The Practice of Islam in Pakistan and the Influence of Islam on Pakistani Politics

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Introduction

Speculation about the trends in the practice of Islam among the Pakistani polity and the influence of Islam upon Pakistani politics has been rife, particularly in the wake of September 11, 2001, and the decision of President Musharraf to support the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Yet, little of what has been written about Pakistan is based upon empirical studies of Islam and politics. Rather, much that has been written has been based upon qualitative research methods or upon content analysis of Pakistani publications.

Both methods, while valuable, have specific shortcomings. Researchers employing these methods have little means of defining the representativeness of their findings. Those who rely upon a close reading of the Pakistani popular press are confronted with a myriad of challenges based upon the nature of the Pakistani press. At one extreme are those papers that are published in English. They are consumed by an English-literate elite, and the views that such papers espouse may not reflect the sentiments of the Pakistani populace at large. At the other extreme are the copious vernacular papers that also reflect the niche preferences of their constituents. The quality of journalism inherent in these vernacular publications is widely regarded as suspect and the publications as popular fonts of disinformation. What is conspicuously absent in Pakistan is a popular press that captures the sentiment of the wide-ranging Pakistani populace.

This paper will augment the body of literature of Islam in Pakistan and the influence of Islam upon Pakistani politics by drawing upon three recent

surveys conducted by three different organizations.[1] This effort has four ob-
jectives. First, it will explore Pakistani religious commitments. Second, it
will identify trends in support for religious and militant organizations.
Third, it will assess public support for reform efforts undertaken by the
Musharraf regime. Fourth, it will untangle the dual trends of changing reli-
gious propensity and anti-U.S. sentiment.

These empirical findings will be augmented with interviews conducted
by one of the authors in Pakistan in January 2003 with serving and retired
Pakistani generals and other officers, think-tank analysts, politicians, jour-
nalists, and U.S. consular personnel in Islamabad and Lahore.

In the next section, the three data sources will be described and cri-
tiqued. In the third section, we present the empirical findings. The fourth
section discusses the empirical findings and synthesizes them with interview
data and the literature. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of future di-
rections.

Data and Methodology

THE SURVEYS

This paper employs data from three different surveys conducted by the
Gallup Organization, the *Herald* (Karachi), and by the U.S. Department of
State.

Gallup Poll

The Gallup Poll was fielded in nine countries in December 2001 and Janu-
ary 2002 (see Figure 4.1). The sample size across these nine states was 10,004.
Of these, 2,043 were from Pakistan. The percentage of Christian respon-
dents in the Gallup Lebanese sample was very different from the percentage
of Christians in the Lebanese population base. Whereas 57 percent of the
Gallup Lebanese sample was Muslim and 43 percent Christian, 70 percent
of the Lebanese population is Muslim and 30 percent are Christian.[2] Rather
than constructing weights to account for this distributional difference be-
tween the sample composition and the overall population, we divided the
Lebanon sample into Muslim and Christian groups for purposes of analysis.

FIGURE 4.1. Where does religion rank among these five things: family, extended family, country, self, and religion?

Therefore, in our analyses, we present findings from ten groups (two of which are from Lebanon).

According to the Gallup Organization, the sample design of the survey seeks to measure the opinions of the entire national population of each country. To achieve this, the in-country samples were derived using a multi-stage probability sampling technique. The first stage is comprised of selecting primary sampling units (PSUs), which are the main locations where the interviews are conducted. Notably, individual PSUs were selected from each urban and rural stratum, and, where possible, further stratified by other socioeconomic and demographic variables (for example, educational attainment and household income). To ensure that the survey samples conform to their respective national population distributions, undersampled rural areas were weighted upward.

Other stages in the sample design were devised to contend with possible biases in the selection of the households and the selection of household members. The Gallup Organization maintains that as a result of the way in which the samples were drawn and weighted, the poll results should repre-

sent the entire population of adults (aged eighteen and above) resident in the given country at the time of the interview. It is important to note that the Gallup Organization did not employ citizenship screens or screens for religion (thus the problem with the Lebanese sample). This may be particularly disconcerting for the Gulf states, given that a large percentage of their population is comprised of expatriates from South and Southeast Asia. The overall sample is given below.

