	—	—
Attend dars-e-Qur'an irregularly	0.023* (0.009)	—	—	—	—
Group cue x attend dars-e-Qur'an daily	-0.007 (0.011)	—	—	—	—
Group cue x attend dars-e-Qur'an an irregularly	0.001 (0.008)	—	—	—	—
Attend dars-e-Qur'an for pietistic reasons		0.013 (0.009)	—	—	—
Attend dars-e-Qur'an for non-pietistic reasons		0.024** (0.009)	—	—	—
Group cue x attend dars-e-Qur'an for pietistic reasons		0.004 (0.009)	—	—	—
Group cue x attend dars-e-Qur'an for non-pietistic reasons		-0.007 (0.010)	—	—	—
Support for a religious political party			-0.017* (0.008)	—	—
Group cue x support for a right-wing political party			0.011 (0.008)	—	—

Continued

Table 2. *Continued*

	Personal piety		Political Islam		
Belief that sharia requires physical punishment	—	—	—	0.019* (0.009)	—
Group cue × belief that sharia requires physical punishment	—	—	—	−0.006 (0.008)	—
Support for increasing sharia in public law	—	—	—	—	0.170** (0.018)
Group cue × support for increasing sharia in public law	—	—	—	—	−0.016 (0.017)
Constant	0.899** (0.020)	0.901** (0.020)	0.922** (0.020)	0.901** (0.020)	0.769** (0.024)
R^2	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.25
N	5,358	5,324	4,689	5,358	5,251

NOTE.—OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religious sect. Regressions include region fixed effects. Shaded results highlight estimates corresponding to tests of H1 and H2.

**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 (two-tailed).

We also estimated regressions testing H1 and H2 for each group individually (see online appendix D). As with the combined measure, no measure of religious practice or political Islam significantly predicted support.

TEST OF H3 (INTERPRETATION OF JIHAD)

As mentioned above, although jihad is commonly interpreted by Americans to be associated with violence in the name of Islam, this is not the universally accepted view across the Muslim world. Respondents who view jihad as an internal religious struggle (or as an external but state-level struggle) are significantly less likely to support militant groups than those who view it as a violent, extra-state struggle. As shown in the shaded cell of column 1 in table 3, those who believe that jihad entails the non-state use of violence exhibit 2.3 percentage points greater support for militant groups than those who do not ($p = 0.03$, two-tailed). Furthermore, respondents who believe that jihad is an external, non-state struggle exhibit 1.9 percentage points greater support for the militant groups than respondents who believe that jihad is an external struggle but one that must be declared by the state (see the difference between the two interaction terms in column 1 of table 3). A Wald test confirms that this difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.08$).

Is this effect substantively important? Bullock et al. (2011) show that treatment effects from endorsement experiments are not easily interpreted in scale-free terms and are best used to assess sign and significance. Nonetheless, there are numerous ways to calibrate the effect. First, we compare the difference-in-difference estimate to other theoretically important predictors. For instance, going from the bottom income group to the top income group is associated with a 3.3-percentage-point-decrease in support for the policies, three of which involve social services. The difference-in-difference estimate represents almost 70 percent of the income effect. We can also benchmark the effect against the differences between the four main provinces of Pakistan in support for policies. Because the four provinces vary in their administrative competence, colonial histories, ethnic distributions, population density, and present-day economic structures, there are large inter-provincial differences in support for policies.[32] The policies are most popular in Punjab (the most populous and urbanized province) and are 11.4 and 7.7 percentage points less popular in Balochistan and Sindh, respectively, which are less densely populated, less industrialized, and receive fewer government services outside of a few cities. The effect of jihad attitudes represents between 20 and 30 percent of these inter-provincial differences.

Additionally, the effect size of the difference-in-difference is, in absolute terms, almost twice as large as the impact of the group endorsement among those who believe jihad is strictly an internal struggle (represented by the

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32. A recent paper by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) uses a similar approach of comparing effect sizes against regional differences.

coefficient estimate of β). Further, respondents in the control group who believe that jihad can involve non-state violence exhibit 8.3 percentage points lower support for the policies (η_1). Accordingly, endorsements by militant groups reduce aversion to the policies by over 25 percent.