Pakistan	2,043
Iran	1,501
Indonesia	1,050
Turkey	1,019
Lebanon	1,050
Morocco	1,000
Kuwait	790
Jordan	797
Saudi Arabia	754
Total Sample	10,004

Source: Gallup Organization, "The 2002 Gallup Poll of the Islamic World?" http://www.gallup.com/poll/summits/islam.asp (accessed March 12, 2003). In some countries (for example, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia), some questions were not included in the survey variant fielded for those countries. As a consequence, the countries represented for specific questions may vary.[3]

Herald Survey

The second source of data is the reported findings of a poll commissioned by the *Herald*, a news publication based in Karachi, and conducted by Oasis International Pakistan. This poll was conducted in two days (January 27 and 28, 2002). The poll included 1,239 urban respondents, of whom 634 were female. According to the description of the sampling methodology, a "stratified disproportionate sampling" was used to ensure that individuals from all socioeconomic groups were included.[4] (Had the sample been proportionately drawn on the basis of representation, there would have been relatively few respondents from higher income brackets.) The survey team included fifty-six male and fifty-six female interviewees. This enabled the survey team to conduct same-sex interviews within the respondents' homes in a standardized in-person format.

The sample is nearly evenly distributed between men and women, drawn across four age groups (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, and 45–64) and from four socioeconomic groups defined by income, profession, work experience, and education. The sample reportedly is representative of Pakistan's primary urban centers, such as Karachi and Larkana (Sindh), Lahore, Multan, and Rawalpindi-Islamabad (Punjab), Quetta (Baluchistan), and Peshawar (North West Frontier Province). Respondents are distributed roughly equally across the different cities. (Note that the sample was not drawn according to the population share of these cities.) According to the *Herald,* the survey does not cover rural Pakistan and has a margin of error that ranges from 3 to 5 percent.

U.S. Department of State

The third data source is from a survey sponsored by the Office of Research of the U.S. Department of State.[5] The survey instrument was written by the Office of Research and was executed by a "reputable Pakistani public opinion research firm." The fielding of the instrument began in the middle of March 2002 and ended in the first week of April.

The sample size was 2,058. All respondents were over eighteen years of age and were based in ten major cities in Baluchistan, Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh. The results were tabulated using weights to adjust for the educational distribution across Pakistan. These population weights were derived using official Government of Pakistan data from the 1998 Housing Census of Pakistan. According to the Department of State, the 95 percent confidence interval is plus or minus 3 percentage points.[6] Since the surveys have been repeated several times, where possible and where relevant, we present time-trend analyses.

Critical Views of the Data

While the Gallup Poll was drawn from a nationally representative sample, the other two surveys were conducted in urban environs. The Gallup data also provide extensive psychographic and demographic information about respondents, which is not available with the other two data sources. Because Gallup produced respondent-level data, we were able to analyze the data controlling for education, gender, locality of the respondent (rural vs. urban), and so forth.

FIGURE 4.2. How positively or negatively is our value system being influenced by the West?

One of the drawbacks of the Gallup data is that some of the questions asked of the respondents are vague, allowing for multiple interpretations. For example, several questions ask respondents about their feelings toward the following countries: France, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. However, it is difficult to interpret the responses. Are the respondents indicating their assessment of the people of those countries? Are they interpreting the question to be about national policies—foreign or domestic? Are participants in the survey addressing their perception of the culture of those countries? As such, such questions only convey vague information. Other problems with this survey include the deliberate exclusion of questions in sensitive markets, such as Saudi Arabia. Further, as this survey only addresses Muslim countries, it is difficult to contextualize these respondents' answers. Do respondents in Pakistan, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia answer the various survey items in ways that are statistically different from those of, say, France? All of these concerns render interpretation of results less straightforward than they may appear at first blush.[7]

With respect to the data published by the *Herald* and the U.S. Department of State, we employed their published tabulations. Unfortunately, the

1	2	3	4	5

Contradicts   Does Not
Totally   Contradict
At All

■ Christian Lebanese	✦ Kuwait	● Saudi Arabia
■ Jordan	✦ Turkey	● Pakistan
□ Iran	✪ Morocco	○ Muslim Lebanese
○ Indonesia		

FIGURE 4.3. To what extent are aspects of modernity as we currently experience it in contradiction with our traditional value system?

estimates of the sample means did not have standard errors associated with them. Therefore, we are unable to determine whether or not a pair-wise comparison of sample means is statistically significant.

Gallup Data Handling and Methodology

Analyses of the respondent-level data from the Gallup survey were conducted by the authors. For those questions that were answered on a scale (for example, ordinal data), we deleted all answers that were either "missing" or indicated as "don't know." This was done such that we could employ the most powerful statistical tests to make pair-wise comparisons of the observed country means. We used a non-parametric analogue to the t-test called the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test (also known as the Mann-Whitney U Test) to compare pair-wise country means and to determine the statistical significance of the observed difference. For nominal data items (that is, questions which are answered with a "Yes" or a "No," and "Don't know"), a typical Chi-Square test was used to execute pair-wise comparisons of country means.

FIGURE 4.4. The time for a better understanding between the West and the Arab/Muslim world will probably . . .

The probability cutoff employed here is higher than may be usually employed to determine whether pair-wise differences of means are statistically significant. We used a probability cutoff of 0.001 or lower. This bound was determined using the Bonferroni correction method to adjust the standard 0.05 threshold. The Bonferonni-determined cutoff was calculated by dividing the 0.05 threshold by the total number of unique pair-wise country comparisons; for most questions this meant forty-five unique comparisons (by comparing eight countries, plus Muslim and Christian Lebanese). For those questions that were not fielded in specific countries, the Bonferonni cutoff was adjusted accordingly. To graphically indicate differences in responses between countries, a black bar is used to indicate which nations are statistically indistinguishable.

Findings

In this section, we report findings from the various data sets employed in this analysis. First, we employ the multicountry findings of the Gallup data

FIGURE 4.5. Importance of religion among one's family, extended family, religion, country, and self.

to contextualize Pakistan vis-à-vis the other Muslim countries included in the survey.[8] This will provide a broad overview of how Pakistani participants responded to a series of background questions on religion, family, and perceptions of the West and of modernity. Second, we explore these general findings more thoroughly by presenting results of in-house RAND analyses of Pakistani respondents in the Gallup data. In the third and fourth section, we analyze published findings from the *Herald* and from the U.S. Department of State data, respectively.

Pakistan in Context

To contextualize Pakistan and Pakistani respondents, we present findings from four questions from the Gallup poll fielded in eight Muslim countries. (Note: Indonesian respondents were not asked to respond to these questions.) These questions are intended to provide a broad overview of respondent sentiment on the importance of religion, the perceived influence of the West on traditional culture, views on modernity, and relations with the West.

To ascertain the importance of religion (however defined), Gallup re-

FIGURE 4.6. To what extent do aspects of modernity, as we currently experience this in our society, contradict our traditional value system?

quested respondents to rank religion within other parameters, including family, extended family, country, self, and religion. Among the participants of the eight countries (nine groups), Pakistanis are more likely to rank religion as "most important" (a value of "1"), as shown in Figure 4.1. Only Kuwaiti respondents were more likely to rank it so.

The questionnaire also asked whether respondents felt the West was negatively influencing their value system. Among participants from the eight countries, Pakistanis (along with Moroccan and Muslim Lebanese respondents, as indicated by the black bar) were most negative in their assessment. (These results are available in Figure 4.2.) The reader should note the tight distribution of responses: the country means of most countries were clustered between 2 and 2.5.