In addition to quantitative assessments of substantive significance, we can also analyze the effect size using substantive knowledge about the political and security context in Pakistan. In 2008, 17.5 percent of elections to the Punjab Assembly and 14.7 percent of elections to the National Assembly were decided by margins under 3 percentage points. Although we do not know whether support for militant organizations directly translates into support for political parties, if support for the groups has electoral spillovers for parties who more closely align themselves with violent organizations, then our estimated effects can be electorally meaningful.

Second, these effect sizes are substantively significant given that these militant groups are small in size and therefore even modest changes in support among the broader population can translate into meaningful improvements in recruitment and local infrastructure. Although the dependent variable cannot be interpreted in scale-free terms like a dichotomous measure, the difference-in-difference estimate reported above is equivalent to 2.3 percent of the sample moving from 0 to 1 on the policy support scale. As a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, a 2.3-percent increase in support among the population of males in Bahawalpur and Gujranwala (the two districts of Punjab most commonly cited as recruiting centers for militant groups) represents approximately 70,000 individuals (Census of Pakistan 1998). This may seem small when compared to the base of a national mainstream political party, but it is very large compared to the membership of these groups, which range from a few hundred (e.g., LeJ/SSP) to several thousand (e.g., LeT) (U.S. Department of State 2011b, pp. 225, 227).

Indeed, perhaps the best comparison is to extremist parties in Europe. For instance, increases in the national vote share for the National Front in France were about 2–3 percentage points throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in Le Pen's shocking advancement to the runoff in the 2002 elections. Accordingly, political commentators in Europe are often alarmed when extremist and potentially violent organizations achieve even small increases in support among the polity (Elash 2010).

We estimated several versions of this specification to assess the robustness of this result. As shown in table 3, we estimate successively more saturated versions of the regression model. In column (2), we estimate a model including a host of demographic controls. Column (3) listwise deletes respondents who did not answer the income question. In column (4), we also include interaction terms between the group cue and the demographic controls. Finally, in column (5), we include all the religiosity measures mentioned above. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term between the group cue and a violent conception of jihad is highly stable across all four specifications, ranging between 0.023 and 0.027. In all five specifications, the coefficient achieves statistical significance at the 95-percent level. Finally, the difference between those who believe that jihad can involve non-state

Table 3. The Effect of Textual Interpretation of Jihad on Support for Militant Organizations (standard errors in parentheses)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β: Group cue	–0.013	–0.018*	–0.018*	–0.055*	–0.038
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.021)
η_1: Belief in jihad as external, extra-state struggle	–0.083**	–0.073**	–0.074**	–0.073**	–0.056**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
η_2: Belief in jihad as external, state-level struggle	0.008	0.004	0.006	0.003	–0.001
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
γ_1: Group cue x external, extra-state struggle	0.023*	0.027*	0.027*	0.026*	0.023*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
γ_2: Group cue x external, state-level struggle	0.004	0.010	0.009	0.012	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Constant	0.850**	0.935**	0.933**	0.952**	0.817**
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.027)
R^2	0.12	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.32
N	4,428	4,428	4,309	4,428	3,876
Region fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income listwise deleted	N	N	Y	N	N
Group cue–demographics interactions	N	N	N	Y	Y
Other religiosity variables	N	N	N	N	Y

NOTE.—OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Regressions include region fixed effects. Omitted category represents respondents believing that jihad is an internal struggle. Shaded results highlight estimates corresponding to tests of H3.

    $**p < 0.01$; $*p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

action versus those who believe it allows only state action ranges between 1.4 and 1.9 percentage points across specifications and is statistically significant in all models except column (4), where it approaches significance ($p = 0.13$).