Gallup also sought to understand the various perceptions of modernity among their respondents. The survey included two variants of the same question: one asked whether respondents found "modernity as they experienced it to be in conflict with their traditional value system," and the second inquired whether or not the respondents found modernity "as experienced by the West" contradicted their value system. Consistent with their general survey methodology, Gallup did not provide any fixed definition of modernity, leaving its meaning to be determined by the subjective interpretation of the respondent.

Here, we present findings only for the first variant of the question. Pak-

FIGURE 4.7. To what extent do aspects of modernity, as experienced in the West, contradict our traditional value system?

istani respondents were less likely than most to indicate a total contradiction and were more likely to inveigh on the subject neutrally (see Figure 4.3). This suggests that even though Pakistani respondents were more concerned than most about the influence of the West upon their traditional value system, they were among the least concerned about the corrosive influence of modernity writ large. Although, as we will see, their agnosticism about modernity is not unqualified.

On the question of how optimistic respondents were about a potential rapprochement between the West and the Arab/Muslim world, Pakistani respondents (along with Morocco, Indonesia, and Iran, as indicated by the black bar) were the least pessimistic (see Figure 4.4). For sure, the magnitude of this finding is certainly mitigated by the tight distribution of the sample means: most country means fell between the values of 2.1 (Jordan) and 2.8 (Pakistan). Thus, for most purposes, the country means suggest either ambivalence on the issue or a slight indication that a bettering of relations will not be forthcoming.

Gallup Data: Pakistani Respondents

Having situated Pakistan among the other respondent countries, we now explore findings exclusively for Pakistani respondents in the Gallup data. It

FIGURE 4.8. Which of these statements do you associate with Western nations?

should be noted that as we have respondent-level data, we were able to ex-
amine whether there were significant differences in means when broken out
by gender, urban vs. rural, age, and levels of education. Notably, none of the
pair-wise differences examined were statistically different or significant in
magnitude. As such, we only present aggregate means for the entire Pakistan
sample.

In this analysis, we present findings from four questions for the Pakistani
respondents. First, we examined the distribution of Pakistani respondents'
ranking of the importance of religion among one's own family, extended
family, religion, country, and self. As shown in Figure 4.5, more than 70 per-
cent of Pakistani respondents ranked religion as "Most Important." Nearly
20 percent ranked religion second among these five things. It should be re-
called that the connotation of "religion" was left to the subjective interpre-
tation of the respondent. However, this metric suggests that irrespective of
how the participants interpreted "religion," they resoundingly asserted its
primacy.

We next examined Pakistani opinion about modernity. We first looked at
the distribution of Pakistani responses on whether or not their experience of
modernity contradicts their traditional value system. These data elements
were ordinal, with "1" indicating a "total contradiction," and "5" indicating
that "it does not contradict." As shown in Figure 4.6, the largest share of re-
spondents answered with a value of "3." One way of interpreting this re-
sponse is ambivalence. The distribution of responses in the direction of "to-
tal contradiction" and "no contradiction at all" is nearly symmetric.

FIGURE 4.9. Do you approve or disapprove of the ban on these religious organizations?

However, when one examines the distribution of Pakistani responses about whether or not they perceive modernity, "as experienced by the West," to contradict their traditional value system, the distribution shifts. Whereas in the former question, Pakistani respondents appear ambivalent, in this question Pakistani respondents tended to be more likely to find a total contradiction, as shown in Figure 4.7.

Finally, we analyzed responses to a series of five statements, given below. Respondents were requested to indicate whether these statements applied to the countries of the West:

"Care about poorer nations"
"Respect Arab/Islamic values"
"Fair toward Arab/Muslim countries"
"Support Arab causes in international organizations"
"Fair stance on Palestine situation"

While the individual percentages are indicated in Figure 4.8, it is notable that Pakistani respondents overwhelmingly indicated that these statements did not apply to the West. Indeed, the principal findings from this question suggests that a large majority of Pakistani respondents perceive the countries of the West to be disrespectful toward and unfair and indifferent to Islamic values, states, and causes.

FIGURE 4.10. To what extent do you agree or disagree that religion should be kept separate from politics?

Evidence from the Herald

In this analysis, we examined three metrics from the expansive survey commissioned by the *Herald*. These data elements addressed levels of support for: reform efforts of the Musharraf regime; secularization of politics and a legal framework based on the Q'uran and Sunnah.

The first of such questions addressed the issue of support for efforts to ban religious *tanzeems* (organizations). The groups identified in this question included those groups that operate primarily in the Kashmir theater, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). It also included sectarian groups, such as the Sunni Deobandi Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), which targets Shi'as in Pakistan, and the Shi'a organizations that target Sunnis, such as the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jaffria (TNFJ). The question also addressed the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), which fought along with the Taliban and seeks to transform Pakistan into a state similar to that of Afghanistan under the Taliban.

The largest share of respondents indicated support for the ban—even for those groups that operate in Kashmir, such as the LeT and JeM: more than 50 percent of respondents supported banning the LeT, and nearly 50 percent supported the ban on JeM. A majority of respondents also agreed with banning the sectarian groups SSP and TNFJ. Slightly more than 50 percent

FIGURE 4.11. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Q'uran and Sunnah should be the source of all Pakistani law?

concurred with the prohibition on the pro-Taliban group TNSM (see Figure 4.9).

The next set of questions examined the level of support for the secularization of politics and the level of support for using the Q'uran and Sunnah as the basis of Pakistani law. As shown in Figure 4.10, the largest fraction of Pakistani respondents (over 60 percent) agreed completely and another 10 percent agreed somewhat that religion should be kept separate from politics. Fewer than 20 percent indicated that they disagreed with the assertion that religion should be separate from politics. Yet, despite the ostensible large-scale support for separation of Islam from politics, respondents overwhelmingly indicated widespread support for the use of the Q'uran and the Sunnah as the basis of all Pakistani law. As shown in Figure 4.11, more than 80 percent agree completely that Q'uran and Sunnah should comprise the basis of Pakistani law.

U.S. Department of State

We next examined four separate data elements from a 2002 U.S. Department of State Survey. Specifically, we present findings on public support for

FIGURE 4.12. In general, do you approve or disapprove of our government banning those groups of religious militants? Strongly or only somewhat?

banning religious militant groups, support for decreased state tolerance of religious extremism in Pakistan, and support for *madrasah* reform. We also present longitudinal findings tracing out the support for religious leaders since January 1998.

With respect to support for banning religious militant groups, 50 percent of respondents indicated that they "strongly approved" and another 27 percent indicated that they "approve somewhat" of banning religious militant groups. Conversely, only 4 percent indicated that they "strongly disapprove," and another 7 percent "somewhat disapprove." These findings (shown in Figure 4.12) resemble the findings of the *Herald* survey data (available in Figure 4.9).

Pakistani respondents also indicated that they are generally supportive of decreased state tolerance of religious extremism. For example, Figure 4.13 demonstrates that 50 percent of the respondents indicated that they strongly support decreased tolerance for such extremism, and another 28 percent indicated "somewhat support" for the same. Conversely, only 7 percent indicated that they "strongly disapprove," and another 3 percent noted that they "somewhat disapprove" of the statement.

Moreover, Pakistani respondents indicated a strong level of support for *madrasah* reform, as shown in Figure 4.14. The largest share of respondents (66 percent) indicated that they strongly support *madrasah* reform, and an-

FIGURE 4.13. Do you agree or disagree that religious extremism should no longer be tolerated in Pakistan? Strongly or only somewhat?

other 20 percent said that they somewhat support such reform. Only 4 percent somewhat opposed and 3 percent strongly opposed such reform.

Finally, we examined available time-trend data on support for religious leaders. For analytical purposes, we combined categories of "A good deal of support" and "A fair amount." We also combined responses for "Not very much" and "No confidence." The third grouping of responses was formed by combining responses indicated as "Don't know" and "No response."