Table 4. The Effect of Textual Interpretation of Jihad on Support for Militant Organizations (by Group) (standard errors in parentheses)

	Kashmir Tanzeem	Afghan Taliban	al-Qa'ida	Sectarian Tanzeem
β: Group cue	–0.055	–0.091**	–0.045	–0.034
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)
η_1: Belief in jihad as external, extra-state struggle	–0.073**	–0.073**	–0.073**	–0.072**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
η_2: Belief in jihad as external, state-level struggle	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
γ_1: Group cue x external, extra-state struggle	0.011	0.048**	0.017	0.024
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
γ_2: Group cue x external, state-level struggle	0.002	0.029*	–0.009	0.032*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Constant	0.953**	0.954**	0.952**	0.948**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
R^2	0.17	0.15	0.16	0.17
N	4,428	4,428	4,428	4,428

NOTE—OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Regressions include region fixed effects and interactions between group cue and the demographic variables. Omitted category represents respondents believing that jihad is an internal struggle. Shaded results highlight estimates corresponding to tests of H3.

**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 (two-tailed).

We conducted two further robustness checks of these findings. First, as shown in online appendix E, both questions that comprise the jihad measure exhibit a similar pattern of results. With respect to the first question, those who believe that jihad is at least partly an external struggle are between 1.7 and 1.9 percentage points (depending on specification) more supportive of militant groups than respondents who believe that it is solely an internal struggle. With respect to the second question, those who believe that jihad can be waged by non-state actors are about 2.0–2.2 percentage points more supportive of militant organizations than respondents who believe that it can be waged only by the state. In addition to being statistically significant, these effect sizes are substantively similar to those reported above for the full jihad measure using both items.

Second, we estimated specification (4) from table 3 for each of the four militant groups individually. As shown in table 4, the positive interaction term between the group cue and the main jihad measure is in the expected positive

direction for each of the four groups. Further, none of the estimated coefficients on the interaction term are statistically significantly different from one another at the $p < 0.05$ level.[33] Nonetheless, the interaction term appears smallest for Kashmiri tanzeem (DID: 1.1 percentage points). It is the only group whose DID estimate exhibits a significant difference compared to another group (vs. the Afghan Taliban, $p = 0.07$).

Although a full exploration of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper, a potential explanation can be briefly sketched here. The Kashmir question occupies a unique position in Pakistan's national discourse. Pakistan has long held the position that partition is incomplete until it receives Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan's quest to acquire Kashmir, and its concomitant reliance upon so-called "freedom fighters" to "liberate" Kashmir and secure its succession to Pakistan, are ultimately rooted in appeals to Pakistani nationalism as opposed to jihad. Second, the Kashmiri groups are not associated with committing violence within Pakistani borders. Respondents who conceive of jihad in peaceful terms may be least antagonistic toward groups that have not been creating negative externalities in Pakistani communities.[34]

Conclusion

Suggested links between Islam and political violence have been a prominent feature of academic and policy debates about terrorism and instability in the Arab World and South Asia. In an effort to bring empirical evidence to this discussion, we designed and fielded a large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan that measured support for specific militant organizations and several distinct aspects of religiosity.

Strikingly, the only measure of religiosity in our survey that is consistently and positively correlated with support for militant organizations is a specific vision of religious doctrine.[35] Those who believe that jihad is a militarized struggle that can be conducted by individuals are 2.3–2.7 percent more supportive of policies endorsed by militant groups than are individuals who

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33. Because the dependent variable is different for each of the specifications in table 3, the regressions are estimated separately and zero covariance is assumed between coefficients. Since the covariance between the estimated coefficients is likely positive, the regression coefficients are actually more statistically similar than revealed by our tests.

34. Although the Afghan Taliban is not responsible for violence within Pakistan's borders, it is possible that respondents conflated the Afghan Taliban with another militant organization, the Pakistani Taliban, which was responsible for a great deal of domestic attacks. The Afghan Taliban is now recognized by Pakistanis as being different from domestic insurgents (e.g., the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan), but that was not the case in 2009 when our survey was fielded.