This is presented in Figure 4.15. It is notable that the overall trend in support for religious leaders from June/July 1998 to March/April 2002 is downward. In the beginning of the data series, 56 percent of respondents indicated that they supported religious leaders. In March/April 2002, support was at 38 percent.

Despite considerable volatility in this data series, there are a few intriguing features. First, in July 1999, there was a substantial increase in support for religious leaders (from 40 to 48 percent). Similarly, another "bubble of support" appears across September/October 2001 and persists until January 2002. While we cannot determine whether these increases are statistically significant with the available information about these data series, we will revisit these bursts in support and posit some potential explanations.

FIGURE 4.14. Do you support or oppose *madrasah* reform? Strongly or somewhat?

Discussion

DATA INTEGRITY REVISITED

Looking across these different data sources, a number of themes and ostensible contradictions emerge. This section will identify and, where possible, attempt to cast light on some of the more perplexing contradictions, drawing from data from in-country interviews and from the literature, where appropriate. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the survey instruments and some of the more vague and undefined concepts inherent in the instruments, it may not be possible to fully disentangle discordant findings. Moreover, in the final analysis, the robustness and durability of these analyses turn on the credibility of those who fielded and prepared the data for analysis. Unfortunately, there is little information that permits such an assessment of these concerns.

It must also be kept in mind that with the exception of the Gallup data, these answers reflect *urban* Pakistani respondents. We therefore know very little about the respondents of rural or even suburban areas. Moreover, while Gallup is confident of its country-level aggregate results, Gallup does not suggest that the accuracy of the polling measures holds beyond the national-level reporting. (For example, we could not safely use the Gallup data to ob-

FIGURE 4.15. Please tell me how much confidence you have in Pakistan's religious leaders?

tain information about rural or urban respondents or for other demographic distributions.)

Thus, it should be kept in mind that, with the exception of the Gallup results, these findings tend to reflect a particular (that is, urban) segment of the Pakistani public populace, rather than Pakistan at large. It may be tempting to diminish the significance of the urban-focused findings of the *Herald* and the U.S. Department of State surveys on the basis that urbanites may differ in key characteristics from their rural or suburban counterparts. However, it should be noted that Pakistan is the most urbanized country in South Asia (see Table 4.1), and the trend toward urbanization continues despite a slowed pace in recent years.[9]

MODERNITY AND THE WEST

The Gallup data suggest that even though Pakistani respondents tend to be among the *most* concerned about the untoward influence upon their traditional value system, they are the *least* pessimistic about the possibility of a future rapprochement between the West and the Muslim/Arab world.

TABLE 4.1

Percentage of Population in Urban Areas. Countries of South Asia, 2001

Country	Percentage Urban (2001)
Pakistan	33.40
India	27.90
Bangladesh	25.60
Sri Lanka	23.10
Afghanistan	22.30
Nepal	12.20
Bhutan	7.40

SOURCE: *World Urbanization Prospects, The 2001 Revision: Data Tables and Highlights Table,* specifically Table "A.1. Population of urban and rural areas at mid-year and percentage urban, 2001" (United Nations Secretariat, 2002).

Another interesting finding is that Pakistanis appear to have conflicted perceptions of modernity. Even though they are likely to find modernity *as experienced by the West* to be discordant with their own traditions and values, they are less concerned about modernity *as they experience* it. Making sense of this finding is complicated by the fact that Gallup has provided no sense of what they intend "modernity" to suggest to the respondent. Nor is there any information about how the notion of modernity was interpreted by the survey participants.

Thus, this finding that Pakistani respondents view modernity in distinct ways—depending upon whether the reference is their own encounter with it or whether the reference is the West's experience of modernity—could simply be an artifact of poor polling or of a poorly crafted instrument. However, it is also possible that the different answers to the two question variants reflect some genuine interest on the part of Pakistani respondents to adopt features of modernity that conform to their value system. It may also suggest that Pakistanis may feel empowered to engage in this process of adaptation, to absorb that which is acceptable and to discard that which is not, or that they feel empowered to create their own concept of modernity altogether.

Indeed, Pakistanis have access to the amenities of modernity and they partake of and contribute to notions of a globalized culture. Even the most "fundamentalist" organizations make extensive use of technology in pursuit of their objectives. For example, the militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba

makes extensive use of the Internet to disseminate information about its operations and—particularly prior to being a proscribed foreign terrorist organization—for raising funds. They also publish extensively through the traditional means of print capital. Even among the much-vilified *madrasahs*, there are those institutions that make heavy use of electronic media. Rather than teaching their pupils to avoid engagement with modernity, these *madrasahs* are selectively appropriating its tools.[10]

Jerrold Green notes the fascination that scholars of Islam and Islamic societies have with the information revolution, which comprises only one important dimension of modernity.[11] Green cites a compelling draft analysis by Eric Rouleau of "The Use of Information Technology by Dissidents." Rouleau, according to Green, writes that in Iran, "even at the bastion of conservatism [in Qom] . . . to which this writer paid a visit, an entire floor is devoted to arrays of sophisticated computers. . . . One is thus confronted with the unusual sight of rows of mullahs in traditional garb playing computer keyboards like pianos."[12]

However, Green's comments upon Rouleau's observation are relevant to this quandary over modernity:

> The only thing that is so surprising is that it is so surprising. Mullahs drive cars, fly in planes, and use telephones. Why would they not use computers? ... All who observe the Middle East not only agree that these technologies are used and that they are important, but they also wish to point out that whomever they champion uses them.[13]

Green's observations are useful to remind us that modernity and the embrace of modernity is not the exclusive precipitant of secularization or privatization of faith. Moreover, Green's assessment echoes that of Vali Nasr, who notes that not only does modernization *not* necessarily produce secularization, but religion too can no longer be seen as "impervious to change and irrelevant to modernization. The task therefore becomes one of reconciling anachronistic values and loyalties with time-honoured assumptions about the content, nature and direction of modernizing change."[14]

Certainly, one interpretation of the Gallup results of Pakistan is consistent with these worldviews. Namely, rather than rejecting modernity out of hand, Pakistani respondents appear to be actively mobilizing modernizing changes that are consistent with their worldviews while remaining suspect of those elements which are discordant with their perceived ensemble of values and traditions.

SECULARIZATION OF POLITICS AND ISLAMIC LAW

As noted, data published in the *Herald* present the dichotomous finding that even though Pakistani respondents overwhelmingly indicated a support for a secularization of politics, they still supported the notion that the Q'uran and Sunnah should comprise the basis of Pakistani law.

A number of explanations may be offered to de-conflict these findings. First, it may simply reflect poor polling. Second, it could reflect a hesitance on the part of respondents to answer freely on one or both questions. For example, depending upon how the question is fielded, respondents may anticipate that supporting a secularization of politics is the "expected" answer or feel awkward about answering to the contrary. Similarly, respondents may have felt uncomfortable disagreeing that the Q'uran and the Sunnah should form the fundament of Pakistani law. This latter is particularly understandable, given the context of Pakistan's draconian anti-blasphemy laws and the harsh punishment that ensues if convicted. The *Herald*, which also noted this dichotomy, also expressed the concern that "few Pakistani Muslims can be expected to say publicly that they would prefer to be governed by secular legislation as opposed to laws rooted in religious scriptures."[15]

Yet another explanation may be that Pakistani respondents do not necessarily see these two issues in conflict. For example, it is often heard within Pakistan and elsewhere that Islam is not simply a religion, it is a complete system for living one's life. This view, if widely held, may explain the broad support for Q'uran and Sunnah within the context of Pakistan's legal framework. However, given the preference for such a legal framework, it is entirely possible that respondents prefer that religious organizations should not engage in politics. In fact, this view is held by many religious organizations themselves. For example, Tablighi Jamaat (see chapter by Metcalf in this book), as a principle, does not involve itself in politics.