35. To underscore the null results for the other religiosity measures, the interaction term is not positive and significant in specification (5) of table 2 for any of the other four variables besides the jihad measure.

believe jihad is an internal struggle for righteousness, an effect we argue is substantively meaningful. Furthermore, those who interpret jihad as involving external, non-state action were significantly more supportive of militant groups than those who believe jihad can be led by states alone.

Our findings have at least two important practical implications. First, efforts to deal with the potential for violence of Islamist political movements should focus on the content of religious doctrine. In this sense, nascent programs in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia that seek to enlist religious scholars in deconstructing and delegitimizing the theological justifications for violent politics should be welcomed and supported (Rabasa et. al. 2010). Second, the prospect of Islamist parties coming to power in the wake of the Arab Spring should not necessarily be viewed with alarm. It is only when the theological tradition embraced by party leaders legitimizes the use of non-state violence for political ends that policymakers should be concerned.

From an empirical perspective, this study contributes to a debate about the relationship between Islam and violence that is often long on rhetoric but short on evidence. In measuring the dependent variable, we introduce an approach designed to reduce non-response rates on a sensitive topic. In conceptualizing the independent variable of religiosity, we consider the importance of doctrine and textual interpretation, aspects that have not been previously analyzed. In line with studies of religion and politics in both the United States and abroad (e.g., Layman 2001; Wiktorowicz 2005), we find that religious *practice* is unrelated to support for militant groups. Rather, it is the content of one's beliefs concerning the acceptability of violence that has a powerful influence.

Appendix. Question Wordings

POLICIES FOR ENDORSEMENT EXPERIMENT

The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

The newly elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot

A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes, for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/ Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

In recent years, the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

A great deal
A lot
A moderate amount
A little
Not at all

VIEWS OF JIHAD

Some people say jihad is a personal struggle for righteousness. Others say jihad is protecting the Muslim Ummah through war. What do you think?

Jihad is solely a personal struggle for righteousness.
Jihad is both a personal struggle for righteousness and protecting the Muslim Ummah through war.
Jihad is solely protecting the Muslim Ummah through war.

Some people say only a Muslim state/government can use military force to protect a Muslim country or Ummah in the name of jihad. Others say individuals and non-state organizations can use military force in the name of jihad. What do you think?

Only states/governments should use military force in the name of jihad.
Both states/governments and individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.
Only individuals should use military force in the name of jihad.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

Do you attend dars-e-Qur'an?

Yes
No

How many times do you go to dars-e-Qur'an per week on average? (open-ended)

What do you like most about attending dars-e-Qur'an?

Get in touch with neighbors
See my friends
Be closer to Allah
Fulfill my religious duty
Learn more about Islam

POLITICAL ISLAM

Seeing the current situation in Pakistan, do you think that Shari'a should play a much larger role in Pakistan law, a somewhat larger role, about the same role, a somewhat smaller role, or a much smaller role?

Much larger role
Somewhat larger role
About the same role
Somewhat smaller role
Much smaller role

Here is a list of things some people say about Shari'a. Tell us which ones you agree with.
Shari'a government means:

A government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off of hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law.

Agree
Disagree

Which political party best represents your views/do you like the most? (open-ended)

DEMOGRAPHICS

Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?

Sunni
Shi'ite
Non-Muslim

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

Primary
Middle
Matric

Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc.)
Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)
Professional (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D., or other professional degree)
Illiterate

What is the approximate monthly income in your household?

Less than 3,000 rupees
3,000 to 10,000 rupees
10,001 to 15,000 rupees
15,001 to 25,000 rupees
More than 25,000 rupees

Are you married?

Yes
No

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, to do website browsing, or to send and receive e-mail?

Yes
No

Do you have a personal cell phone?

Yes
No

Can you read in any language with understanding?

Yes
No

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?

Yes
No

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?

Yes
No

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are freely available online at http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/.

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