Alternatively, it may be the case that respondents distinguish between politicians *as lawmakers* and politicians *as implementers* of law, with greater importance on the latter. Pakistani respondents may believe that an ideal politician might be someone who accepts current interpretations of the law and who spends most of her/his time in being fair, hardworking, and eschewing corruption and other untoward activities.

Both the data from the *Herald* and the U.S. Department of State suggest that there is wide support among Pakistani respondents for banning religious organizations, *madrasah* reform, containment of religious intolerance, and so forth. Yet, despite what appears to be a broad base of support for such reform efforts, the Musharraf regime has not been aggressive in fully implementing any of these reform efforts. Even though several different ordinances have been passed on *madrasah* reform, little has actually been done. There is neither incentive to comply with the ordinance nor punishment for those who choose not to comply.[16]

Similarly, while the government of Pakistan has ostensibly proscribed militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), etc., in practice this has not occurred. While Pakistan temporarily detained many of the leaders of the proscribed groups, they have subsequently been released. The groups also re-formed under new names. According to data obtained through interviews in Pakistan in January 2003, these groups are still operating but have been told to "keep a low profile" to minimize conflict with India and the United States.[17] In November 2003, the government of Pakistan again tried to impose new bans on the newly reorganized and renamed outfits. For example, on November 4, 2003, the government outlawed six militant groups: Tehreek-e-Islami (formerly Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan), Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (former Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan), Khudam ul-Islam (former Jaish-i-Mohammad), Hezbul Tehrir, Jamiat ul Furqan, and Jamiat ul-Ansar.[18] Jamaat-ul-Dawa was put on a watch-list.[19] The authors have not been able to ascertain the efficacy of these more recent efforts.

There is a growing consensus that Pakistan would like to curb sectarian militant groups (including, among others, SSP, LeJ, and SMP) and the sanguineous violence associated with the Sunni-Shi'a conflict. Indeed, according to our interviews in 2003, sectarian violence has declined, in part due to the increased ability of the police to penetrate the cells and shut them down.

In practice, permanently degrading the power of these groups—much less dismantling them—is considerably more difficult. The problem principally arises from Pakistan's persistent belief that it can contain some forms of militancy (for example, Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants and sectarian groups) while sustaining those groups that claim to operate in Kashmir.

While such a clear segmentation of militant groups is alluring, it is not realistic or feasible. Sunni sectarian groups have long been tied to those groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi militants were trained in Afghanistan along with militants operating in Kashmir. The SSP has long been associated with the faction of Jam'iat-i-Ulama-Islami (JUI), led by Sami 'u 'l-Haq, and Pakistan-backed Harakat-ul-Ansar and Taliban units operating in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Similarly, the LeJ is also an off-shoot of JUI.[20]

The government of Pakistan has been hesitant to truly shut down the militant production system—in which the *madrasahs* figure prominently— because it seeks to maintain its options on the Kashmir issue.[21] Thus, even while Pakistan has generally been very supportive of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts with respect to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, it has not demonstrated a robust commitment to reverse course on the Kashmir militancy at this juncture.

It also remains unclear who within Pakistan is thoroughly convinced of the strategic advantages of abandoning Pakistan's long-worn policy of using militant proxies in Indian-held Kashmir.

SUPPORT FOR ISLAMIC PARTIES

Despite the various positions articulated by Pakistani respondents vis-à-vis reform efforts, secularization of politics, and support for religious leaders, the coalition of Islamic parties still did very well in the October 2002 elections. How can this be explained? Again, the question must be asked whether the polling data systematically failed to capture the nuances of Pakistani popular sentiment or whether something more complex is operating among the Pakistani electorate.

In this paper, we offer the following hypothesis to explain the electoral outcome, *despite* what appeared to be countervailing trends in Pakistani popular sentiment. We submit that the growing anti-American sentiment, efforts of the Musharraf regime to manipulate the electoral outcome, and concordant increasing resentment of the Musharraf regime and the Army have created a political space, which the coalition of Islamic parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), could exploit. Each of these trends will be explored and synthesized below.